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Abstract 
This thesis is an attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of the British 
withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971, with special emphasis on the Trucial States 
before it became the United Arab Emirates in December 1971. 
The work commences with a review of the historical British connection with 
the Gulf from 1820 to the Kuwait operation of 1961. Then we look at various 
nationalist movements and the political upheaval around the Gulf, such as the 
Aden and Dhofar rebellions, and how that affected the British presence in the area. 
The British tried to curb such influence from reaching the Trucial States, especially 
those of Nasser and the Arab League, by introducing some economic development 
through the Trucial States Development Office. Furthermore, Britain gradually 
ceded various responsibilities such as legal and internal security to the rulers. At 
the same time the British companies working in the Emirates were encouraged to 
rely on their own resources without the protection of the British troops. 
The establishment of a federation between the nine emirates was Britain's 
prime aim but when that failed in July 1971, the federation of the seven was es-
tablished (Ras al-Khaimah entered the federation in February 1972). Furthermore, 
Britain worked hard to bring Saudi Arabia and Iran together in order to help to 
fill the vacuum that would occur after the withdrawal of the British troops. The 
latter policy changed Britain's stance on the territorial disputes from support for 
the rulers of the Trucial States to pressuring them to compromise with Iran over 
the Islands of Abu Musa and the 'funbs and with Saudi Arabia over Buraimi. 
The thesis concludes that all of these factors prepared the Emirates to stand 
on their own and consequently enabled the British withdrawal in December 1971. 
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Introduction 
1. Significance of the study: 
Even though the British withdrawal from the Gulf was 20 years ago, British 
relations with the Gulf Arab Emirates are still strong. There are numerous ex-
amples that may illustrate this close relationship. For example in 1980 there were 
more than 550 British companies working in the Emirates in comparison to only 90 
British companies in Egypt at the same period. Furthermore, there is a substantial 
number of British expatriates working in the Gulf, outnumbering the expatriates 
of any other western country. In addition whereas the foreign oil companies have 
almost all been nationalized all over the the Middle East, Abu Dhabi have retained 
the concessionaire as a partner. At the same time the foreign oil companies are 
helping to operate the national oil companies that were recently established in the 
Gulf States. Finally, during the Gulf crisis the Gulf States sought help from their 
old ally, the United Kingdom, when they were threatened by Iraq. In order to 
understand the roots of this strong relationship, this thesis will study the British 
withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971. 
There are various motivations for carrying out this research. First of all the 
present writer, being a former student of the British-controlled military school (the 
Trucial Oman Scouts' Boys School) is personally interested in understanding the 
British policy towards the area in the sixties. However, the available published 
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materials on the subject are limited and mainly emphasize the earlier periods. 
Thus there is a need to study in detail the circumstances leading up to the British 
withdrawal. Besides that, after the withdrawal various problems occurred which 
have their roots in the withdrawal period. They included boundaries disputes, the 
weakness of the federal structure of the Emirates, Gulf security, the duplication 
of military forces, and the Iranian seizure of certain Gulf islands etc. By studying 
the period of the British withdrawal we may contribute to a better understand-
ing of these problems. In addition, this thesis hopes to prepare the ground for 
greater understanding of contemporary British policy towards the Gulf by ade-
quately assessing British policy toward the area before and during the withdrawal 
period. 
2. The Problem and the Scope of the study: 
The factors that might have influenced the British withdrawal from the Gulf 
can be divided into two sets of variables. First, domestic variables that had ex-
isted in the United Kingdom itself. Amongst these factors were: (a) the military 
financial cuts of 1966 which might have undermined British military strength and 
capability; (b) the internal struggle within the Labour Party over the allocation of 
resources. The left wing of the party wanted the Government to put more resources 
into social programmes such as health and education. (c) The economic problems 
that made the Government devalue the pound sterling in November 1967; and 
(d) the European factor which was that Britain was trying to join the Common 
Market. However, these factors have been covered by several studies, therefore we 
do not intend to go over them again. 
The aims of this study therefore are to examine and analyse the factors that 
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existed in the Gulf and which might have had a role in convincing the British 
Government to withdraw. Accordingly, this study will concentrate on the following 
aspects: 
1. The identification and analysis of the nationalist movements in the Arabian 
Peninsula and the Gulf and how they influenced the British withdrawal policy. 
2. The economic development of the Trucial States and how prepared these States 
were to stand on their own without the British presence. 
3. Identification and discussion of British economic interests in the region and 
how the oil companies managed to survive without British protection. 
4. Identification and study of the various political, territorial, administrative and 
security arrangements the establishment of which Britain encouraged before 
the withdrawal in December 1971. 
The study of these various factors is limited to the Trucial States before it 
became the United Arab Emirates on 2nd December 1971 and to a lesser degree 
to Bahrain and Qatar. The reasons are that Bahrain and Qatar were much more 
developed than the Emirates both in the growth of nationalist feeling and in eco-
nomic development. Furthermore, the Emirates have been neglected in the past 
and hence concentrated study is needed. 
3. Previous Studies: 
There have been limited studies on the British withdrawal from the Gulf and 
those which are available either focus on the military aspect of the withdrawal, 
such as Darby's East of Suez, and Jackson's Withdrawal from Empire, or they 
concentrate on the impact of the withdrawal on United States policy towards the 
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Gulf, like Sirriyyeh's The Gulf: British withdrawal and US policy, 1968-11, 
Notwithstanding, there are other materials written about the Gulf and which 
refer to the British position in the Gulf in a broad way. One notable example 
are the writings of former British Political Agents, diplomats and British national 
working in the Gulf on private contracts. For example, Balfour-Paul (1991) The 
end of empire in the Middle East; Sir Bernard Burrows (1990) Footnotes in the 
Sand; Sir Anthony Parsons (1986) They Say the Lion; Frank Brenchley (1989) 
Britain and the Middle East; P. Rich (1991) The invasion of the Gulf; and Butler 
(1989) Uncivil Servant in India, Pakistan, Kenya and Abu Dhabi_ Since these books 
were written by people who were themselves greatly involved in shaping events in 
the Gulf during their service there, using these books has enriched this study 
and given it many insights which have helped in understanding the withdrawal 
phenomena. 
Studies dealing with the establishment of the United Arab Emirates are limited 
also. For example, Taryam's (1987) The Establishment of the United Arab Emi-
rates gives details of various meetings between the rulers in 1968-71 in order to 
establish the federation. Taryam though did not discuss the British role in forming 
the federation. Another valuable work on the transformation of the Emirates is F. 
Heard-Bey's (1982) From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates. Heard-Bey ex-
plored various characteristics of society: the culture, tribes, economic and historic 
roots of the United Arab Emirates. It seems however, that Heam1Bey's coverage of 
the British policy toward the area in the sixties left important points inadequately 
covered (for example the deposition of Sheikh Sha~hbut) probably for political 
reasons. Al-Mutawa5(1983) thesis Social change and political development in the 
Omani Coast, 1934-1910, concentrated on social and political developments in the 
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Emirates. He argues that nationalists were behind the British withdrawal from the 
Gulf. Hawkin's (1972) The Labour Party and the Decision to withdraw from East 
of Suez, investigated the factors that influenced the withdrawal decions of 1968. 
However, he neglected factors that existed in the Gulf. 
Therefore the available research on the topic is limited in scope and this en-
couraged us to try to make some new contributions toward understanding the 
British withdrawal policy from the Gulf in 1971. 
4. Method of study: 
The study is primarily based on various unpublished documents obtained from: 
(a) The Public Records Office at Kew Garden in London; (b) The Private Archive 
at the Cultural Foundation in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates; (c) The Gen-
eral Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Arab Emirates; (d) Private 
Papers ; (e) Interviews with over 35 personalities including former British soldiers, 
civil servants, former employees of British companies, Arab politicians and for-
mer advisers now in retirement; and (f) substantial correspondence with former 
British officials who had a connection with the Gulf in one way or another. (see 
hi bliography). 
The bulk of the source material on the economic development of the Emirates 
in the 1960s, boundary disputes, the correspondence of the oil companies with the 
rulers, and the minutes of various meeting of the Trucial States Council, has been 
gleaned from the Cultural Foundation's Private Archive. However this massive 
collection of documents has been closed to researchers and it seems that the degree 
of secrecy will increase with the establishment of the proposed National Archive in 
Abu Dhabi. The problem one faced was that there were no specific rules regulating 
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the usage of these documents and thus one's research depended very much upon 
the personal judgement and discretion of the director of the Private Archive. The 
latter agreed, after much procrastination, to permit the present researcher to read 
the necessary documents but would not allow him to make any copies. A further 
restriction was that one was not permitted to make notes from certain documents. 
The most interesting and enjoyable part of the research was interviewing former 
British and Arab officials who were in positions of power in the Gulf. It is important 
to have some record of their experience before their memories faded. Furthermore, 
because of the British Public Record Office's 30 year rule on documents the only 
alternative is to meet the people who actually served in the Gulf at that time. 
The advantage in meeting such personalitiestn::ke the researcher aware of other 
events and stories which might not be important for an official to report to his 
government but were significant in explaining certain points. However, one should 
be cautious in taking everything they say for granted. For even though some of 
them lived in the area for a long time there were still certain aspects of the society 
which they might not be fully aware of. 
The method of organizing the documents in this thesis is as follows: 
a. TSDO: Documents on the Trucial States Development Office. They contained 
minutes of the Rulers of the Trucial States meetings from 1966-1971; letters and 
communication between the Trucial States Development Office and various per-
sonalities like Sheikh Shakhbiit; agricultural, water and soil surveys and surveys 
relating to fisheries; minutes of the Deliberative Committee; minutes of the police 
commissioners' meetings; and, general items relating to the Development organi-
zation. 
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b. BDU: British Documents on the United Arab Emirates. This general index 
contains material on the communication of the rulers with the Political Agents and 
Residents about the boundaries of the Emirates; banking agreements with various 
rulers; letters from the oil companies to the rulers; and a letter from the British 
Foreign Secretary, R.A. Butler, to Prince Fay~al bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, Foreign 
Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, relating to the Buraimi dispute, August 
1964. 
c. F: Federation Documents. This file is comprised of the manuscripts of the 
rulers' meetings, letters, resolutions, and telegrams related to the Federation of the 
Arab Emirates. It also contained Major General Sir John Willoughby's report on 
the Federation's defence needs. 
d. MFA: The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs' General Archive which con-
tains numerous files on the foreign relations of the United Arab Emirates. This 
study was concerned only with the United Kingdom file (which was numberred 
1/3/3) with special interest in documents relating to the 1971-73 period. This file, 
unfortunately, could not be located but the present writer was not totally disap-
pointed because some of the materials on the British Military Assistance Team 
-(M.AT) were found in the Military file numberea 1/1/3. 
e. The Private Papers: The use of the private papers of two individuals has 
greatly enriched this study. Firstly those of Ma]:Imud J:Iasan Jum 'ah, a former Iraqi 
minister who was invited by Sheikh Zayed to supervise Abu Dhabi's development 
programmes in 1967. He became General Director of the Development Board from 
1968-1973, and later on was appointed adviser to the ruler of Abu Dhabi. 
Mr. Jum 'ah has collected important documents about Abu Dhabi relating 
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to that period especially in the field of economic development. He also possesses 
valuable letters relating to the development of Abu Dhabi. Furthermore, he made 
notes during the meeting between Sheikh Zayed and Edward Heath, the Conser-
vative Opposition Leader, during his visit to the Emirates in 1969. However he 
was hesitant to allow certain documents to be copied out in their entirety believing 
them to be of a particularly sensitive nature, but he allowed this researcher to read 
them and even copy brief extracts from them. 
The second set of private papers belonged to Najim D. I;Iamudi who was 
also a former Iraqi official who had come to Abu Dhabi in the 1960s. He was in 
a position to witness political development which took place from 1968-72 while 
he was adviser to the ruler of Abu Dhabi on federation affairs. The papers that 
he allowed the present writer to see were related to the efforts of the British (as 
well as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) in discussions concerning the establishment of 
the nine-emirate federation. Furthermore, he recorded information regarding the 
Buraimi dispute as well as details of his meetings with British officials such as Sir 
Geoffrey Arthur the Political Resident in the Gulf. 
5. Organization of the study: 
The study consists of seven chapters. The first chapter traces Britain's in-
volvement in the Gulf region from the last century until the Kuwait operation of 
1961. The second examines the development of nationalism in the Arabian Penin-
sula from 1962: the Yemen revolution, the Aden rebellion, the Oman civil war, 
the Dhofar revolution and the spread of nationalism into the Trucial States. The 
third discusses the economic development of the Trucial States with emphasis on 
the British role in economic development through the Trucial States Development 
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Council. The fourth deals with the British role in preparing the Trucial States 
to depend on themselves in the legal, police, military and political spheres. The 
fifth provides an account of the British economic interests in oil, trade and invest-
ment and how they prepared to depend on themselves before the withdrawal of 
the British troops. 
The sixth chapter analyzes the political arrangements that Britain strived to 
create before the withdrawal date. This chapter includes an assessment of the 
federation of the nine emirates and the reason for its failure. There follows a further 
discussion of the federation of the seven emirates and the British role, especially 
that of Sir William Luce, in the affairs of both federations. The special Saudi-
Iranian understanding, the "Twin Pillars" system is also discussed with emphasis 
on the British and American role in creating it. The final chapter deals with the 
territorial disputes related to Bahrain, the Tunbs and Abu Musa islands and the 
Buraimi oasis and considers the role of the British not only in their attempt to solve 
these problems but also the reasons for their success and failure in this respect. 
The thesis ends with a conclusion, derived from our discussion in the preceding 
chapters and a comprehensive bibliography. 
6. Note on Transliteration: 
For the sake of greater accuracy, I have followed a policy of transliteration from 
the Arabic throughout the thesis. In the view of the researcher, this is particularly 
important with regard to many of the toponyms which are generally unfamiliar 
to those living outside the area. Without a transliteration method, even a reader 
familiar with the Arabic language would often be unsure of the original Arabic word 
and thus how it should be pronounced, so confusion in the case of identification 
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might easily occur. 
Certain proper names (Nasser, Ibn Saud, Zayed for instance ) have been left in 
their familiar English form and the same applies to Bahrain, Kuwait, the names of 
the Arab Emirates, Oman, Muscat, Dhofar and so on where the anglicized spellings 
are now so widespread. I have preferred, however, Makkah and al-Madinah to the 
usual English renderings of Mecca and Medina. 
The method of transliteration follows that adopted by the well-known Ency-
clopaedia of Islam, ( 2nd. Edition: Leiden, 1960 - still in progress) except for the 
following details:-
(a) The Arabic letter qafappears as q (not as~). 
(b) fim appears as j (not as dj). 
(c) Words ending in a ta 'marbiifah ( when not in the construct state, mu¢ a/) have 
been given a final h, (i.e. Madinah, not simply Madina). 
(d) Arabic letters rendered by two consonants in English ( th, kh, etc.) are not 
italic or underlined. 
(e) A final double waw is represented as uww not ii. 
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Chapter I 
Historical Background: The Development of British 
Interests in the Gulf 
1.1 Introduction 
Britain's interests developed in the Gulf because it was considered one of the 
frontier regions flanking the Indian Empire. The Gulf made a bridge between 
Europe and the Far East, across which a number of invaders, and conquerors have 
marched. The control of the strategic straits at Hormuz and of the upper Gulf 
was of major importance for the Portuguese, Dutch, French, and the British. The 
British presence in the Gulf, however, survived for more than a century and a half 
- considerably longer than the presence of the other European nations. 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the development of British interests in 
the Gulf from their arrival in Gulf waters in the seventeenth century until Britain's 
military operation in Kuwait in 1961. How did these interests develop? What was 
the role of the British authorities, both of the government of India before 194 7 and 
the relevents ministries in London? And how did the local societies, the regional 
powers as well as the other European powers react to these developments? In order 
to outline these developments this chapter will categorize these interests chrono-
logically under different headings; commercial, strategic and economic interests, 
which focus mainly on oil. 
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1.2 Commercial Interests 
The first ship of the British East India Company had reached India in 1608 
under the command of William Hawkins. The English pioneers were able to get 
a firman (Royal Decree) from the Mughal emperor, and not long afterwards a 
trading factory was established on the Indian coast at Surat. The Company's pro-
duction of broad cloth and other commodities exceeded the demand in India, so the 
Company's agents started to look for markets outside India. This search brought 
them to the Gulf to trade with Persia. 2 Thus, Britain's entry into the Gulf came 
about more by accident than design. In the first place, the Company's merchants 
were interested in selling their products to the Persians, but found themselves in 
rivalry with the former masters of the Gulf- the Portuguese. However, the Shah 
of Persia agreed to do business with the British. He allowed them to establish 
a factory at Bandar Abbas3 but asked them to help him recapture Hormuz from 
the Portuguese. Eventually, Hormuz was returned to Persian control in 1622 with 
English help. 4 After the Portuguese were defeated in Hormuz, a new rival emerged 
in the form of the Dutch East India Company. Even though the Dutch had coop-
erated with the English in defeating the Portuguese, they challenged the British 
at the court of Shah Safi, who succeeded to the Persian throne in 1629. By 1680, 
the Dutch were firmly established at Bandar Abbas and Basrah but the decline of 
Holland in the eighteenth century affected the Dutch position in the Gulf and, as a 
result, the English replaced them as they had previously replaced the Portuguese, 
and the last Dutch base in the Gulf was subsequently abandoned in 1765.5 
A third East India Company (after the British and the Dutch) was established 
in 1664, by the French.6 They were granted similar rights for trading via the Gulf 
by the Shah of Persia. The French had also made attempts to increase their 
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influence in the Gulf by establishing a residency at Basrah in 1755.7 The British 
were suspicious of French movements in the Gulf and also of their activities in 
India which resulted in conflict. The Anglo-French conflict was resolved during 
the Seven Years' War (1756-1763) in favour of Britain, and as a result the French 
position in the Gulf was weakened.8 
As a result, Britain was left as the only western power on either shore of the 
Gulf but due to security problems after the death of Nadir Shah in 17 4 7 the East 
India Company headquarters was moved to Basrah which was part of the Ottoman 
Empire and was thus, in comparison, safer.9 Basrah also was a convenient trading 
centre that provided British businessmen with close communications with Europe 
through the Syrian routes and at the same time it enabled them to participate in 
the trade of the Gulf. British trade expanded and initially the Company made 
substantial profits. However, at the end of the eighteenth century British trade 
in the Gulf sharply declined. This was as a result of competition from local Arab 
merchants; an outbreak of plague in Basrah; and a shortage of money in the Gulf. 10 
Some of these factors had long term implications. But why did the Company 
remain in the Gulf even though it was not making a substantial profit? This 
question might he answered by looking at the British politico-strategic interests~in 
the area. 
1.3 The Strategic interests 
At the end of the eighteenth century Britain was firmly established in India. 
The British East India Company was collecting taxes, fighting wars, installing 
princes and removing others. 11 The Crown took over the Company in 1858 and 
Queen Victoria was proclaimed Empress of India in 1878.12 Therefore, it was im-
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portant to protect the routes that led to the Empire and to exclude the other 
powers from disturbing the Empire's frontiers. For this reason Britain again be-
came concerned about the activities of the French, this time following the French 
invasion of Egypt in 1798. For the first time it made the British take seriously the 
possibility of a French overland attack on India. 13 They were also concerned about 
the Ottoman presence at the head of the Gulf and the activities of Arab tribes in 
Southern Iraq. These threats prompted Britain to sign the first agreement with 
the Sultan of Muscat in 1798.14 The agreement was a turning point in the history 
of British involvement in the Gulf. It enabled the Government of India to exert 
some control over the Sultanate since the Sultan agreed to exclude other powers 
from his territories. In 1808 the Sultan also extended the agreement by accepting 
a British Political Agent at Muscat. 15 The major reason why the Sultan signed the 
agreement was the existence of a new challenge that came from the "Wahhabi" 
movement in central Arabia and the Wahhabis' ally the Qawasim.16 
The Qawasim tribes, whose base was in Ras al-Khaimah, controlled both sides 
of the Gulf and their position became so powerful that they demanded dues from 
British ships passing through the Gulf. 17 Thus, the Qawasim represented a threat 
to the Company's trade in the Gulf, and as a result a rivalry had developed. The 
Government of India retaliated by accusing the Arabs in the Gulf of piracy. For 
the Arabs, though, the action was justified by their wish to defend their traditional 
trade routes to India and the Far East. In addition, to the Gulf Arabs the British 
seemed just like the cruel Portuguese, who had indiscriminately killed women, 
children and the old. There was no guarantee that the British would refrain from 
doing likewise. 18 Therefore, there was a struggle between the Arabs of the Gulf 
and the British. British expeditions against the Arabs were repeated three times 
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before the Arab Sheikhs agreed to sign the 1820 Agreement in which they agreed to 
stop further attacks on British-protected ships. 19 During these expeditions British 
forces destroyed a substantial number of Arab ships. In 1835 the Sheikhs signed 
another treaty because the 1820 treaty had not brought complete peace to the area. 
The Sheikhs were persuaded by the British Political Resident, Captain S. Hennell, 
(the Residency was established in Bushire, Persia, in the 1770s) to sign a truce 
forbidding maritime attacks on each other during the next pearl-fishery season. 
The truce was annual, and in 1853 it was accepted as a permanent truce. 20 The 
Truce was upheld by the Indian Navy which patrolled the Gulf's shores. The third 
type of agreement the Sheikhs signed (after the 1820 non aggression and the 1853 
truce treaty) was the Anti-Slavery Agreement in 1847.21 The latter gave Britain 
an opportunity to intervene in the internal affairs of the Gulf. 
Britain's attempt to control the Gulf area did not, however, go unchallenged. 
This time challenges came from outside the Gulf for example, that of Mehmet 
'Ali Pasha of Egypt. In 1834, Mehmet 'Ali was interested in extending his power 
over the Arabian peninsula. The Holy cities of Makkah and al-Madinah came 
under Egyptian influence at the end of 1837. A second Egyptian army was sent 
to the rich coffee producing country of Yemen and a third army was operating 
along the Euphrates not far from the Gulf and Persia. 22 These events created 
a significant change in Anglo-Egyptian relations. Lord Palmerston, the British 
Foreign Secretary, on hearing this said "Mehmet 'Ali is distinctly to understand 
that Great Britain will not permit either the Pasha or his subordinates to continue 
this system of universal hostilities to British commerce." 23 Consequently Aden was 
occupied by British forces on January 16th, 1839 on direct orders from London, 
and at once became a calling station for British vessels. 
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On the Persian side of the Gulf, British concern regarding the consequences of 
the Persian annexation of Herat in 1856 prompted a war with the Shah in 1856-57. 
It is possible that Britain saw this action as a possible door to the invasion of 
India. The Anglo-Persian war brought the British forces into strategic locations 
near the Gulf such as Kharg, Bushire (Bushahr) and M ul~ammarah. However, a 
peace treaty between the two countries was signed in March 1857, by which the 
Persians agreed to abandon Herat and their claims to Afghanistan. 24 Evidently 
Britain was not interested in acquiring territory at this stage but it was interested 
in keeping the routes, which were relevant to the Indian Empire, open and in 
friendly hands. The result of the war with Persia plus the agreements with the 
Sheikhs put the British in full control of the Gulf. From that time Britain was 
able to exert considerable control over Arab shipping in the Gulf and to place 
restrictions on their trading activities. However, even though the Gulf trade with 
India had multiplied especially after introduction of the steamer communications it 
was not the local Arabs or Persians who benefited from it. Most of the profits were 
earned instead by the Europeans and the Indian merchants who served as their 
agents. Native shipping activity was the principal victim because, in addition to 
the restrictions now enforced by the British, the dhows (type of Arab boat) found it 
more and more difficult to compete seriously with the steamers on the Indian-Gulf 
trade lines. These developments caused grave hardship to the peoples of the Gulf 
but British control over the area was now too strong for them to offer effective 
opposition. 
The other threat to Britain's routes to India came from Imperial Russia. In 
1877 the Russians were marching toward Constantinople. If Russia succeeded in 
dominating Turkey, then it would control the routes leading to India. Therefore, 
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Turkey had to be supported against Russia. 25 The other frontier that the Russians 
threatened was Persia, which was strategically important because of its location 
between Russia and the Gulf; and the old Czarist dream was to capture one of 
the Gulf ports. If this had occurred it would have challenged Britain's naval 
domination of the Gulf. Thus to stop the Russians, Persia was transformed into a 
buffer state with the Persian Shah supported by Britain. 26 
The British position in the Gulf region then came under threat from the Ot-
toman Empire which had occupied al-Hasa in 1871.27 This Ottoman expedition 
appeared to be a direct threat to the British position in the Gulf, mainly after 
Ottoman influence was extended to Qatar. Ottoman activity in the upper Gulf 
prompted Britain to search for a new policy in order to reaffirm the Crown's po-
sition in this part of the Empire. 
Further to these events, the British position in the Gulf was again challenged by 
the French who, in cooperation with Russia, re-entered the field in the 1880s. Their 
challenge was significant because their agents had contacted some Arab Sheikhs 
in the Gulf and persuaded the Sheikh of Umm al-Qaiwain to fly the French flag in 
1891.28 They were also negotiating to build a coal d~pot on the Oulf shores. _ 
Finally, Great Britain's other competitor was Germany which had won the 
Baghdad Railway concession from the Ottoman Sultan in 1899.29 This railroad 
would eventually connect Berlin with Baghdad. For Germany, this pact was meant 
to be understood as a symbol of her rising power and imperial interests in the 
Middle East. For Great Britain it was considered as a menace to the balance 
of power in the Middle East and as a menace to her interests in the Gulf region, 
particularly since Kuwait had been chosen as the terminus of the Baghdad Railway. 
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As a consequence of these challenges to the British position in the Gulf, a new 
exclusive treaty with the Sheikhs was reached in 1892. In this treaty, which was 
signed on different dates by the Sheikhs of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, 
Umm al-Qaiwain, Ras al-Khaimah and Bahrain respectively, the Sheikhs each 
accepted the following: 30 
I do hereby solemnly bind myself and agree, on behalf of myself, my heirs and 
successors, to the following conditions, vis:-
lst. That I will on no account enter into any agreement or correspondence with 
any power other than the British Government. 
2nd. That without the assent of the British Government, I will not consent to the 
residence within my territory of the agent of any other Government. 
3rd. That I will on no account cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation 
any part of my territory save to the British Government. 
Kuwait before 1899 was regarded as being under Turkish protection, but due 
to the Berlin-Baghdad railway scheme, Great Britain was encouraged to engage 
in a similar exclusive agreement with Sheikh Milbarak of Kuwait on 23 January 
1899.31 
Having overcome the threats from Mehmet 'Ali Pasha, these exclusive agree-
ments were intended to exclude powers such as France, Russia, the Ottoman Em-
pire and Germany from gaining a foothold in the Gulf region. At the same time 
it gave- Britain the- right to control-the foreign and defence -affairs of the Arab 
Gulf States. Such agreements placed the rulers virtually under British control. 
As a result Britain emerged as the sole supreme power in the Gulf making not 
only the Gulf States but also the other Great Powers recognise that supremacy. 
France signed an agreement that recognised British control over the area in 1904 
and Russia, Germany and Thrkey made similar agreements in 1907, 1912 and 1913 
respectively. 
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1.4 The Evolution of Britain's Economic Interests 
As has been shown already Britain's concern with the protection of the routes 
that led to India was the prime reason for involvement in the area. From the 
beginning of the twentieth century, however, the discovery of huge quantities of oil 
in the Gulf made Britain appreciate its economic importance as well. 
The first oil concession in the Gulf was granted to William Knox D 'Arcy by 
Mu~affar al-Din Shah of Persia in 1901, to find, exploit and export petroleum in all 
Persia except the Northern provinces.32 The first oil strike was at Masjid-Sulayman 
on 26th May 1908.33 The initial reason for the British Government's interest in 
the affairs of the oil industry was the conversion of the Royal Navy ships from coal 
to oil in 1913.34 To this end, Britain in 1914 had reached an agreement with the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company by which the Government subscribed £2.2 million to 
the Company's capital and thus obtained a controlling interest of 51% and the 
power of veto in matters of the highest policy. 
On the Arab side of the Gulf, however, the rulers signed an undertaking that no 
concessions for oil would be granted in their territories except to a person appointed 
by the British Government. Kuwait signed such an undertaking in 1913, Bahrain 
in 1914 and the Trucial States in 1922.35 In this Agreement the Sheikhs each gave 
to Britain the following undertaking:36 
Let it not be hidden from you that I write this letter with my free will and give 
undertaking to your Honour that if it is hoped that an oil mine will be found in my 
territory I will not give a concession for it to foreigners except to the person appointed 
by the High British Government. 
The purpose of the above agreement was to facilitate the British subjects in 
obtaining oil concessions in the Gulf and to exclude non-British interests, the 
principal fear was the infiltration of American interests. But the American oil 
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companies were able to win considerable oil concessions in the region. For example, 
in 1928 the Standard Oil Company of California (Socal) won the Bahraini oil 
concession37 and in 1933 it again won another oil concession in Saudi Arabia. 38 
Also in 1934 the American-owned Gulf Oil Corporation and APOC formed the 
Kuwait Oil Company with equal shares to explore the Kuwait oil concession.39 
In the Trucial States the D'Arcy Exploration Company Ltd., a subsidiary of 
APOC, obtained oil concessions in most of these Sheikhdoms in 1935-36. However, 
in the meantime, in 1935 a new company, the Petroleum Concession Limited, 
was formed with the specific object to obtain oil concessions in the lower Gulf. 
The shareholding of Petroleum Concession Limited was the same as IPC of which 
AIOC (now BP) 23.75%, Royal Dutch/Shell 23.75%, Compagnie Fran~aise des 
Petroles (CFP) 23.75%, Near East Development Corporation 23.75% and 5% to 
the Gulbenkian Estate.40 Therefore in 1937 the Petroleum Concession Limited, 
to which the D 'Arcy Exploration Company option had been assigned, won oil 
concessions in Dubai and Sharjah and in 1938 in Ras al-Khaimah. In 1939 Abu 
Dhabi and Ajman oil concessions were won by Petroleum Development (Trucial 
Coast) Ltd., (PDTC) that replaced Petroleum Concession Limited as its subsidary 
in_1938.41 
The role of oil in shaping Britain's policy in the Gulf at the turn of the century 
was of immense importance. It involved Britain firstly in the internal affairs of the 
Gulf emirates over their territorial boundaries, and secondly in the struggle to 
stop the penetration of American oil companies in the exploitation of Gulf oil 
resources. As a British Cabinet memorandum in 1919 stated, "we possess in the 
South Western corner of Persia great assets in the shape of the oil fields, which 
are worked for the British Navy and which give us a commanding interest in that 
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part of the world." 42 Oil, as a result, made a great impact on British policy in the 
Gulf mainly after the two World Wars. It was clear that oil was the main reason 
for Britain's continued presence in the Gulf even though it had withdrawn from 
India in 1947. 
1.5 Britain's Position in the Gulf (Post-World War I) 
There were overlapping British interests in the Gulf at the turn of the century 
but the military use of the Gulf bases throughout the Great War was an essential 
one due to the Ottoman Empire's entry into the war on the side of Germany. The 
involvement of the Ottoman Empire in the war gave Britain a reason to invade 
the Ottoman provinces of Basrah and Baghdad (that were later to form part of 
Iraq) in order to protect her oil installations at Abadan. However the principal 
reason was that if the Turks had penetrated into the Gulf, there was fear that they 
could have influenced the Muslims in India against British rule. At the same time 
German agents could easily penetrate and sabotage the oil fields. Therefore, in 
October 1914 British troops and a fleet were stationed in the Gulf and by March 
1917 Baghdad had been occupied.43 Subsequently, at the end after the war, Sir 
Percy Cox was appointed as the first High Commissioner of Iraq. 44 
Furthermore, the Ottoman entry into the war gave Britain a free hand on 
the Arabian shore of the Gulf. For example, Ibn Saud signed a treaty with the 
British Government of India in December 1915 whereby Britain recognized his 
independence as ruler of N ajd and Hasa, and he in return agreed to abstain from 
any aggression against Kuwait, Bahrain and other Arab Sheikhdoms. In 1916 
Qatar, which previously was under Ottoman Empire rule, signed an agreement 
with Britain similar to that of the exclusive agreements with the other sheikhdoms. 
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Again Ibn Saud pledged to recognise Britain special position in Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Qatar and the Trucial States in the treaty of Jeddah in 1927.4r, 
In Persia, which was the focus of Britain's oil interests at that time, the Rus-
sians had occupied the northern part and Britain's influence was dominant in the 
south. The central Government was very weak, therefore Britain was left with a 
free hand and was well placed to impose her will on Persia. 
In this way Britain's position in the Gulf was strengthened after World War 
I and was free from problems in sharp contrast with Iraq or Palestine. As was 
indicated by the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs before the House of Lords in 
May 1924: "In reference to our position in the Persian Gulf ... it is at the present 
time absolutely untouched and unassailable." 46 
In comparison to the pre-war period, Britain had increased its power through-
out the Gulf region and became involved in the affairs of the Gulf Emirates in new 
ways. For example, in 1922 it negotiated Kuwait's frontier with Ibn Saud at the 
Treaty of al-Uqair. 47 Furthermore, British interference in the internal affairs of the 
Gulf States became more forceful than before as the example of the removal of 
Sheikh 'Isa of Bahrain in favour of his son in 1923 illustrates.48 At the same time 
in 1932 the first permanent British establishment in the Trucial States came with 
the construction of a rest-house for the Imperial Airways in Sharjah. This occurred 
as a result of the transfer of the air route from the Persian side of the Gulf to the 
Arabian side.49 The reason for this change was that Persia refused to extend the 
Persian Route Agreement; however, in Sharjah British officials were able to sign 
an agreement with its ruler in 1932. On top of that, Sharjah became the main base 
for British facilities in the Trucial States for both military and civilian aircrafts 
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with refuelling grounds, emergency landing grounds and sea plane-alighting areas 
throughout the Trucial States.50 
In addition, British military facilities were established in various parts of the 
region. For instance, at the end of 1932 a landing-ground had been laid out together 
with an oil depot at Masirah island off Oman; in 1934 a petrol store for the RAF 
was built at Salalah in south Oman51 ; and, in 1936 Jufair in Bahrain became the 
Royal Navy HQ in the Gul£. 52 
Finally, the introduction of a system of British Political Agents in the Trucial 
States also occurred at this stage with the appointment of a British political officer 
in Sharjah in October 1939. Later, in 1953, this officer was upgraded to the status 
of 'political agent' and the agency was then moved to Dubai. 53 
1.6 Britain's Position in the Gulf (Post-World War II) 
During the Second World War British troops fought again to maintain control 
over the Gulf region. For instance Iraq, at the head of the upper Gulf, was a country 
of strategic importance for the Allied Forces, playing a major role in the war efforts. 
Besides its oil, the Fertile Crescent also provided the Allied Forces with labour, 
supplies of grain and herds of cattle. More important for Britain was the strategic 
route to India that would have been threatened had the Germans succeeded in 
breaking into Iraq. Therefore, when the pro-German nationalist Government under 
Rashid 'Ali came to power in Iraq on 31st March 1941 with popular support, 
British troops from bases inside Iraq together with reinforcements from outside 
overthrew this regime and a pro-British government was installed in its place. 
The new government of N uri Sa 'td accepted the British garrison force and dealt 
with Britain according to the provisions of the 1930 treaty. Later on, the garrison 
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became part of the Baghdad Pact until its withdrawal after the 1958 Revolution. 54 
The second significant area of British action in the Gulf during the Second 
World War was Iran. Iran took on a new significance after the Germans had 
invaded the Soviet Union in 1941. One of the best ways to come to the aid of the 
Soviet Union was through Iran, hence Iran's invasion was arranged. Dissatisfaction 
with Reza Shah's policy toward Germany and his opposition to the Allies' access 
through Iran to the USSR were taken as a pretext for the invasion. The two powers 
invaded Iran; the USSR from the north, and Britain from the south. Britain later 
deported Reza Shah to South Africa, and his son Mul,lammad Reza Pahlevi was 
placed on the throne. 55 
In the post-war period, the Gulf was affected by the British decision to relin-
quish its position in India in 194 7. Contrary to some opinions, 56 this decision had 
a great impact on British policy toward the Gulf. Formerly, India was the centre of 
the British Empire but that dimension was removed by virtue of the declaration of 
Indian independence in 1947. As a result, the Middle East superseded India as the 
major component of the British Empire for two reasons: economic and strategic. 
The economic importance was mainly based on the oil fields of the Gulf region. 
According to the British Permanent Under-Secretary's Committee (PUSC) paper 
that assessed Britain's policy toward the Middle East, April 1949:57 
The Middle East, and particularly the oil producing countries and Egypt (cotton) 
is an area of cardinal importance to the economic recovery of the United Kingdom and 
Western Europe. It is hoped that by 1951 82 per cent of our oil supplies will be drawn 
from the Middle East (as compared with 23 per cent in 1938) and this will present the 
largest single factor in balancing our overseas payments. If we failed to maintain our 
position in the Middle East the plans for our economic recovery and future prosperity 
would fail. 
Strategically, the Middle East was important for Britain and the Western 
World because of the new Cold War situation. The PUSC expressed this strategic 
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importance in the following terms:58 
The Middle East is important strategically because it shields Africa, is a key centre 
of land and sea communications, and contains large supplies of oil, particularly in Persia, 
the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Above all, in the event of attack on the British 
Isles, it is one of the principal areas from which offensive air action can be taken against 
the aggressor. 
The material weakness of the United Kingdom (particularly with regard to 
military forces after withdrawal from India and the loss of the Indian Army) made 
it difficult to pursue these interests in isolation. British policy toward the Middle 
East was therefore built on a new outlook that sought to transform the old colonial 
system into a relationship of "equal partners" with the Middle East States. An 
excellent example of Britain's new strategy was the creation of the Baghdad Pact in 
1955. The general design behind this change in policy was to prevent the initiative 
from passing to anti-British nationalists and thus to prolong less direct and costly 
British influence in the area.59 In spite of Britain's efforts to alter her position in 
the area, however, she failed to up-date her plan toward the Middle East. This 
was due to the implication of the Palestine question and the creation of Israel and 
then the rise to power in Egypt of President Nasser.60 
The other change in British policy toward the Gulf which came as a result of 
the withdrawal from India in 1947, was the transfer of responsibility for the Gulf 
from the Government of India to Her Majesty's Government in London. This took 
place on the 1st of April, 1947 a few months before the British withdrawal from 
India. For a year the Gulf was subordinate to the Commonwealth Relations Office 
and after that the Foreign Office took it over. 61 Unlike the Government of India, 
the Foreign Office took a closer interest in the affairs of the Gulf and was more 
concerned with the proper administration of the Sheikhdoms. The Government of 
India was always reluctant to interfere in the internal affairs of the Sheikhdoms 
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since its main concern was the security of its routes. As Sir Rupert Hay, the first 
Political Resident in Bahrain, pointed out in 1953:62 
[U]ntil the early thirties of this century we studiously refrained from all interfer-
ence with the internal affairs of the Shaikhdoms ... The construction of an air-port at 
Sharjah and the grant of concessions to an oil company forced us to modify this policy 
to some extent ... we are in effect, in contradiction to our declared policy in the other 
Sheikhdoms, tending to treat the Trucial Coast more and more as a Protectorate and 
whether we like it or not we shall, I feel, find ourselves compelled increasingly to assume 
responsibility not only for the maintenance of law and order but also for administration 
and development. 
The loss of British influence in the Middle East was not paralleled among the 
Gulf Sheikhdoms, whereby Britain intervened more directly in the internal affairs 
of the Sheikhdoms after the Second World War. This new interventionist policy 
that was adopted by Britain toward the Sheikhdoms stemmed from her desire to 
protect her expanding interests in the region; notably, oil and airline facilities. 
British intervention can be seen in the increased number of Political Agents as 
well as in the reorganization of the administration in the region. 63 
The British Political Residency was moved in August 1946 from Bushire in 
Iran to Bahrain, and hence the severance of its long-standing connection with 
Iran. Eventhough the transfer of the Residency headquarters to Bahrain had 
been decided on before the Second World War, it was not carried out until 1946. 
The Political Resident in his capacity was responsible for eleven states (Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Qatar, seven Trucial States, and Oman) and was assisted by various 
Political Agents, Political Officers and Consuls. The dates for establishing Political 
Agencies varied from one state to another in accordance with its importance as 
viewed by the British authorities. For instance, the British Political Agency was 
established in Kuwait and Bahrain in 1904,64 but was not established in the Trucial 
States until 1939. Prior to 1939 the Trucial States were administered through 
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an Arab Agent representative called the Residency Agent who reported to the 
Political Residency in Bushire.65 Subsequently, with the expanding activities of 
the oil companies the Residency Agent was replaced by a British Political Officer 
stationed in Sharjah in October 1939. However the Political Officer did not take 
up permanent residence there until 1948. In 1953 the Agency was transferred to 
Dubai, and the status of the post was raised to that of Political Agent. Also 
from 1957 onwards, there was a Political Officer resident at Abu Dhabi and with 
the development of oil in Abu Dhabi the status of the post was raised in 1961 
to a full Political Agency. 66 These Political Agents gave advice to the rulers and 
occasionally, when the Agent felt it was necessary, they insisted on their advice 
being followed by the rulers. 
Other forms of British interference in the internal affairs of the Sheikhdoms 
was in the restructuring of the state system by the incorporation of the previously 
independent state of Kalba with Sharjah and the recognition of Fujairah as a new 
state in 1951.67 Furthermore, in the wake of transfering Gulf responsibilities to 
the Foreign Office, certain institutions were established, such as the Trucial Oman 
Scouts in 1951, the Trucial States Council in 1952 and the Development Office 
in 1-965 (see chapters- 3- & -4) .- Besides -that,- -the-drawing-of-the -Tr-ucial-States-
boundaries by various British missions (see chapter 4) represented another form 
of interference in the internal affairs of the Gulf Sheikhdoms that Britain felt was 
necessary in the 1950s. In addition to these policies Britain also carried out some 
military operations such as their intervention in the Buraimi dispute in 195568 and 
into the interior of Oman in 1957-5969 (see chapters 2 & 7). 
In Oman, British influence became stronger after Sultan Sa •Id bin Taymur 
signed new treaties with Britain in 1951 and 1958.70 The latter agreement was 
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behind the establishment of the Sultan's Air Force as well as the strengthening of 
the Sultan's Army. The wording of the agreement was as follows: 71 
Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have agreed to extend assis-
tance toward the strengthening of Your Highness's Army. Her Majesty's Government 
will also, at Your Highness's request, make available regular officers on secondment 
from the British Army, who will, while serving in the Sultanate, form an integral 
part of Your Highness's Armed Forces. The terms and conditions of service of these 
seconded British officers have been agreed with Your Highness. Her Majesty's Gov-
ernment. will also provide training facilities for members of Your Highness's Armed 
Forces and will make advice available on training and other matters as may be re-
quired by Your Highness. 
Her Majesty's Government will also assist Your Highness in the establishment 
of an Air Force as an integral part of Your Highness's Armed Forces, and they will 
make available personnel to this Air Force. 
Also during this period three particular issues had a major impact on the 
British position in the Gulf in the 1950s, as we shall see below. 
1.6.1 The Persian Oil Dispute 
Oil became a subject of great expectation and hope but it also became a 
symbol of foreign influence and one of the targets most favoured by nationalists. 
A common accusation aganist the oil companies had been that they were an in-
strument and a motive force of imperialism in the Middle East. In Iran the Anglo 
Iranian Oil Company ( AIOC) had become a symbol of British domination over 
Iran. Even though AIOC had tried to offer the Iranian Government a new agree-
ment that would replace the old one, that offer was in fact less than the 50-50 
formula of profit sharing that ARAMCO was offering to Saudi Arabia. 
Within a few days of taking office as Prime Minister of Iran in April 1951, Dr. 
Mo}:tammad Musaddeq addressed the issue of oil. He appointed a committee of 
five members to conduct negotiations with AIOC and on 1st May 1951 the Iranian 
Parliament nationalized the Company. In September the Company evacuated its 
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technicians and closed down the oil installations while the British Government 
reinforced its naval force in the Gulf and lodged complaints against Iran before 
the United Nations Security Council.72 When, however, these measures failed to 
pressurize Musaddeq into abandoning nationalization, a coup organised by Britain 
and America was carried out in 1954, toppling Musaddeq and replacing him as 
Prime Minister with the Army Cheif of Staff, General Zahedi. 73 
Some conclusions can be gleaned from the Iranian oil dispute of 1951. The 
most painful result of the dispute for AIOC which in 1954 became British Petroleum 
(BP) and the British Government in general was that British ownership of the Ira-
nian oil and Abadan refinery was reduced from 100 per cent to 40 per cent. The 
remaining shares were divided among different international oil companies. The 
group of foreign companies set up in 1954, known as the consortium, consisted 
of BP 40%, Shell 14%, various American oil companies 40% and CFP 6%.74 The 
disturbances to oil supply caused by Iranian nationalization of AIOC resulted in 
a rapid expansion in oil production in the Gulf Sheikhdoms. 
Politically the British Government suffered considerable public discomfort 
over the Iranian oil dispute. In the Arab Gulf States people sympathized with the 
Iranians and some even expressed their anti-British feelings. The British political 
representatives in the Gulf realized that confidence was low among the rulers of 
the area who were concerned about such anti-British feelings among their people. 
For example, the Ruler of Kuwait had conveyed, in a discussion with the British 
Political Agent in Kuwait, Colonel Dickson, his lack of confidence in the British 
Government. The Ruler said that Britain "was tired of war and was today too 
weak to do anything, let alone guard her honour, her prestige and her nationals." 75 
Furthermore, some of the British political representatives in the Gulf were worried 
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that the people of the area might follow Musaddeq's lead in causing difficulties for 
the oil companies. Nevertheless, nothing like that happened principally because the 
Gulf States were heavily dependent on the oil companies to ensure the development 
of their oil resources. At the same time, Britain, in cooperation with the United 
States, had made an example of Musaddeq and this had discouraged any other 
potential nationalists from challenging the oil companies. 76 In spite of that the 
Iranian oil dispute of 1951 did damage Britain's reputation and it increased anti-
British feeling as well as promoting negative attitudes towards the oil companies 
among the growing number of educated nationalist Gulf sympathizers. 
1.6.2 The Suez Crisis, 1956 
The Suez crisis represented Britain's determination to protect her oil inter-
ests, (among other things) in the Gulf and the Middle East in general. Sir Anthony 
Eden's dislike of Nasser, whom he compared with Mussolini, saying "his object was 
to be a Caesar from the Gulf to the Atlantic, and to kick us out of it all", 77 il-
lustrates the emotional part of the story. Selwyn Lloyd, Eden's Foreign Secretary, 
after touring the Middle East in 1956, reported his conversation with Nasser to 
the Cabinet by pointing out that, "Colonel Nasser was unwilling to work with the 
Western Powers or to cooperate in the task of securing peace in the Middle East. It 
was evident that he was aiming at leadership of the Arab World [and that Britain] 
could not establish a basis for a friendly relationship with Egypt." 78 That being 
the case, the British Government decided to do its utmost to counter Egyptian 
policy: by supporting the Baghdad Pact, by supporting Libya, by seeking to es-
tablish in Syria a Government more friendly to the West, by countering Egyptian 
influence in the Sudan and the Gulf and by withdrawing her financial support for 
the Aswan High Dam.79 The United Kingdom also encouraged the United States to 
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withdraw her financial support for the Aswan High Dam. In retaliation to British 
and American withdrawal of funding for the High Dam, Nasser nationalized the 
Suez Canal on 26 July 1956 with the belief that through the canal revenue he could 
well finance this major project. The ways in which Britain tried to put pressure on 
Nasser are outlined in a secret memorandum by the British Department of Trade 
written on 24 August 1956. They included: freezing all Egyptian accounts, an em-
bargo on Egyptian trade,80 and calling up the Suez Canal conference in London.81 
Finally after some diplomatic moves and threats, Britain, in collusion with Israel 
and France launched an attack on Egypt in late October/early November 1956. 
Britain accepted a ceasefire demanded by the UN on 6th of November and under 
American pressure British troops were evacuated. 
The effect of the Suez crisis on the shipment of oil towards Western Europe 
was profound. Oil traffic accounted for 65 per cent of the total tonnage transported 
through the Canal in 1956. More than 77 million tons of oil a year passed through 
the Canal and 25 million tons a year were transitted through the IPC pipelines in 
Syria. Both operations came to a complete halt due to the crisis.82 Britain and 
other Western European States, had now either to depend on American oil, which 
would run down their balance of dollars, or they had to transfer the oil shipment 
via the Cape route. In both cases there were not sufficient quantities to cover 
the regular European consumption of oil. The Cape route would take at least two 
weeks longer, and another problem was the shortage of big oil tankers economically 
capable of transporting the large quantities of oil needed to make this route viable. 
Accordingly, in November 1956, a 10% cut in oil consumption was introduced by 
the Ministry of Power of the United Kingdom. 
The consequences of the Suez crisis on the British economy, according to Mr. 
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Macmillan who was the Chancellor at that time, were regarded as grave.83 In one 
month Sterling lost £100 million of its gold and dollar reserve84 ; the estimated 
deficit for 1957-58 was £564 million compared with £352 million for 1956, due to 
the loss of production and additional dollar expenditure on oil. 85 Food shortages 
were not really serious, but most of the supplies from the Commonwealth like tea 
and spices were badly affected.86 However, the main trouble came from the shortage 
of oil. This was because most of the Arab oil producing countries had announced 
their support for Egypt. Kuwait, which was by far the biggest oil supplier to 
Britain, had temporarily cut back her oil production.87 Some KOC installations 
such as the oil wells, underwater pipelines at Al_lmadi Port and the gasoline pipes 
feeding an electricity generator were sabotaged. The pipelines were damaged and 
four oil wells were set on fire. 88 The Sheikh of Kuwait also came under pressure from 
his people to boycott British commercial interests and cancel existing contracts 
between his State and British firms and to dispense with the services of British 
technicians. 89 It was reported that an Islamic Guidance Association in Kuwait 
was distributing a pamphlet calling the people of Kuwait to stand up against the 
Western aggressors.90 The situation in the Gulf and especially in Kuwait was of 
serious concern to the British Foreign Office to the extent that the Secretary of 
State was about to send a letter to the Sheikh of Kuwait in order to 'stiffen him a 
bit' in face of popular anti-western pressure. However on the advice of the Political 
Resident in Bahrain the draft letter was cancelled. 91 
The Saudi Arabian reaction, was expressed firstly by breaking off diplomatic 
relations with Britain and France; and secondly by proclaiming an embargo on 
the shipment of Saudi oil to Britain and France (which lasted until March of the 
following year). Thirdly, Saudi Arabia instructed ARAMCO to stop the flow of oil 
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to the Bahrain refinery because it was located in a British controlled territory.92 At 
the same time, ARAMCO and American firms were quick to utilize the situation 
to their advantage. Indeed there is evidence that ARAMCO contributed some 
donations to Egyptian victims of the Suez War.93 
In other parts of the Gulf reactions varied from violent attacks on British 
citizens and their interests in Bahrain to a subdued reaction in the Trucial States 
and Oman. Yet, clearly, the rulers of the Gulf States of Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi 
and Sharjah were shocked that Britain had taken sides with Israel in the Suez 
crisis. The rulers of Qatar, Sharjah and Abu Dhabi had strongly protested to the 
British political agents and had even expressed their sympathy for Egypt.94 During 
his call on the rulers of the Trucial States during the crisis, the British Political 
Resident, Sir Bernard Burrows, explained to them that the action of Her Majesty's 
government was taken "in the best interests of all of the Gulf States in seeking 
to maintain freedom of passage through the Canal in face of the Egyptian and 
Israeli conflict." He reported, though, that the ruler of Sharjah "was obviously less 
happy at the turn of events than the Ruler of Dubai but assured me that he would 
do his best to restrain his Egyptian and Jorda;.ian teachers from criticizing H.M. 
Government." 95-This made some o(the British political agents in the Gulf r~peat 
and emphasize their request to the British Government in London to take some 
kind of action against Israel such as pressing Israel to withdraw from Egyptian 
territory. They saw this as the best way to convince the Gulf rulers and their 
peoples that Britain was not siding with Israel and that her aim was to maintain 
freedom of passage through the Canal in face of the Egyptian and Israeli conflict. 
The rulers were not convinced by this argument and the British representatives 
in the Gulf knew that the "vast majority of Arab opinion is for Nasser, right or 
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wrong." 96 
The most serious consequences of the Suez crisis, however, was that Britain's 
position in the Gulf no longer remained unchallenged. The crisis had opened a new 
way of challenging the pax-Britannica. The nationalists, inspired by the leadership 
of Nasser, recognized the sensitive and weak point which the West cared for most, 
namely, the oil installations. In these changing times the treaties with the local 
rulers were not sufficient anymore, as they were in the nineteenth century, to guard 
imperial interests. Therefore it was a lesson and a turning point for both the oil 
companies and the British Government to revise their policies towards the Gulf 
States. The Suez crisis had proved that the West was vulnerable to interruptions 
in the supply of Middle Eastern oil, and the oil companies were vulnerable to 
political nationalists. The crisis undermined British prestige in the region. 
1.6.3 The Iraqi Revolution, 1958 
The British Government had made a great effort to secure the Iraqi oil conces-
sion for a British oil company in the 1920s.97 Britain had depended on Iraqi as well 
as on Kuwaiti oil during the Musaddeq dispute of 1951. However, forces opposing 
the British position in Iraq as well as the regime of N uri Sa 'td gained strength 
from the success of Nasser at Suez98 and The Times reported that nationalist feel-
ing in Iraq was running very high because of the Suez crisis.99 In addition, the 
rise to power of 'Abd al-Karim Qassim in Iraq as a revolutionary leader with his 
promises to eliminate imperialism from Iraq was a great blow to British interests. 
First of all Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact and secondly Qassim issued 
Decree Law 80 of 11 December, 1961, which limited the IPC concession to less 
than 0.5% of the former concession but at that stage actual operations were not 
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nationalized. 100 IPC had tried to get the British Government to help but the Gov-
ernment responded merely by dispatching a diplomatic note. 101 After Qassim was 
overthrown in 1963, negotiations did little to relieve the impasse between the IPC 
and the Iraqi Government and in 1972 all assets of IPC were finally nationalized. 102 
The other economic loss for Britain after the Iraqi Revolution was that Qassim 
swung Iraq towards the Soviet orbit. The first economic agreement between Iraq 
and the Soviet Union was signed in March 1959 with an emphasis on military, 
economic and cultural cooperation between the two countries.103 Furthermore, 
Britain's trade with Iraq was deteriorating. Iraqi annual imports from Britain 
amounted to £38 million before the revolution and were increasing. However, 
they fell to £30 million by 1960, and hardly regained their former high level six 
years later (Table 1.1). Before the revolution a Development Board had been es-
tablished in 1950 as a means of using the oil revenues with British advice. 104 The 
Development Board had carried out construction projects including the building 
of bridges, dams, roads, houses, schools, irrigation, and so forth. After the Rev-
olution however, the Board, which was accused of being under British influence, 
was abolished. 105 
Alter the 1958 Revolution, Iraq played a sig1iificant role in encouragin-g anti-
British feeling in the Gulf. Through radio and newspapers Iraq criticised the 
British presence in the Gulf and accused the rulers of being British lackeys.106 
1. 7 Britain and the Gulf at the beginning of the 1960s. 
The Persian oil dispute, the Suez Crisis and the Iraqi Revolution had a mo-
mentous effect on British policy towards the Gulf. Firstly, Britain had lost her 
principal bases in the Suez Canal and at J:Iabbaniyyah and Shu 'ybah in Iraq. The 
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Table 1.1: Iraq Trade With UK. (£m.) 
Year UK Export UK Import 
1955 26.5 32.6 
1956 32.6 24.2 
1957 34.4 12.2 
1958 31.1 50.5 
1959 31.8 53.1 
1960 28.5 54.2 
1961 28.5 45.0 
1962 20.2 53.1 
1963 17.7 61.8 
1964 20.2 80.3 
1965 21.6 70.0 
1966 25.8 65.6 
1967 17.3 24.1 
1968 16.0 28.0 
-· 
1969 21.9 31.1 
1970 23.7 18.1 
1971 24.8 18.7 
1972 26.8 36.8 
1973 27.0 34.1 
Source: 
UK Government, Central Statistical Office, Annual Abstract of Statistics 
(London: H.M.S.O, 1964-1975). 27 
British base in the Suez canal had been the single largest of the entire British 
defense establishment throughout the world, except India. It had had more than 
thirty-eight camps and ten airfields in use during World War 11. 107 According to 
the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936, the number of British garrisons allowed to be 
stationed in the canal area was 10,000 persons in peace-time, and the RAF was 
subject to a peace-time, maximum of 400 pilots. However, the number of the 
British troops (with some of the Allied forces) garrisons had reached over a million 
soldiers by the end of the World War II, and until their withdrawal in June 1956, 
their number was never less than 75,000 men. 108 
In comparison with the Suez base, the British garrison in Iraq was a mod-
est one. Britain retained RAF bases at l:labbaniyyah, Shu 'ybah and Basrah for 
over 35 years, until their final withdrawal in May-June 1959.109 Different RAF 
squadrons had been stationed at these bases but the number of aircraft did not 
exceed 200 planes during peace time. Despite the small size of the British garrison 
in Iraq, it played an important role in connecting the empire due to its important 
location. Furthermore, RAF aircraft had conducted various operations in the Ara-
bian Peninsula such as participation in the Buraimi dispute and in the civil war 
in the Imamate in Oman. 
Secondly, with the loss of the Suez and Iraqi bases, it became more difficult 
for Britain to reach her bases in the Gulf and Aden from the United Kingdom 
or Cyprus due to air restriction on over flying by various Arab countries as well 
as Turkey. 110 This instigated the British Government to seek a new approach to 
protect her interests in the Gulf. The 1957 Defence White Paper outlined this new 
approach in the proposed strategic Mobile Forces.l11 The gist of this policy was 
that "overseas garrisons were to be reduced, a central reserve was to be maintained 
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in Britain, and reinforcements were to be despatched from Britain at short notice 
when required." 112 But the course of the internal Oman rebellion, as well as the 
Kuwaiti operation, had illustrated that the mobile forces were no substitute for 
troops on the ground in maintaining stability in a troubled area. Therefore, Britain 
came to rely, more than before, on her Aden base as well as on the smaller bases 
in the Gulf. 113 
As far as the Aden base was concerned it had significantly expanded after 
the Iraqi revolution of 1958, and in 1959 it became the headquarters of British 
forces in the Middle East. By December 1963 some 8,000 men were stationed in 
Aden, mainly army and airforce personnel. The RAF also had a sizeable airport 
in Khormakser that could accept any type of aircraft; the British navy had a 
squadron serving as the naval headquarters unit; and at a cost of £20 million, 
married quarters, army workshops, and stores were constructed in Aden before 
1962 and 1966.114 
1.7.1 The Kuwait Operation 
Kuwait became of prime economic importance to the United Kingdom af-
ter the Second World War. It was a major source of oil supply to the United 
Kingdom which drew over half of her oil from Kuwait's oil fields between 1957 
to 1960.115 Concerning Kuwaiti investments in Britain, The Financial Times had 
estimated that these totalled more than £300 million by 1960.116 Equally, BP and 
Shell had enormous investments in K uwait. 117 Britain, however, was persuaded 
to give Kuwait her full independence and abrogate the 1899 treaty. 118 The most 
convincing reasons were firstly that Kuwait had developed significantly enough to 
manage her internal and external affairs; secondly, the Amir of Kuwait had asked 
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for the termination of the Agreement; thirdly, independence was considered the 
best method of combatting nationalism. 
Therefore on 19th June 1961 an exchange of notes was signed between the 
Amir of Kuwait, Abdullah al-Salim Al Sabah, and the British Political Resident 
in the Gulf, Sir William Luce, in which the new relationship between Britain 
and Kuwait was defined. The main points were that the 1899 Agreement be 
terminated and that the two Governments should continue their relations in a 
spirit of friendship, and that the Government of the United Kingdom should assist 
the State of Kuwait if the latter requested such assistance.l 19 Less than a week 
after the termination of the Anglo-Kuwaiti treaty, Abdul Karim Qassim laid claim 
to Kuwait as an inseparable part of Iraq. 120 Yet, how genuine was Qassim's threat? 
Why did Britain respond so quickly? How did the Kuwait Operation affect the 
British presence in the Gulf? And what did Britain gain from the Operation? 
The seriousness of Qassim's threat has been a matter of disagreement among 
many commentators. Many writers considered that the idea of Qassim taking 
over Kuwait by force was an exaggeration. They saw other motives behind his an-
nouncement. First it was a political solution for his troubles inside Iraq. 121 Qassim 
had problems with both the Kurds122 and Iraqi political groups of Nasserites, com-
munists and Ba 'thists. 123 Another motive that has been suggested is the struggle 
over the leadership of the Arab World. The Times, for example, stated that Qassim 
wanted to sell his image to the Arabs as "the most anti-imperialist of the Arab 
leaders." 124 The Economist explained that Qassim wanted to prevent Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia from gaining control over the Gulf. 12Ei On the other hand, those who 
took Qassim seriously justified their fears through the Iraqi military manoeuvres 
in Basrah and the violent press and radio campaign from Baghdad. 126 However, 
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Basrah at this very time was witnessing a military parade to mark Iraqjs National 
Day on 14th July. 127 Some saw this parade in Basrah as a pretext by Qassim 
to transfer troops to the border in preparation to invade Kuwait. Therefore the 
British Government could not see any clear proof of an Iraqi troop movement with 
the intention of invading Kuwait. At the same time) the British representative 
in Kuwait) Sir John Richmond128 j was not consulted over the introduction of the 
Vantage Operation (Kuwait operation) and the British Ambassador to Iraq con-
sidered aggression to be unlikely) although not out of the question. 129 Therefore, 
we might question the motives that made the British Government carry out the 
operation since there was not enough proof of the seriousness of General Qassim's 
statement. 
Britain's decision to rescue Kuwait was ostensibly because of her treaty obli-
gations with the Government of Kuwait. The Ruler of Kuwait requested British 
assistance on the morning of 30th June. 130 However, others argued that Britain's 
assistance was meant to serve political and military objectives. The operation, it 
was stated, would give Britain greater influence over the rulers to encourage them 
to develop not only their own states but other parts of the Middle East in order 
to contain the spread of communism. Kuwait and the Gulf States could partic-
ipate in this strategy through the distribution of their oil wealth to their Arab 
neighbours. The problem was that most of the Sheikhs were refusing to go along 
with the plan, but it seems that the Kuwaiti incident made them have second 
thoughts about it. 131 Furthermore, the British Political Resident in the Gulf had 
no difficulty in explaining to the other rulers of the Gulf the strength and value of 
their relations with H.M. Government132 . In addition, from a military perspective 
the Kuwait operation served as a good training manoeuvre through which Britain 
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could discover the strengths and weaknesses of her defence policy toward the Gulf-
the Strategic Mobile Forces. 
An assessment of the results of the Operation shows the extent of the problems 
with which Britain had to contend during her mission to defend the independence 
of Kuwait.l33 There were problems with air cover because Kuwait had no radar 
system; problems of getting the tanks on land due to lack of a landing ramps for 
the ships; problems due to temperatures of 120 degrees Fahrenheit, many soldiers 
suffering from heat exhaustion; arrangements for the command control and ad-
ministration of the forces were inadequate; there were difficulties in establishing 
an efficient communications system that could work because some of the troops 
arrived without their signalling equipment and much of the available signalling 
equipment was rendered useless due to heat and some equipment was even dam-
aged; and there was a problem with the transfer of troops from the UK due to a 
temporary ban on over-flying by Turkey and Sudan.134 The cost of the operation 
was £1 million135 and the immediate consequence of the Kuwait incident was that 
the Arab League agreed to replace British troops in Kuwait and also admitted 
Kuwait as one of its members on 20th of July 1961.136 
The Kuwait operation drew attention to the limitation of British defence 
policy toward the Gulf in particular to the shortages which existed in men and 
equipment. Furthermore, as a result of the operation a battalion group was sta-
tioned in Bahrain and in 1962 work started on permanent accommodation and 
other facilities there. Similarly at Sharjah permanent accommodation were built 
for the British garrison there and the RAF reconstructed the airfield and built 
additional quarters. 137 The underlying objective of this expansion was a change in 
the British defence policy toward the Gulf from protecting British interests from 
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outside bases like Cyprus, to the use of bases within the Gulf. The 1962 Defence 
White Paper highlighted the importance of a continued Gulf security: "Peace and 
stability in the oil-producing states of Arabia and the Persian Gulf are vital for 
the Western World. We are, and still remain responsible for military assistance to 
those states in the area to which we are bound by treaty." 138 
1.8 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the Arab Gulf States' position in the British Empire was less 
closely tied into the general framework of the Empire. They were in a position 
similar to that of the Protectorates of South Arabia. The Gulf States had been 
brought under British protection through several treaties that were signed in the 
nineteenth century. The 1892 treaties became the main basis of British authority 
in the area. 
The independence of India in 1947 destroyed the original raison d'etre for the 
British position in the Gulf but the discovery of oil resources in the region meant 
that it acquired new interests and an importance in its own right. Although 
Britain's influence was declining in the Middle East as a whole, it was on the 
contrary increasing in the Gulf area. Therefore Britain protected her position there 
by using the Aden military base as well as other minor bases in the Gulf. The 1961 
Kuwait operation had proved the value of those bases in facing the outside threat 
that came from General Qassim of Iraq. For instance, from the Aden base British 
troops were quickly transfered to Kuwait and Bahrain and Sharjah were also used 
by the RAF and other British troops during the Kuwait operation. The question 
that had arisen, however, was how would Britain react to such challenges to her 
position if they came from within the Gulf region. This question will be addressed 
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in the next chapter. 
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Chapter II 
Political Development in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula 
2.1 Introduction 
By the 1960s, Britain's physical/military position in the Middle East had been 
reduced to the bases in Aden and the Gulf which were smaller in comparison to 
the former Suez base. These bases were used to protect the 'vital' oil interests as 
well as to fulfil Britain's obligations towards the rulers. However, political events 
in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula were disturbing the British position in 
the area. Three main events were largely responsible, namely: the experience of 
revolution in both Yemens; the Imamate and the Dhofar Revolution in Oman, and 
the development of anti-British feeling that was building up among nationalist 
groups in the Gulf (with emphasis on the Trucial States). The purpose of this 
chapter is twofold: firstly, to study these political changes and analyse their effect 
on the British position in the Gulf; and secondly, to discover their role in influencing 
the withdrawal announcement of January 1968. 
2.2 The Yemens: Experience of Revolution 
Traditionally Yemen was ruled by an Imamate system that followed the Zaydi 
sect of Islam. However, Imam Al_lmad died on the 18th of September 1962 and 
this event was followed eight days later by a coup d'etat which took place under 
the leadership of the republican General, Abdullah al-Sallal. Under his command 
Yemen was proclaimed the Yemen Arab Republic.l However, from October 1962 
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to June 1970 the country was locked in a civil war between the Republicans and 
the Royalists (those who remained loyal to the Imam). 2 The Yemen Civil War was 
a manifestation of the Arab 'Cold War'.3 It had brought the two camps, the 'rev-
olutionary' states of Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Algeria, and the 'conservative' states 
of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco, to the brink of war. Fighting, be-
tween Egypt and Saudi Arabia over Yemen, was only stopped after both countries, 
especially Egypt, were humiliated by the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. 
Egypt's involvement in the Yemen Civil War had various aims. Firstly, it rep-
resented Nasser's drive against Britain and colonialism. He saw the new Republic 
as a base from which he could fight Britain in Aden and the Gulf. According to 
Nasser he went to Yemen in order to defend the revolution from Britain because 
the revolution in North Yemen would jeopardize Britain's imperialist position in 
the South and in the Gulf. He stated in a speech that, "Britain thought that the 
Revolution would affect Aden and the Protectorate, and harm the British design 
of keeping the Federation of South Arabia under its authority, therefore Britain 
and the reactionary states launched a campaign against the Republic." 4 Secondly, 
Nasser saw an opportunity to spread Arab Nationalism in Saudi Arabia, Aden, and 
the Gulf States. According to Heikal, a dose confidante of Nasser and former edi-
tor of al-Ahriim, Egypt went to Yemen initially as a matter of principle and belief 
in Arab Nationalism. Heikal, also wrote, "the victory ofthe revolution in Yemen is 
the high road towards Palestine; indeed, victories of revolution in Saudi Arabia, in 
Jordan, and in other countries where reaction dominates, will be high signs on the 
road to victory in Palestine." 5 It seems that what Heikal meant was that changing 
the reactionary Arab regimes to a form of revolutionary Arab Government would 
make it easier for the Arabs to unite in their struggle against Israel. That idea 
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was open to question since the revolutionary Arab regimes were challenging each 
other.6 The other way of understanding Nasser's involvement in Yemen is to look 
at the oil fields in the Arabian Peninsula. Nasser hoped to utilize that wealth in 
solving the Palestinian problem. According to Nasser's book, The Philosophy of 
the Revolution, oil was one of the main strengths of the Arab World 7 which could 
be used as a political weapon against the 'imperialists': "If Britain believes she 
can intimidate us I have this to say: we also can apply economic sanctions against 
Britain," by which he meant oil.8 
Saudi Arabia's involvement in the Civil War of Yemen was intended to curb 
the spread of revolution, to maintain the status quo and to weaken Nasser. At 
the beginning of the civil war Saudi Arabia was shaken for several reasons. The 
first reason was the weakness of the administration under King Saud. There was 
also the defection of some Saudi princes as well as a number of Saudi pilots to 
Egypt. Another factor was the pressure of many Yemeni labourers who were 
working inside Saudi Arabia and who carried out some acts of sabotage inside 
Saudi Arabia. A further reason was that the Egyptian fighter planes in seeking to 
eliminate Royalist bases in Saudi Arabia, in fact bombed some Saudi settlements. 9 
But threats to the Saudi regime were contained due to diplomatic and military help 
from Jordan, the United States and Britain. Furthermore, the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia was strengthened by the deposition of King Saud in November 1964.10 
The war brought the Saudis closer to the Western world. In a letter to King 
Fayll!al, President Kennedy had emphasized the importance of stability in Saudi 
Arabia and he assured the government that it " ... can rely upon the friendship 
and cooperation of the United States." 11 The American government recognized 
the Republic of Yemen in December 1962 and tried to persuade both the Saudis 
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and the Egyptians to disengage.12 
The British Government faced a dilemma over the current situation. On 
the one hand Britain was not happy with a revolutionary regime in Yemen next 
door to her base in Aden. On the other hand if she recognized the Republican 
regime in Yemen Britain could improve her reputation in the Arab World which 
had been damaged by the Suez crisis. In the end Britain withheld her recognition 
of the new Republic and gave some support to the Royalists including guns and 
ammunition. 13 This policy exacerbated the relations between the Yemen Republic 
and the British Government over Aden. Egypt and the Yemen Republic, for their 
part, had given arms to nationalists groups in the Federation of South Arabia. 
There were some conflicts along the frontier between Yemen and the Federation 
during which British aircraft bombed a number of Yemeni villages. 14 Britain was 
charged by the Yemen Republic at the United Nations of provocation, aggression 
and intimidation against Yemeni territory. 15 Anglo-Egyptian friction over Aden 
came to an end when Britain hastily withdrew from Aden in 1967. 
2.2.1 Aden and the Protectorates rebellion 
Britain's involvement in Aden went back to 1839 when Captain Hains had 
occupied the area. The reason for this acquisition was that it provided the British 
navy with a useful strategic post on the route to India.16 Britain had divided the 
area into three parts. The main base was Aden Colony which came tinder the 
direct authority of the Crown. There was also the Western Aden Protectorate 
and the Eastern Aden Protectorate which were brought under British influence 
through various kinds of treaties by which the Sultans, Amirs and Sheikhs of twenty 
one states accepted the advice of the British representatives in their respective 
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territories. After the Egyptian revolution of 1952 the British officials in Aden had 
tried to amalgamate those states; however the rulers only accepted the idea of a 
federal government after the Iraqi Revolution of 1958.17 
Another concern of the British authorities and the rulers of the 'South' was 
the Imam in the 'North'. He claimed that the Protectorates were part of his 
Kingdom.18 For that reason he was considered a threat by British political agents 
and the rulers of the South. However, the rulers in the South became more vul-
nerable and their position was challenged by their people after the Imamate was 
abolished in the North. Furthermore, the new 'Republicans' were critical of the old 
feudal regimes in the South and associated themselves with the increasing number 
of nationalists in the Federation of South Arabia. 
Various nationalist groups had developed in the South throughout the 1950s 
and 1960s, but the most important were the pro-Marxist National Liberation Front 
(NLF) and' the pro-Nasserist group, the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South 
Yemen (FLOSY). On 14th October 1963 in the Yemen Arab Republic the NLF 
announced its formation and took the Radfan mountains as their guerrilla base in 
the South. Many of its leaders belong to the Arab Nationalists' Movement {ANM) 
that had been founded in the early 1950s by a group of Arab intellectuals, including 
George l:labash and Wadi' l:laddad at the American University of Beirut. However, 
the NLF broke away from the Nasserite line that was followed by the ANM and 
turned to the far left of Marxist-Leninism adopting armed struggle against the 
British and the Federation of South Arabia. 19 
The FLOSY nationalist group was formed in January 1966 through Egyptian 
efforts to unite various groups, including the NLF, into a unified national front. 
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Most of the FLOSY leaders and supporters were pro-Nasser and relied heavily on 
Egypt for their financial support, weaponry and propaganda. After a few months 
of negotiation the NLF refused to join FLOSY accusing it of backward bourgeois 
attitudes. Thus, fighting between the two groups was inevitable and continued 
until November 1967 when the NLF emerged victorious. 20 
The British troops met this nationalist revolt with a long-drawn-out operation 
that resulted in heavy casualities. The involvement of British troops brought 
criticism from all over the world including the United Nations, the Arab League, 
the Afro-Asian Council as well as a section of both the British public and the British 
press. Several British newspapers argued that Britain was putting her soldiers' lives 
in danger in Radfan in order to protect some feudal Sheikhs. 21 In December 1963 
the High Commissioner, Sir Kennedy Trevaskis, proclaimed a state of emergency. 
Following this, some of the Trade Union leaders in Aden were arrested and the 
number of troops stationed in Radfan was increased.22 However, the application of 
the state of emergency brought increased criticism from within Britain especially 
from the Labour Party, then in opposition. The Labour Party looked upon Aden's 
Trade Unions Congress, which was registered in Aden in 1953, with respect. It 
was favourably compared to British Trade Unions and encouraged as a socialist 
organisation in Aden. Other British officials, however, considered a trade union 
as being too democratic an institution for the Colony but nevertheless saw in it 
an organisation that could be negotiated with as opposed to an unrepresentative 
group of workers. However, to the dismay of the British officials the ATUC was 
taken over by various nationalist groupings. The Labour Government, which came 
to power in 1964, tried to use its friendly relations with the ATUC in order to form 
a broadly-based government that would replace Britain after withdrawal and at the 
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same time be accepted by all the political groupings in South Arabia. However, the 
idea was opposed by another more radical groups, namely the National Liberation 
Front (NLF).23 
Britain found herself fighting a long 'counter-insurgency' war with different 
guerrilla groups, 24 which was eventually to cost her more than £27 million. The 
number of British casualities was increasing as the following table illustrates: 
Table 2.1: British casualities 1963-67 
1963 45 
1964 75 
1965 298 
1966 480 
1967 75025 
Therefore, the British Government was looking for the best way to withdraw 
and evacuate the British troops because the Aden base, which was intended as the 
headquarters of the British troops in the Middle East and supposed to defend the 
area, was actually facing difficulties in defending itself. For instance, the British 
campaign in Radfan had lasted three months instead of the planned three weeks 
and was only successful after 2,000 troops had been brought from Britain to fight 
along with the Federal forces. Thus as more British troops were needed to deal 
with the insurrection in different parts of the Federation and as the cost of the 
campaign rose criticism both at home and internationally increased. 26 
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The decision to hand Aden over to the Marxist-orientated NLF instead of 
the nationalist Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY) needs some 
clarification. According to Serjeant, the British Government deliberately handed 
Aden to the NLF because it had accepted the British conditions which had been 
discussed secretly.27 It could be that Britain had already had enough trouble with 
Nasser and thought that if his supporters (FLOSY) came to power they would then 
seek a union with the pro-Nasser Abdullah Sallal who was based in the North. If 
this union were to take place Nasser would be in a better position to carry on his 
fight against Britain in the rest of the Arabian Peninsula. The other possibility 
was that Britain wanted to keep her influence in Arabia and the Gulf: by having 
a radical neighbour the rulers of the Gulf would live under a continuous threat 
and would then need to retain special links with Britain. This might explain why 
some of the rulers insisted on keeping British troops in the area even after Britain 
had made public her intentions to withdraw by 1971. Yet another possibility could 
be that Britain handed over power to the NLF because they were considered to 
be the strongest group and could keep the country united and stable after the 
withdrawal British troops. On balance the evidence suggest that Britain beleived 
that the NLF posed less of a threat to the British interests in the Gulf than the 
pro-Nasserate FLOSY. 
The final task of withdrawing the British troops from Aden was given to Sir 
Humphrey Trevelyan who was required 'to evacuate the British Forces and their 
stores in peace'.28 The departure though was not done in peace and was actually 
one of the severest military engagements experienced by British troops in South 
Arabia. 
The withdrawal from Aden deeply concerned the rulers of the lower Gulf. Ac-
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cording to Sir William Luce, who served in both Aden and the Gulf, the evacuation 
had a damaging effect on the Gulf rulers. It had shaken the Sheikhs' confidence in 
Britain's friendship because since she had left the rulers of the Federation of South 
Arabia without protection, the Gulf rulers feared that they too might eventually 
be abandoned by the British and face exile or death. 29 This led the British Gov-
ernment to send Mr. Goronwy Roberts, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, on 
a visit to the Gulf in November 1967 to inform the rulers that Britain's withdrawal 
from Aden would not apply to the Gulf and that Britain would remain in the Gulf 
as long as necessary without any timetable for withdrawing. However, the Gov-
ernment that was left in power in Aden after the evacuation of the British troops 
immediately encouraged nationalists in the Gulf and Oman to follow its example. 
2.3 Oman: the Imamate War and Dhofar Revolution 
British military command in the Middle East was moved from Aden to Bahrain 
in 1967 and was renamed the British Forces Gulf Command with accompanying 
bases in Sharjah and the Masirah island in Oman. There were several reasons for 
the British presence in Oman. After World War II British interests in Oman and 
the Gulf centred on vital strategic points. On the one hand, Oman was considered 
an important strategic base for the British Royal Air Force (because of its location 
in-between Africa, the Middle East and the Far East) while on the other hand it 
was considered important due to the oil fields in the Gulf and in Oman itself. At 
the same time, Oman controlled the strategic Straits of Hormuz through which 
all tankers entering and leaving the Gulf had to pass. Finally, Britain consid-
ered Oman so important that it developed close friendship with Sultan Sa 'td bin 
Taymfi.r of Oman. Therefore, Britain responded quickly to the Sultan's difficulties 
in the 1950s30 (see Anglo-Omani treaties in ch.1). The most dangerous challenge 
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to the Sultan's authority came firstly from the Imamate uprising in 1957-1959, and 
secondly from the Dhofar rebellion which was more sophisticated ideologically as 
well as in the military field. The Dhofar revolution started in 1965 and continued 
until 1976 when it was finally suppressed. 
The Imamate wars to seek independence from the authority of the Sultan of 
Muscat, Sa'Id bin Taymiir, were built on the lbadi religious doctrine. lbadism 
is a branch of the Khariji sect that developed in the first century of Islam. It 
emphasized the leadership of an imam as the religious and political head chosen 
by the elders of the tribes. 31 
In September 1920, following the resistance of the Omani Ibadi tribes to the 
Sultan's control, the Treaty of Sib was concluded. The Treaty was mediated by 
the British Political Agent in Muscat, Mr. Wingate. Under the Sib Treaty the 
Sultan granted control of justice, trade and administration to the Imam and the 
people of the interior, and for their part the Imam and his followers agreed not to 
attack the Sultan's position. The wording of the Treaty of Sib included four points 
pertain to the Government of the Sultan and four points which pertaining to the 
people of Oman (i.e. the term used to refer to the people of the interior). Those 
pertaining to the people of Oman were as follows: 32 
1. Not more than five per cent shall be taken from anyone, no matter what his 
race, coming from Oman to Muscat or Matrah or Sur or the rest of the towns 
of the coast. 
2. All the people of Oman shall enjoy security and freedom in all the towns of the 
coast. 
3. All restrictions upon everyone entering and leaving Muscat and Matrah and all 
the towns of the coast shall be removed. 
4. The Government of the Sultan shall not grant asylum to any criminal fleeing 
from the justice of the people of Oman. It shall return him to them if they 
request it to do so. It shall not interfere in their internal affairs. 
The four conditions pertaining to the Government of the Sultan are: 
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1. All the tribes and Shaikhs shall be at peace with the Sultan. They shall not 
attack the towns of the coast and shall not interfere in his Government. 
2. All those going to Oman on lawful business and for commercial affairs shall be 
free. There shall be no restrictions on commerece, and they shall enjoy security. 
3. They shall expel and grant no asylum to any wrongdoer or criminal fleeing to 
them. 
4. The claims of merchants and others against the people of Oman shall be heard 
and decided on the basis of justice according to the law of Islam. 
However the treaty was interpreted by the Sultan and the British to mean 
that the Sultan's sovereignty over the whole of Oman was not challenged whilst 
the Imam of Oman, on the other hand, understood it as the basis for creating an 
independent state for the Imamate. In 1954 Ghalib b. 'Ali became Imam, and 
the relations between him and Sultan Sa 'ld bin Taymiir began to deteriorate seri-
ously. With aid from Saudi Arabia, Imam Ghalib claimed complete independence 
maintaining that the oil concessions granted by the Sultan were not valid in areas 
under his control and applied for membership of the Arab League. 
The policy of extending the Sultan's authority over the tribes of Central Oman 
was encouraged by H.M. Government, because it would enable Petroleum Develop-
ment (Oman) Ltd to take full advantage of their concession, and it would exclude 
Saudi influence from the area and thus possible interference from the American oil 
companies. In pursuing the above aim, the British Government in 1953 instructed 
the Political Resident in the Gulf, Bernard Burrows as follows: 33 
Her Majesty's Government hope that the Sultan of Muscat will be able to extend 
his authority peacefully and effectively over the tribes of the Central Oman and that 
Saudi influence will be excluded from that area. Her Majesty's Government are ready 
to assist the Sultan in this task but wish if possible to avoid direct involvement. 
In December 1955 the Sultan's forces, helped by Britain, forced the Imam 
and his supporters to surrender. The Imam's brother, 'falib bin 'Ali, fled to Saudi 
Arabia and later to Cairo where he was able to rally some Arab help and establish 
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an Imamate Office in 195 7. 34 
The Imamate struggle for independence was full of contradictions from the 
beginning. On one hand the Imamate leadership had associated itself with the 
secular revolutionary Egypt, but on the other hand it was trying to establish a 
religious Imamate and at the same time was completely dependent on the 'Wah-
habi' Saudi regime and Egypt. Saudi Arabia and Egypt, under the leadership 
of King Saud and President Nasser, respectively, were enjoying a rare period of 
friendly cooperation at the end of the fifties. Both countries had been in conflict 
with Britain in the past; Saudi Arabia over Buraimi, and Egypt over Suez. Thus, 
they were more than happy to offer their help to the Imamate movement. At the 
same time, it was a rare opportunity for Nasserism to enter the "closed" area of 
Oman, but it seems that Nasserism was not easily accepted by the religiously moti-
vated Omani tribes. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, was totally unacceptable to 
the lbadi Imamate because of the fundamental religious differences between them. 
Moreover the lbadi-lmamate had participated in the Buraimi disputes on the side 
of the Sultan and the British troops. However, both sides tolerated each other for 
political reasons. 
The Imamate leaders needed Saudi financial and military aid. The Saudis 
helped in training the Omani Liberation Army in Dhammam and in 1957 fresh 
fighting between the Sultan's forces, assisted by the RAF and the Trucial Oman 
Scouts, and the Imamate's troops broke out. This civil war had lasted for many 
years, and although the Imam increased his efforts in 1959 the Sultan's forces were 
by that time highly trained and well equipped by the British Government.35 
After 1959 the Imamate movement added a political dimension and was able to 
61 
present its case at the United Nations and thus embarrass the British Government 
internationally. The 'Oman Question' was investigated by an Ad Hoc Committee 
which was established in 1963 by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The 
Committee continued what a special representative of the Security-General, Mr. 
De H. Ribbing, who visited Oman in early 1963,36 had started. The Committee, 
which was not permitted by Sultan Sa 'td to visit Oman, reported that the ques-
tion of Oman was a serious international problem requiring the special attention of 
the Assembly and it proposed that the question be solved by negotiations assisted 
by a United Nations Committee.37 In considering the Ad Hoc Committee report, 
the General Assembly of the United Nations, in December 1965, passed Resolu-
tion 2073 in which it condemned the British Government for its colonial policies 
and foreign intervention in Oman. The resolution also recognized the "right of 
the people of the territory as a whole to self-determination and independence in 
accordance with their freely expressed wishes." Finally it called upon Britain to 
withdraw from Oman. 38 The British Government and the Sultan did not accept 
the UN resolutions and therefore the 'Question of Oman' was regularly brought 
up on the UN Agenda. 
The involvement of the United Nations in the Omani dispute had given the 
latter a world-wide publicity. The leaders of the Imamate, like 'fa.lib bin Ali, 
Sheikh Sulayman bin J:limyar and $alil:t al-J:Iirthi, were received warmly when they 
addressed the United Nations General Assembly.39 They had also toured the So-
viet Union, China, Europe and other countries. This of course had led to much 
criticism of the British Government which was embarrassed by accusations that 
she was keeping Oman and the Gulf shut off and backward. Even Britain's closest 
ally, the United States had asked her to restrain the Sultan of Muscat as well as the 
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British officials in Oman in their violent ways of dealing with the Imamate problem. 
In fact, the Americans did not want the Saudis to blame them for not restraining 
the British Government and feared that the Saudis might retaliate against Aramco 
and the air base at Dhahran if they took no action. Besides that the Americans 
in discusssion with the British Foreign Office pointed out their fear that this dis-
pute might allow Russia to increase its influence in the Arab world.40 Therefore, 
the British Government pressed for negotiations in Beirut with the representatives 
of the Imamate delegation who demanded complete and immediate independence. 
The talks were unsuccessful as the British refused to accept their demands.41 How-
ever, even though the Imamate revolt was unsuccessful in its main aim, namely 
that of establishing an independent Imamate State, it had had some significant 
effects. Firstly, it gave the British authorities cause for concern regarding their 
policy toward the area. Secondly, it had internationalized the Omani cause, and, 
thirdly the world became aware of the Gulf and Oman and the British involvement 
there. It also paved the way for a more sophisticated Marxist revolution in the 
Dhofar mountains. 
By 1970 the Imam, who took up residence in Saudi Arabia, was asked by King 
Fayl?al either to remain quiet and accept the status quo or leave the country. The 
Imam took the first option. 42 The Saudi Government changed its policy toward 
Oman after the British withdrawal announcement, by (a) playing a leading role 
in Gulf security (see 6.1); and (b) resisting the communist rebellion in Dhofar 
through cooperation with the Sultan. 
2.3.1 The Dhofar Revolution 
Dhofar, the Southern province of Oman, is distinct from the rest of the coun-
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try in its tropical climate; in its language (related to the ancient languages of South 
Arabia); and in its Shaf'i-Sunni Islam as opposed to the non-Sunni Ibadi inhab-
itants of the Sultanate. The Dhofar province is also distinct in its mountainous 
character in that the altitude rises to as high as 4,500 feet; and, located on the 
border with Yemen (South Yemen), by its distance from Muscat, the capital of 
Oman.43 
It was the Imamate rebellion that had encouraged tribal leaders of Dhofar 
province to try to set up their own separate state and escape from the harsh rule 
of Sultan Sa •Id of Muscat. These dreams turned into reality with the adherence 
to the cause of young Dhofaris working in the Gulf who had come into contact 
with Arab nationalists. These young Dhofaris were encouraged by the success of 
the Yemen Revolution in 1962. By 1964 these two groups, viz. the tribal leaders 
and the Dhofari branch of the Arab nationalists, had organized themselves into a 
front called the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF). However, the DLF did not become 
active until 9 June 1965 when it made its first declaration.44 What concerns us 
here about the Dhofar Revolution (which itself is beyond the scope of this study) 
is the influence that this rebellion had on the British presence in the area.45 
By 1966, the Dhofar rebellion was creating some concern among the British 
authorities in the Gulf for varieties of reasons. For example, they felt it was a 
threat to their interests in the Gulf and Oman. Also this was a time when Britain 
was trying to expand its military presence in the region after the experience of 
the Kuwait operation of 1961. Britain had recognized the difficulties involved in 
mobilizing forces from Britain, therefore, each Gulf ruler was encouraged to develop 
his own army and air force by using capital from oil revenue. 
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This new policy had been accepted by Kuwait, which had already started to 
develop a Kuwaiti Air Force with the help of British advisers.46 In Oman, Sultan 
Sa 'ld also started to expand and develop his armed forces but he did this with 
some reservation because he was afraid that the rapid expansion of armed forces 
could pose a military threat to his regime. Furthermore, he was not in a position 
to improve the living conditions in his country because even though oil exploration 
was taking place the Sultan was not yet receiving oil revenues. 
The Emirate of Abu Dhabi, under the control of Sheikh Shakhbiit, was even 
more reluctant to develop its armed forces but in 1964 Sheikh Shakhbiit did agree 
to the establishment of a small defence force under the command of Colonel Tug 
Wilson. After Sheikh Shakhbiit was removed in August 1966 the forces were ex-
panded and were equipped with Hunter aircrafts.47 
Moreover, Britain was to retain a direct military presence in Oman and 
demonstrated this by leasing the Island of Masirah from Sultan Sa '}d for ninety-
nine years after the defeat of the Imamate forces in 1959. Masirah became part of 
British Military Command in Aden. But it was not until after the Kuwait oper-
ation of 1961 that Masirah became more important. In 1962 a 9,000 foot asphalt 
runway was constructed there. The strategic position of the Island on account of 
its isolation and offshore location, caused it to outlive all the other British bases in 
the Gulf and thus the RAF continued using it until their withdrawal in 1977 after 
the defeat of the Dhofar rebellion.48 The same was the case with the Sharjah RAF 
station that was established in the thirties and later expanded after the Kuwait 
operation in 1961 with a new 9,000 foot asphalt runway. The RAF base in Sharjah 
received further expansion in 1967. 
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By 1966, however, the Dhofar situation was intensifying and Britain did not 
want any further large scale dissidence in Oman such as that which had occurred 
in the Imamate. It already had enough trouble with the nationalists in Aden.49 
The guerillas nevertheless were having considerable success, as was epitomized by a 
series of well-planned and skillfully executed operations, when compared with those 
of the Imamate, which claimed the lives of British officers and caused casualties 
among the Sultan's forces. There were also attempts on the Sultan's life: for 
example there was one in May 1966 by his guards. This state of affairs created 
a good deal of anxiety for the British authorities because these activities gave 
indications that the situation would continue for many years to come. 50 Therefore, 
Britain accepted the Sultan's requests to put into effect the 1958 treaty which 
requested that Britain offer military assistance to the Sultan. Consequently, a few 
units of army and RAF were rapidly dispached to Oman. British military forces 
in Oman were quick to publicise their presence to the rebels and any potential 
supporters by means of exercises, show of the flag and firepower demonstrations. 
In order to avert the threat of rebellion in Oman, Britain introduced a number 
of new measures. The first was political and economic development. Oman was 
considered an independent State but with special treaty relations with Britain. 
However, Sultan Sa •Id was causing consternation for Britain because he was not 
eager to spend money on development and was ruling Oman like a police-state. 
After 1967, when oil was found by Shell in commercial quantities, the Sultan 
began receiving substantial oil revenue but was still not spending on development. 
According to H.M. Consul-General in Oman, Mr Carden (1965-1969) it became a 
major political problem when the Sultan had money but refused to spend it:51 
Britain had an old alliance with Oman and with the Sultan. The Sultan pre-
sented Britain with a problem. He had inherited in 1930s a bankrupt state that was 
left by his father who abdicated and lived in a hotel in Bombay in poveJl'ty. The 
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Sultan always remembered this and he did not want to be bankrupt so he did not 
spend money which he did not have ... The oil was found by Shell and then his finan-
cial position was different but he had been influenced by the last 30 years. He could 
not stop being afraid of spending money. It became a major political problem when 
he does have money but does not spend it on the welfare of his people like schools, 
hospitals, roads etc. The problem for the British government was that we knew his 
people were getting restless, they wanted these necessities ... We tried to persuade him 
to be generous but he used to say: I am an independent sovereign and you British 
mind your own business. 
The British authorities tried to persuade Sultan Sa •Id to change his methods 
but, as Mr Carden explained, the Sultan refused to cooperate in utilizing the oil 
revenue for the economic development of his country. However, Sultan Sa •Id did 
cooperate with the British in regard to their strategic interests. Britain had an 
RAF station at Salalah, Dhofar, in addition to the RAF base on Maslrah Island. 
Also the British Navy was permitted to use the Sultan's ports at any time, and 
a British oil company was responsible for developing the countr)t' oil resources. 52 
Therefore, in spite of the fact that Sultan Sa •}d's policy presented an an embar-
rassment to Britain because of the harsh nature of his rule, 53 Britain continued 
to offer him financial support and between 1959 and 1967, before the discovery of 
oil, provided a grant of £250, 000 annually. The development programme which 
involved building roads, establishing agricultural trial stations and constructing 
a number of health dispensaries, was headed by Sir Hugh Boustead.54 Boustead 
recalls that although he found Sultan Sa •Id a pleasant man he was nevertheless 
responsible for obstructing development in Oman. 55 This problem became more 
serious when the country began to receive substantial oil revenue after 1967. 
In the light of the Sultan's reluctance to introduce economic development in 
Oman which was promoted by the British authorities as a measure to help contain 
the rebllion of Dhofar, the British officials now began to see the need for political 
change in Oman. They tried to get concessions from the Sultan but their attempts 
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to persuade him to change his policies or to step down in favour of his son met 
with failure. Nevertheless, in July 1970 Sultan Sa'Id abdicated in favour of his son 
Sultan Qabiis. Officially, Britain considered this as an internal affair but there was 
strong evidence that the British were closely involved in the coup. 56 
The other measure that Britain had introduced in an attempt to avert the 
threat of the Dhofar rebellion was a series of military operations in Dhofar province 
from 1965 onward. In order to support the military operations in Oman the number 
of troops was increased and military units were transfered from Cyprus to Bahrain 
and Sharjah. 57 First, a number of Canberra B16 aircrafts were transferred from 
the squadron in Cyprus to the RAF base in Sharjah. Other RAF planes were 
despatched to Masirah along with a parachute regiment.58 Secondly, the RAF 
bases Sharjah and Masirah were developed. For example in 1965-67, the RAF 
base at Masirah was completely rebuilt at a cost of £3 million that provided 
fuel storage installation, a new water distillation plant and communication centre 
storage installations.59 Thirdly, the British Government sent the destroyer, H.M.S 
Fearless, to the Dhofar border with South Yemen to launch an operation in the 
Hauf area. This was undertaken by elements of the 1st Irish Guards.60 However, 
Britain could not continue this sort of operation in Oman on a wide scale due to 
defence cuts as well as her responsibilities elsewhere such as NATO. At the same 
time the British public, press and parliament were uneasy with regard to these 
operations.61 Therefore Britain encouraged the Sultan to seek help from other 
countries like Jordan and Iran. In addition, it encouraged British soldiers to seek 
personal contracts in the Sultan's forces. As a result of this policy, more than 
1,500 British officers and soldiers arrived in Oman to assist the Sultan's forces and 
were only withdrawn in March 31, 1977 after the defeat of the rebellion.62 
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The Dhofar Revolution thus had a significant impact on the British presence 
in the Gulf. On the one hand, Britain had been fighting the rebellion in Oman in 
order to protect her interests in the Gulf but, on the other hand, Britain's military 
operations in this area and the very presence of British troops became a provocation 
in itself. Hence it was easier for the DLF to encourage other nationalists in the Gulf 
to rally around them. Even though the Gulf was considered a quiet area, except 
for Bahrain, the DLF was able to contact the nationalist forces in the Trucial 
States as well as in Bahrain and Kuwait.63 The Dhofar Revolutionaries attempted 
to link up with different nationalist groups in the Gulf but at the beginning they 
concentrated on the Dhofaris working in the area. Most of the Dhofaris were 
employed in the armed forces and the police, and when they returned to Dhofar 
on vacations some were recruited into the revolutionary movement which sought to 
recruit other Dhofaris working in the Gulf in the late sixties. 64 Other groups were 
discovered in the Ras Musandam mountain region by the British Desert Intelligence 
Officer, Captain Tim Ash, in early 1970.65 The most important impact of the 
Dhofar revolution was that Oman and the Gulf were no longer isolated from world 
opinion. They became the focus for debates in Britain and the Arab World as well 
as in the international arena. People became more aware of the colonial war that 
Britain was fighting in Dhofar and some even considered it 'Britain's Vietnam'.66 
Thus Britain's presence in the Gulf was affected by the Dhofar Revolution and it 
could be argued that the rebellion was one of the reasons that persuaded Britain 
to withdraw from the Gulf before the situation there reached the same position as 
it had in Aden. 
2.4 The lower Gulf: development of anti-British sentiment. 
By the beginning of the 1950s Arab nationalism had had little affect on the 
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lower Gulf States. However during the course of the Musaddeq dispute of 1951 
some anti-British feeling did emerge in the southern shores of the Gulf (see chapter 
1).67 It was the Egyptians who had introduced modern Arab nationalism into the 
lower Gulf in the 1950s. This nationalism had come with the Egyptian Revolution 
of 1952 which had been orchestrated under the leadership of Nasser and whose 
specific aims were anti-colonialism and Arab unity. The Foreign Office, in its 
instructions to the British officials in the Gulf in 1956, warned that,.68 
The principal threat to the British position in the Gulf seems to come, imme-
diately, not from the rulers who recognize the value to themselves of our relationship 
with them but from the dissident and reformist elements over whom Egypt exercises 
the greatest influence. 
The growth and significance of Egyptian influence in the Gulf (after the 1952 
Egyptian Revolution) was represented in different ways. First, a significant num-
ber of Egyptian school teachers were seconded from the Egyptian government. 
Second, a number of students had been sent to Egypt from the Gulf for further 
education. Third, a number of other Egyptian technicians and professionals such 
as doctors were employed by the Gulf Sheikhdoms. And fourth, influence was ex-
erted by the radio broadcast from Cairo, the Voice of the Arab Gulf, and through 
the distribution of newspapers and magazines. 69 
Before looking at President Nasser's direct encouragement of anti-British feel-
ing in the lower Gulf and the Arab League's involvement in the Trucial States in 
1964-1965, the national movements in Bahrain and Qatar will be summarized. 
Bahrain and Qatar were more developed than the Trucial States due to the ear-
lier discovery of oil. Nationalism had arrived earlier with the introduction of 
widespread education, as well as contact with Arabs who came to work in these 
States. However, Bahrain had experienced organized nationalist movements since 
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the early fifties. One example was the Higher Executive Committee which was 
established in October 1954 and was able to make the government accept it as a 
legal organization. 70 After huge demonstrations during the Suez crisis, the Bahrain 
government had declared a state of emergency and asked the British Government 
for help to which the latter responded by sending a battalion of British troops. 71 
By 1965, during the Bahrain Oil Company (BAPCO) strike, the national 
movement in Bahrain emerged once again. There were widespread demonstrations 
in the streets of Manama during March of that year which were concerned with 
redundancies in BAPCO as well as with political issues. Since Bahrain was impor-
tant for the British forces that were withdrawing from Aden, both Britain and the 
Bahraini Government refused to accept any demands from the nationalists and the 
rioting was terminated very quickly by force by the Bahrain police commanded by 
British officers. 72 
The other Gulf emirate that had experienced a small short-lived nationalist 
uprising was Qatar. The early discovery of oil in Qatar in January 1940, (although 
it was to be December 1949 before any oil was shipped out),73 led to contact 
with Egyptian and Palestinian teachers in much the same way as in Kuwait and 
Bahrain, though in Qatar it was on a much smaller scale. The inspector of the 
education department was an Egyptian, most of the teachers were Egyptians and 
the rest were Palestinians. 74 In April1963 there was a demonstration in support of 
the proposed Union between Egypt, Syria and Iraq. The demonstrators, who were 
young and educated Qataris with some Yemeni labourers and others, established 
a National Unity Front after clashing with the authorities. They demanded from 
the Government various reforms such as the freedom to form trade unions. The 
government, however, reacted severely by imprisoning and exiling the leaders of 
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the movement including l:lamad al-'Atiyyah and 'Abdullah al-Musnid. 75 
The British representatives in the Trucial States had advised London that 
Nasser might seek to expand Egyptian influence in the Gulf region because Britain 
had neglected to concern itself with the development of the region. The Egyptians 
used radio to brodcast propaganda which argued that Britain had been exploiting 
Gulf oil without developing the region. Accordingly, we find that many of the po-
litical agents in the Trucial States had pressed the British Government to do more 
to develop the area. For example, Sir Bernard Burrows, the Political Resident in 
the Gulf, in 1953 urged the British Government to provide capital for development 
in the Trucial States, because he felt that: 76 
If they cannot get it from us or from other Gulf rulers they will turn to Egypt, 
not necessarily because they sympathize with Egypt politically, but simply because 
help is avilable there and indeed is known to be waiting on offer. 
In response to this, but with some reluctance, Britain spent £25,000 on the 
area in 1955-6.77 However, in order to counter Egyptian influence in the area more 
attention and economic assistance was needed. Britain responded in a number 
of different ways. For example, British teachers were provided for the vocational 
schools, and the rich Emirates like Kuwait were encouraged to help with educa-
tion and hospitals. 78 In addition the oil companies were asked to participate in 
developing the area and encouraged to employ more local people. The oil compa-
nies were also urged by the British government to improve their arrangements for 
technical training for the local inhabitants. 79 Finally, the British authorities in the 
Gulf, through the British Council, encouraged students from the Gulf to study in 
Britain. 80 It was hoped that this would lead to more pro-British feelings than had 
been the case. 
However, the above measures which were designed to counter Egyptian in-
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fl.uence in the Gulf, were not totally effective. On the one hand, Britain had 
encouraged Kuwait to help the Trucial States by sending teachers, but Kuwait 
had no teachers of her own and therefore sent Egyptians. 81 The other reason 
why countering Egyptian influence in the Trucial States was unproductive was 
the willingness of some rulers (like Sheikh $aqr of Sharjah) to cooperate with the 
Egyptians. An Egyptian educational mission was opened in Sharjah in 1958.82 By 
1963 the Egyptian mission had trained and sent more than eighty teachers to the 
Trucial States. 83 However, Britain probably felt that this was no great threat since 
the number of Egyptian teachers did not exceed a few hundred and thus could be 
carefully watched and controlled. 
In 1964 the Arab League had formed a fact-finding mission to the Gulf under 
the League's General Secretary, 'Abdul ~haliq l;lassunah, his assistant Sayyid 
Nawfal, and one representative from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iraq respectively. 
The mission visited the Emirates in November 1964 where it met the Sheikhs of 
Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial States. Besides this, the mission had opportunities 
to meet different Arab immigrants and had also attended rallies and delivered some 
speeches. The Mission's report to the Arab League Council had two important 
recommendations. The first suggestion was that a specialist Arab team made up 
of experts in ~lectricity, roads, water drilling and agriculture should be sent to the 
Emirates so as to study the needs of the area. The other recommendation was an 
idea to establish an Arab Development Fund for the Emirates. The Arab League 
Council approved the recommendations, and the specialist group was sent to the 
Emirates in Ju;-196.f.84 
The British authorities allowed the first Mission because they thought it would 
concentrate on economic fields. However, when they found it had been involved 
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in political discussions, the second mission in June 1965 was denied entry to the 
Emirates. Sir William Luce, the Political Resident, ordered the closing of the 
Sharjah airfield to prevent the Arab League delegation landing. 85 According to 
Balfour-Paul who was Political Agent in Dubai at that time, Nasser had tried to 
use the Arab League to weaken British control by persuading the rulers of the 
Trucial States to terminate their treaties and friendship with Britain. 86 
Another aspect of British reaction to the Arab League mission was the de-
position of Sheikh $aqr of Sharjah. This incident needs more explanation since 
Sheikh $aqr was considered a symbol of Arab nationalism in the Trucial States. 
The policy of Her Majesty's Government towards the Gulf rulers' association with 
the Egyptians had been unobtrusive at first. The rulers were not questioned about 
their meetings with, for instance, Anwar Sadat, the Egyptian Minister of State, 
during his visit to the area before the Suez crisis. They were not prevented from 
participating in fund-raising during the Suez crisis. It was quite in order for the 
Sheikhs to pay "lip service to the emotional concept of Arab solidarity." 87 Further-
more, the Political Resident in the Gulf recommended that:88 
Our role must in certain respects be unobtrusive. We must avoid putting too 
much strain upon the loyalties of the rulers over issues touching their 'Arab' con-
sciousness. 
But that was not always the rule especially when some of the Sheikhs, Sheikh 
$aqr in particular, acted in a way that was considered dangerous to British influ-
ence in the Gulf, and refused to break his relations with the Egyptian Government. 
In addition, Sheikh $aqr bin Sultan al-Qasimi, (Ruler of Sharjah 1951-65) sup-
ported the Arab nationalists. The Political Resident in Bahrain, Sir Bernard Bur-
rows, described him as an 'ambitious man with a modicum of education'. Sheikh 
$aqr had toured the Middle East and had returned with promises of help from 
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Egypt in 1958. He had been, according to the Political Resident, "singled out 
among all the Trucial Coast rulers as the Egyptian target and has been flooded 
with offers of hospitality and technical help by Egyptian personalities in close touch 
with the Government" .89 Furthermore, at a later date he had received some help 
from Egypt in the form of education and health assitance for his state. Sheikh 
~aqr had explained the reasons for his close association with Egypt by saying that 
he merely wanted to develop his state and since Britain was not offering him the 
help he needed, he had turned to Egypt which, in any case, he considered an Arab 
'sister state. '90 
There are three main reasons which may explain the replacement of Sheikh 
~aqr by his cousin, Sheikh Kha.led, in 1965. The first reason, and the most im-
portant, was that Britain wanted to keep the Trucial States stable and free from 
any irritant elements such as Egyptian influence. The spread of nationalism in the 
Trucial States had created some concerns to the British officials in the Gulf. For 
example, Sir James Craig recalls that when he was appointed to the Trucial States 
in 1961 as a Political Agent he was asked to pay great attention to the Egyptians 
and Palestinians working in the area.91 Major Jim Stockdale, with twenty two 
years service in the TOS, was a Desert Intelligence Officer on the eastern coast of 
the Trucial States in Khor Fakkan from 1968 to 1971. When asked about the role 
he was performing in that area, he pointed out that: "I was looking after the bor-
der disputes between Fujairah and Sharjah, taking care of the illegal immigrants 
that were using the port at Khor Fakkan, and at the same time keeping an eye on 
Egyptian and Palestinian teachers in the schools of the eastern coast." 92 The TOS 
Commander 1964-67, Brigadier De Butts, noted that "Pictures of Nasser were 
everywhere ... Sheikh ~aqr was permitting Egyptians to demonstrate in his Emi-
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rate, and they were attacking Britain's policy." 93 Sir James Craig had explained 
to Sheikh $aqr "the disadvantages in associating with Egypt and that he should 
be on the British side because he had a treaty with H.M.Government. However, 
he refused to curb his relationship with the Arab League and the Egyptians." 94 
Mr. M. Tait, Assistant Political Agent in Dubai in 1965, added that "the removal 
of Sheikh $aqr was for a security reason because he was under the influence of his 
private secretary Mr. Ghareeb, an Egyptian, whom the Agency classified as an 
agent." 95 
The second reason for removing Sheikh $aqr was strategic. That is to say, 
Britain's policy in the Trucial States in the fifties was supportive of Kuwait. For 
example, there was some talk in the Foreign Office of renouncing the treaty obliga-
tions with the Trucial States and concentrating on Kuwait. However, Sir Bernard 
Burrows, Political Resident in the Gulf 1953-58, in a letter to Sir James Bowker, 
(Assistant Under-Secretary of State, FO 1950-53) could not endorse that:96 
I remember that you and others in London said to me that it might have to be 
considered at some time whether it was going to cause continuing international com-
plication and a continuing commitment of expenditure. I know that you are familiar 
with the argument that if we gave up the Trucial States this would seriously reduce 
our power to influence events in Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar, which are generally 
admitted to be of great importance to us .. .In fact I do not feel that the Trucial States 
are now a derelict area of which we should be glad to be rid, but that with a little 
care and continuity we can make something quite good out of them. 
In other words, Britain in the fifties had concentrated on Kuwait because of 
her oil. But, with the discovery of huge quantities of oil in Abu Dhabi in 1958, 
the Trucial States became a key element in the British policy in the Gulf; what is 
more, after withdrawing from Aden the Trucial States became an alternative base 
for the British troops. As a result, Sharjah was the ideal replacement for Aden 
as a British military base that could contain the troops that would be withdrawn 
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from Aden by 1966-67. 
But contrary to official British opinion, the Ruler of Sharjah, Sheikh $aqr, did 
not welcome the idea. He resisted the new agreement to expand British military 
bases in Sharjah that Mr. George Thomson, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, 
was trying to get him to accept in May 1965.97 However, after the removal of 
Sheikh $aqr, the new Ruler, Sheikh Khaled bin Mul,lammad al-Qasimi, accepted 
the agreement and signed it together with the British Political Agent in Dubai, 
Sir David Roberts, in 1966.98 It made available to British authorities additional 
land for new facilities to be used by British troops. Therefore, in 1967 British 
troops that had moved from Aden were stationed in the old RAF-TOS base at 
al-Mal],atah in Sharjah, and the Ttucial Oman Scouts, TOS, were moved to al-
Murqiib garrison. Sir David Roberts explained that Sheikh Khaled had insisted 
that the TOS remained in Sharjah. The other point that the Political Agent 
had negotiated with Sheikh Khaled was an agreement regarding the delivery of 
water for the troops.99 The British Government made a down-payment of £100,000 
in August 1966 and subsequently an annual payment of a similar amount from 
January 1967.10° Finally, the third reason for the removal of Sheikh $aqr was to 
warn the other Sheikhs that Britain was determined to keep the Gulf under her 
control and would not allow any contacts that were regarded as unacceptable to 
her. 
The removal of Sheikh $aqr in 1965, served as a warning to the nationalist 
groups that their activities would not be tolerated by Britain. However anti-British 
feelings were exacerbated again with the June 1967 Arab/Israeli War. 
There was an atmosphere of despair and disappointment in the Gulf after 
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the June 1967 War. The people were frustrated with the result and anti-British 
activities were intensified after Cairo incorrectly announced that Britain had par-
ticipated in the surprise Israeli attack on the Egyptian air force bases on 6th of 
June. 101 Demonstrations, rioting and other violent anti-British activities spread 
all over the Gulf. In Bahrain, as the Political Agent there, Sir Anthony Parsons, 
recalled: 102 
In no time demonstrators were swirling and chanting outside the gates of the 
Agency. The next four or five days were confused and hectic. The flames of excitement 
burnt high in Bahrain and the Agency was surrounded by shouting crowds from early 
morning until late at night. 
In Dubai, riots and demonstrations also occurred for a few days and some 
shops were destroyed. The British Agency there was also surrounded for two days 
and the Political Agent, Sir David Roberts, brought in the TOS because he thought 
it was too much for the Dubai Police to handle and restore order. 103 In addition, in 
Sharjah, sailing boats from a British club were burned during a night incident. 104 
In the short term, the outcome of the June War was negative for British policy 
in the Gulf because the people's desire for freedom and their hatred of colonialism 
was enhanced. But at the same time Nasser, who was backing nationalism in the 
Gulf and Oman, now began to lose interest. By calling on Arabs to unite behind 
him on the issue of Palestine, he called for financial assistance from oil producing 
countries and King Fay!;Jal and the other Gulf rulers were ready to help Nasser to 
rebuild what the war had destroyed. Accordingly, the Cairo Radio station "Voice 
of the Arab Gulf" was shut down and the Egyptians changed their attitude towards 
the Gulf Sheikhs. 105 As a result, the British Political Agents in the Trucial States 
had now to concentrate their efforts on other 'subversive' elements that had broken 
away from Nasser due to his failure in fulfilling their dream as the man who would 
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lead them to victory. 
After the 1967 June defeat, the Arab nationalists in the Gulf, as well as in the 
rest of the Arab World came to realize that, after all, N asserism did not provide 
the magical solution to the crisis in the Arab world. 106 Some of the nationalists in 
the Gulf joined Marxists in Dhofar and others joined Ba 'thists while support for 
Nasser declined. In the Trucial States: (a) the supporters of the DLF (which be-
came the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf "PFLOAG" 
in 1968) were located mostly in the TOS107 ; (b) the Ba 'thists supporters group 
had taken 'Ras Musandam Mountain' as their base, but later (as was mentioned 
before) were discovered by the authorities; and (c) the rest, who came mostly from 
wealthy families and the ranks of educated people, were a non-violent opposition 
group and were located in the urban areas of Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah and Dubai. 
Even though their number was relativly small, the nationalist groups created a 
significant cause for concern for the British authorities as well as for the rulers. 
For example, the TOS in cooperation with the British army had mounted a joint 
operation in the Ras Musandam area in 1971, before British withdrawal, against 
the Shal,ml;t tribe who had been recruited by Ba 'thists activists from the Trucial 
States' towns, who received military equipment and support from Iraq. As an 
additional means of dissuading the Shal;tul;t tribe from any future revolutionary 
activities the British authorities in the Gulf also introduced some social services 
in the area such as a visiting doctor who travelled through the villages. They also 
improved communications between the tribal areas and the city of Ras al-Khaimah 
as well as introducing other medical and practical help. 108 
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2.5 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to describe the forces of nationalism that 
existed in the Arabian Peninsula in the 1950s and, in particular, the 1960s and the 
effect of such forces on the Trucial States, in order to understand the role played 
by these movements in the British withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971. The Yemen 
Revolution of 1962 and its impact on the development of nationalism in the area 
together with Britain's withdrawal from Aden have been discussed. The latter 
occurred as there was no point in having a base that had to waste large resources 
defending its very existence rather than doing the job for which it was created. 
The Imamate of Oman and Dhofar revolution also played a considerable role 
in influencing British policy in the area. The Dhofar affair, however, was by far 
the most outstanding movement that influenced Britain's withdrawal. Like the 
resistance in Aden, the Dhofar revolution was strongly anti-British and they used 
the British presence to recruit more members to their movement. Finally, they 
were able to present their case internationally and embarrass Britain, mainly at 
the United Nations. 
In the Trucial States, however, the strength of nationalism was questionable. 
Two different arguments have been generated concerning this matter. There are 
those such as Taryam who claim that Britain's evacuation from the Gulf was due 
to the pressure of the nationalist movements and there are those, on the other 
hand, such as Balfour-Paul, who suggest that nationalism played no significant 
role whatsoever. It is hoped that the foregoing analysis demonstrates that con-
flict between Britain and the nationalists played no major role in the withdrawal 
decision. However, had British forces remained in the area then this might have 
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encouraged the growth of the nationalist movements to dangerous proportions. 
Thus, Britain probably concluded that it would be better to withdraw from the 
area before internal opposition had reached boiling point. At the same time Britain 
had encouraged development in the area as a means of both absorbing any nation-
alist criticism and also of preparing the Emirates to stand on their own feet when 
the inevitable withdrawal came. The nature of this development will be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
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Chapter III 
Economic Development in the Trucial States 
3.1 Introduction 
By the end of 1967, although Britain had withdrawn from Aden; she had sent 
her Minister of State, Mr. Goronwy Roberts, to assure the rulers of the Gulf that 
there was no schedule for similar action in the Gulf and that Britain was going to 
remain as long as necessary. Nevertheless, a few months later, in January 1968, 
the same Minister returned to the Gulf in order to inform the rulers that Britain 
now had a plan to withdraw by the end of 1971. The crucial question asked by 
many people, including members of the House of Commons, was, why did Britain 
not withdraw from the Gulf at the same time as she withdrew from Aden? Would 
it not have been more convenient to have withdrawn from the whole area at the 
same time since it was expected that Britain would face difficulties in defending 
the Gulf without the Aden base? 
The answer to be assumed by this thesis was that Britain's economic interests 
in the Gulf were the motive for her remaining in the area. However, as we have 
seen in the previous chapter, keeping the British forces in the Gulf was creating a 
certain amount of anti-British feeling. Therefore, it seems that Britain remained 
in the Gulf after the withdrawal from Aden only as a temporary measure until 
such time that the Gulf Emirates should be able to stand on their own feet. Ac-
cordingly, this chapter intends to analyse economic development in the Trucial 
States with an emphasis on the British role. It will cover the Northern Trucial 
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States (Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah) Dubai 
and Abu Dhabi Emirates. Furthermore, it will attempt to explain Britain's role 
and aim in encouraging development in the area and assessing whether those Emi-
rates were in fact sufficently developed enough to be left to their own devices by 
the end of 1971. 
3.2 Britain's role in the economic development 
Modern economic development in the Trucial States passed through two 
stages. First, in the early fifties, Britain had encouraged development and con-
tinued to do so until 1965. The second stage started in 1965 and lasted until the 
establishment of the United Arab Emirates in 1971. 
In the first stage, the amount of money that Britain contributed was very 
modest. The objectives were to create certain facilities for the oil companies which 
had directed their efforts towards the Gulf after the Persian oil dispute of 1951. 
Since the oil companies needed to import a great deal of heavy equipment in order 
to expand oil production, the rulers were encouraged to develop their ports to which 
Britain allocated some aid. 1 Thus, the first of the United Kingdom's objectives 
for promoting development was to protect and facilitate the activities of the oil 
companies. The other objective in the fifties was to improve economic conditions 
in the Trucial States in order to build up their resistance to nationalism2 and the 
new influence being exerted by the Arab League. Therefore, the objectives of the 
first stage were part of Britain's general policy towards the Middle East which was 
to preserve her economic and political interests.3 
The total amount that had been contributed to development in the Trucial 
States from 1954 to 1965 was only £1,050,000. It included the following: the 
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establishment of a school in Sharjah in 1953; the provision of water supplies in Ras 
al-Khaimah; the improvement of Dubai Hospital4 ; falaj restoration in Buraimi; the 
dredging of Dubai creek; the establishment of dispensaries in different Emirates; 
the establishment of an agricultural Trial Station in Diqdaqah in 1957, and a 
Trade School in Sharjah. 5 Aid from other sources was also welcomed in the Trucial 
States. Kuwait, for example, had assisted with education and medical aid; Qatar 
and Bahrain also assisted in educational developments and the United Nations 
had assisted in water surveying,6 together with the anti-locust project 7 and indeed 
such aids were encouraged by Britain. 
The second stage of development in the Trucial States was on a wider scale. 
It involved creating a Development Office under the authority of the Trucial States 
Council (TSDO) in 1965. However, before discussing the activities of the Devel-
opment Office, it is necessary to analyse the reasons for its creation. 
In contrast to Britain's aim of economic development in the fifties as a means 
of strengthening her presence in the area, it seemed that the new policies were in 
fact, preparatory to her departure. In reply to a question in the House of Commons 
George Thomson, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, in an attempt to stress the 
attention that was being given to economic development in the Gulf, stated on 17 
April 1967:9 
the Trucial States Development fund was set up by the present Government a 
year or so ago with a capital grant of over £1 million. Work has been continuing on 
an all-weather road link between the Truda! States. We shall push ahead with these 
constructive proposals. 
The objectives of the development plans in the sixties were various. Firstly, 
Britain introduced such a policy as an alternative to the Arab League assistance 
that was not welcomed by Britain because of the League's political activities (see 
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chapter 2). Secondly, the policy aimed at preparing the emirates to stand on 
their own feet before the withdrawal day. George Thomson, after his visit to 
the Gulf States, May 8 - 16 1965, explained that the British Government was 
anxious to modernize her relationship with the Gulf States.10 Such steps included 
giving added assistance to the less wealthy states in order to promote economic and 
political advance and to transfer to them certain functions such as jurisdiction over 
foreigners. The more developed Emirates such as Bahrain were recommended to 
join some of the United Nations organisations. The others were encouraged to meet 
together to discuss their common problems, such as the currency crisis during the 
devaluation of the Indian Rupee.l1 Furthermore, Mr. George Brown, the British 
Foreign Secretary, explained this aim on 20th July 1967 by saying that "it is our 
long-term aim to create a situation in which these small States can stand on their 
own feet." 12 However, Brown did not clarify the reasons why Britain wished to help 
those states and he by-passed the protection of oil as the possible main reason. 13 It 
thus appeared that the policy initiated by the Labour Government was a long-term 
plan which aimed not only at the protection of oil interests but at maintaining the 
old pax Britannica system and of replacing it eventually with a local one through 
developments in the area. 14 
In order to accomplish the above mentioned objectives, it was necessary to 
keep British troops in the Gulf even if the ability to defend it without the Aden 
base was questionable. Mr. Duncan Sandys, the former Tory Colonial Secretary, 
questioned the policy of remaining in the Gulf after evacuating the Aden base. 
He pointed this out in the House of Commons on 12th June 1967: "Once we 
have broken our commitments and withdrawn our protection from South Arabia, 
it will be politically and militarily almost impossible to hang on in the Persian 
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Gul£." 15 Even though it is possible that the Labour Government had accepted 
that argument, it could not have withdrawn from the Gulf at the same time as the 
withdrawal from Aden. Britain wanted to withdraw from the Gulf, but they had to 
remain temporarily because the Emirates were not yet developed. Therefore, the 
troops in Sharjah, Bahrain and Masirah were increased and military installations 
were built up. Mr. Denis Healey explained this policy in the House of Commons 
on 18 January 1967:16 
the point is to insure the continued stability of the Gulf until countries in the 
area are capable of maintaining stability on their own. We do not regard a base in 
Aden as being necessary for that purpose. But consequent on leaving Aden, we feel 
it necessary to make a small increase in our forces in the Persian Gulf to maintain 
our obligations. 
Thus, we may deduce that the presence of British troops in the Gulf was for 
the purpose of maintaining stability while development was taking place, and that 
when the said aim had been accomplished they would be withdrawn. This brings 
the discussion to the question of the economic accomplishments of the Trucial 
States Development Office (TSDO) and the other economic developments that 
were encouraged by the British Government in the Trucial States. 
3.3 The Trucial States Development Office 
The aim of the Trucial States Development Office (TSDO) was, as has been 
seen, to prepare the Trucial States to stand on their own feet. It was assumed 
by the British authorities that Abu Dhabi, and Dubai to a lesser extent, would 
share their wealth with the Northern Trucial States17 ; hence, the setting up of the 
TSDO in the summer of 1965 was intended to develop the less wealthy Emirates. 
The TSDO followed two objectives: the first was to provide inter-state services, 
the second was to provide capital programmes in the Northern Trucial States.18 To 
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achieve these two aims, the Gulf rulers were asked to contribute to the Development 
Fund that was put under the authority of the Trucial States Council. The initial 
contribu.tions allocated to the Fund were as follows: 
- Britain £1,000,000 (over 3.5 years) 
- Qatar £250,000 
- Abu Dhabi £100,000 
- Bahrain £40,00019 
A further sum of £100,000 was subsequently received from Abu Dhabi during 
Sheikh Shakhbiifs reign, but it was after Sheikh Zayed's accession to power in 
August 1966 that the Development Fund received more than £2 million from 
Abu Dhabi (up to August 196820 ). By 1971 Abu Dhabi's contributions to the 
Fund amounted to more than 90 per cent of a total of £13 million.21 Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia did not contribute through TSDO but were allowed to give 
assistance directly to the rulers of the Emirates. Egypt, on the other hand, wanted 
to contribute through the Arab League mission (see chapter 2) but the British 
authorities insisted that any contribution should be made through TSDO which 
Egypt refused to do. 
The entire administration of this organisation which was responsible for run-
ning the development in the Trucial States, was concentrated in the hands of the 
British Political Agent, who was the chairman of the Trucial States Council un-
til 1966. According to the new policy of preparing the States to replace Britain, 
Sheikh Shakhbut was approached by the Agency to chair the TSC but he declined. 
Thus Sheikh $aqr of Ras al-Khaimah was elected in March 1966.23 However, the 
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Political Agent played the leading role in the discussions regarding economic and 
political issues. He also retained his seat on the TSC and attended all its meetings; 
in addition, he sat in on the meetings of the development committees such as the 
Deliberative Committee, and his suggestions were seriously considered. 
The other influential British personnel in the development activities were some 
26 British experts at senior staff level in the TSDO. In 1965 Mr C. B. Kendall was 
appointed as Acting Director of the TSDO, a job he held until 1971, when he 
became Financial Adviser to the TSC.24 Other officials included: Mr H. G. Rae 
who was the Director of Public Works; Mr Van Ollenbach the former Director of 
' 
Agriculture in the Bahrain Government; Mr J. McKay the Agriculture Adviser to 
the TSDO; Mr. A. White the Fisheries Adviser; and Mr J. Taylor the Technical 
Education Adviser. The remaining staff were either Jordanian, such as 'Adi al-
Baitar, the Secretary-General of the TSC, or Omanis such as the Health Adviser, 
Dr. 'A~,>im al-Jama1I. 25 Generally, the contribution of ex-British Colonial Office 
civil servants and the like to development in the Trucial States was effective, prob-
ably due to their experience in the Sudan Civil Service, Aden, India, Africa and 
the Ministry of Overseas Development, Beirut office. 26 
These senior advisers, in co-operation with the advisers to the rulers, many 
of whom were British or Arabs appointed on the recommendation of the British 
political agent, were very influential in making the rulers accept British views on 
development priorities. Such senior advisers were also supposed to train nationals 
to replace the advisers before their departure. For example, during the discussion 
of the TSC budget in 1967 the Secretary-General of TSC, al-Baitar, insisted on 
creating some major posts which should be filled by nationals. However, the rulers 
believed that it was better to spend money on development projects rather than 
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training nationals but they reluctantly accepted the demand of the Secretary-
General.27 Consequently, by 1970, some nationals were ready to take their place 
in the development programme; for example, 'lsa al-Gurg was appointed as the 
Director of Development; Abdullah al-Mazru 't as the Director of the Development 
Office; Salim I;Iumayd as the Principle of Trade Schools28; and other nationals 
were appointed in various departments. 29 
The assessment of the TSDO accomplishments, together with other develop-
ments that were encouraged by Britain, can be grouped into three categories. The 
first focusses on the social services: education, health, low-cost housing and the 
supply of water and electricity. The second category deals with provision of the 
economic infrastructure for transportaion, harbours and town development. Fi-
nally in the third section surveys of economic resources of agriculture and fisheries 
will be assessed.30 
3.3.1 Social Services 
Firstly, with respect to social services the Northern Trucial States were ex-
tremely poor and the essential needs of their indigenous population were, in large 
part, not fulfilled, nor were the needs of the rising number of immigrants. In view 
of these needs, the TSDO had offered a variety of social services in the areas of 
technical education, health, water supply, low cost housing, and electricity since 
its establishment in 1965. 
In the field of education the TSDO took responsibility for technical education.31 
There were three technical schools in the Trucial States established in Sharjah in 
1958, in Dubai in 1964 and in Ras-al-Khaimah in 1969.32 However, the demand for 
technical education was limited and the number of students attending those three 
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Table 3.1: TSDO: Social Services, (BD) 
Services 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 Total 
Education 101,779 89,866 130,745 232,836 318,805 279,329 295,680 1,449,000 
Health 76,320 73,197 123,726 192,829 316,349 433,772 344,211 1,560,403 
Housing 8,999 23,302 23,675 62,600 13,436 28,649 12,300 172,961 
Electricity 93,905 104,198 251,389 680,120 280,480 879,140 955,000 3,239,182 
Water supply 265,813 75,393 169,436 636,660 137,751 506,959 355,000 2,157,013 
Sources: 
TSC, Report, (1969). 
TSDO, Major Capital Works Programme, (1969 and 1970). 
TSDO, The Official Bulletin, (Dec., 1971). 
TSDO, News Letter of the Trucial States, (Dec., 1970). 
schools hardly increased: in 1970 there were 313 students; in 1971, 386 students.33 
All three schools offered a four year intermediate course of education, the first year 
being a preparatory technical course for all pupils, and the following three years 
being either a general engineering course or a carpentry course. In the final year 
the students usually specialized in one of the courses offered by the school such as 
electrical installation, motor vehicle work, welding or carpentry. 
In 1971, the Dubai 'Trade' School began a secondary technical course lead-
ing to the advanced qualifications necessary for obtaining the City and Guilds 
Certificate of the London Institute.34 The technical schools were, in fact, craft 
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training institutions which were preparing students for jobs in such fields as air-
conditioning, garage work, carpentry, etc. They had also associated with them a 
commercial school which prepared students for clerical jobs. The other programme 
which was run by the TSDO in the educational field was the scholarships and train-
ing programme. It was a 'future plan' policy to enable the local citizens to take 
over the work of the expatriates in the field of education. The programme was 
run by a TSDO Scholarship Selection Committee which was established in 1967. 
There were two programmes: firstly, a training programme to enable ex-students 
of further education to train abroad in the United Kingdom at colleges such as the 
Crawley College and King Alfred's College, Winchester,35 or in the Qatar Training 
Centre which had accepted 52 students in November 1970.36 Students could also 
train either in Bahrain or Sudan. 37 The second programme was to coordinate the 
scholarships awarded to the Trucial States by Arab countries like Egypt, Jordan 
and Iraq. 38 Although the Scholarship and Training Programmes were essential and 
many students had benefited from them, they did not produce enough qualified 
and educated citizens. This was because they were limited by the TSDO priorities 
in allocating the funds. 39 
The other social service supervised by the TSDO was the Health Department. 
On the establishment of the TSDO in 1965, the medical facilities available in the 
Trucial States consisted of a central hospital in Dubai, al-Maktum Hospital, which 
was established in 1950 with 75 beds; a small hospital in Ras al-Khaimah with 10 
beds; 10 clinics in different parts of the Emirates, and a touring doctor system.40 
The TSDO, from 1965 to the establishment of the Federation of the UAE in 1971, 
had spent some BD 1.6 million on health.41 It had covered the expenses of building 
more clinics and extending the existing facilities, but the TSDO's role in health 
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care was gradually diminishing due to Kuwait's increasing assistance in this field. 
Abu Dhabi was also directly financing some health facilities in the Northern Trucial 
States.42 
In comparison with the quite extensive support of the health services, the 
TSDO had taken little interest in building low-cost housing. The houses in the 
Trucial States were usually of the barasti type (houses built of palm fronds).43 In 
1965 Sheikh Mul).ammad al-Sharqi of Fujairah requested the Development Fund 
to implement a low-cost housing development programme in his Emirate instead 
of the electricity programme, a scheme which was given priority by the Trucial 
States Council.44 Accordingly, 42 houses were built by the TSDO in Fujairah and 
completed by 1968.45 The other areas that had received assistance in housing 
were MCU?fiit, Diba, Daqdiiqah and Umm-al-Qaiwain.46 The total amount spent on 
housing services was in the region of BD 173,000.47 
In terms of financial support the most expensive projects in the area ofsocial 
services carried out by the TSDO were the supply of water and electricity. In both 
areas, the TSDO had spent a total of more than BD 5,000,000.48 As far as the 
water supply was concerned, there were different methods implemented to provide 
adequate water. In May 1965 it was decided to set up a Water Resources Survey to 
investigate different water resources including: the measurement of floods in wadis; 
the falaj (the underground water canals) system; rainfall; and the assessment of 
the ground-water potential.49 Other resources were investigated through the Rural 
Water Development Scheme by drilling wells and distributing pumps on loan to 
the rural areas, 50 or by cleaning and repairing the falaj, such as the project of 
repairing the falaj of I:Iatta, MCU?ffit, Fill and Sakamkam.51 Finally, in order to 
avoid water supply difficulties in the cities, the 'Urban Water Supplies Project' 
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was implemented in the five Northern Trucial States in 1965. The Urban Water 
Supplies Project was carried out under the direction of Sir William Halcrow and 
Partners, the TSC's consultants. They followed a method of drilling certain bore 
holes away from the cities such as in Biday' 20 kilometres from Sharjah, and water 
was then carried through pipelines to storage tanks in the cities. 52 However, these 
small projects proved inadequate. For example, in Sharjah with the increase in 
British troops, as a result of the evacuation from Aden, the ruler of Sharjah had 
to commission another company to drill more wells in the summer of 1968.53 
Supplies of electricity were to be obtained by means of diesel engines under 
the supervision of the British firm of Kennedy and Donkin, the electrical consul-
tants to the TSDO which had seconded its engineer, Mr Wirsle, to reside in the 
Trucial States. 54 Accordingly, in 1966, four power stations were constructed, in 
Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain and Ras al-Khaimah.55 In Fujairah, the Ruler 
had contracted a private company to supply electricity to Fujairah city but the 
TSDO had carried out the electrical scheme in Diba town in Fujairah. 56 The total 
electricity capacity of the Northern Trucial States in 1969 was 10 MW.57 Finally, 
with the expansion of electricity supplies in the Northern Trucial States, the re-
sponsibilities of operating as well as financing electricity were handed over to the 
governments of these states early in 1971.58 
3.3.2 Economic infrastructure in the Trucial States 
In the area of economic infrastructure, the TSDO carried out an important 
scheme which particular emphasis on roads, harbours and town development. Con-
sequently, the improvement of such basic infrastructure facilities had a lasting effect 
in linking the Trucial States together. In addition, the harbour development also 
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made it easier for the other development programmes to be carried out. Until1964 
there had been no proper system of roads in the Trucial States, except for small 
internal roads. However, from 1964 to 1971 over 220 kms of all-weather surfaced 
roads were constructed and a network of internal town roads was developed in the 
five Northern Trucial States. 58 This was achieved at an estimated total cost of BD 
6.5 million, of which 75% was financed by Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, 17% by 
the TSDO and the remaining 8% apparently by the Emirates themselves.59 The 
TSDO's role in terms of finance was very minor when we bear in mind that most 
of the TSDO fund was financed by Abu Dhabi. However, the TSDO had initiated 
the plans and had encouraged the rulers to participate in them as the following 
example. 
A pioneer road of an inter-state type was the Dubai-Sharjah road which was 
financed by the TSDO fund and supervised and designed by Sir William Halcrow 
and Partners. The other roads that the TSDO constructed were some 11 kms of 
town roads in Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain and Ras al-Khaimah, and a small 
road of 4 kms in the village of Khan in Sharjah.60 
The other road project which commenced in 1967 but was not completed until 
after the establishment ofthe UAE,61 was the trans-peninsular and east coast roads 
of 125 kms .62 The 'Eastern Coast Roads Programme' was vital for integrating the 
east and west coasts of the U AE 63 and took some years to complete. There were 
several obstacles, including shortage of funds, 64 rugged mountainous terrain and 
wadi beds to negotiate, as well as the use of the area by the British Royal Engineers 
and by other British troops for training purposes. 65 
The final project that was initiated by the TSDO with regard to transport 
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Table 3.2: Roads in the Trucial States 
Roads Length Authority Cost 
(BD OOOs) 
Dubai Sharjah 13.5 Development Office 428 
Town roads in Development Office 52 
Sharjah - Ras al-Khaimah 
Thans-Peninsula and Development Office 438 
East coast roads 
Khan village 3 Development Office 37 
Sharjah town roads Development Office 53 
Ajman town roads Development Office 29 
U mm-al-Qaiwain Development Office 29 
Ras al-Khaimah causeway Development Office 32 
Ras al-Khaimah town Development Office 36 
Sharjah towns 20 Sharjah 320 
Khan - Sharjah - 4 Sharjah 120 
dual carriageway 
Sharjah - Dhayd 48 Abu Dhabi 1,300 
Ajman town roads 6 Abu Dhabi 90 
Sharjah-Ras al-Khaimah 116 Saudi Arabia 3,500 
Total 221.5 6484 
Sources: 
"Roads in the Thucial States" Appendix to Newsletter of the Trucial States Council, 
1-15 September 1970, pp. 1-4; TSDO, The Official Bulletin, December 1971, pp. 3 and 
18; TSDO 23/8, Minutes of 29th Session of TSC. Dubai, 29.8.1967, pp. 13-14. 
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was the proposal of a road running from south of Ras al-Khaimah to al-'Ayn, 
a distance of approximately 175 kms. The road was considered necessary for 
the road network of the Trucial States as well as for marketing the agricultural 
products from projects planned at Milail,lah, Dhayd and l:lamraniyyah. However, 
because there were some financial problems the road was eventually completed by 
the Federal Ministry in the summer of 1978.66 
With reference to ports, Dubai was the first to take the advice of the British 
authorities and develop its harbour. Following the Iranian oil dispute of 1951, 
the oil companies increased their oil drilling in the Gulf and this necessitated the 
development of harbours for the importation of heavy machinery. 67 The other 
Trucial States took some time to raise funds and for the most part, this was done 
under TSDO supervision. 
There were a number of other projects undertaken by the TSDO or by the 
Governments of the northern Emirates for example, the Sharjah 20 berth deep 
water jetty which was financed by Sharjah State sources and cost BD 1.4 million. 
However, in Ajman and Umm-al-Qaiwain, the TSDO had financed 35 metre jetties 
at a combined cost of BD 66,000 which were completed in 1968.68 The Ajman and 
Umm al-Qaiwain Governments had to contract other British consultants for further 
work in their harbours due to the small amount that was allowed by the TSDO. 
Ras al-Khaimah, on the other hand, managed to obtain funds from the British 
Government of £43,000 in order to improve its port before the establishment of 
the TSD0.69 A further project designed for protection of the small port ofMa'ayri<;l 
against sea storms involved the lining of its bank by some one and a quarter km of 
rocks. This was undertaken in April 1967 by the TSD0.70 In addition, the Khor 
Kuwair jetty of Ras al-Khaimah was built in 1968 to enable rocks to be exported to 
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Abu Dhabi for the construction of its new port; this was financed by Abu Dhabi. 
The other project which was implemented in Ras al-Khaimah, in co-operation with 
the Union Oil Company, was a BD 385,000 scheme to solve the problem of shifting 
sands at the entrance to Ras al-Khaimah harbour. The operation was essential to 
enable offshore oil explorations.71 Moreover, on the east coast of the Trucial States 
the only harbour facility was a small jetty in Khor Fakkan which was constructed 
by the Public Works Department of the TSDO at a cost of BD 80,000 in 1968.72 
Unlike the other coastal towns, the Diba and Fujairah jetty projects were not 
carried out until after the establishment of the Federal Government in 1971.73 
As well as the development of roads and harbours, there were other small 
economic infrastructure projects that were carried out by the TSDO or by the 
local authorities and the oil companies, such as the building of small roads in 
the towns, street lighting, the building of slaughter-houses, and a 50-line radio 
telephone exchange in Ajman and Umm al-Qaiwain developed in early 1969 at a 
cost of BD 27,000. The telephone network that was established in Sharjah, Ras-
al-Khaimah and Fujairah was through direct agreement between those States and 
the British Cable and Wireless Company. 74 
3.3.3 Surveys of economic resources 
With regard to the third aim of development in the Trucial States, the ex-
ploitation of the existing resources as well as the search for new resources and 
thus the diversification of the country's economy, the TSDO's role was in the main 
limited to surveys, most of which were on water resources. 75 
The main economic resources which were of concern to the TSDO were agri-
culture and fisheries. As fish is an important natural resource in the Trucial States, 
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the TSDO had put some effort into integrating this as part of the local industry. 
In 1964, the British Chief Fisheries Officer in Aden visited the Trucial States 
and after a second visit to the area in February 1965 recommended the development 
of fisheries there. The recommendation was seconded by Dr. D. Hall, Fisheries 
Adviser to the British Ministry of Overseas Development, in April 1966.76 How-
ever, when the subject was brought up during the TSC ordinary meeting on 16 
November 1966, the rulers had their doubts as to the success of such an industry 
and suggested instead that contact should be made with a private fishing company. 
Despite the fact that the Political Agent was not happy with this resolution, he 
contacted a Bahraini fishing company, 77 but it was not interested in the Trucial 
States fishing industry. Accordingly, the Agent brought this item to the Deliber-
ative Committee Session and reminded them of Dr. Hall's recommendations and 
that the Deliberative Committee had agreed to present the fisheries item to the 
next TSC ordinary meeting. 78 The TSC hesitantly accepted the recommendation 
of the Deliberative Committee to establish a Fisheries Department at the end of 
1967 headed by a British Adviser, Mr. A. W. White. 79 The Fisheries Adviser ac-
cordingly prepared a proposal for a 3-year development plan costing BD 2,000,000 
and which included the following: the purchase of a fishing vessel; the construction 
of offices, and a marine workshop; a loan scheme for fishermen and wholesale fish 
markets with ice plants and cold storage in various places in the Trucial States. 80 
Because, however, the rulers in the TSC were not convinced of the value of 
the plan, sufficient funds were not made available until the end of 1969,81 and 
offices were not ready until March 1970.82 In the meantime, the Fisheries Adviser 
managed to gain the support of the Sheikh of Umm al-Qaiwain for the scheme. As 
a result, he opened an office there, built a small marine workshop and distributed 
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63 marine engines to fishermen under the Government of Umm al-Qaiwain's loan 
scheme for fishermen. 83 In Khor Fakkan on the east coast of the Trucial States, 
the Fisheries Department headquarters was finally built by the TSDO in 1970 and 
was equipped with a fishing boat for exploration, the Majid laboratory, a marine 
workshop, staff quarters,84 cold stores and an ice factory.85 
The reason for the rulers disinclination over the fishing industry was both 
economic and social. Economically, there were contradictory reports on the pos-
sibilities of commercial quantities of fish being available in the territorial waters 
of the Trucial States.86 However, the Fisheries Adviser reported to the TSC in 
February 1970 that a considerable resource of small shrimp suitable for canning 
had been discovered off Ras al-Khaimah,87 and commercial quantities of anchovy 
were available off Ghurfah in Fujairah State.88 Nevertheless, even though the sur-
vey samples proved promising for a potential canning industry, the rulers were 
concerned that such a project would result in the destruction of traditional fishing 
activities and threaten the livelihood of many of their subjects. 89 
The British authorities in the Gulf had realized the importance of agricul-
ture in 1950 and had arranged for Mr. Robin Huntingdon, an ex-TOS officer, to 
establish the Agricultural Trials Station at Diqdaqah in 1955.90 The TSDO took 
over the Diqdaqah Station in 1965 and extended its activities. By 1971 the Trial 
Station comprised an agricultural school, which was opened on 11 October 1967 
and cost the TSDO BD 7,000 a year.91 However, the number of students attending 
the school was very low.92 There was also a veterinary clinic; livestock breeding; 
seeds, fertilisers and tractor services to the farmer, and the Milail,lah agricultural 
scheme. 
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In 1968 a 300 hectare agricultural scheme was established by the TSDO in 
Milail,tah at the cost of BD 47,172. This scheme involved the development of irri-
gated agriculture using well water and consisted of the creation of small 4 hectare 
plots for the cultivation mainly of vegetables.93 The new farms that were created 
were offered to tribesmen from Bani Qitab who were encouraged to settle there 
and become farmers. The scheme was successful in bringing about the settlement 
of the tribesmen. The Bani Qitab agricultural development was less successful in 
economic terms because the tribesmen needed training before they could under-
take successful farming activities. Instead of following the TSDO programme for 
agriculture development the newly settled tribesmen established their own rather 
different agriculture activities. 94 
To summarize the TSDO's share of developments in the Trucial States from 
1965-1971 one cannot but admire its accomplishments but not without some reser-
vations. The allocation of resources shows clearly the emphasis that the TSDO 
had put on creating the basic infrastructure facilities particularly roads, harbours, 
water and electricity. Yet, at the same time, expenditure on education, health, 
agriculture and other capital projects had been small, if not negligible. Further-
more, the amount of funding allocated to developing different projects was not 
sufficient to create a strong basis for future developments. Accordingly, since inde-
pendence most of the projects initiated by the TSDO have been redesigned, such 
as the eastern roads, or completely abandoned, such as the Milail,lah agriculture 
scheme. Added to that, there was, to a certain extent a lack of integration in the 
development plans among the northern Trucial States, on the one hand, and Dubai 
and Abu Dhabi on the other. 
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3.4 Development in Dubai 
British involvement in development in Dubai and Abu Dhabi differed from 
that in the Northern Trucial States in that it was of an indirect nature involving 
mainly consultative and technical advice. In the case of Dubai, Britain did not 
need to give aid because the private sector contributed to Dubai's economic devel-
opment. Whereas Dubai had embraced the ideas for development put forward by 
the Political Agent in the 1950s, Sheikh Shakhbiit, ruler of Abu Dhabi 1928-1966, 
completely rejected British pressure for change. 
The first important development project in Dubai was the deepening of the 
creek in 1958 under the supervision of the British consultants, Sir William Halcrow 
and Partners. The harbour was dredged again in 1967 at a cost of more than £9 
million by the British contractor, Richard Costain; the consulting engineers were 
again Hal crow and Partners. 95 In addition, with the expanding trade activities 
in Dubai, it was necessary to build an airport which the Dubai Government did 
in 1961 and which was replaced by an all-weather international airport in May 
1965.96 The other project completed early in the 1960s was a small bridge over 
the Dubai creek at a cost of £194,000, which was paid for by the Ruler of Qatar, 
the son-in law of Sheikh Rashid bin Sa 'ld, the Ruler of Dubai.97 By 1967, further 
business-oriented projects had been created such as luxury hotels, cinemas, sports 
stadia and three international banks. 98 
The Dubai Government appears not to have been over-concerned with the 
social services in the 1960s. Fortunately, for the Dubai Government, health and 
education were paid for by the Kuwaiti Government and electricity, water and tele-
phone systems were being run by private companies.99 However, with the discovery 
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of oil in 1966, social services development in Dubai increased with the building of 
houses and town roads, the setting up of a new chamber of commerce, the taking-
over of postal services from the British Postal Agencies, the establishment of a new 
fish and vegetable market, together with the construction, in June 1968, of huge 
oil installations and underwater storage tanks holding 500,000 gallons.l00 
It is worth noting that development in Dubai was influenced by certain ele-
ments in Dubai society. For example, the ruler of Dubai himself, Sheikh Rashid 
al-Maktfim, was commercially rather than politically minded. He also surrounded 
himself with certain consultants who were above all businessmen like Mahdi al-
Tajir and 'lsa al-Gurg. 101 At the same time the Dubai community contained 
certain elements of Persian origin who were skilled in commercial activity due 
partly to their previous experience on the Iranian side of the Gulf. Finally, there 
was the business activity and acumen of certain British companies such as Gray 
Mackenzie and Company, the shipping and marine adviser; Halcrow and Partners, 
the favoured consultants; John Harris, architect and town planner of Dubai; the 
British Bank of the Middle East; Richard Costain civil engineers; George Wimpey 
and company; and Cable and Wireless. 
However, Dubai's economic development would not have been possible with-
out its entrepot trade. Since the 1920s when many Persian merchants settled in 
Dubai, enterport trade had been the dominant economic activity. For example, in 
1969 the Middle East Development Division (British Ministry of Overseas Devel-
opment) found that in Dubai the largest proportion of the population were engaged 
in trade whereas in the other Sheikhdoms the largest proportion of the population 
were engaged in agriculture and fishing. Dubai, capitalizing on its geographical 
position, carried out trade with Iran, Saudi Arabia, the other Gulf emirates and 
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the Indian Continent to the extent that most of Dubai's imports were re-exported 
again, especially to the above mentioned countries. For example, it was estimated 
that in 1968 Dubai had actually made a total income from all trading activities 
amounting to BD 13 million in comparison to the oil income of the same year 
which amounted to only BD 0.31 million. 102 In brief, Dubai's prosperity by the 
end of the sixties had made it more than prepared to survive economically without 
the official backing of the British. 
3.5 Development in Abu Dhabi 
The previous analyses drew attention to Britain's role in pioneering modern 
development in Dubai and the less wealthy Northern Trucial States. In Abu Dhabi, 
by contrast, Britain had some problems in pursuing the same policy while Sheikh 
Shakhbut was ruler. The problem was not one of money but Sheikh Shakhbut's 
stand on development. 
In comparison to the other Emirates, Abu Dhabi was rich but Sheikh Shakhbufs 
policy would never have indicated this fact. For example, in 1963 Abu Dhabi re-
ceived £2.3 million from her oil revenue, in 1967 £39.6 million and by 1971 it 
was receiving £179.2 million (see table 3.3). But the estimated total development 
expenditure from 1962 to 1966 was only £1.75 million. The projects that were 
undertaken during the reign of Sheikh Shakhbut included: a 9-inch water pipe 
line from al- 'Ayn town to Abu Dhabi; a small jetty in Abu Dhabi; two water-
distillation plants; a couple of schools; a power station; a small hospital; and a 
number of roads within the Enirate.103 
In the following section the role played by Britain in the development process 
during Sheikh Shakhbut reign will be analysed. Furthermore, the reasons for the 
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Table 3.3: Abu Dhabi Oil Revenue ( £m.) 
Year Amount 
1962 0.7 
1963 2.3 
1964 4.4 
1965 11.9 
1966 35.6 
1967 39.6 
1968 64.1 
1969 79.9 
1970 96.9 
1971 179.2 
Sources: 
UAE, Currency Board, Bulletin, vol. 1, No. 2, May 1975, p. 123. 
deposition of Sheikh Shakhbut will be considered together with the extent to which 
Britain prepared Abu Dhabi for the eventual withdrawal. 
The assessment of Sheikh Shakhbiifs case and his policy with regard to devel-
opment is important to the understanding of Britain's role. On the one hand, there 
is a considerable literature which regarded his position as against development, but 
on the other hand there appears to be little in the way of objective reasoning. Ac-
cording to Taryam, Sheikh Shakhbut was against development as was Sultan Sa 'td 
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of Oman, neither of whom therefore suited British policy towards the area at this 
time. 104 Al-Mutawah, however, argued that Sheikh Shakhbufs policy would en-
danger the area through the spread of unrest that might come from the Dhofar 
Revolution or through the influence of the Arab League. 105 The Financial Times 
early remarks on Sheikh Shakhbut were a warning to the British authorities: 106 
If the revenue from oil at Abu Dhabi is not to be used for the benefit of the 
people, it would be an absurdity for the whole sheikhly system. This will be a great 
blunder by Sheikh Shakhbii~ and a revolution and tribal armed conflict will be the 
consequence. 
The above quote from The Financial Times about Sheikh Shakhbut might 
have prepared the ground for his removal. On another occasion it was declared 
that he was 'keeping his oil revenues under his bed'. 107 
The number of accusations continued, occasionally by a prominent British 
politician such as Mr. Edward Heath who BMl met Sheikh Shakhbut in his first 
Gulf trip in 1966. He wrote that Sheikh Shakhbut:108 
was known for his astuteness and his ruthlessness - the former being demon-
strated in his dealings with the oil companies, the latter in the way in which he had 
usurped his father's position and maintained himself in power. 
Finally, Sheikh Shakhbut was accused of treating the British with suspicion 
and severity. The author Mann wrote of him: 109 
In his relationships with the British, it appears that he is suspicious and achieves 
a hidden satisfaction in irritating and confusing them. 
The above views concerning the personality of Sheikh Shakhbut can be un-
derstood in the light of various points. Sheikh Shakhbut refused to accept the 
British Government's advice to utilize his oil wealth in developing his Emirate. 
For example, Colonel Hugh Boustead, who earlier had failed to encourage Sultan 
Sa 'ld of Oman to improve the conditions in his country, was appointed by the 
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British Government to serve in Abu Dhabi with the hope that Arab respect for 
age and his previous experience would be of influence. However, his hopes and the 
hopes of Sheikh Shakhbiit 's British private secretary, William Clark, were dashed 
and they both failed to influence Shakhbiit to develop Abu Dhabi. Rather the 
Sheikh declared himself uninterested in their advice and was completely averse to 
forming a governmental structure or acting on any advice from them. 11° Further-
more, in 1962 he refused the £25 million development plan for Abu Dhabi town 
commissioned by the British firms, Sir William Halcrow and Partners, Scott and 
Wilson, and Kirkpatrick and Partners.111 
Furthermore, Sheikh Shakhbiifs policy on development had created problems 
for British companies working in his Emirate. For example, the British Bank 
of the Middle East had signed an agreement with Sheikh Shakhbut on 7 March 
1958 to open offices in Abu Dhabi territories.l12 The Bank became interested in 
Abu Dhabi on the news of an oil discovery there and in February 1959 a small 
branch was opened in Abu Dhabi town.l13 Initially, Sheikh Shakhbii~ welcomed 
the Bank which was willing to pay 20% of the net profits of the branches in 
Abu Dhabi territory to the Ruler. The Bank also agreed to employ Abu Dhabi 
subjects as part of its staff as Shakhbii~ demanded. 114 However, Sheikh Shakhbii~ 
withdrew his money from the BBME after a personal dispute with the Bank's 
manager and that resulted in the BBME branch in Abu Dhabi accumulating losses 
of nearly £150,000 between 1959-1966.115 Also the British contractors, architects 
and private investors such as Halcrow and Partners and Wimpey's faced difficulties 
in getting contracts from Sheikh Shakhbii~ who preferred Arab firms such as the 
Lebanese owned Contracting and Trading Company (CAT).116 
On top of that, relations between Sheikh Shakhbii~ and the oil companies were 
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also deteriorating. It is clear that at first the oil companies enjoyed good relations 
with Sheikh Shakhbut as can be seen from correspondence between Shakhbut and 
the Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd in 1960. For example, R.E.R. 
Bird, on behalf of the Petroleum Development, wrote to Sheikh Shakhbut on the 
28th October 1960, informing him of the financial arrangements that his company 
was prepared to offer after the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in Abu 
Dhabi. He states: 117 
I am writing to confirm our discussion yesterday when I said that my Co., had 
much pleasure in saying that it is making arrangements to pay to Your Excellency 
£125,000 sterling immediately and a further £125,000 sterling on the 27th October 
1961 both payments (totalling £250,000 sterling) being advances against and to be 
recoverable from payments to Your Excellency in respect of royalty after the com-
mencement of export of oil. [Sheikh Shakhbufs reply was] I agree to the foregoing. 
In 1964, however, when the oil companies proposed a new 50-50 oil profit 
sharing arrangement which had been introduced in other oil producing countries, 
the oil companies had great difficulties getting Sheikh Shakhbut to accept it. The 
Economist pointed out that oil had brought problems for Abu Dhabi as the example 
of Sheikh Shakhbufs rejecting the oil companies' proposal of a 50-50 agreement 
demonstrated. 118 According to Sir Donald Hawley, Political Agent in the Trucial 
States 1959-61, ~ Sheikh Shakhbut was unwilling to agree to new and more 
favourable terms of a 50-50 arrangement because he came to fully understand the 
terms of the original concession whereby he was paid a fixed royalty of 12.50% 
for each ton of oil exported from his Emirate. But the new arrangements were 
probably too complicated for him to adjust to and understand.119 Or as the ARR 
pointed out that the new arrangements were not welcomed by Shakhbut because 
he was appalled at the speed of the change which oil wealth was going to bring to 
his Emirate. 120 However; the evidence suggest that Sheikh Shakhbut was deeply 
suspicious of possible implication of the oil companies proposal giving what he 
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believed the betrayal by the British over the territorial disputes (see below). He 
though eventually agreed to sign the 50-50 profit sharing propsal in September 
1965. 
The other problem that occurred between the British Government and Sheikh 
Shakhbut was his stand with regard to the TSDO. Since Abu Dhabi was the richest 
of the Trucial States 'it is an important ingredient in any co-operative venture' 
in the Gulf wrote the Times, 121 However, Sheikh Shakhbut was not willing to 
cooperate with the British authorities by using his wealth to develop the poorer 
northern Trucial States. Mr. Heath, during his discussions with Sheikh Shakhbut 
in 1966, found that it was difficult to persuade him122 
to help the rest of the Trucial States and to relieve the British taxpayers of 
!lome of the burden they were carrying. 
But to Mr. Heath's surprise, Sheikh Shakhbut answered him with some 
shrewdness by saying: "Who do you think I am? Some sort of communist fellow? 123" 
By now the British authorities in the Trucial States were convinced that 
development in the northern Trucial States could not proceed without the partie-
ipation of Abu Dhabi. Therefore, in order to interest Sheikh Shakhbut in their 
policy, he was invited to be the first chairman of the Trucial States Council in 
November 1965. His reply was that he was willing to attend the TSC meetings but 
was not prepared to chair it 124 , but he did accept their other proposal of creating 
a special flag for the Council. 125 Furthermore, in 1966 he had paid £200,000 to 
the Council funds and was promising a further £300,000. But, the British desire 
for more comprehensive cooperation between Shakhbut and the northern Trucial 
States and stronger involvement in the TSDO programmes had been resisted by 
Sheikh Shakhbut. 126 
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The reasons for Sheikh Shakhbiifs refusal to cooperate with the British au-
thorities and the difficulties he had caused British private companies can be un-
derstood in the light of various points. One factor may have been the British 
Government's role in the dispute between Qatar and Abu Dhabi in 1960 over 
J:laliil island which made Sheikh Shakhbiit mistrust the British. 
The J:laliil affair began with the oil companies' exploration for oil in the ter-
ritories of the Gulf emirates. At that time ownership of the Island of J:laliil was 
recognized by the British Government as belonging to Abu Dhabi, but in 1958 
the Shell Company in Qatar wanted to use the island as a base for its offshore 
operations, since the ruler of Qatar included it in the Shell concession. The British 
Government therefore had appointed two British experts and asked both rulers to 
submit their cases to them for arbitration. In his letter to Sheikh Shakhbut in 
December 1960, the British Political Resident in Bahrain, Mr. G. H. Middleton, 
urged Sheikh Shakhbut to cooperate with the experts:127 
Her Majesty's Government were most anxious to achieve an early solution of 
the question of the ownership of the Island of ij:alul...Therefore two experts have been 
assigned to visit the Gulf in order to examine the evidence of both sides. 
The experts visited both emirates, Qatar and Abu Dhabi, and examined the 
available documents and claims. Qatar, with the help of its Egyptian lawyer, Dr. 
Hasan Kamil, had presented its documented claims to the British legal experts. 
Shakhbiit, however, "refused point blank to discuss its sovereignty, on the grounds 
that since H.M.G knew perfectly well it belonged to him, there was nothing to 
discuss." 128 He stated to the experts: "Why should I give you documents? This 
island is mine, there is no need to give documents129 ." The experts spent a whole 
year discussing and studying the question and finally reported in favour of Qatar. 
In a letter to Sheikh Shakhbut the Political Resident reported that according to 
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the judgement of the two experts they found that: " ... all the evidence available 
to them on l:laliil and the other islands justified Qatar's claims to l:laliil. [And] 
Her Majesty's Government endorse the conclusions",130 
This greatly angered Sheikh Shakhbut, to the extent that he accused Colonel 
Boustead, Political Agent in Abu Dhabi, and the British government of betraying 
him. Later, it was reported by Dr. Allan Horan, ADMA Chief Representative 
in Abu Dhabi that "Sheikh Shakhbut was very unhappy about the decision over 
I:Ialul" 131 . In reply to the Political Resident's letter Sheikh Shakhbut totally re-
jected the experts' verdict and stated that:132 
We have nothing to do with this which rather concerns you as, before this, you 
have disposed of Umm Sa 'Id according to your wishes and the company has made a 
port there for exporting oil. You have also disposed of ~alul according to your wishes 
and erected establishments thereon. 
We now have nothing to do with this affair and the matter is in your hands as 
it was before. 
It seems that Sheikh Shakhbut felt betrayed by the British decision to award 
the island to Qatar even though Britain had originally recognized his ownership 
of l:laliil. Therefore he accused the British Government of taking sides with Qatar 
so that they might establish the oil industry in l:laliil as they had established the 
port at Umm Sa 'Id in the southern part of Qatar also claimed by Abu Dhabi. 
The British decision over l;laliil island appears to have had a profound impact on 
Sheikh Shakhbiit who like other Gulf rulers had trusted the British implicitly. Now 
he saw that when it suited their interests the British would go back on their word 
by reversing a decision taken at an earlier date.133 
The other border dispute which upset Sheikh Shakhbut concerned the bound-
ary between Abu Dhabi and Dubai. A settlement of the disputed boundary was 
required to facilitate oil exploration, and was regarded by the Political Resident as 
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a matter of urgency. The Acting Political Resident, C.G. Mann, wrote to Sheikh 
Shakhbut on 16 May 1961, that it was not possible to delay this settlement any 
longer. 134 
Accordingly, in 1961 the British Political Resident in Bahrain sent Mr. An-
drew Johnston on a mission to make further studies of the frontier between the two 
Emirates. Mr. Johnston tried to persuade the two rulers to settle their dispute but 
failed. He therefore proposed his own solution to the dispute which was accepted 
by the British Government, but not by Abu Dhabi or Dubai.135 Sheikh Shakhbut 
strongly rejected the Johnston proposals but the British Government insisted that 
he accept them. 136 (See Internal boundaries in chapter 4). 
As a consequence of these incidents, Sheikh Shakhbiifs confidence in the 
British authorities was shattered and as a Sheikh with the sensitivities of the 
traditional Arab tribesman, he tried to avenge his injuries by rejecting anything 
associated with the British. On one occasion he told Boustead:137 
What sort of a. friend are you to give away my lands without even telling me? 
Besides l:laliil and the Abu Dhabi-Dubai border dispute, Shakhbiifs philoso-
phy of gradual development probably stemmed from his fear that a rapid pace of 
development would bring social problems to his subjects. Some observers argued 
that the Sheikh's rejection of British advice on development was prompted by his 
belief that fast economic development would bring further problems to Abu Dhabi. 
The Arab Report and Record stated that Sheikh Shakhbut was138 
afraid of the effects that sudden wealth and too rapid progress would have on 
his subjects and on the social structure of his state. 
Accordingly Sheikh Shakhbut 's refusal to cooperate with the British author-
ities in utilising his oil income for the development of his Emirate as well as the 
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non-oil producing Emirates would have created difficulties for British policy in the 
region; that of withdrawing and leaving behind a developed and stable govern-
ment. Sheikh Shakhbut had his own perception of development; that of gradual 
development which would not disturb the way of life his people were living. It 
was actually a problem of adjustment on the part of Sheikh Shakhbut to the new 
wealth that oil brought for Abu Dhabi. And even though he was slowly adapting 
himself and his subjects to this new wealth, the British authoritites expected more 
of him. However, when he failed to respond to their advice, the British wanted his 
removal and this was engineered by the British Government in co-operation with 
his family on 6th August 1966.139 
3.5.1 Abu Dhabi development after 1966 
We turn now to the reign of Shakhbut's successor Sheikh Zayed, who was both 
active in the economic development of Abu Dhabi as well as that of the northern 
Trucial States. In order to assess the extent of Abu Dhabi's progress before the 
withdrawal, two main points will be focussed on. Firstly, a description of the pro-
grammes that had been carried out during the first Five-Year Development Plan of 
Abu Dhabi in comparison with what had been achieved in Sheikh Shakhbiit's time. 
Secondly, the role of the British authorities and British firms will be investigated 
emphasising, (a) the participation of British firms and (b) the background of the 
people employed in development programmes in Abu Dhabi. 
On his accession to the Sheikhdom, Sheikh Zayed declared that140 
the ruler who is entrusted with power to safeguard the interests of the people 
will be considered useless by them if he lives for himself and exploits the wealth of 
the country for his personal interests. 
This statement was a clear indication that he was determined to be different 
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from the previous ruler in utilizing the oil wealth of his emirate. To his advantage, 
oil revenue had increased (see table 3.3) and thus Sheikh Zayed was able to spend 
money on many types of development in a manner that led the Times to speculate 
on his spending:141 
British officials, who once worried about his predecessor's tightfistedness, are 
now wondering whether to urge restraint. 
Indeed, as a result of exceedingly rapid development, the budget did run into 
a deficit in 1969 of BD 12 million.142 In an effort to counter this state of affairs, 
the government postponed the implementation of some projects as the deficit had 
affected the First Five-Year Development Plan of Abu Dhabi drawn up at the end 
of 1967 (see table 3.4).143 The amount that had been allocated for the Five-Year 
Development Plan was BD 234,325,000 but at the end of December 1971 the real 
amount spent was BD 196,000,000 which was 83.6% of the original allocations. 144 
The accomplishments of the Plan in comparison with the previous projects 
(i.e. before Sheikh Zayed became ruler) in the field of education are rather re-
markable. In 1966 Abu Dhabi had four schools for boys and one primary school 
for girls which together were attended by 587 students.145 The number of students 
had jumped to 13,175 by the academic year 1971-72.146 The number of schools had 
also increased to 42 by the end of 1971.147 One of the reasons for the increasing 
number of students in Abu Dhabi was that students were receiving incentives such 
as free books, free clothes and free meals, as well as a monthly allowance that had 
cost the state BD 700,000 by the end of the Five-Year Plan.148 
The other social services to which the plan addressed itself were housing and 
health facilities. Before 1966, Sheikh Shakhbut had arranged for a limited number 
of low-cost housing projects financed by the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company and 
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Table 3.4: Abu Dhabi's Five Year Development Plan (BD 000). 
Services Amount 
Education 12,140 
Health 6,510 
Agriculture 13,969 
Industries 63,100 
Communication 82,870 
Municipalities 54,260 
Housing 16,700 
Labour 2,785 
Tourism 5,916 
Public Buildings 9,720 
Loans and Industries 49,880 
Source: 
The National Bank of Dubai Ltd, Report of the Board of Directors, for the 
Year Ending 30th November 1968, Dubai, 1968, p. 6. 
which were completed in 1966.149 Whereas, in the Five-Year Plan a scheme to 
build 4,000 houses and 17 new small villages with full social services150 , as well as 
500 villas for Government staff, 151 was fulfilled. 
As far as the health sector was concerned, there were around 90 hospital beds 
in Abu Dhabi town and the American Mission Hospital at al-'Ayn152 before the 
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Five-Year Development Plan was implemented. However, in the plan there was 
allocation for the construction of 6 hospitals plus 11 infirmaries and 3 isolation 
clinics most of which were completed. 153 
Water and electricity are essential commodities in Abu Dhabi due to the high 
temperatures in the Emirate during the summer months together with a lack of 
surface water. The underground water is generally saline except for the town of 
al- 'Ayn where there is a source of fresh water. In 1966 a pipeline was constructed 
from al- 'Ayn to Abu Dhabi, a distance of 130 km to the east, but in 1968 with the 
introduction of the Five Year Plan a desalination plant with a capacity of 5 million 
gallons per day was constructed to supply Abu Dhabi city, and water from al-'Ayn 
was used for al- 'Ayn itself. 154 The success of the water schemes demanded large 
electricity projects, hence, the 10 MW power station of 1966 had to be expanded 
to reach 103 MW by 1975155 (see table 3.5). 
Economic infrastructure, including communications and municipalities, was 
the most costly area of the plan and received BD 121 million. 156 However, due to 
the financial problems that had occurred in Abu Dhabi in 1969, 800 Km of roads 
were constructed instead of the 1,000 Km target set out in the Plan.157 For the 
municipalities, projects of more than BD 50 million had been allocated to provide 
town planning in Abu Dhabi and al- 'Ayn which included town streets, corniche 
walls, water supply projects, abattoirs, sewage systems158 , public transport and 
market places. 159 Among other communication projects was the expansion of the 
telephone system and postal services; the establishment of an international airport; 
the deepening of Abu Dhabi harbour as well as establishing 6 wharfs; a television 
station; a 50 KW medium-wave radio station160 and a daily newspaper.l61 
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Table 3.5: Water and Electricity in Abu Dhabi 1966-1971. 
Year Water Supply Electricity 
m.g.p.d KWs 
1966 0.8 3,000 
1969 1.7 21,000 
1970 4.2 70,000 
1971 6.0 136,000 
Sources: 
Abu Dhabi Government, Abu Dhabi Office in London, Notes on Abu Dhabi, 
1970, (London: June 1970) p. 20; International Bank for Reconstruction 
and development, "The Economic Development of the Arab Gulf Emirates," 
March 1970, p. 95. 
There were certain projects which had been left for the private sector in order 
to encourage the latter's participation in the building of Abu Dhabi. Among these 
projects were the establishment of five hotels, five printing presses, the construction 
of commercial buildings and a project for a poultry farm at al- 'Ayn.162 
As a result the plan had changed the face of the emirate completely. However, 
the rapid pace of development gave rise to serious social problems. As an example, 
stress and depression etc., were associated with the rapid development following 
the discovery of oil. This also affected cultural and religious values by weakening 
the social relationship of kinship which had characterized Gulf society for centuries. 
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Furthermore, the number of foreign workers had expanded due to the jobs that 
were created by the development plan. 
As far as the British authorities' role in the development process in Abu 
Dhabi was concerned, it was less direct than in the northern Trucial States. This 
was mainly achieved through the British Government's close involvement in the 
appointment of key advisers to serve in the Government of Abu Dhabi. At this 
time there were few local experts to advise on economic developments as noticed 
in 1967 by the London Chamber of Commerce's Trade Mission to Abu Dhabi:163 
there are few experienced local merchants and still fewer able to handle technical 
products. 
Foreign experts were needed for most of the development programmes and 
they were recruited by the British authorities i.e., the Political Agent, on the advice 
of the British Government. The oil companies appear to have been less important 
concerning appointments. The ex-oil expert, Allan Horan stated that: 164 
the companies supported the development of a governmental structure with 
the appointment of advisers as being a highly desirable feature without necessar-
ily being directly involved in these developments; they merely had to live with the 
consequences. Thus the companies were for the advancement of the emirate. 
There were two types of recruitment: Arab, and British experts. Of the 
British experts who were recruited by arrangement with the Political Agency in 
Abu Dhabi, most had previous service in for example, the Federation of South 
Arabia or other British colonies. Mr. E. J. Thompson was appointed as the 
Financial Director of Abu Dhabi 165 , and his assistant was Mr. W. J. Hill; the 
Director of Education was Mr. E. K. Gordon. 166 In addition, the investments of 
Abu Dhabi were run by a committee headed by Sir John Hogg of Glyn Mills. 
Similarly Abu Dhabi port management was controlled by Mr. Robertson; the 
Public Works Department was controlled by Arabicon Consultants (in association 
130 
with Alan Grant and Partners as a consulting engineers and with George and 
Davies as a chartered architects) and by Mr. Cowdery as the Assistant Director 
of Public Works. 167 
The other institutions that were under British control were the military, with 
its three branches, air, navy and army which were headed by the former British 
Officers Mr. Storey, Mr. Pool and Colonel Wilson respectively.l68 
After 1971 most of these British experts were replaced or had retired, although 
some did take jobs outside the government services for example, in the commercial 
sector. However, their influence on Abu Dhabi's development was considerable, 
firstly because they were in a position to handle the day-to-day work during those 
crucial years and secondly because their superiors, who were mostly either Sheikhs 
or young Abu Dhabi citizens, had little previous experience. Furthermore, their 
Abu Dhabi 'superiors' were tied up chairing more than one department169 at the 
same time, thus, much of the day-to-day running of the government departments 
was carried out by British advisers. 
The Arab experts, were mostly recruited from Sudan and Iraq. For example 
the legal adviser to Sheikh Zayed, Sali~ Fara~, was from the Sudan; the oil adviser, 
Dr. Nadim Pachachi, the Development adviser, Mr. Ma~mud ij:asan Jum 'ah and 
the political adviser, Dr. Adnan Pachachi were all from Iraq. There were also 
appointments of Iraqis and Sudanese to the Palace Court of the Ruler, such as 
Najim al-Oin l:lamudi, adviser on federation affairs. 
It should be remembered that during this period the Gulf was under pressure 
from Arab revolutionary states such as Iraq and Egypt and with so many British 
advisers, and the presence of British military forces in the Trucial States, it was 
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important for the Ruler to surround himself with advisers from Arab countries. 
However, such Arab advisers were not Arab nationalists nor were they in any sense 
revolutionaries. Rather, they were of Western education and background170 and, 
more significantly, pro-British which largely stemmed from their appreciation of 
the British authorities who had arranged their appointments in Abu Dhabi. For 
example, Mal?.mud I;Iasan Jum 'ah, who held the post of development adviser was 
known to Sir Richard Beaumont, former British Ambassador in Iraq, in 1960s and 
recommended for the post by him. 171 
Nevertheless tension did sometimes arise between the British and the Arab 
advisers as illustrated in the Kendall-Faral) correspondance. In June 1968, C.B. 
Kendall, the TSDO Acting Director wrote to ~alel?. Faral?., the legal adviser to Abu 
Dhabi, about a complaint that he understood Faral?. had made to the Chairman 
of the Trucial States Council that he, Kendall, was addressing correspondence to 
Sheikh Zayed directly about Development Fund affairs rather than through the 
appropriate officer in the Abu Dhabi civil service. Faral?., however, denied men-
tioning Kendall by name but indicated that he had mentioned to al-Bai~ar, the 
secretary-general of the TSC, that he had received correspondence from the Coun-
cil addressed to His Highness the Ruler and signed by council staff. In reply, 
Kendall argued that while he was glad to have assurances that there was no per-
sonal criticism against him, the matter had nevertheless come to the attention of 
the Ruler. He addmitted to being indignant at an apparent innuendo which was 
capable of doing mischief and stated that this was not the firstt time that this had 
happened. This example demonstrates the sort of tensions that e~sted between 
the British and Arab advisers. Even though the Arab advisers were officially closer 
to the rulers, nontheless they were in reality regarded by the British as inferior to 
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the British advisers. 172 
·It can be argued that the appointment of British and Arab advisers was 
beneficial for both the development of Abu Dhabi and for Britain whose interests 
they served. It can be seen that the development projects in Abu Dhabi which 
were directed from the Ruler's Palace and initiated on the advice of both the 
British and Arab advisers173 , (for example, the Abu Dhabi- al-'Ayn road174, the 
telephone exchange system175 , the sea water distillation plant176 , gas turbines177 , 
the airport runway and the sewage scheme178 and so on) were completed mostly 
by British firms (see chapter 5). Furthermore, once the decision had been made 
to withdraw, these very advisers played an important role in the transfer of power 
from the British Government to the Gulf rulers by sitting on various committees 
that transferred responsibilities from the British Government to the Emirates. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Modern development in the Trucial States under British supervision passed 
through two stages. The first stage was spread over 10 years, starting at the 
beginning of the fifties and finishing at the beginning of 1965. The second stage 
was short, but accomplished a wide range of development projects from 1965 until 
just prior to the withdrawal in December 1971. In evaluating both stages, it is 
suggested that Britain's purposes were not the same in both cases. 
In the first stage, Britain wanted to keep her troops in the area, in contrast 
to the second stage, when her aim was to withdraw those troops. Accordingly, the 
Development Office was created in 1965 to supervise development in the poorer 
northern Trucial States. As a result, in the northern Trucial States the develop-
ment of roads, harbours, electricity, water resources, low-cost housing, etc. was 
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undertaken. Dubai was different because of its bouyant commercial activity and 
the discovery of oil which meant that it was able to finance its own development. 
In Abu Dhabi under Sheikh Shakhbut the situation was also different in another 
way. He was not happy with the British officials due to the ijalul Island incident 
and other border disputes. Therefore, he rejected their advice for the development 
in his Sheikhdom which prompted the British authorities to engineer his deposition 
in August 1966. The new leadership in Abu Dhabi was more anxious to carry out 
development programmes, but there was a shortage of experts. Accordingly, Arab 
and British experts were recruited by the political agents to help in the process of 
Abu Dhabi's development. 
These policies aimed to establish basic infrastuctures in the Trucial States so 
that they were better prepared, economically and socially for the withdrawal of 
British troops in 1971. Other responsibilities such as jurisdiction, defence, police, 
boundary settlements and political unification were gradually handed over to the 
Trucial States by the British authorities, as will be examined in the next chapter. 
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Chapter IV 
The Retrocession Process 
4.1 Introduction 
Other sectors which experienced developments in the sixties were the legal 
system, the military and security forces and there was also an increase in the 
degree of political coordination among the rulers of the Trucial States. In this 
chapter the extent to which these sectors were prepared for independence before 
the withdrawal of Britain will be investigated; especially the role played by Britain 
in the preparation. At the same time, the scope of retroceeding these responsibilites 
to the authorities of the Trucial States will be considered with particular emphasis 
on the role of the Political Agent. 
4.2 Political preparation 
Politically, the British Government had worked on strengthening the Trucial 
States Council (TSC) which had been established in 1952. The Council, however, 
did not become active until after 1965 when it became clear that Britain was 
changing her policy. Therefore cooperation among the Trucial States had entered 
a new phase that was eventually to lead to an independent state. Furthermore, in 
order to implement this policy of cooperation among the rulers and see that minor 
aspects did not disturb stability, the question of a final settlement regarding the 
territorial boundaries between the Trucial States was discussed with the Political 
Agent. At the same time he also encouraged the rulers to have closer links with 
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Saudi Arabia by permitting, for example, Saudi nationals to enter the Trucial 
States without a visa, 1 and encouraging the Emirates to participate in the United 
Nat ions and the Arab League organizations. 2 These policies prepared the ground 
for a further amalgamation in the establishment of the United Arab Emirates 
federation in December 1971. But first it is necessary to consider the Trucial 
States Council in terms of its role as a political institution for the Trucial States, 
paying particular attention to its impact on the area. 
4.2.1 The Trucial States Council (TSC) 
The Trucial States Council (TSC) was established in 1952 by the British au-
thorities to bring about a measure of economic and political cooperation between 
the rulers of the Trucial States. In the meetings between the rulers that usually 
took place once or twice a year, the Political Agent was firmly in control and the 
limited funds made avilable to the TSC by the British Government were controlled 
by him. In the early years individual rulers used the TSC meetings as an oppor-
tunity to petition the British Agent for assistance with specific projects in their 
emirates, for example, schools or falaj restoration. But there were no cooperative 
ventures between the Emirates. 3 
In 1964 a Deliberative Committee was established by the TSC on the ad-
vice of the British Agent, James Craig; in addition, in 1965 the Trucial States 
Developement Office (TSDO) was established. Later in 1965 a constitution was 
drawn up setting out the responsibilites of the TSC and its two organizations, the 
Deliberative Committee and the TSDO (Figure 4.1 ). 
According to the constitution the TSC's prime responsibility was for the eco-
nomic, social and cultural development of the Trucial States, but in reality it was 
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essentially a supervisory body and real power remained with the political agent 
and individual rulers. 
According to the constitution the TSC's main responsibilities were: 
(a) The Council should decide the kind of projects that would receive allocation 
of funds. However,4 
In drawing up its programme the Council will take into account the recom-
mendations of the Deliberative Committee and of the Director of the Development 
Office. 
Nevertheless, real power in the selection of projects lay with the Political 
Agent who was a key member of both the Deliberative Committee and the TSC. 
Brian Kendall, the British Acting Director of the TSDO 1965-1970 wrote on 16 
July 1991:5 
as for the development programme itself, this came up in the usual governmen-
tal way - proposed by the heads of individual departments (Agriculture, Technical 
Education, Health, Public Works, Fisheries) knocked into shape by me, discussed 
in Executive (or Deliberative initially) Committee and finally put to the Council of 
rulers. 
The reason for this was probably that most of the Arab delegates to the 
Deliberative Committee appointed by the rulers had limited political power 
as well as little understanding of technical projects. 
(b) The TSC should appoint an Arab expert as Director of TSDO and select 
in conjunction with him senior members to head special departments of the 
TSDO. The appointment of the subordinate staff had to be left to the Director. 
In fact a British expert, Mr. Brian Kendall, who had been involved for many 
years with developments in Sudan, was appointed in 1964 as 'Development 
Secretary' at the British Agency in the Trucial States. He was appointed to 
carry out the duties of the Director but to avoid any infringement upon the 
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Figure 4.1: Diagram of the Trucial States Council. 
Constitution, he was given the title of Acting Director. Mr. Kendall stated 
on 15 June 1991:6 
There was a lot of manoeuvering over the post of Director of Development. 
Of course, in the early days a Palestinian (who held a senior position in Shell) was 
brought down to Dubai but rejected by the rulers; later Sayyid 'fariq [bin Taymur) 
of Muscat was suggested but nothing came of this; and in the end I continued as an 
''Acting Director" until 1971 when 'Isa [Isa] al-Gurg was brought in as a figure-head 
Director and the excellent Abdullah al-Mazru '1 to head the office, with myself as 
Financial Adviser. [Transliteration is of the present writer] 
One reason for appointing a British person as the Acting Director instead 
of selecting an Arab could have been that the British official would have a 
greater influence on the rulers in getting the projects carried out. An Arab 
on the other hand, who might have been from another Arab countries or a 
native of the Emirates, might have felt that he had to listen and submit to 
the point of view of the rulers which in the end might not have been accepted 
by the Political Agent. Furthermore, the British adviser would ensure that 
British companies received priority when TSDO contracts were awarded. In 
addition, and perhaps of greater significance, he would keep the Political 
Agent informed about TSDO activities, as Mr. Kendall in fact used to do. 
(c) The third responsibility of the Council was to approve and, where necessary, 
amend the development estimates that were submitted annually by the De-
velopment Director. 
(d) Finally, the TSC was expected to delegate further authority to the Devel-
opment Director so that he could deal with contingency expenditure, effect 
virements of unspent allocations, etc. 
As a further step towards encouraging cooperation between the Trucial States, 
at the lOth Session of the Deliberative Committee it was cautiously suggested by 
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'Adi al-Baytar, the Secretary-General of the TSC, (who was a Palestinian and 
initially recruited as legal adviser to Sheikh Rashid, ruler of Dubai, on British 
recommendation) that a single flag be raised in the TSC buildings. The Committee 
accepted his suggestion and recommended it to the next TSC meeting. The flag, 
which they hoped would become a national flag, had three colours: red, white and 
a seven pointed green star that represented the seven Emirates. 7 In presenting the 
flag to the rulers at the TSC meeting, the Secretary General stressed that Sheikh 
Shakhbut, who did not attend the meeting but was nevertheless an important 
figure, had also accepted his proposal. 8 The rulers discussed the issue and agreed 
to have the flag raised on the buildings of the TSC.9 However, the rulers were 
not prepared to go further in accepting the Deliberative Committee's suggestions 
of uniting the police, passports, flags and various anthems. Sheikh Khalid bin 
Mul_lammad of Sharjah, seconded by Sheikh Mul_lammad bin Hamad al-Sharqi of 
Fujairah, proposed that these questions be discussed initially outside the TSC in 
private meetings with the other rulers. Therefore, in its 28th Session, the Council 
decided to delay any further discussion on the aforementioned subjects until the 
rulers had debated them. However, with regard to the police, the Council passed 
a decision calling on the Police Force Commissioners to hold a meeting to discuss 
their common problems10 (see below). 
Before 1965 it was not part of Britain's policy to encourage the TSC to become 
a strong governmental institution. However, after 1965 there were indications that 
Britain wanted to strengthen the Council to take over a more influential role in 
the state affairs of the Trucial States.11 
The constitution of the TSC also outlined the responsibilities of the Deliber-
ative Committee:12 
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a. The Committee shall be composed of one or, if desired, two representatives of 
each Trucial State's ruler, selected by him from nationals of the Trucial States. 
b. The Committee shall meet at such intervals in the council and the Director of 
the Development Office or his nominee shall act as Secretary. 
c. The Committee shall elect its own Chairman and Vice Chairman. The Director 
of the Development Office or his nominee shall act as Secretary. 
d. The Committee shall consider all matters put to it for discussion by the Council 
or the Director of the Development Office and shall submit its recommendations 
thereon. It may also intimate recommendations on subjects tabled by its mem-
bers. 
e. The Committee shall advise the Director of the Development Office on the award 
of contracts... The Director of the Development Office shall not be bound to 
accept the Committee's advice but in the event of his rejecting their advice he 
shall report the reasons to the council at its next meeting. 
However, the role of the Committee was essentially consultative. It mainly 
acted as an intermediary between the TSDO and the rulers, and real power re-
mained with the Political Agent and the British Acting Director of the TSDO, 
Brian Kendall. In 1970 the Deliberative Committee was renamed the Executive 
Committee. 
Another important sign that the British were encouraging the TSC to become 
a stronger political organization was symbolized by the transfer of the chairman-
ship of the Council from the Political Agent to the rulers themselves. The Polit-
ical Agent, Balfour-Paul, had suggested to the rulers at the 24th session of the 
TSC on 23 November 1965 that he should no longer occupy the Chair at Coun-
cil meetings.13 The rulers, after discussing the matter, decided that the Political 
Agent should, however, attend the meetings but that the chairmanship would ro-
tate among the rulers in accordance with the alphabetical order of the Emirates. 
However, this decision was conditional upon the agreement of Sheikh Shakhbii~ 
who had not attended the meeting. 14 To the disappointment of the Political Agent, 
Sheikh Shakhbii~ did not agree and this resulted in the Council proposing the fol-
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lowing: 
1. Electing one of the rulers to be the Chairman of the TSC. 
2. Electing a Vice-Chairman to carry the responsibilties of the Chairman during 
his absence. 
3. Elections should be held annually, and 
4. The chairman's period of office started immediately after the election and 
finished, with the election of a replacement, after one year. 15 
Accordingly, Sheikh $aqr bin Mul;tammad of Ras al-~aimah was elected as 
Chairman and Sheikh J:lumayd ai-Nu 'aymi the Crown Prince of Ajman, was elected 
as Vice Chairman in 1966.16 Furthermore, the Council decided to pay a monthly 
allowance to the Chairman of the Council for fulfilling his obligations.17 In the 
following election Sheikh $aqr was re-elected until October 1968 when he was 
replaced by Sheikh Khalid bin M ul:mmmad al-Qasimi ruler of Sharjah, until March 
197118 when Sheikh $aqr was re-elected again as Chairman.19 
While economic and social matters appear to have been of prime importance 
to the British authorities they may also have wanted to acheive a political purpose 
through enlarging the responsibilities of the TSC, in particular encouraging coop-
eration between the individual rulers. However, the British Government clearly 
was unwilling to give the Council, and therefore the rulers, any real power. The 
case would have been different if they had transformed the TSC into a constructive 
instrument of government so that the rulers might solve key problems together such 
as boundaries disbutes. Real power, however, remained with the British Political 
Agent. 
160 
4.2.2 Internal boundaries 
Britain realized that if it was to encourage cooperation among the rulers then 
it was essential to solve certain important problems. Boundary disputes were a 
major obstacle preventing cooperation between the Sheikhs. In the late 1960s when 
Britain announced its withdrawal and sought to bring about a federation of the 
Trucial States, it was felt that boundary disputes might result in the collapse of 
the federation initiative. Therefore, the Political Resident warned the Sheikhs that 
Her Majesty's Government was anxious to see a final settlement to the question 
of their common boundaries. 20 
Territorial settlements had previously been reached in 1956-57 during commu-
nications between Mr. Peter Tripp, the Political Agent of the Trucial States, and 
the rulers of the Trucial States. However, some of the rulers were not pleased with 
the settlement and had asked for further investigations. The most serious problems 
regarding boundaries were the Abu Dhabi-Dubai; the Sharjah-Dubai; the Oman-
the Trucial States; the Fujairah-Sharjah and the Fujairah-Ras al-Khaimah border 
disputes. 21 
The Abu Dhabi-Dubai common boundary was potentially the most serious 
problem. The 1950s settlement was not accepted by either Emirate and therefore 
the Political Resident urged the rulers to cooperate with Mr. Andrew Johnstone's 
(Assistant Political Agent in Dubai) mission to find an acceptable solution for both 
parties. 22 He was unable to satisfy either of the rulers, but the Political Resident in 
Bahrain decided to enforce his recommendations upon the Sheikhs. Accordingly, 
Sheikh Rashid bin Sa 'id of Dubai was asked to accept the following, as set out in 
the Political Resident's letter:23 
(a) that the boundary between your Sheikdom and that of Abu Dhabi in the south 
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shall run from Sharf Sallum in the east to TawT ['l-]Faqa' to the site of the dead 
TawT Dhulaymah, to Tawl Braq, to the site of the dead Muallaqah and thence 
west to Wadi (1-] 'ushush, 
(b) that the boundary should, for the time being, run through these wells, which 
will be considered as neutral property. I have instructed Mr. Johnstone to 
make further enquiries about the ownership of these wells and H.M. Govern-
ment's decision with regard to them will be communicated to you later in the 
year.[Transliteration of the present writer) 
The same letter was also sent to the ruler of Abu Dhabi. However, both 
Sheikhs were not happy with Mr. Johnstone's report of :t4ay 1961.24 As a result, 
tension arose between the two Emirates, but the British authorities were deter-
mined to enforce the Johnstone report. 
Another event which was to cause tension occurred in 1962. Sheikh Shakhbut 
had dug a well near Tawi Bada' al-Mughanni which Dubai considered to be part 
of its territory. Sheikh Rashid of Dubai wrote to James Craig, the Political Agent 
in the Trucial States, on 10 May 1962:25 
It is not possible to ignore or to tolerate these acts. So we write to inform Your 
Excellency of the course of events in our area so that you may take the necessary, pos-
itive measures to stop the digging yourself or allow us to take the necessary measures 
ourselves to stop it. 
The Political Agent, however, in reply to Sheikh Rashid rejected his threat 
reminding him that "I recognize that Your Excellency is not pleased with the 
decision. The Ruler of Abu Dhabi is also not pleased." 26 Therefore Craig de-
cided to enforce the settlement that had been recommended by Johnstone, "Since 
agreement between the two rulers proved impossible the only solution was for the 
Political Resident to declare the boundary, in accordance with the authority given 
to him by the rulers." 27 He again emphasized Mr. Johnston's report by stating 
that "I am authorized to state that the Political Resident recognizes the frontier 
described in his letter of May 27, 1961 as the only legal frontier between Dubai 
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and Abu Dhabi." 28 
Despite the Political Agent's decision, the border disputes of the two Emirates 
were not solved until1968 during the Sumayl). conference. During this conference, 
when the plans for federation between Dubai and Abu Dhabi were discussed, the 
dispute was solved because Abu Dhabi was willing to make a concession to Dubai 
as part of the general discussion over the federation. 29 Britain found this agree-
ment satisfactory because firstly it had been solved in favour of Britain's close ally 
in the Trucial States, Dubai; secondly, Sheikh Zayed's willingness to undertake 
a concession represented an important step for the federation and strengthened 
Britain's efforts in that direction.30 
The Dubai-Sharjah common boundary dispute was outlined in Mr. Walker's 
(Assistant Political Agent in Dubai) report of April, 1956 after an undertaking by 
both the rulers of Dubai and of Sharjah to accept the Political Agent's arbitrations 
in 1955.31 J.P. Tripp, the British Political Agent at that time in the Trucial States, 
informed the ruler of Dubai about Walker's report on 2nd April 1956 stating:32 
that the boundary point on the coast between your Sheikhdom and that of the 
Sheikh of Sharjah shall be a line running between al-Mamzer and al-bu-Hailleaving 
al-bu-Hail to Dubai. This line starts at right angles from the coast and passes half 
way between the houses of Hilal bin ~umayd and Khallfah bin ~asan near Birkah 
Well. 
However the Ruler of Dubai did not accept Walker's report and requested 
the Political Agency to reconsider the matter.33 However, since Sharjah, after 
the removal of Sheikh ~aqr in 1965 and the assasination of Sheikh Khalid bin 
Mol).ammad in 1972, had no stable Government, the boundaries between the two 
sheikhdoms were not solved until 1985. 
As far as the Trucial States-Omani frontiers were concerned, Sultan Sa 'id bin 
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Taymur had signed different agreements with the rulers of the Trucial States34 
and the British authorities had played a major role in the execution of these agree-
ments. The Political Agency had drawn up the frontiers between the Sultanate 
and the Trucial States in 1950s and then Britain, which was responsible for the 
international affairs of the Trucial States, regarded these agreements as valid and 
binding on both parties and recognized the frontiers laid down in them.35 Through 
these agreements, such as the Wadi Mad}J.ah agreement between the Sultanate and 
Ras al-Khaimah in 1969,36 the Sultan was entitled to rule over areas in the heart 
of the Trucial States territories thereby creating dissatisfaction among the Trucial 
States' rulers and potential for further tension. 
An opportunity was missed by the Political Agents in the area during the 
fifties and at the beginning of the sixties when the rulers were weak and when the 
various territorial disputes could have been solved. However, Britain failed to solve 
the problem through discussion with the rulers. Instead, Britain had to impose 
settlements which failed to solve all the problems and so tension, and the possibility 
of renewed conflict, remained high. In 1972, for example, more than 12 people were 
killed in a border dispute between Fujairah and the Sharjah enclave of Kalba. 37 
Other areas where disturbances might occur were Dhayd-Falaj al-Mu 'alla, Masafi 
and the region of Ru'us al-Jibal. The latter dispute would concern not only Ras 
al-Khaimah but also the Sultanate of Oman.38 
4.2.3 The opening-up of the Trucial States 
The third political issue that Britain encouraged in the Trucial States to 
prepare them for independence, was the opening up of the area by their joining 
the UN and the Arab League organizations and by improving their relations with 
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neighbouring states such as Saudi Arabia. 
Until 1965 it had been in the interests of the British authorities to prevent 
any other foreign intervention in the area through the exclusive use of agreements 
which were made in the nineteenth century. However after 1965 there were signs 
that Britain was relaxing her policy of excluding other powers from the Gulf; for 
example, American and Japanees oil companies were permitted to seek oil con-
cessions in the Trucial States. In addition, a consortium of Phillips Petroleum 
Company, American Independent Oil Co., (Amin Oil) and the Italian AGIP were 
granted an oil concession in Abu Dhabi in January 1967.39 Further, in Decem-
ber of the same year another concession in Abu Dhabi, an area covering 4,416 
square km, was granted to a Japanese oil consortium which formed the Abu Dhabi 
Petroleum Development Company.40 The other Japanese group that gained an oil 
concession in Abu Dhabi was the Mitsubishi group that formed the Middle East 
Oil Development Company in May 1968.41 In particular, the transfer to American 
oil companies of some of Britain's oil interests in the Trucial States was meant 
to give the United States a stake in the security of the Gulf area. This eventu-
ally paved the way for the USA to take over from Britain the responsibility for 
security in the Gulf. Furthermore, it was felt that the participation of American 
oil companies would contribute to the security of British oil companies; therefore, 
Britain encouraged the rulers to negotiate with American and indeed, Japanese 
oil companies. These negotiations provided the Emirates with valuable experi-
ence in drawing up international agreements that were different from the existing 
concessions that had been signed by the rulers. In this way the Emirates were 
given greater responsibility for controlling their own affairs, particularly in the 
international sphere. 
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The Emirates were also opened up to greater contact with the Arab World 
mainly with the Arab League Organization, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan. Fol-
lowing the British withdrawal announcement, Arab League officials were welcomed 
in the Trucial States in June 1968, whereas before that time, the British authorities 
consistently refused to allow Arab League involvement in the area.42 In 1969 Abu 
Dhabi had also begun to contribute to certain Arab League Organizations such as 
the Arab Postal Union, the Arab Chamber of Commerce, Information and Tourism 
Organizations and also paid over £3 million towards the Arab Economic and Social 
Development Fund.43 Consequently, Algerian representatives in the Arab League 
recommended Abu Dhabi's participation in Arab League activities.44 A~mad al-
Suwaydi, chairman of Abu Dhabi's royal court conveyed Abu Dhabi's support for 
Arab causes and for the struggle of the Palestinians against Israel during his first of-
ficial visit to Cairo to participate in the Arab League's Economic Session in 1969.45 
Sheikh Zayed also visited several Arab States and expressed his solidarity with the 
key Arab causes such as Palestine. 46 Britain encouraged the growing acceptance 
of Abu Dhabi within the Arab States and agreed to Abu Dhabi's participation in 
Arab League activities. 
After the January 1968 withdrawal announcement, King Husain was the first 
Arab head of State to pay an official visit to the Trucial States, in April 1968, 
which probably paved the way for the Emirates to begin to assume responsibility 
for their own foreign affairs.47 
A more important role in the affairs of the Trucial States was played by Saudi 
Arabia. Even though Saudi Arabia at that time was not on good terms with either 
the Trucial States or Britain, relations improved with both of them after the Yemen 
Revolution in 1962. Britain encouraged Saudi Arabia to play a more positive role 
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in the affairs of the Trucial States because that was conducive to her own policy 
of stabilizing the area. Thus, in August 1964 Mr. R.A. Butler, the British Sec-
retary of State for Foreign Affairs, welcomed the suggestion of the Saudi Arabian 
government for a settlement of the Buraimi question, and he regarded this as a 
return towards the close friendship and cooperation that had existed between the 
British government and King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud the founder of Saudi Arabia48 
(see chapter 7). He also considered the Anglo-Saudi relationship, "not only as most 
valuable in itself but also as providing an important contribution to that stabil-
ity of the Arabian Peninsula which is needed to permit its peaceful progress and 
development." 49 Furthermore, the Foreign Secretary suggested that the Govern-
ment of Saudi Arabia should cement brotherly ties with Abu Dhabi in order to 
facilitate the peaceful development of the area and that, "H.M. Government, as 
the friend of both parties, would be very happy to see such ties established between 
them." 50 
What also sympolized the opening up of the Trucial States was their enrolment 
in UN Organizations like WHO, FAO and UNESC0.51 The rulers requested to 
participate in these organizations and Britain readily agreed and indeed offered 
much encouragement. 
4.3 Legal retrocession 
The traditional judicial system in the Trucial States revolved around the 
Shari'ah courts that were presided over by a qac;li. But the British Government 
had worked out a different code for British nationals and other foreigners living in 
the Emirates. British jurisdiction, covered almost everyone and everything with 
the exception of the actual subjects of the Trucial States and what were strictly 
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local matters. 52 Its basis was the Indian Legislature and Bombay Legislature and a 
successive wave of Orders in Council which were issued in the 1950s. 53 Accordingly 
courts were established in the Trucial States under the Political Agent, who acted 
as judge, and his deputy who acted as an assistant judge. Further to this there 
was a Higher Appeal Court established in Bahrain under the Political Resident. 54 
However, by the 1960s the situation had changed and the British authorities 
gradually encouraged the rulers to develop their own judicial system. At the 
begining of the 1960s the British authorities .Q@6(eded jurisdiction over non-national 
Arab Muslim residents in the Emirates to the rulers and any legal issue arising was 
dealt with either by the Shan'ah courts or through judgements made by the ruler 
himself in accordance with 'urf (convention). Also, in 1964 Al;lmad al-Baitar, a 
Palestinian, was appointed by the Political Agency in Dubai as a legal adviser to 
the Trucial States, with the exception of Abu Dhabi. Accordingly, al-Baitar drafted 
a number of ordinances for the rulers, and legislation to set up three courts to cover 
the Trucial States: a Court of First Instance, a Criminal Assize, and a Court of 
Appeal. 55 However, his recommendations were not accepted by the rulers because 
each ruler wished to establish a court for his own emirate with an Arab legal expert 
as an adviser. By 1968 Dubai and Sharjah had established their own courts and 
Abu Dhabi had established its first Traffic Court in 1966, with a Jordanin lawyer 
as legal adviser. The other emirates did not establish their own courts until a few 
months before the British withdrawal. 
Therefore, H.M. Government began -ee5Ceding to the local courts of the rulers, 
jurisdiction over persons of various nationalities and over various matters. 56 For 
example, in February 1966 various laws were retroceded to the court of Abu Dhabi 
such as Traffic Law, Workmen's Compensation Law and a Labour Law. 57 By the 
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end of July 1971 a total of 38 enactments were retroceeded to Abu Dhabi. The 
jurisdictions that were transfered to Dubai by July 1971 were as follow: 
- Workmen's Compensation Law of 1965. 
- Customs Law of 1966. 
- Police Regulations Law of 1966. 
- Traffic Law of 1967. 
- Income Tax Law of 1969. 
- Penal Code and Law of Criminal Procedures of 1970. 
- Code of Civil Procedure of 1971. 
In Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah similar laws were retroceded too, but in the 
other Emirates of Ajman Umm al-Qaiwain and Fujairah the courts were not ready 
yet to recieve full jurisdiction from the British courts in the Gulf. Nevertheless, 
the retrocession process was completed in haste, just before the withdrawal at the 
end of 1971, which gave little chance for the Trucial States to work out their own 
laws. For example, the extra-territorial jurisdiction regarding Immigration; the 
Civil Airport Ordinance; the Dangerous Drugs Law; the Liquor Law; the Control 
of Fire Arms; the Ammunition and Explosives Law; the Law of Contract; and the 
Law of Civil Wrongs, were not retroceded until the end of 1971.58 
At the same time British subjects in the Trucial States were immune to these 
laws. According to what had been laid down in the Political Agent's letter to the 
ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, even after the termination of British jurisdiction in Ras 
al-Khaimah, "the status of United Kingdom military and certain civilian personnel 
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and the Trucial Oman Scouts" would be continued under H.M. jurisdiction.59 
This understanding between Sheikh $aqr and the Political Agent, Mr. J. Walker, 
continued for some time after the general retrocession of H.M. jurisdiction for the 
Trucial States in 1971, and the same understanding was given by other rulers. 
The people to whom British jurisdiction was still to apply in the aftermath of the 
British withdrawal were the following: 
1. Members of H.M. Armed Forces in the Trucial States including those British 
soldiers and Officers working in the local forces and their dependents; 
2. Any person serving in those organizations, specifically those accompanying 
H.M. Armed Forces; 
3. TOS members; 
4. Any employee of H.M. Government and their dependents, registered by the 
Political Agents. 60 
The groups mentioned above were also exempt from paying customs duties 
and were exempt from import and export restrictions, driving licences and ex-
change controls. They enjoyed the freedom of entry and stay in the Emirates and 
departure thereafter should they so wish.61 
With the establishment of the U AE, a similar understanding was reached 
with the United Kingdom military personnel, their dependents and accompanying 
civilian personnel, besides the British, who were serving with the Union Defence 
' Force or the forces of any member-state of the U AE. This included British military 
personnel who came to the UAE either for a visit; such as Major General R.E. 
Coaker, Director of Military Operations in the U.K. Ministry of Defence; those 
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engaged in trials like that of the "Scorpion" light tank in Abu Dhabi; and those 
personnel providing training for the U AE forces; for example, the British Military 
Assistant Team (MAT).62 
As a result, even though jurisdiction had been retroceded to the courts of 
the Trucial States, Britain continued to have some jurisdiction in this area. Be-
sides reserving some legal rights, the Political Agents played· a strong role in the 
retrocession process. For example, the Trucial States Council, on suggestions from 
the Political Agent, established a Retrocession Committee that was responsible 
for the general retrocession jurisdiction. It had among its members at least one 
representative from each Emirate as well as a representative from the Politcal 
Agency. Furthermore, the rulers' legal advisers participated in the Committee 
meetings: al-Bai!ar (Dubai) Musa Jayoussi (Fujairah) Y. Dweik (Sharjah) T. Ri-
mawi (Ajman) $alii). Faral). (Abu Dhabi) K. al-Safreni (Ras al-Khaimah) together 
with Judge Cameron of the British Political Agency.63 These legal advisers, as we 
have mentioned before, were either brought in by the British authorities to work 
with the rulers or were employed by the Trucial States Council such as al-Bai!ar. 
Since most of the local members of the Retrocession Committee did not have 
any legal training, the rulers' legal advisers together with the Political Agent con-
ducted separate meetings to discuss the retrocession of H.M. jurisdiction to the 
Rulers's courts. It was the responsibility of the legal advisers to the rulers to bring 
to the Political Agent and his legal adviser drafts of new laws formulated for each 
emirate. The Agent in his turn would study them with the other British legal ex-
perts of H.M. Courts and sometimes they would ask the rulers' adviser to amend 
certain sections of a law before accepting it. Once amendments had been made 
the law would be accepted for retrocession. 
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However, the enactment of those laws which the Political Agent assumed to 
be part of the new federal legal system as slightly different. As the record of the 
Retrocession Committee explained:64 
As far as the Immigration, Public Security Liaison Office and Identity Card 
Laws were concerned, these would be amended slightly to take into account the fact 
that they would not now be enacted in the Council (TSC), and that they would antic-
ipate Federation Laws. The Political Agent would then take them round individual 
Rulers and get them to sign. 
In the record of one retrocession meeting, held in July 1971, the Political 
Agent and the legal advisers found out that some laws required a lot of careful 
preparation before legislation could be produced.65 For instance, there was a con-
troversy over an immigration law that was drafted in 1971.66 Dubai wanted to 
exempt Iranian subjects from visa entry as the Committee had recommended for 
the subjects of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait. This, however, was not 
accepted by Abu Dhabi because, as ~amfidah bin 'Ali the representative of Abu 
Dhabi pointed out, it would cause some embarrassment for the newly proposed 
federation vis-a-vis the Arab countries.67 
In sum, the legal structure of the Emirates was strongly influenced by the 
British authorities. The previous Order in Council regulations remained in force 
in the Emirates and the Arab legal advisers remained actively involved. 
4.4 Military and Security Forces 
The post-1965 era witnessed various military developments in the Trucial 
States. It coincided with the British withdrawal from Aden and with the antici-
pated withdrawal from the Gulf, that was eventually announced in January 1968. 
As we have seen in the legal and political sectors, Britain had encouraged a mil-
itary build up in the area too. Besides strengthening the Trucial Oman Scouts 
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(TOS) and permitting the rulers to establish private forces, Britain later strove to 
unite the area's defence forces through Colonel Sir John Willoughby's Mission in 
1969. 
4.4.1 The Trucial Oman Scouts (T.O.S) 
The TOS, which dates back to February 1951, was the first local institution 
created by Britain in the Trucial States. Its establishment was due to a number 
of reasons.68 One of the main reasons was the need to protect the oil companies 
that were surveying the area for oil. As we have mentioned before, the Persian 
oil dispute of 1951 had encouraged the oil companies to look for oil in the Gulf. 
Since no territorial boundaries had been established among the Emirates disputes 
did occur from time to time. As a result, the British Government established the 
Trucial Oman Levis in 1951, renamed TOS in 1956.69 This policy of interfering in 
the internal affairs of the Gulf Emirates was a radical departure from the old view 
that regarded the Gulf as merely an out-post of India. 
Besides protecting the oil survey parties and interfering in internal tribal 
disputes, the TOS was supposed to protect the Political Agents and any other 
British politicians who happened to be travelling in the Trucial States. In addition, 
according to Brigadier De Butts, TOS Commander from 1964-67, the purpose of 
forming the TOS was "to keep the peace in the Gulf States because of disputes 
over territories due to oil discoveries." 70 
Due to these factors it was decided to establish military garrisons in various 
strategic areas throughout the Trucial States; for example, the Mirfa' garrison was 
in close proximity to Saudi Arabia so as to meet any threat that may have come 
from that side. 71 According to Colonel Tug Wilson, the purpose of Mirfa' was to 
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guard the western part of the Trucial States because the tribes in Liwa were in 
a remote region and thus if the TOS did not have a garrison there, could easily 
be influenced by the Saudis. 72 Colonel Wilson also added that the Mirfa' garrison 
was intended to protect the installations of the oil companies which had started 
to build up around Jabal Dhannah. 
Another purpose of the Scouts was to contribute to the internal security of 
the Emirates. Since the area had come under British protection in the nineteenth 
century, Britain had sought to maintain the existing state system and prevent any 
Emirate increasing its territory at the expense of another. 73 The only exception 
was the case of Fujairah that was recognised by Britain in 1952'instead of the state 
of Kalba (see chapter one). According to Major Jack Briggs, former Commissioner 
of Dubai Police, one of the purposes of the TOS was to maintain the old status 
quo by preventing ambitious rulers such as Sheikh Rashid al-Maktiim from seizing 
territory from the weaker states.74 However, serious internal disputes still arose 
between the Emirates due to the fact that those exploring for oil needed to know 
with whom to negotiate. One such dispute occurred between Fujairah and Ras al-
Khaimah who both claimed the small village of Masafi. The division of the village 
between the two Emirates by the representative of the Foreign Office created a 
perpetual enmity among its inhabitants; In order to solve the problem, the Political 
Agent established a TOS garrsion in that village and eventually a Scouts squadron 
was set up permanently at Masafi. 75 
The Scouts also played a strong role in protecting the Trucial States from any 
outside threat from Saudi Arabia throughout the disputes over Buraimi. To this 
end, a permanent Scouts garrison was established at al-Jahll, one of the settlements 
in the Buraimi oases under the sovereignty of Abu Dhabi [today in the province of 
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al-'Ayn]. 76 The Scouts also participated in the Imamate Civil War from 1957-1959 
(see chapter two). 77 
The Scouts, trained and officered by the British, were able to strengthen 
Britain's hold on the Trucial States. In general, while the majority of soldiers were 
recruited from the tribesmen of the Trucial States and Oman, a number of soldiers 
(106 out of 1,504 in 1970) was recruited from other Arab countries. When it suited 
Britain the Scouts were used to interfere in the internal affairs of the Emirates and 
indeed to depose uncooperative Sheikhs, as for example, Sheikh Saqr in 1965, and 
Sheikh Shakhbut in 1966. 
The process of building up the Scouts, (which had grown from 500 troops in 
1956 to 1504 strong in February 197078 ) into a national force followed a number 
of steps. Initially a slow process of shifting the loyalty of the TOS away from the 
Political Resident to the rulers was introduced through the participation of the 
Scouts in the Trucial States Council meetings. At first, British officers represented 
the Scouts, whereas later efforts were made to bring in Arab officers to deliver their 
annual report to the Council as any other department of the organisation. At the 
same time, the rulers were encouraged to participate in the social and military 
activities of the Scouts. Furthermore, the funding of the Scouts was not totally 
paid by the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence (as had previously been the 
case) because the rulers had started paying a certain percentage through the TSC 
before the withdrawal. According to a communique issued by the TSC in March 
1970, the Council of Rulers "approved the expenditure of funds, accumulated from 
bank interest on the contribution of the rulers to the salaries of the members of 
the TOS, to cover the cost of making the medals, and to spend the balance for 
the welfare of the force." 79 This kind of participation by the rulers in the affairs of 
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the Scouts reveals that Britain was successful in forging closer links between the 
Scouts and the rulers. With the establishment of the UAE in December 1971 the 
TOS were incorporated in the new defence force of the Federation. 
The other step that symbolized the retrocession of the Scouts was a policy 
that increasingly saw British Officers being replaced by Arab ones. Colonel Ive, 
former TOS Commander, mentioned that the Scouts had already removed some of 
its British Officers serving in the administrative sector. In addition it was decided 
that the Scouts should purchase their supplies from local Arab traders: as Colonel 
lve stated, "We intend to buy our own materials through local agents." 80 As has 
been mentioned previously, the number of British Officers and NCOs was gradually 
decreasing and the number of Arab Officers was increasing. In 1968, The Financial 
Times put the British Officers serving in the Scouts at 100 personnel81 ; a number 
which was reduced to 43 by 1975.82 On the other hand the number of Arab officers 
was increased from 20 to 29 in only one year that is in between 1969-1970. 
In spite of the increase in the number of Arab officers in the Scouts, the 
evidence suggests that British influence remained strong. Many of the new Arab 
officers were from Aden and Jordan where they had been trained by the British. 
Others were ex-students of the British-run Scouts Boys' School, which had been 
established in 1958 in the TOS's main military garrison at Sharjah. By 1970 more 
than 101 students had graduated from the Boys School83 and a high percentage 
of them eventually rose to officer rank in the Scouts. Consequently, the British 
style of running the Scouts continued even though the number of British officers 
declined. 
After the British withdrawal announcement in January 1968, the Scouts be-
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came concerned about their future, and consequently many joined the Abu Dhabi 
Defence Force instead. In 1970, the commander of the Scouts urged the rulers 
to contemplate the fate of the Scouts after 1971.84 A number of measures were 
introduced such as: awarding a Long Service Medal to eligible member of the 
Force85 ; the construction of cement barracks instead of tents, as in the Himham 
garrison at Ras al-Khaimah; increasing the salaries of both officers and men; in-
troducing automatic guns as opposed to the old rifles; and TOS personnel assisted 
in the training of the new military forces created by individual Emirates. 86 These 
changes certainly helped to lessen their apprehension. However, the Scouts were 
losing their hegemony in the Trucial States and they began to be replaced by the 
military forces of the Sheikhs. In the following pages, these forces will be consid-
ered so as to attempt to identify the reasons for their establishment together with 
the connection between the establishment of the forces and the British withdrawal. 
4.4.2 The Military Forces of the individual Emirates 
In the early sixties, Britain had encourged Abu Dhabi to build up its own 
forces because by that time Abu Dhabi, unlike the other Emirates, was receiving 
substantial oil revenue. It was not until the withdrawal announcement in January 
1968 that the rulers of other Emirates were encouraged to develop their forces. 
The initial reason for the establishment of military forces in the major Emi-
rates was the need for security to fill the vacuum that was left by the withdrawal 
of British troops. The security of the area was looked upon from different angles 
by Britain and the rulers. Britain for her part, was concerned about internal sub-
versions inspired and encouraged by one or more foreign powers based on their 
experience of the Egyptian role in the nationalist movement in Aden. Britain's 
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Table 4.1: The Trucial States' Forces 
Place N arne of the Force Year established Strengh by 1970 
Trucial States TOS 1951 1500 
Abu Dhabi ADDF 1964 6000 
Dubai DDF 1968 360 
Sharjah National Guard 1968 230 
Ras al-Khaimah RAK Mobile Forces 1968 210 
Sources: 
J.C. Hurewitz, The Persian Gulf: Prospect for Stability, Headline Services Pub-
lished by Foreign Policy Association, no. 220, (Washington, D.C., April 1974); 
Otto Von Pivkar, Armies of the Middle East, (London: Book Club Association, 
1979) pp. 125-142; TSDO 23/6/2, "Colonellve's report." Dubai, 1970. 
response to this security problem was at two levels. The first, was to encourage 
the main Emirates to develop their own military forces to be responsible for inter-
nal security; since, without the build up of the forces of the individual Emirates, 
Britain might have found it necessary to increase the size of the TOS, who were 
of course funded by Britain. Second, Britain, together with the United States 
encouraged Iran and Saudi Arabia to cooperate in order to play a more important 
role in regional security (see chapter 7). 
For the rulers, however, it is possible to identify a number of reasons why 
they sought to develop their own military forces. Their main concern was not 
internal subversion but the threat from Iran and Saudi Arabia or indeed from one 
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or other of the Emirates themselves. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia had well-known 
territorial claims over territory within the Emirates. Saudi Arabia was darning 
the Buraimi oases and Iran was claiming a number of islands belonging to Sharjah 
and Ras al-Khaimah (see chapter 7). 
Abu Dhabi, which was under threat from Saudi Arabia over Buraimi, tried 
to convince Britain not to leave the Gulf, and expressed its willingness to pay the 
cost of maintaining the British troops. In addition, Sheikh Zayed in 1969 tried 
to persuade the British Opposition Leader Edward Heath to enter into a defence 
treaty with Abu Dhabi once the Conservative Party had gained power.87 However, 
when all his scheming had come to nought, Sheikh Zayed began to expand his 
defence forces that were originally established in 1964.88 
The second reason for a proliferation of private defence forces in the Trucial 
States was that the rulers were suspicious of the Trucial Oman Scouts. While the 
Scouts in theory belonged to the Trucial States, they were under British control, 
through the Political Resident, who was ultimately responsible for their finance. 
There were a number of reasons for the rulers' suspicion of the Scouts : (a) the 
removal of Sheikhs ~aqr and Shakhbut had been carried out by the Scouts in 1965-
66; (b) the soldiers of Aden and the Protectorates, who were organized by Britain 
and were supposed to form the federal army, had mutinied against their Sultans 
before the British withdrawal from Aden in 1967; (c) there were pockets of Dhofari 
rebels in the Scouts (see chapter 2); and, (d) the impact of the 1967 war. This last 
point needs greater clarification. 
After the out break of the 1967 June War between the Arabs and Israel, the 
TSC held an emergency meeting to discuss the situation. The President of the 
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TSC, Sheikh ~aqr bin Mul).ammad, Ruler of Ras al Khaimah, explained the reason 
for this emergency invitation, by saying:89 
I called for this emergency session on account of the present circumstances 
which our Arab Nation is experiencing and in order to study and discuss together 
these circumstances so as to come to a unified position regarding them ... .it is a duty 
incumbent on the the Trucial States to assist their brother-Arab States in their war 
against the Israeli gangs .... and since it is known that the TOS are forces that belong 
to the Trucial Coast; (Sheikh $aqr, the President of the TSC had suggested) sending 
these forces to fight aganist Israel as an assistance from the Trucial Coast to the sister 
Arab States. 
It was a suggestion motivated either by the need for the Sheikhs to express 
their solidarity with the Arab States fighting Israel, or due to the demonstrations 
that took place in the streets of the Trucial States, or perhaps for both reasons. 
However, the Political Agent rejected the suggestion and explained that the Scouts 
were paid by H.M. Government to keep peace and stability on the Trucial States 
and that any decision to send the Scouts outside the States remained in the hands 
of the Political Resident in Bahrain.90 This demonstrated that the real authority 
over the Scouts was with Britain and this was probably one of the reasons why the 
rulers turned their backs on the Scouts and developed their own armies willing to 
accept their commands. 
The third reason for establishing individual forces may be explained by the 
prestige that the rulers attached to military strength. 91 The establishment of a 
strong militray force using the wealth from oil revenues could be seen by rulers to 
enhance their status in the eyes of neighbouring rulers, and indeed, in the wider 
Arab World. 
The rapid expansion of individual forces in each emirate and in particular in 
Abu Dhabi (see table 4.1) meant that substantial contracts for arms and equipment 
were obtained by British companies. For example, the Land Rover Company sold 
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hundreds of vehicles to the military forces of the various Emirates. 92 There was 
also in Abu Dhabi's Defence Force in 1970, British-supplied equipment in the 
form of Saladin armoured cars, Ferrat Scout cars and 25-pound guns for artillary 
support. In addition, Abu Dhabi had contracted British companies to provide 
training and maintenance services for its Air Force. 93 Indeed the British companies 
had won a substantial amount of Abu Dhabi military spending which rose from a 
few thousands dinars in 1965 to BD 40 million in 1969.94 
At the same time there were many British officers serving in the new military 
forces established by individual Emirates; for example, the commander of Ras al-
Khaimah Mobile Forces was Major David Neal, who had served in the Scouts,95 
and Captain Tim Ash, former TOS officer, became a Major in the Ras al-Khaimah 
Mobile Forces.96 Other British nationals served in the upper ranks of ADDF such 
as Colonel Wilson, who was commander of the Army; Mr. Pool, the Navy; Mr. 
Storey, the Airforce; Charles Winter, the Royal Guard; and Arthur Clements who 
became Chief Intelligence Officer.97 In addition to those who joined the local forces, 
there were some British soldiers from the British Army who helped in training and 
establishing the private Defence forces. For instance, in June 1972, a group from 
the British Military Assistance Team (MAT) in Sharjah agreed to train officer-
candidates for the ADDF's infantry battalions.98 As a result, more British Officers, 
often after their retirement, found jobs with high salaries in the private defence 
forces of the Trucial States.99 Besides, there were several Jordanians among the 
lower officer ranks, but most of the non-commisioned officers and lower ranks were 
recruited from Omanis and local Arabs. 
A further example of British influence was evident in the way that the soldiers 
dressed. This followed British traditions to the extent of uniforms, medals and 
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badges, as well as in the names of the various ranks and in the administration. 
Thus, it is clear that Britain played an influential role in establishing the Sheikhs' 
separate armies. 
Britain allowed development of the private forces because it was believed that 
they might have a useful role to play in controlling internal security. Unfortunately, 
the build-up of the private forces within the Emirates provoked a degree of rivalry 
between individual Emirates. Indeed, Albert Hourani in 1968 had envisaged that 
Britain's assistance in training and equipping local military forces might lead to 
negative results and cause intensive rivalry between the Sheikhs.100 Examples of 
the clashes between forces of individual Emirates included a conflict between Dubai 
and Sharjah over the village of Nazwa that occurred once Britain's authority in the 
area came to an end in 1971. Also, these different forces could be a direct threat to 
the rulers themselves as was evident by the example of Sheikh 'Abd al- 'Aziz, the 
Commander of Sharjah National Guard, who tried to depose the Ruler of Sharjah, 
Sheikh Sultan, in 1986. The other disadvantages of these private forces was that 
their rapid expansion naturally weakened the position of the TOS which could 
have formed the nucleus of a federal government force. 101 Finally, the emergence 
of five different defence forces in the Thucial States led to the duplication of military 
installations, personnel and training programmes which greatly increased military 
expenditure. 
4.4.3 Willoughby and the question of the Federal Defence Force 
During the second meeting of the rulers of the nine Emirates to form a fed-
eration in Doha, Qatar, from 20-22 October 1968, the defence and security needs 
of the federation were discussed and as a result the rulers agreed to appoint a 
183 
senior military adviser to prepare a study on the subject, (see chapter 6). Major 
General Sir John Willoughby, a former commander of British land forces in the 
Middle East and a former security commander in Aden 1965-67, was invited to be 
the defence adviser to the federation. After spending over two months in the Gulf, 
Sir John submitted his report on 20th April 1969. He believed that the nature of 
the threats against the federation of Arab Emirates after the withdrawal of British 
forces from the area in 1971 could come from two sources. Firstly, through internal 
subversion from: 102 
(a) Dissatisfied elements in the densely populated centres. 
(b) Foreign labour. 
(c) Illegal immigrants. 
(d) The illicit importation of arms and explosives. 
(e) A deliberate programme of subversive propaganda. 
Secondly, Willoughby beleived that a threat to the federation might come 
from external sources but not unti1:103 
The Union has been weakened by subversion and in particular by the sowing of 
discord between member states by subversive elements. 
In the light of this, the Willoughby report emphasized the internal rather 
than the external factors as the main threat to the stability of the federation. In 
addition, the report suggested that the people of the Emirates, illegal immigrants, 
or foreign labour could be influenced by a foreign power, such as Egypt, Iraq, PDRY 
or the Soveit Union, and thus attempt to overthrow the federation government. 
Taking into consideration: (a) the problems of the Arabian Peninsula at that 
time: civil war in North Yemen, radical government in South Yemen and the 
Dhofar revolution in Oman (see chapter 2); (b) the policy of mutual understanding 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran over Gulf security (see chapter 6); and (c) the 
previous experience of Willoughby in Aden as a former security commander from 
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1965-67, then it was no surprise that Willoughby emphasized internal factors as 
the main threat to the stability of the federation. However, it could be argued 
that the report over-emphasized the internal threat aganist the federation because 
the subversive elements identified by Willoughby i.e. illegal immigrants, foreign 
labour and the nationals of the Emirates, were hardly capable of posing such a 
threat (see chapter 2). 
Accordingly, the report recommended the establishment of a small Union 
Defence Force (UDF) that would contain 2000 men in the army, 104 8 medium-
sized patrol craft for the navy,105 9 Tigercat Ground-based missiles to be deployed 
around important targets and 18 Haucker-Hunter Aircraft.106 
As far as the fate of the TOS was concerned, the report did not ignore its role, 
as Taryam has suggested, 107 nor, on the other hand, was making the TOS the nu-
deus of the federation force the most important point in the report, which al-Sayyar 
has incorrectly stated. 108 In fact, the TOS was to play a role in the new federal 
force but a minor one. For example, in Article 66 the report recommended: 109 
(a) Existing TOS training facilities should be used to the full. 
(b) The British Government should be asked to agree that the TOS should help in 
training the first Union battalion. 
The report envisaged that the TOS would eventually be absorbed within the 
new force. 
However, it can be argued that the forces that were to play a particularly im-
portant role in establishing the proposed UDF were the British forces in the Gulf. 
In Article 58, the report stated the necessity of a body of foreign troops in training 
and forming the UDF and that was "preferably a British Army training team." 110 
Also the report suggested that the UDF's proposed Command be established at 
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Sharjah because, "it will be useful to liaise with British forces during the formative 
period and be near a centre of communication in order to obtain expert specialist 
advice." 111 Finally, the report recommended that "a number of foreign nationals 
will be required in forming the UDF" 112 presumably British officers. Willoughby 
himself in the report commented that the UDF could be criticized as being "British 
inspired and British-trained and could be interpreted as an attempt to continue 
British Military influence on the Gulf." 113 Nevertheless, the British Military Train-
ing Team (MAT) that was stationed in Sharjah became responsible for training the 
federation forces. They gave advice regarding reconnaissance, artillery, engineers 
etc.114 
The above arrangements were meant to prepare the area for the withdrawal 
but there was some disagreement. The British, including Sir John Willoughby, 
Colonel Tug Wilson, (Commander of Abu Dhabi Defence Force) Mr John Butler, 
(Abu Dhabi Financial Adviser)115 , John McCarthy of the Foreign Office116 and 
several other notable figures, supported the establishment of a smaller army as 
the report recommended. However, some of the rulers such as Sheikh Zayed, who 
had a dispute with Saudi Arabia over Buraimi (see chapter 7) did not agree with 
the report. They favoured the establishment of a stronger defence force instead. 
The rulers' views were reflected in the Military Committee discussion during the 
meeting that was held in Bahrain from 15-16 June 1969. 
The rulers' representatives in the Military Committee during their discus-
sion concerning the federation of the nine states (see chapter 6) recommended, 
(contrary to the Willoughby report) the establishment of a stronger defence force. 
Furthermore, the Committee recommended inviting a military training team from 
a friendly Arab country to take the responsibility of training the UDF.l17 At the 
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same time the Committee recommended that: 118 
a request be made to one of the Arab Kings or Presidents to second a number 
of high-ranking officers and to elect one from them to command the UDF. 
After the failure of the attempt made by the nine Emirates to federate, a 
mixture both of the Willoughby report and of the Military Committee recommen-
dations became the basis on which the U AE defence forces were eventually built. 
For example, the Emirates' defence forces went along with the Committee's recom-
mendations in building up a stronger defence force but at the same time it followed 
the report in inviting the British to train and command the UAE forces (see 4.4.2). 
4.4.4 The Police Force. 
The first police force was set up m the Trucial states in the 1950s. This 
was at a time when the exploration for oil was taking place which was attracting 
foreign labour to the region. The expansion of the educational system brought 
teachers from other countries, particularly from Egypt. This was also a time 
when Arab nationalism was spreading into the region. The latter rather worried 
the British authorities who had been responsible for issuing entry visas, controlling 
immigrants, organizing jurisdiction over foreigners, and protecting British subjects 
working in the oil instalations. Because the British were worried about these 
developments, the rulers of the Trucial States were encouraged to form their own 
police forces. Consequently, Dubai in 1956, was the first Emirate to establish a 
police force, under the command of a British officer. The first officer was an ex-
TOS officer, Captain Peter Clayton, and he was followed by Major P. Lorimer, 
who served until 1965; his successor from 1965-75 was Major Jack Briggs. Abu 
Dhabi Police Force, established in 1957, was also under a British officer, Mr. C. 
Stokes.119 The rest of the Trucial States' police forces were set up in 1967-68, and 
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were mostly under British officers. 120 
The idea of a federal police force was first suggested by the Political Resident 
in Bahrain. In 1959 he had summoned police officers from all the Trucial States 
to discuss with them ways of establishing a federal police force in the Trucial 
States, 121 after which a police expert came from Aden to see how such a force 
might be established in the area. However, the proposal was rejected at that 
time by the rulers and the initiative came to nought. The reason was that while 
the individual police force of each Emirate was under the control of its ruler, the 
federal police would not only be staffed by British police officers, but it would 
also be under the control of the Political Resident. Major Jack Briggs, former 
commander of Dubai police force, explained that "the rulers did not want a police 
force with a British officer looking over their shoulders" 122 particularly an officer 
who had not been appointed by and was not responsible to them. At the same time 
Britain did not proceed with the plan because, at that time, it was not thinking 
of a withdrawal. 
Nevertheless, from the middle of the 1960s Britain began to encourage the 
rulers to strengthen their police forces. In 1966, the Political Agent in the Trucial 
States, Sir David Roberts, was given the responsibility of reinforcing the existing 
police forces in the Emirates by bringing in senior British officers and by establish-
ing new police forces in Ajman, Sharjah, and the other smaller states. The reason 
for this action was linked to the events in Aden and the transfer of British troops 
to the British base in Sharjah, which the British Government felt necessitated a 
stronger police force in the area to protect British military personnel and their 
families. Sir David stated that "I had to consider the security of the British people 
because of the troubles in Aden." 123 
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Further efforts to federate the police forces in the Trucial States came about 
as a result of the Deliberative Committee of the TSC's recommendation on 16th 
March 1967 calling for the unification of the police forces of the Trucial States. 
The TSC, in its 28th session in April 1967, accepted the above recommendation 
and passed a resolution calling on:124 
The police commissioners of the Trucial States to hold meetings for the purpose 
of harmonizing rules and regulations of the police forces of the Trucial States as well 
as coordinating their policies. 
Thus, the first meeting of the Trucial States' police commissioners, was held 
in July 1967 and was attended by the following representatives: Major Barnum 
representing Abu Dhabi, Major J. Briggs representing Dubai, Major Robert Burns 
representing Sharjah, Major Trevor Bevan representing Ras al-Khaimah, Major 
Henchman representing the TOS, Captain Humphreys from Dubai Police and al-
Baitar in his capacity as Secretary General of the TSC. 125 They tried to coordinate, 
harmonize and strengthen the laws of the police forces. They also passed some 
recommendations for the rulers of the Trucial States to discuss. 
The police commissioners recommended three points. The first was concerned 
with illegal immigrants who came in increasing number after the discovery of oil 
in the area. They recommended that: (a) each Emirate should issue its own im-
migration law to replace the British law; (b) the issue of immigration cards and 
work-permits for foreigners; (c) to deport illegal immigrants and (d) to be more 
severe with the owners of boats who smuggled in illegal immigrants.126 Although 
these recommendations were accepted by the Deliberative Committee in its 20th 
session on 19th August 1967127 , they did not, however, obtain the consent of the 
rulers in the Council meeting of 29 August 1967, and thus no unified position was 
reached on the immigration issue. The rulers nevertheless agreed to issue immi-
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gration laws similar to those of Abu Dhabi. The Council's latter resolution on 
immigration had, however, "reserved the right of each ruler to amend the Abu 
Dhabi immigration law to fit each particular Emirate" 128 and such an amendment 
to the immigration law might provide an opportunity for certain Emirates to in-
crease their income by selling passports to illegal immigrants. Also for political 
reasons some of the rulers felt that it was appropriate to increase the population 
of their respective Emirates by naturalizing a number of illegal immigrants. Fur-
thermore special privileges were given by Dubai to Iranian immigrants because 
of the friendly relations which existed between Iran and Dubai.129 On 1st April 
1971, the deputy commissioner of Abu Dhabi's police force, J:lamudah bin 'Ali, 
had explained to his Government how Dubai was embarrassing them by allowing 
Iranians to enter Dubai without restrictions. He further explained: 130 
I, as a representative of Abu Dhabi, raised my objections to the matter and 
explained to them that we in Abu Dhabi have certain rules and we are not intending 
to violate them. The reason for my objections is that Dubai, by favouring certain 
people like Iranians, would put us in an embarrassing situation vis-a-vis the other 
Arab countries. 
The second recommendation that came out of the commissioners meeting 
was the unification of the laws and regulations of the Trucial States' police. This 
suggestion was seconded by the Deliberative Committee who asked the Emirates 
to make their police rules conform to a similar pattern.131 This recommendation 
was also duly accepted by the rulers in their 29th Session as above132 . 
The third recommendation of the commissioners was a controversial issue as 
far as the rulers were concerned. The commissioners called for the establishment of 
a central jail, a police college, a central office for <;riminal registration and an annual 
bulletin for the Police.133 The rulers did not accept that recommendation for the 
reason that it had sounded too federal at the time seeing that the withdrawal had 
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not yet been conceived. Also the rulers felt that each Emirate should supply its 
own police requirements. 
The spirit of co-ordination among the police departments of the Trucial States 
had not improved enough to stop the waves of illegal immigrants which arrived 
in the area. Furthermore, with the absence of legal provisions for deciding on 
nationality many illegal immigrants were able to buy passports and this entitled 
them to nationality. 134 As a result, the police commissioners of the Trucial States 
failed to arrive at a clear conclusion with respect to federating the police forces of 
the Emirates. 
There were, however, further meetings of the police commissioners during the 
time leading up to the withdrawal. For example, on 25th March 1971 a meeting 
was held in Dubai, and was attended by the police commissioners of the Trucial 
States, as well as by the Political Agent in the Trucial States, Mr. J. Walker135 , and 
Major Briggs, representative of Dubai, presided over the meeting. He suggested the 
establishment of a central registration office for crimes, unifying regulations and 
laws of the police, unifying dress, salaries of the police and so on.136 He also pointed 
out that his urgent message was totally supported by H.M. Political Agent Mr. 
J. Walker. The Political Agent explained to them ways of enhancing the security 
of the area by proposing some recommendations and promised to ask for support 
from H.M. Government with a view to developing the Emirates' Police. 
The first recommendation by Walker was to establish a general security coun-
cil which would co-ordinate the police forces of the Emirates. The second rec-
ommendation suggested connecting the whole area to one radio network; and the 
third was to establish 'a special branch' to deal with crime investigation in each 
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Emirate. He was keen to form a radio network for the police by providing extra 
facilities for the police forces in Ajman, U mm al-Qaiwain and Fujairah and also to 
establish a special branch in any Emirate which did not possess one at that time. 
The success of the general security council idea was doubtful since the rep-
resentative of Abu Dhabi, Mr. N. I.Iamiidi, questioned the reason why it should 
not be established in Abu Dhabi. 137 I.Iamiidi had thought that it was part of the 
British plan to make Dubai the focal-point of power. The commissioners recom-
mendations for a central jail, general security council and the unification of the 
police regulations were on the agenda of the rulers' 33rd Session in July 1971, but 
the rulers were too busy negotiating the actual formation of the UAE and therefore 
their final communique did not mention these issues.138 
The other important issue that the police representatives discussed in their 
March 1971 meeting was the subject of illegal immigration. Their response to this 
was to ask Abu Dhabi to deploy its coastal guards to inspect the coasts of the 
whole Emirates in order to restrict illegal immigration, together with drugs and 
gun-running. They also discussed an immigration law and this was duly passed in 
November 1971.139 
4.5 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to study developments within the Trucial 
States in the political, legal, security and military contexts of the sixties. The 
subsequent aim was to analyse the process of retroceding those responsibilities 
from H.M. Government to the authorities within the Trucial States. 
In order to create some political coordination among the rulers of the Trucial 
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States three political points were studied. The most important was the emer-
gence of the Trucial States Council which was to form the basis of a new federal 
state. Besides its annual sessions, which were attended by the rulers of the Seven 
Trucial States and the Political Agent, the Council also supervised the economic 
development of the area. 
However, due to various obstacles such as the boundary disputes between the 
emirates, the TSC was prevented from becoming a strong political body. The 
latter problem had been recognized earlier by the British authorities in the Gulf 
and so they had made the Sheikhs promise to accept the findings of several British 
missions. The third political development involved opening up the country to 
outsiders such as the American oil companies, the Arab League and the various 
UN organizations. 
This of course increased the judicial burden and as a result the rulers were 
encouraged to take over the whole area and the old practice of foreigners being 
tried by H.M. courts was abandoned. However, the gradual retrocession of legal 
rights to the courts of the rulers had created a certain amount of confusion which 
had enabled illegal immigrants to settle in the area. Even though it was the task 
of the police to prevent illegal immigrants getting into the Trucial States, they 
were unable to do so, due both to the lack of appropriate laws, and the absence of 
cooperation among the police forces of the Emirates. 
As far as security of the area was concerned, Britain had first created the 
Trucial Oman Scouts in 1951. It had then encouraged the rulers to build up their 
own private forces and finally the British tried to unite the area's military forces 
through the efforts of Sir John Willoughby in 1969. 
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The purpose of all this effort was to prepare the Emirates to rule themselves 
after the withdrawal of British troops in 1971. It is interesting to see that Britain 
was successful in her attempt to retrocede her responsibilities for law and order, 
the police and the military to the rulers of the Trucial States. However this was 
obtained not without cost. The highest price that the Emirates paid was the 
significant number of illegal immigrants, mainly from Iran, who settled in the 
area. Furthermore, multiplication of military forces in the Emirates was a possible 
source of instability instead of the intended aim of stablizing the area. Finally, 
Britain was not entirely successful in solving the numerous boundary disputes 
both between the Emirates themselves and also between them and neighbouring 
States which again represented a potential destablizing force in the area. 
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Chapter V 
British Economic Interests in the Emirates 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we will discuss British economic interests in the Emirates and 
how they interacted with the withdrawal issue of 1971. 
As we have seen, Britain was initially in the Gulf to protect her Indian Empire, 
but after the Second World War the economic resources of the Gulf and oil in 
particular, became an essential element in Foreign Office planning. The protection 
of this oil wealth was a key factor in determining British policy towards the region 
such as the formation of the Baghdad Pact, the Kuwait operation and the extension 
of military bases in Aden and the Gulf. (see chapters 1 and 2). Lastly, future 
security of oil investments and supply represented an important factor in Britain's 
decision to withdraw from the Gulf in 1968. 
We intend in this chapter to clarify the argument that seeks to connect the 
protection of British economic interests in the Gulf with the presence of British 
troops. To what extent was this argument valid by the end of the 1960s? What 
was the British Government's position and that of the Opposition on the matter? 
Finally, what were the substitute ideas that had been introduced in its place? The 
second part of the chapter will discuss the role, policies and reaction of the oil 
companies towards the new policy. of withdrawing the troops. This chapter will 
also consider not only other British economic interests in the areas of trade and 
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non-direct investments but also the Emirates investments in Britain, and their 
connection with the withdrawal policy. 
5.2 Security of the Gulf oil 
After Britain had granted India independence in 1947, her vital overseas in-
terests were located in the Gulf which by the beginning of the 1970s contained 55% 
of the World's proven oil reserves at that time, outside the Communist World.l 
Firstly, Britain had an important stake in the oil industry of all Gulf States, with 
the exception of Saudi Arabia whose oil interests were under American control 
in the form of the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO). British compa-
nies owned thirty per cent of the petroleum rights in the Gulf, an investment 
that equalled £900m.2 Secondly, Britain's total oil imports from the Gulf in 1967 
amounted to about 50% of her total consumption, with Kuwait alone accounting 
for 35% in 1966.3 The other Western European countries and Japan were also 
heavily dependent upon the Gulf for their crude oi1.4 Therefore, Britain's indus-
trial economy was dependent upon the flow of Gulf oil and any disturbances could 
easily create a significant problem for the British economy, not to mention the 
economies of other Western European countries and Japan. 
In addition, earnings from the oil industry were considered an important factor 
in the British balance of payments and the gold and dollar earnings of the sterling 
area. According to The Times of 11 November 1967, £200 million a year in foreign 
exchange was earned by Britain through the oil companies' activities in Gulf oil.6 
Furthermore, most of those oil producing Emirates were members of the sterling 
area and kept their sterling reserves in London. 
For a long time, the security of this area had been guaranteed by the British 
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base in Aden and the other smaller bases in the Gulf. When Britain decided to 
withdraw from Aden, extensions to her bases in Sharjah, Bahrain and Masirah 
were carried out in 1966-67. The future security of Gulf oil came under discussion 
and one can identify three different arguments. 
The first argument was that the British presence in the Gulf was essential for 
the security of the oil industry there. The supporters of this argument pointed 
out that in 1961 Kuwait was saved from Iraqi aggression only by the presence of 
British troops in the area. Furthermore, they predicted that if Britain withdrew 
from the Gulf her oil interests would be jeopardized because a power vacuum would 
be created which might bring chaos and war that ultimately would stop the flow 
of oil.7 The troops' presence in the Gulf, they pointed out, was costing only £20 
million annually which was very low in comparison with the huge investments. 8 
This was the official view held by the Labour Party until January 1968 and the 
Conservative Party until March 1971.9 
The second argument threw doubts on the role of the British military presence 
in the Gulf and argued that it actually undermined the security of the area instead 
of safeguarding it. There were indeed changing attitudes in British official circles 
towards the problem. This view was held by a number of academics, 10 junior 
civil servants in the Foreign Oflice11 and by the fact that a Labour Minister, 
Christopher Mayhew, actually resigned over the issue. In his resignation speech 
to the House of Commons on 22 February 1966 he pointed out that the British 
military presence in the east of Suez was actually "defeating its own ends because 
it arouses suspicions of colonialism and weakens the will of free Asian people to 
stand up for themselves." 12 
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This argument took account of the changing political climate in the region. 
In the Gulf nationalist feeling was growing and beginning to be expressed openly. 
Young people in the Gulf, who were becoming more aware and educated, were 
beginning to believe the Egyptian accusation that their rulers would be simply 
Western lackies as long as the British troops remained there.13 The example was 
given of Aden, which it was argued, should be seen as a warning to Britain that 
keeping troops in a foreign land without the agreement of its people would not be 
tolerated and would only undermine British interests.14 According to this argument 
the Aden case would probably be repeated in the Gulf if Britain insisted on keeping 
her troops in the area. It would result in a disaster for the oil companies and other 
British interests which would suffer the same fate as the BP refinery in Aden which 
was nationalised immediately after independence.15 
Furthermore, according to this argument the British military presence would 
provide a pretext for nationalists to lean towards the Communist World as in the 
case of Dhofar. This would endanger the very regimes in the Gulf that the oil 
companies were intent on keeping stable. Qassim in Iraq and the NLF in Aden 
came to power, it was argued, by using the British presence in their countries as 
an essential ingredient of their political strategy.16 
These arguments clearly affected the thinking of the Labour Government 
which finally announced in January 1968 the withdrawal of British troops from 
the Gulf by the end of 1971. Denis Healey, Defence Secretary 1964-1970, as well as 
Sir William Luce, Political Resident in the Gulf 1961-1966, were both against the 
idea of withdrawal but their position had become less rigid by the end of 1967. Mr. 
Healey, for example, in 1964 emphasized the role of British troops in protecting 
British interests overseas, in particular east of Suez.l7 Three years later, however, 
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he had his doubts, pointing out that the presence of British troops in the Gulf 
"can be as much an irritant as a stabilising factor. The problem in the Gulf really 
is to decide when the disadvantages of remaining are greater than the advantages, 
and this is a very difficult question of political judgement." 18 Sir William Luce also 
changed his position by emphasising the commercial nature of oil supplies which 
he recommended be left to the oil companies, (see Luce's opinion in chapter 6). 19 
The third argument that appeared to have been accepted as a new strategy 
for protecting British economic interests in the Gulf relied on three major points:-
( a) A political solution: by creating a federal system among the smaller emirates, 
solving the problems over the Islands and encouraging an understanding between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran. (b) An economic development of the area, (as we have 
seen in chapter 3). (c) The encouragement of the British-dominated oil companies 
to rely for survival on their own strategy. What we shall examine here is point (c) 
since we intend to discuss the political solutions in the coming chapters. 
5.3 The Strategy of the Oil Companies 
Before discussing the policy of the oil companies in the Emirates and how they 
managed to rely on their own initiatives, their historical concessionary background 
will be briefly outlined. Then we shall study the policies that the oil companies had 
introduced in order to survive without the protection of British troops. Finally, 
the scope of the success of these policies will be evaluated. 
In 1922 the rulers of the Trucial States signed a new agreement with the 
British authorities that obliged them to restrict oil concessions solely to compa-
nies which had the backing of the British Government. 20 Accordingly each of the 
concession agreements that were signed during the 1930s, (Dubai, 1937; Sharjah, 
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1937; Ras al-Khaimah, 1938; Kalba, 1938; Abu Dhabi, 1939; Ajman, 1939; Umm 
al-Qaiwain, 1945) were granted to the Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) 
a subsidiary of IPC, (23.75% were allocated to BP, Shell, CFP and Near East 
Development Corporation (USA) and 5% to the Gulbenkian Estate) . 21 However 
exploration for oil in the Trucial States was stopped because of World War II. 
But with the oil dispute in Iran in 1951 a massive effort was made to find oil in 
Dubai, Sharjah and Abu Dhabi. In 1950 oil was discovered first in the Ra's al-~adr 
area (in Abu Dhabi territory) but not in commercial quantities. 22 However, Umm 
Shaif and Bah oil fields in Abu Dhabi commenced producing oil in commercial 
quantities in 1958 and 1960 respectively. 23 In 1962-1963 the first oil shipments 
from Abu Dhabi's oil fields found their way onto the world market .24 Oil oper-
ations in the other Emirates were given up and activities were concentrated on 
Abu Dhabi. Petroleum Development changed its name to Abu Dhabi Petroleum 
Company (ADPC). 25 
The other company with a major oil concession in Abu Dhabi was the D'Arcy 
Exploration Co. Ltd., that had negotiated a 30,730 square kilometres concession 
in Abu Dhabi's offshore area in March 1953.26 Two years later, D'Arcy Co. gave 
up its concession in favour of Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Limited (ADMA) a newly 
formed operating company set up in joint partnership by British Petroleum (BP) 
and Compagnie Francaise des Petroles (CFP) to run the concession.27 It discovered 
oil in 1958 and started to export it from Das Island terminal in 1962.28 
In Dubai too, BP gained a minor share in Dubai Petroleum Company that was 
owned by a group of international oil companies which discovered oil in commercial 
quantities in the offshore area in 1966.29 
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By and large the British oil companies were dominant firms in the oil economy 
of the Trucial States; BP and Shell each owned 23.75% of ADPC and BP owned 
66.66% of ADMA. 30 This meant that both companies owned a substansial per 
centage of the Abu Dhabi petroleum industry and thus were the dominant firms 
until the participation agreements in the 1970s.31 
They were in a position to determine the terms of oil exploration, the rate 
of royalties and taxes and the levels of production. Because development in the 
oil industry was relatively recent in Abu Dhabi compared to other countries in 
the region, the position of the oil companies was stronger. Nevertheless, the oil 
companies were clearly conscious of changing political circumstances in the region 
and realized that it would be a mistake to place complete reliance on protection by 
British troops and so they sought to take steps to ensure their own protection. 32 
This essentially took the form of policies by oil companies to ensure good relations 
with the host governments. 
One such step was the relinquishment by ADMA/ ADPC of large parts of their 
original concession areas. In the in-shore concession that covered the whole of Abu 
Dhabi's territories, ADPC had relinquished most of its concession rights in stages. 
In 1965 the Ruler of Abu Dhabi signed an agreement in which ADPC agreed 
to relinquish 63,000 square kilometres of its concession and agreed to relinquish 
further areas within 15 years.33 ADMA also signed an agreement, in November 
1966, in which it was to relinquish two areas in 1967 and agreed to relinquish 
further areas every three years. 34 The areas relinquished by both companies were 
taken up by Japanese and American companies.35 
The advantages for the oil companies of this policy were as follows. First of all, 
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the major producing fields in Abu Dhabi remained in ADMA/ ADPC hands and 
what they had relinquished were not highly productive fields. Secondly, by allowing 
other oil companies access to the Trucial States, the vulnerability of ADMA/ ADPC 
to nationalist criticism would be reduced. For example, Dhofari rebels were capi-
tilizing on the issue by claiming that oil companies were exploiting the resources of 
the area: such propaganda might win them more supporters. If other oil compa-
nies were allowed to produce oil in the area, nationalist groups would have several 
companies to point their fingers at instead of only two. At the same time, the 
arrival of Americans and Japanese in the area had involved their governments, 
especially the US, in the security of the Gulf. Thirdly, the entrance of the new oil 
companies, which had offered better financial terms, had increased the financial 
ability of the rulers to spend on developments which would, consequently, enhance 
their political stability. 
The second development that took place in order to secure the oil companies' 
future was a revision of the financial agreement. In 1965 the oil companies agreed 
to pay 50% of the profits to the ruler of Abu Dhabi.36 The 50-50 profit-sharing 
formula was a necessary deal not only for the security of oil activities against 
the threats of the nationalists but also in the sense that the host governments 
became partners with them. At the same time the formula increased Abu Dhabi's 
revenue which Sheikh Zayed then used to develop Abu Dhabi and the other Trucial 
States.37 
The third development was the participation of the oil companies in the eco-
nomic and political changes of the Trucial States. However this role was performed 
indirectly because the oil companies' participation in domestic development was 
seen by the nationalists as an attempt to dominate the host country. This policy of 
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indirect association with development in the Trucial States went hand in hand with 
the Foreign Office recommendations that "oil companies should confine themselves 
to the production of oil and should not play a direct part in development projects 
which might involve them in domestic politics thereby spoiling the harmony of 
their relations with the governments concerned." 38 
Nevertheless, the oil companies had participated directly in the economic de-
velopment of the area although on a small scale, by building houses, roads, schools 
and by teaching the local people certain technical skills. The merchant commu-
nities of both Abu Dhabi and Dubai also benefited from the activities of the oil 
companies on a daily basis (such as the purchase of foodstuffs, consumer goods, 
small equipment etc.) even though most of the heavy equipments used by the com-
panies for these projects were imported directly from abroad. 39 Politically, there is 
some evidence that the oil companies had assisted the Abu Dhabi government in 
appointing advisers from the Arab countries such as the oil expert Nadim Pachachi, 
ex-chairman of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) who 
was oil adviser to the Abu Dhabi Government from 1967-1973.40 
The fourth development was the oil companies' emphasis on their personal 
relations with the host governments. They worked hard to gain the confidence of 
the rulers, which they had failed to get from Sheikh Shakhbut. However, with the 
latter's deposition in 1966 the oil companies again enjoyed a harmonious relation-
ship with the Abu Dhabi government. According to ADPC representative, Mr. 
David Heard, the relationship between his company and the ruler was extremely 
good, "our manager could go to the Ruler any day." 41 This sort of approach greatly 
helped the survival of the oil companies: since the Sheikhs in the Emirates held 
the reins of power, it was obviously in the supreme interest of the companies that 
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they should forge close links with them. 
To what extent, however, did the oil companies succeed in their new strategy? 
First of all, the Emirates were not in a position to produce, distribute and market 
their oil, which made them heavily dependent on the oil companies to carry out 
these tasks. In contrast with other oil producing countries such as Iran, Iraq and 
Algeria that had had oil for many years and had thus trained its own people in oil 
skills. Abu Dhabi had just discovered oil and so had not yet had sufficient time to 
educate its people in the acquistion of oil skills. In the case of Dubai, oil was only 
discovered in 1966 and began to be exported in 1969; clearly too short a period 
for Dubai to be able to manage its own oil production by itself. 
Secondly, the withdrawal of the troops would not affect the oil companies 
because the Emirates were under pressure to develop. The Emirates needed the oil 
companies to ensure increased oil production, in order to fund social and economic 
development and also defence expenditure. Clearly, to support these ambitious 
development programmes the Emirates needed to increase oil production and thus 
revenues. 
Thirdly, after the Arab defeat in the 1967 war, the oil producing states were 
asked at the Khaf1;iim Arab League Conference to offer financial assistance to 
those countries defeated in the conflict with Israel: Egypt, Jordan and Syria. This 
meant that the oil producing states had to increase their oil production in order 
to meet these additional financial obligations. In return the so-called "progressive 
states" like Egypt had to reduce their propaganda against the Gulf rulers which 
in turn strengthened the position of the oil companies. Finally, the survival of the 
oil companies was also in the interests of the rulers whose own survival was largely 
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dependent on their ability to develop the Emirates in the face of radical changes. 
Such development needed huge financial support so the rulers were obliged to 
cooperate with the oil companies. Therefore the survival of the oil companies was 
also in the interestes of the rulers of the Emirates. 
The above arguments were well understood by the oil companies, hence they 
did not panic when the British Government decided to withdraw the troops. On 
the contrary, it could be argued that the oil companies favoured withdrawal because 
they realized that nationalist and extremist activities would eventually be directed 
not only against British bases but also against the oil installations42 should the 
troops remain. Besides that, the survival of the oil companies was in the interests 
not only of the Emirates but of the progressive Arab States as well, who were now 
dependent on subsidies from their oil rich neighbours. Clearly, therefore, British 
oil interests could be preserved without the presence of British troops. 
5.4 Other economic interests 
While Britain's primary interest was the protection of her oil interests, once 
the Emirates began embarking on social and economic programmes then, of course, 
an important market was created for British companies. At the same time, the 
Emirates looked to Britain as the most important area in which to invest surplus oil 
revenues. According to Sir Steward Crawford, H.M. Political Resident in the Gulf 
1966-1970, Britain was in the Gulf to pursue peace and stability, and to protect 
her economic interests as well as in fulfilling treaty obligations. Those interests 
were oil supply and the growing market of the Gulf.43 The Gulf market as well 
as direct investment of the Gulf's oil wealth in Britain were stressed by Donald 
McCarthy, head of the Arabian Department at the Foreign Office 1967-68, who 
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saw in these two factors a partial explanation of why the British Government was 
hesitant in fixing a date for withdrawal.44 In addition to this, the Mission of the 
London Chamber of Commerce to the Gulf in 1963 revealed that the Gulf was "one 
of the most interesting and attractive markets in the whole of the Middle East." 45 
This meant that at this early stage of development, the British businessman was 
aware of the Gulf's potential as a market for British products. Indeed by the 
1980s the Gulf had become Britain's third most important market after Europe 
and North America. 46 As Lord Selsdon, chairman of the Committee on the Middle 
East Trade (COMET) explained in 1981 when talking of the importance of the 
Gulf market for British trade, "Qatar may be the size of Enfield but it has more 
to offer in the short and medium-term than China." 47 
However, despite these huge economic interests by 1968 Britain had decided 
to withdraw her troops. What we should like now to assess is the impact of that 
decision on the above mentioned interests. Was it in the interests of these British 
firms for the British troops to stay or to be withdrawn? How did they manage to 
survive without the protection of British troops? 
5.4.1 Advantages for British companies 
Let us consider at the outset the factors that made British products and com-
panies win the lion's share of the market and development projects in the Emirates 
before and after the withdrawal announcement. First, the British historical con-
nection with the Gulf was clearly an advantage to British firms when seeking to 
establish themselves in the Emirates. That is to say, those multi-national British 
corporations like Sir William Halcrow & Partners, the British Bank of the Middle 
East (BBME) Gray Mackenzie, Sir Alexander Gibb & partners, Richard Costain, 
218 
John Harris, Cable & Wireless and so on, had entered the Gulf in the wake of 
their country's influential and powerful presence. For example, in the first quarter 
of 1962 a total of 32 British businessmen had visited Abu Dhabi in comparison 
to a mere 15 businessmen from other nations to visit the area at the same time. 
In the last quarter of 1962 only 13 non-British businessmen visited Abu Dhabi 
in comparison with 26 from Britain.48 This suggests to us that it was easier for 
British businessmen to enter the Gulf market because of Britain's control over for-
eign relations of the the Emirates. This meant that the British had the power to 
exclude foreign interests by refusing to issue visas. Hence it was difficult for others 
to enter because of visa restrictions and so forth. Therefore, in the early stages 
of oil production the market in the Emirates was accustomed to British products 
and the businessmen who sought to promote them. 
These historical privileges also made it easier for various British commercial 
enterprises to take over functions which fell outside their specific domain. For 
example, the BBME officials were involved in Development Committees, Creek 
and Harbour Schemes, Electricity Company development and similar activities in 
Dubai. The Bank also collected Customs Duty on behalf of Dubai Government 
for many years.49 Other British firms were also monopolizing the market: Gray 
Mackenzie were running Dubai port on behalf of the Dubai Government; Richard 
Costain won most of Dubai's construction tenders; and Sir William Halcrow su-
pervised most of the Dubai projects. Indeed from 1946 until 1963 BBME had 
a written agreement from Dubai whereby the ruler agreed not to allow any other 
bank to operate in Dubai. 50 Thus past ties between Britain and the Emirates paved 
the way for the continuous involvement of British firms in the area. 
The second advantage for British enterprises was that English was the second 
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language in the Gulf. Knowledge of English was on the increase with so many 
students going to the United States and Britain for their education. Furthermore, 
because of the English language many people from the Emirates probably preferred 
Britain to other countries for their business transactions, and a su bstantialnumber 
of them chose to come to Britain for their summer holidays. 51 
The third advantage was that the presence of British consulting engineers, 
contractors, surveyors and architects and a good number of British expatriates, 
(many of whom held high ranking jobs in sensitive places in the sheikhs' govern-
ments) had undoubtedly influenced the granting of contracts to British companies. 52 
This British presence was most evident in Dubai which had the biggest British com-
munity in the Emirates. Their presence in Dubai dated back to before the oil era, 
hence over the years the British had been able to forge personal links with the 
inner circle of the Emirates. Major Jack Briggs of the Dubai police hinted that 
their presence sometimes smoothed the way for British firms to win contracts. 53 
The fourth factor that helped British companies gain a high percentage of 
the contracts awarded in the Emirates was a result of a diplomatic efforts on the 
part of British officialdom, exemplified in the warm welcome that the Sheikhs 
enjoyed during their frequent visits to Britain. Also the continual visits of high-
level British officials to the Emirates had encouraged the continuation of the old 
historical connection. These diplomatic visits were clearly manipulated in order 
to win contracts for British companies. According to some officials in Abu Dhabi, 
al-Suwaydi, Chairman of Abu Dhabi's Amin Diwan, and other officials close to the 
rulers, were approached by British delegations to award tenders to British firms. 54 
Thus, diplomatic channels were used to serve business contracts. 
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It is interesting to note that after the withdrawal of the British troops and 
the establishment of the United Arab Emirates in December 1971 the British 
companies maintained their network of contacts with their old friends (such as 'lsa 
al-Gurg and Mahdi al-Tajir in Dubai55 ) in each Emirate but were not in a strong 
position at the Federal government level. This probably influenced the allocation of 
contracts at the federal level to non-British companies whereas substantial number 
of contracts were awarded to British companies by individual emirates. 
British firms with a long history of involvement in thtEmirates do not appear 
to have been too concerned about the news of the withdrawal. Mr. Arnold of Sir 
William Halcrow, Consultant Engineering, explained that "It never really worried 
us and our work continued, after the PWD left the Trucial States, as consulting 
engineers to the various Rulers of the U.A.E." 56 Furthermore, these companies 
saw an opportunity to increase their commercial activities because of the large 
development programmes that the newly established state would need. Mr. D. 
Paterson, ex-BBME director, stated that his Bank had:57 
recognised that the special position of Britain in the area gave the bank the edge 
in commercial operations but it was obvious that the emergence of independent states 
and the large scale development related to the oil industry gave excellent opportunities 
for commercial advancement. 
However, some other firms reacted strongly to the withdrawal decision. The 
Guardian reported that the withdrawal announcement had "thrown many peo-
ple, especially the average British businessman, into a sort of coma," 58 because 
they were afraid that they would be left alone to face competitive businessmen 
from Japan, West Germany and the United States. Another criticism was re-
ported in The Times by one of Britain's aircraft salesmen, Glen Hobday of the 
British Aircraft Corporation, who said "my own opinion is that the decision was 
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crazy." 59 Therefore, on the one hand the withdrawal announcement had created 
concern among some British companies, especially those firms that had entered the 
Emirates market in recent years. On the other hand the old established British 
firms like Costain and Halcrow saw in the withdrawal an opportunity to advance 
their commercial transactions since the Emirates would need a large development 
programme to be carried out during and after withdrawal. 
5.4.2 Trade 
The importation of consumer goods and machinery by the Emirates from 
Britain notably increased during the withdrawal period. This gives an indication 
that the Emirates were changing their pattern of expenditure. With British troops 
in their territories, the rulers felt secure and were reluctant to accept British advice 
to build up the economic infrastructure. However, after the withdrawal announce-
ment they became more willing to invest in development programmes. 
In this atmosphere, British traders achieved a healthy share of the market. In 
1964 Britain exported to the Trucial States over £5.6 million worth of goods and 
in return imported about £17.3 million, the bulk of which was oil.60 The former 
figure, however, had multiplied to reach £28.2 million in 1969 and in return, in 
the same year, Britain's imports from the Emirates totalled £30.2 million. Yet by 
1975 the figure had reached £200 million in UK exports to the Emirates while the 
latter imports worthed £160 million in the same year. Thus the Emirates' balance 
of trade went into the red in Britain's favour because Britain reduced its import 
of oil mainly after North Sea oil production began. The Emirates' trade Balance 
with the UK has never recovered from that deficit and it gradually changed from 
a surplus averaging £108 million in 1974 to a deficit of Dh 3,750 million (£292.0 
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m.) in 1982.61 
Britain therefore, remained the Emirates' principal supplier and the with-
drawal of the troops in 1971 had not changed this. The British Trade Secretary, 
John Biffen, once stated that, "Since 1971 the value of our exports to these four 
markets [Bahrain, U AE, Qatar and Oman] had increased tenfold. Largely thanks 
to North Sea oil, our imports are a Hittle less than six times their 1Cf71 level." 62 
Accordingly we can conclude by saying that trade relations between Britain and 
the Emirates had become so intertwined that the withdrawal of the troops did not 
affect its flow but on the contrary increased it.63 In certain sectors, like the arms 
trade, Britain greatly relied on the Gulf with over 50% of such trade going to the 
region during the period 1977-1981.64 
5.4.3 British firms and the development of the Emirates 
The aim of this subsection is to illustrate the continuities and discontinuities 
of the UK-Emirates economic relationship by a closer examination of British firms 
working in the Emirates before the withdrawal and in the period immediately 
afterwards: 1968-1973. 
The Emirates' importance for Britain's invisible earnings from overseas was 
significant for two reasons. Firstly, British consultants, construction and civil engi-
neering contractors were closely involved with the region, and secondly, other ser-
vice sectors such as tourism, banking, insurance and freight services, were strongly 
reliant on it.65 
One of the major investment for the British firms in the Emirates was the con-
struction market.66 Many British companies had been associated with the trans-
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Table 5.1: UK trade with the Emirates (£m.) 
Year Exports Imports 
1964 5.6 17.3 
1965 4.2 22.1 
1966 6.2 14.3 
1967 12.1 12.5 
1968 18.5 51.5 
1969 28.2 30.2 
1970 22.3 28.8 
1971 26.3 47.1 
1972 31.1 53.8 
1973 49.4 69.2 
1974 96.9 205.0 
1975 198.8 158.9 
1976 323.9 199.9 
1977 451.9 258.9 
1978 435.5 270.6 
1979 488.3 244.5 
1980 502.2 485.8 
1981 492.1 393.4 
1982 558.8 266.9 
1983 567.8 309.8 
1984 541.9 87.2 
1985 621.4 96.6 
1986 581.8 74.0 
Sources: 
Department of Trade & Industry, Overseas Trade Statistics of the U.K., (London: 
H.M.S.O, 1964-1986); and COMET, "British Trade with Middle East, 1962-1972." 
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formation of the Emirates into more developed states. Companies like Costain, 
Bernard Sunley, Taylor Woodrow, George Wimpey, Brian Colquhoun & Partners, 
Paulings and Humphreys Ltd. had been followed in recent years by other British 
companies.67 The above mentioned companies were capable of winning most of the 
Emirates construction projects. 
For instance in Dubai, Richard Costain had been awarded contracts such as: 
Rashid Port at a cost of £24m in 196868 ; Dubai international airport development 
in 1968 at a cost of £4.1m69 ; further expansion in 1969 of Rashid Port at a cost 
of£20m70 ; land reclamation at £5.1m in 197071 ; the Dayrah-Shindaqah tunnel, 
at £7.5m in 197272 ; Dubai drydock, in a joint venture with Taylor Woodrow, at 
£91m in 197373 ; and a cement plant at £9m,74 which was again expanded in 1974 
at a cost of £20m.75 (see Table 5.2). 
In Abu Dhabi, Costain's were not represented nor was Dubai's famous con-
sulting engineer, Sir William Halcrow. Instead other British companies took the 
lead like Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners in recent years and Arabicon (comprising 
Alan Grant & Co. and George Daves) before the withdrawal. Brian Colquhoun 
& Partners had supervised many schemes in Abu Dhabi and al- 'Ayn like the 
Abu Dhabi sewage system and the al- 'Ayn water supply and sewage system, both 
schemes costing together several millions Bahraini Dinar. [During this period the 
currency of Abu Dhabi was Bahrain Dinar and Dubai was of Qatar/Dubai Riyals. 
BD 1= Q/DR 10= 17s. 6d.]. George Wimpey & Sons, Tarmac Construction Ltd 
and Motherwell also had participated significantly in Abu Dhabi's oil industry. For 
example, in 1969 Motherwell constructed for Abu Dhabi a gas-oil plant at a cost 
of £1m.76 
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Table 5.2: UK Contracts in the Emirates (£m.) 
Year Place Scheme Consultant Contractor Cost 
1968 Abu Dhabi Harbour Gibb 
- Hospital Los ely 1 
Dubai Airport Costain 4.1 
Dubai Rashid Port Hal crow Costain 24 
Abu Dhabi Distillation plant Weir 3 
--- cables to 
al- 'Ayn BICC 0.600 
-- Power station C.A. Parsons 0.100 
-- Cooling equipment Coventry Radictor 0.024 
-- Laboratory equipment Mowlem Group 0.035 
-- Generators John Brown 1.25 
-- Turbines John Brown 2 
--- Concrete airport Mills Scaffolds 0.020 
al- 'Ayn Power station Ruston Engine 0.750 
Sha.rjah Diesel alternators Ruston Engine 0.180 
Dubai Aircraft instruments Space Decks 0.090 
Abu Dhabi Distributors Weir West 2 
- --- Garth 1 
-- Radio studios Marconi 0.500 
-- Airport runway Paulings 2 
-- Road to al- 'Ayn Humphrey 1.4 
RAK RAK creek Hal crow 0.300 
continue Table 5.2 
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Year Place Scheme Consultant Contractor Cost 
1969 Abu Dhabi Power station GEC- AEI 0.300 
-- Hospital Coselay 1 
-- Ga.'!-oil plant Motherwell 1 
-- T.V. Thomson TV 0.040 
-- Telephones Plessey 0.300 
al-'Ayn Subsoil Tarmac 0.228 
Abu Dhabi Electrical Hawker 0.300 
-- Oil storage Wm. Neil 0.830 
Dubai Hospital Bernard Sunley 6 
-- Port Rashid Hal crow Costain 20 
Radio station Cable & Wireless 0.759 
TV. station Marconi 0.059 
Sharjah Water supply Hal crow Dawson Keith 0.100 
Port development Tarmac 1 
Abu Dhabi Mlna Zayed Gibb 195 
1970 Dubai Runway for airport Costain 2.7 
Dubai Land reclamation Costain 5.1 
-- Rashid Hospital John Sadd, Essex 0.040 
Rashid Hospital Norriss A. C. 
Telecommunicatious Plessey Telecom 0.215 
1970 Ras al-Khaimah Power station Kennedy & Donkin 0.750 
Abu Dhabi Radio-Tel. Police Kennedy & Donkin British Pye 0.046 
-- Oil storage tanks Whesoe, Darlington 0.450 
Continue Table 5.2 
227 
Year Place Scheme Consultant Contractor Cost 
1970 Dubai Sewerage Watson 3 
Abu Dhabi Sewerage Brian Colquhoun 3.8 
--- Town Scheme Brian Colquhoun 1.8 
al-'Ayn Sewage disposal Brian Colquhoun 4.1 
Abu Dhabi Sea Wall Arabi con 2.9 
Ras al-Khaimah Creek development Haler ow 0.300 
-- Sea wall Halcrow Mothercat 0.150 
Dubai Creek development Hale row 0.300 
Sharjah Wharfing & dredging Hale row Tarmac 1 
-- Milail,lah irrigation Hal crow 0.130 
Abu Dhabi Town roads Arabicon Arabicon 2.2 
al-'Ayn Town roads Brian Colquhoun 7 
Dubai Bridge Halcrow 0.578 
Sharjah Roads Arabicon Arabicon 1 
Abu Dhabi Buildings 12 
Dubai National Bank building Hale row 0.300 
Sharjah Flats & shops Hal crow 0.250 
1970 Umm al-Qaiwain Govet. buildings Arabi con Arabi con 1 
Abu Dhabi Gas turbine Charles Haswell 5.9 
R.A.K. Power station Kennedy & Donkin 0.500 
Northern Emirates Electricity Kennedy BICC Ltd 0.100 
Sharjah New power station Kennedy Mothercat & BICC 0.600 
Dubai Electricity Kennedy Various UK Firms 1.7 
Continue Table 5.2 
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1970 RAK Electricity Kennedy BICC Ltd 0.150 
Abu Dhabi Water distribution Arabi con Arabicon 0.700 
Sharjan Water supply Hal crow Mothercat 0.300 
Federal Government Water supply Hale row 0.120 
al-'Ayn Water supply Brian Colquhoun 4.5 
1971 Abu Dhabi Sewerage Brian Colquhoun 5.6 
al-'Ayn Sewage disposal Brian Colquhoun 4.1 
Dubai Sewage disposal Watson 3 
Sharjah Drainage Hale row Balfour & Sons 2.15 
Dubai Creek development Hal crow Overseas Ast 0.650 
Sharjah Creek wharves Hale row Tarmac 1.1 
Abu Dhabi Clinics Parsons Brown 0.12 
Ajman Town planning & roads Arabi con Various 2.5 
Dubai Port Rashid Hale row 1 
-- Cement Factory Halcrow 0.6 
-- Jabal 'Ali radio station Hale row 0.15 
Sharjah Retail markd Hale row 0.15 
Abu Dhabi Desalination plant Charles Haswell 6.10 
Dubai Power station Kennedy BICC 0.10 
Khaur Fakhan Generator& transmission Kennedy Dale Electric 
Dubai Electricity extension Kennedy Various 1.35 
RAK New power station Kennedy Various 0.450 
RAK transmission Kennedy Various 
Continue Table 5.2 .... 
229 
Year Place Scheme Consultant Contractor Cost 
1971 Sharjah Electrcity Kennedy Various 0.25 
Abu Dhabi Das Island installation Tarmac 0.35 
-- Das Island desalination George Wimpey 3 
Sharjah Telecom system Cable & Wireless 0.60 
Dubai Land reclamation Halcrow Costaiu 5.1 
1972 Abu Dhabi Sewage Brian Colquhoun 17 
al-'Ayn Sewage Brian Colquhoun 4 
-- Water supply Brian Colquhoun 4 
-- Town roads Paulings 1.7 
Abu Dhabi Oil plant ADMA Wimpey 3 
-- Post Office British Postal 
al-'Ayn New market Brian Colquhoun 0.3 
Abu Dhabi Hilton Hotel Cementation Cementation 3 
-- Port Area warehouses Gibb 1.25 
-- Port cranes Gibb 0.75 
al-'Ayn Water resources Brian Colquhoun 0.50 
Abu Dhabi Prison Brian Colquhoun 0.50 
Abu-Dhabi Oil plant Tarmc 
RAK Airport run way Hal crow 0.11 
Dubai Sewage Watson 18 
Sharjah Sewage system Hale row 5 
RAK Cement Co. Kennedy Wimpey& Others 5.50 
Dubai Sea wall Hal crow Co stain 5.10 
Continue Table 5.2 ... 
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1972 Sharjah Creek development Hale row Tarmac 1.55 
Dubai Dayrah-Shindaqah tunnel Hale row Costain 7.50 
Abu Dhabi New prison building Brian Colquhoun 0.44 
Dubai Electricity Co Kennedy Various 1.35 
Eastern Coas 408 low-income houses Hale row 1.3 
Abu Dhabi Oil installation William Press Int. 
1973 Dubai Cement plant Hal crow Costain 9 
Dubai Drydock Costain-T.Woodrow 91 
Abu Dhabi Oil facilities project Davy-Ashmore F. Harris 100 
Abu Dhabi Rocks for Mtna Zayed Gibb John Howard 0.55 
Dubai Power station, Jabal 'Ali Kennedy 7.5 
Dubai Airport radar supervision IAL 0.03 
Abu Dhabi Gas turbine for 'A~ab GEC Gas Turbines 5 
Federal Govt. Various 3.5 
Abu Dhabi 20 Oil pressure pumps Weir pumps Glasgow 0.40 
Abu Dhabi Oil storage Whessoe 0.327 
Abu Dhabi Gas sulphur plant at Das British Ropeway 0.475 
-- Medical installations Searle UK Group 0.650 
- Oil pumps for ADPC D. Brown Gear Ind. 
-- Water plant for Das Degremont Laing 
-- Gas plant at Das Costain & Tarmac 2.5 
-- 20 oil-pressure pumps Weir pumps 0.400 
-- Expand power network Balfour Kilpatrick 0.5 
Continue Table 5.2 .... 
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1973 -- Tourism study Tourism Planning & Research 0.038 
-- Shiploading at Das British Rope-way 0.475 
-
Tankage Whessoe 0.327 
-- Water filtration Young Chemical 750 
al- 'Ayn Cement plant Mothercat 1.9 
Sources: 
British Embassy, Commercial Department, "Some Projects in hand or under study: UAE," 
October 1972; Idem., "Abu Dhabi Projects in Hand: Abu Dhabi," April1973; Idem., "Some 
Projects in hand or under Study: UAE," February, 1974; MEED, various issues 1968-1975. 
The table below, although not complete, shows that British companies had 
participated in most of the Emirates' development projects, such as ports and 
harbours, sewage, water supply, roads, hospitals, school buildings, power stations, 
bridges, cement plants, dry docks, commercial buildings, land reclamation, ra-
dio and broadcasting stations, tunnels, drainage schemes, oil installations and oil 
refineries. 
The other interesting point we find in the table is that where contracts were 
awarded outside Dubai and Abu Dhabi, the choice of contractor was often deter-
mined by the source of funding for the project. For example, if the funds came 
from Abu Dhabi, as was the case with the Sharjah roads project, then Arabicon 
won the contract. If, however, the source of funds came from the Trucial States 
Development Office, then Sir William Halcrow would have been the choice as con-
sultant. This arrangement resulted in British firms having a balanced influence in 
the other Emirates. 
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Even though many British contractors and consulting engineers had come to 
the area in the early 1950s, like Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners77 for instance, they 
had to follow a new policy after the withdrawal in the 1970s. Some of them had 
entered into partnerships with local contractors, like Costain that had established 
two firms with local partners. In Abu Dhabi, Costain became al-Otaiba Costain 
Co.,78 and in Dubai it became Costain Dubai Company.79 Others had established a 
subsidiary company in the emirate concerned like Grayswift Tanker Service of Gray 
Mackenzie that was working in Ras al-Khaimah. 80 Other companies had taken a 
different· approach by merging with other British companies to do specific jobs like 
Sir William Halcrow, for instance, who had set up Halcrow-Ewbank Petroleum 
and Offshore Engineering Co. to fulfil contracts for the oil and gas industry. 
Also Halcrow-Balfour Ltd. was formed in 1979 to work in the field of health and 
environment engineering. 81 
In other fields of indirect investment, British companies also gained a sub-
stantial percentage of the Emirates' banking, insurance, and freight services. As 
we have mentioned before, the British Bank of the Middle East was the first bank 
to be opened in the area and it continued to be dominant until 1963. The other 
British banks which opened branches in the early period were the Eastern Bank 
and the Ottoman Bank. 82 In the freight and ports services, Gray Mackenzie held 
the lead in the Emirates, running Dubai port, Ras al-Khaimah port and some 
other 33 separate subsidiary and associate companies in the Gulf. Finally, British 
nationals are by far the largest Western expatriate group in the Emirates. 83 This is 
probably due to the large number of British firms that have offices in the Emirates; 
there were more than 550 British firms by 1980.84 Other non-direct investments 
could be derived from the large number of tourists and students coming to Britain 
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from the Emirates as well as the many citizens from the Emirates who come for 
medical consultation and hospital treatment in Britain. 
5.4.4 The Emirates investments in Britain 
The fourth point that usually comes under the classification of 'vital interests' 
was the Emirates' private and official investments in Britain. 
Abu Dhabi's official investments only started with the change of its ruler in 
August 1966. The first finance department in Abu Dhabi was established and 
chaired by Eric Thompson, former expert in various British colonies, from 1967-
1970. The next Abu Dhabi finance director was John Butler who was appointed 
to the post on the recommendation of Sir William Luce85 and who held office 
from 1970 till 1983. On the advice of Eric Thompson and the recommendation 
of the Bank of England, Sheikh Zayed agreed to establish the Abu Dhabi Invest-
ment Board (ADIB) in 1967 with initial capital of £5 million.86 Its role was to 
invest Abu Dhabi surplus revenue abroad. The members of ADIP were: Sir John 
Hogg (British) Chairman; Longstreet Hinton, (American) looked after the Board 
investments in the US; Count Jean de Sailly (French) looked after the Board's 
investments in France; John Tyndall (British) London, managed the UK hold-
ings; N adim Pachachi, the Iraqi born oil advisor to the Ruler was appointed in 
1968; A~mad Khallfah al-Suwaydi, (Abu Dhabi) was appointed in 1970 along with 
Mu}.lammad al-Mulla of Dubai and John Butler, the Abu Dhabi Financial Advi-
sor; Mu~ammad l:labrush, (Abu Dhabi) became member ofthe Board in 1971; the 
Union Bank of Switzerland and the Crown Agents of the UK became members 
in October 1971; and finally John Morrell of Robert Fleming became a member 
of the Board in 1972 and was responsible for the Board's investments in Japan, 
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and also Robert Fleming as a commercial institution was supervised the Board in 
London.87 The Board's main office was in London, and it met three times a year 
there and once a year in Abu Dhabi. After independence however, the Board's 
responsibilities were taken over by the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) a 
new agency that was established in Abu Dhabi under the chairmanship of Sheikh 
Khalifah bin Zayed, the Crown Prince in 1976.88 
The above illustrations of Abu Dhabi's investment developments demonstrate 
that they were in effect in the hands of the British advisers, because there were 
few Abu Dhabi citizen qualified to undertake this task and the small group of 
experienced administrators in Abu Dhabi were closely involved with establishing 
the new institutions in the Emirates. The role of British advisers probably explains 
the substantial amounts that Abu Dhabi had invested in the UK. According to a 
report that was written by the Economic Department of the U AE Foreign Ministry, 
UAE investments in 1974 in shares and equities ofthe British market totalled more 
than £90 million, which represented 10.5% of the total investments in this sector.89 
In the real estates sector, the UAE bought around 15.5% of its investment from 
the UK too. For example in 1974, the Board bought 44% of the Commercial Union 
Building in London for which it paid £86 million.90 As for Abu Dhabi's deposits in 
sterling, these amounted to 13% of the total deposits of Abu Dhabi during the early 
1970s.91 These deposits had reached a minimum holding of £1,800 million in 1975 
compared with the Dubai government's holdings in sterling of around £95 million 
in the same year.92 The Emirates' deposits in sterling thus brought considerable 
support for the British economy.93 
In addition to investments in Britain by Government agencies like the Abu 
Dhabi Investment Board there were also large investments of a private nature by 
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individuals from the Emirates. 94 Therefore we find that many wealthy families from 
the Emirates bought property in the U.K. both for their own use and also as an 
investment.95 Other examples of this type of investment are the horse racing that 
attracted Sheikhs of the al-Maktum family of Dubai96 ; Mahdi al-Tajir's ownership 
of different properties and share-holdings like the Allied Arab Bank97 ; al-Futaym 
Group that has a minor share in Tower Scaffolding (Bristol) Ltd; and the purchase 
of the Park Tower Hotel by Abu Dhabi's ruling family.98 These were significant 
holdings that supported sterling and thus in turn were encouraged by Britain. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed Britain's economic interests in the Emirates with 
regard to oil, trade, invisible investments and the Emirates' investments in Britain 
both before withdrawal and during the first few years of the post-withdrawal era. 
There were conflicting arguments concerning the best way that Britain could 
protect these interests. The classical argument that called for the protection of 
economic interests through bases and troops was challenged. The advocates of 
withdrawing the troops pointed out that the presence of the latter was actually 
defeating its own purpose by arousing nationalist feeling as had been the case with 
Aden. The other argument that was eventually presented suggested that Britain 
ought to prepare the area both economically and politically before withdrawing. 
At the same time the oil companies were encouraged to rely on their own methods 
to ensure that they remained in the Emirates after 1971. 
Thus, the oil companies of ADPC and ADMA, who were affected by events 
in other oil producing countries like Iran and Iraq, decided on their own approach 
in order to survive without the presence of British troops. To this end they agreed 
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to relinquish part of their concessiOn rights; revise the financial agreement by 
introducing the 50-50 formula of profit sharing; participate in the development of 
the host Emirates and enhance their personal connections with their hosts. These 
factors prepared them well for self-reliance, and thus continuity. 
As for trade and invisible investments in the Emirates, the old established 
British firms did not panic over the withdrawal announcement in January 1968. 
They knew that they had many fundamental advantages over competitors from 
other foreign countries, such as the historical connection, the English language, 
the backing of the British government, and personal connections and relationships 
at the highest level. As a result, British firms went on to win huge contracts 
even after the withdrawal period. However, some companies had to enter into 
partnership with a firm of local contractors or even establish a local subsidiary in 
order to continue working in the Emirates . 
As a result it can be concluded that despite Britain's having withdrawn from 
the region, its economic interests were not affected. This view is supported by 
the substantial number of British companies working in the Emirates after the 
withdrawal of troops in December 1971. 
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Chapter VI 
Political and Security Arrangements 
6.1 Introduction 
As has been seen in the previous chapter, the British Government was con-
vinced that it was necessary to find a new way to protect her economic interests 
in the Gulf, as the presence of British troops there was having an adverse effect. 
That led the Labour government of Mr. Wilson, which came to power in 1964, 
to pursue a long-term policy that relied on the economic development of the area, 
giving back some administrative responsibility, encouraging the oil companies to 
depend on themselves in their relations with the host countries and establishing 
appropriate political arrangements. Amongst those political arrangements were: 
(a) the creation of a federal structure for the Emirates; (b) the solution of territo-
rial disputes concerning Buraimi and the islands; and (c) the encouragement of a 
greater understanding between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
What made the political arrangements more significant than the other issues 
was that the British Government had realized that it could not carry out an appro-
priate withdrawal policy without solving these problems. There is some evidence 
that the British Government had started to address these problems even before 
the official withdrawal was announced. For example, Denis Healey, Secretary of 
State for Defence, in March 1965 told the House of Commons that: 1 
[I]f we simply abdicate the responsibilities we now carry, without making any 
arrangements to share them or hand them over to anybody, there is a grave risk that 
some parts of this great area would dissolve into violence and chaos. 
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On 18th December 1968, after the withdrawal announcement, Mr. Healey 
expressed his satisfaction with the progress of these political arrangements in a 
statement to the House of Commons:2 
The Government believe that we must give the local countries, particularly 
those to which we have present commitments, some opportunity to reorganise their 
forces before our withdrawal. I am glad to say that this was very well reported, if I 
may say so, in an article in last Sunday's Sunday Times that more progress has been 
made in the last nine months towards reaching a viable political arrangement in the 
Gulf than had been made in the last twenty years. 
The political arrangements were also of concern to the Conservative Govern-
ment which in the end bore responsibility for the withdrawal plan. Sir Alec Douglas 
Home, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, on December 
6th 1971 told the House of Commons that the Labour Government "would have 
been out of the Gulf with no thought and no arrangement made for future plans." 3 
Therefore, it is intended to study the political arrangements that were car-
ried out by the Labour and the Conservative governments from January 1968 to 
December 1971, to find out the reasons for their success and failure. For example, 
was it in the British interest to have a federation of nine or seven states? To 
what extent were British officials involved in the establishment of the Federation 
of the seven? In what way did the British authorities seek an improvement of 
Iranian-Saudi political relations at the end of the sixties? 
6.2 The Federation of Arab Emirates 
During the intervening period between the British Prime Minister Harold 
Wilson's statement in the House of Commons on 16th January 1968,4 announcing 
the decision to withdraw British troops from the Gulf to the actual withdrawal 
in December 1971,5 the Gulf had witnessed many important changes. The most 
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important challenge was to set up a federal political structure for the Emirates 
and, in particular, the debate about a federation of nine or seven states. This 
section will examine the federation process stressing British role in failure of the 
federation of the nine and success of the federation of the United Arab Emirates. 6 
The concept of a federation came as a result of the visit to the Gulf by the 
British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Goronwy Roberts, on 9 January 1968, 
informing the rulers that Britain was to withdraw her troops by the end of 1971.7 
Even though no public statement was made by Goronwy Roberts on the subject, 
the editor of one well-known Lebanese political periodical, al-lfawiidith, specu-
lated that during Roberts's meeting with the rulers, the Minister expressed Her 
Majesty's Government's desire that the rulers should form a federation among 
themselves.8 The rulers, who were shocked, (some of them could not believe the 
Minister's statement9 ) had started taking the matter seriously. Indeed, in private 
some of them offered to pay the cost of the troops, but this was rejected by the 
Defence Secretary, Denis Healey, who later remarked in a television interview that 
British forces could not be allowed to become mercenaries. 10 Then on 18th Febru-
ary 1968 the rulers of Dubai and Abu Dhabi issued a bilateral agreement on forming 
a union between their emirates.11 The two rulers also invited the rulers of Bahrain 
and Qatar and the other five rulers of Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, Ras al-
Khaimah and Fujairah to join in discussions about a union of the nine emirates. 
At the meeting of 25th February 1968, in Dubai, all the nine rulers agreed to enter 
into discussion about a union of their emirates, to be known as the Union of Arab 
Emirates, and this agreement was known as the Dubai Agreement. 12 From 1968 to 
1971 the Dubai Agreement formed the basis for the discussion of the federation of 
the emirates.13 It outlined the objectives of the Federation of Arab Emirates: the 
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strengthening of mutual ties, the co-ordination of the various development policies 
with due regard to the independence and integrity of each member state, the unifi-
cation of foreign policy and the organization of collective defence. 14 The agreement 
also established federal authorities, consisting of a supreme council, which would 
be the highest authority in the federation, a federal council of experts and a federal 
supreme court.15 
The proposal for the federation of nine emirates met many obstacles and 
after lengthy discussions, that took place between 1968-71, the initiative failed. A 
study of various discussions carried out in the same period will provide a better 
understanding of the obstacles which faced the proposal. 
In order to put the Dubai Agreement into practice, a meeting of represen-
tatives and advisers of the rulers was convened in Abu Dhabi on 18-19th May 
1968 with the aim of agreeing upon an agenda for the meeting of the Supreme 
Council. The preparatory advisers' meeting faced difficulties over the selection of 
items for the agenda. Abu Dhabi, as host emirate, and holding the chair of the 
meeting, proposed a short agenda that consisted of: (a) the selection of constitu-
tional lawyers to study the steps to draft a permanent federal constitution; and 
(b) the establishment of a liaison committee between the lawyers and the rulers. 16 
However, Qatar was not happy with this agenda so it put forward fourteen items 
to be included in the Supreme Council's next meeting. Besides a permanent fed-
eration constitution, Qatar proposed the election of the first Union President; the 
formation of the Union Council; the creation of federation ministries and other 
items such as the establishment of an official gazette. 17 
The two different agendas represented two groups that maintained their di-
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vergent views in an almost unbroken pattern throughout the years spent discussing 
the federation. On one side Qatar, supported by Dubai and Ras al-Khaimah, was 
of the opinion that the Dubai Agreement formed the legal framework of the fed-
eration and that it should not be frozen until the establishment of a permanent 
federal constitution. The Bahrain and Abu Dhabi camps, supported by other 
emirates, saw the Dubai Agreement, as an expression of the rulers' intentions to 
federate and thus regarded the establishment of the institutions Qatar wanted as 
premature. In other words they were cautious about the early establishment of 
federal institutions and instead they wanted to move slowly. In the end the Qatar 
proposals were defeated when they were put to a vote but Qatar again raised the 
issue in the Supreme Council meeting on 25th May 1968.18 
The first meeting of the Supreme Council of the rulers, convened in Abu 
Dhabi 25-26th May 1968, encountered the same differences of opinion that were 
expressed at the meeting of the advisers. Qatar again insisted on the inclusion 
of her items on the Supreme Council's agenda. Therefore, during their closed 
meetings of two days, the rulers failed to reach a decision. This resulted in the 
issue of a communique in which they admitted there were differences about the best 
methods to implement the Dubai Agreement. The communique also announced 
that the next meeting of the rulers would be in Abu Dhabi on 1st July 1968. 
The success of the July meeting of the rulers was credited to Kuwait's efforts to 
mediate. Sheikh $abaQ. al-AQ.mad Al $abaQ., the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, toured 
the lower Gulf from June 22-27th. He met with the rulers of all the emirates, 
aiming to bridge the differences between them. Accordingly, the rulers held their 
Supreme Council meeting in Abu Dhabi on 6-7th July 1968 as a continuation of 
the May meeting. They agreed on the following points: 
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1. to elect a chairman for each session of the Supreme Council of the rulers from 
among its members, 
2. to establish a temporary federal council (cabinet) 
3. to appoint a constitutional legal adviser to draft the federation's constitution. 
(An Egyptian, Sanhiiri, was invited to do this, but due to ill health he was 
replaced by Wal;lid Ra'fat, an Egyptian legal adviser to Kuwait19 ) 
4. to establish a liaison committee that would work between the rulers and the 
legal adviser, and 
5. to establish different committees to study the unification of currencies, the 
flag, the national anthem and the official gazette. 20 
The second meeting of the rulers was convened in Doha, Qatar, from 20-22nd 
October 1968. At this meeting the rulers agreed to establish several committees 
such as immigration, health, education and nationality. Also, the rulers discussed 
federal defence and security problems. This resulted in the appointment of a mili-
tary adviser to prepare a study on federation defence forces. The appointed adviser 
was later named as Major-General Sir John Willoughby (see his Report in chapter 
4). Furthermore, the Doha session of the Supreme Council asked the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development to: "undertake an economic and social 
survey in the Emirates as a preliminary step towards setting up, within a reason-
able period of time, a comprehensive economic and social development plan." 21 
The third meeting of the Supreme Council of rulers was held in Doha, Qatar, 
from 10-14th May 1969 but it was not preceded by the usual preliminary commit-
tee to prepare its agenda because this was opposed by some of the rulers. The 
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host emirate, Qatar, proposed a draft agenda of 20 items that dealt with various 
subjects such as: the election of the Union President, a cabinet of ministers to 
replace the Provisional Federal Council, the site of the federal capital, the federal 
flag, the establishment of a Federal Assembly and the need to contact the British 
government to discuss the withdrawal timetable. 22 However, Bahrain immediately 
counteracted the Qatari agenda with its own 16-item agenda that, however, in-
cluded most of the Qatari proposals. However, after a heated discussion between 
Bahrain and Qatar, the council agreed to establish an ad hoc committee to pre-
pare overnight a new agenda for the rulers' meeting. The next day the council 
held its second session where they discussed the new agenda. This was similar to 
the previous Qatar and Bahrain agendas. 
The Rulers' meeting reached deadlock due to the opposite views that were 
taken by Bahrain and Qatar on the agenda items. For example, Bahrain demanded 
that representation in the National Consultative Council (NCC) should be propor-
tional to each emirate's population, (which would have given Bahrain a majority 
over all the other emirates) whereupon the Qatari representative, Sheikh I;Iamad 
bin Khallfah, pointed out that: "most of the members in the Council prefer equal 
representation for each emirate; Qatar agreed to this because, unlike Bahrain, it 
did not want to contradict the majority." 23 In order to solve the problem, Sheikh 
Zayed of Abu Dhabi proposed that each Emirate should be represented by four 
members with the exception of Bahrain which should have six members, but this 
was rejected by Bahrain. The other matter that was disputed by Bahrain and 
Qatar was the federal capital. Qatar suggested that Abu Dhabi should be chosen 
as the provisional site of the federal capital until a new one could be established on 
the border between Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Bahrain saw this as a waste of time and 
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money and suggested instead that the Supreme Council should immediately decide 
the site of a permanent capital. This resulted in the Supreme Council delaying 
the capital issue until later. Finally, Bahrain objected to the idea that ministers 
(including the Prime Minister) could combine a federal and local position at the 
same time. This objection was interpreted by Qatar as a way of excluding Sheikh 
Khallfah, the Qatari Crown Prince and Deputy Ruler, from the premiership of the 
federation. However, Bahrain's objection was not supported by the other emirates 
and so it was rejected. 24 
The Bahraini-Qatar dispute may also have been motivated by other factors, 
for instance the Iranian claim over Bahrain. Qatar, which like Dubai, was on 
good terms with Iran, did not want to antagonize the Shah, with the result that 
the rulers avoided holding any Supreme Council meetings in Bahrain. This was 
disturbing to the Bahraini ruling family, which sought to gain political strength 
by entering the federation. Thus, as will be seen later, once the Iranian claim over 
Bahrain was removed, Bahrain became stronger in the discussions and began to 
prepare itself for independence. 
The Supreme Council of the rulers convened its fourth meeting in Abu Dhabi 
from 21-25th October 1969 to discuss an agenda that was prepared by the Deputy 
rulers in an earlier meeting held in Abu Dhabi.25 The Council agreed on the fol-
lowing points although the rulers did not actually sign an agreement to that effect: 
1. Sheikh Zayed of Abu Dhabi was to be elected as the federation's first president, 
with Sheikh Rashid of Dubai as vice-president, for two years; 
2. The choice of Abu Dhabi as the provisional capital for the federation and 
the construction of a permanent capital in an area between Abu Dhabi and 
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Dubai; 
3. The selection of Sheikh Khallfah bin Hamad Al Than!, Deputy Ruler of Qatar, 
as first Prime Minister of a thirteen-member cabinet; 
4. The acceptance of equal representation in the proposed National Consultative 
Council, each emirate being allotted 4 seats. 26 
Subsequently, the rulers were supposed to set out these decisions in a fi-
nal communique, but the whole effort disintegrated when Sheikh $aqr of Ras al-
Khaimah and Sheikh Al,lmad bin 'All of Qatar walked out of the meeting. They 
did so in reaction to a statement delivered personally to the meeting by the British 
Political Agent, C.J. Treadwell. In his statement Mr. Treadwell encouraged the 
rulers to overcome obstacles that were hindering the establishment of the federa-
tion. He said:27 
My government will be extremely disappointed if these difficulties are not to be 
overcome. I strongly urge all the rulers to do their utmost to find a way of resolving 
their difficulties. 
The rulers who walked out claimed that the Political Agent's interruption 
of their meeting was an interference in their internal affairs and that this was an 
insult to the rulers and the federation. Sheikh $aqr of Ras al-Khaimah issued a 
statement in which he blamed the Political Agent for the failure of the federation 
discussions, pointing out that the Political Agent's message was, "in both form and 
content rejected by all and that it was regarded as an unacceptable interference 
in the internal affairs of the Arab Emirates." 28 However, on 31st October 1969 
Qatar issued a statement blaming the failure of the Supreme Council meeting on 
disagreements concerning the distribution of ministerial portfolios.29 
It is interesting to note that the Sheikhs who walked out were very close to 
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King Fanal of Saudi Arabia. Could it have been that the choice of Abu Dhabi 
as the federal capital and the choice of Sheikh Zayed as the president would have 
resulted in an embarrassment to their relations with the King, since Abu Dhabi had 
not yet solved its territorial dispute with Saudi Arabia over Buraimi? (See Buraimi 
dispute 6.2.3. ). Alternatively, the reason for the break-up of the meeting could have 
been the rift over the distribution of ministry portfolios among the emirates on the 
last day of the rulers' meeting. Ra'fat, the constitutional adviser to the federation, 
argued in an article published in 1971 that Ras al-Khaimah insisted on holding 
the ministry of defence portfolio, and when this was refused, demanded that of 
the ministry of the interior. However, when this was also refused, Sheikh $aqr 
reluctantly accepted the offer of the ministry of agriculture portfolio.30 Qatar's 
displeasure over the ministries debate was heightened when Sheikh Khalifah, the 
Deputy Ruler of Qatar, (who was selected as Prime Minister) wanted to hold the 
meetings of his cabinet in Doha, his homeland. This was rejected by the other 
rulers on the basis that Abu Dhabi was chosen as the federal capital and hence 
the cabinet ought to hold its meetings there. Nevertheless, the political agent's 
message was used as a pretext for the break up of the meeting and for the final 
communique not being signed. The October 1969 meeting turned out to be the 
last ever meeting of the Supreme Council of the nine emirates. 
The failure of the October 1969 meeting did not, however, stop all diplomatic 
efforts to resolve the obstacles that hindered the formation of the federation. The 
most noteworthy of these efforts were the British Government's missions to the Gulf 
throughout 1970-71, as well as those of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.31 These efforts 
resulted in encouraging the Deputy rulers to continue discussions on the federation. 
On 13th June 1970 the deputy rulers held their meeting in Abu Dhabi. Firstly, 
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they agreed not to discuss the items on which agreement had already been reached, 
such as the site of the capital and the presidency. Secondly, they concentrated on 
points that had not yet been agreed upon by the Supreme Council such as the 
financial contribution by each emirate to the federal budget and the setting up 
of a high-level legal committee to study the draft constitutions submitted to the 
Council. 
The Constitutional Committee of the proposed federation had submitted its 
new draft to the Deputy rulers' meeting of 24-26th October 1970,32 but this meet-
ing witnessed a complete reversal of the Bahraini position. It insisted on discussing 
the representation in the Federal Council (Assembly). The Bahraini representa-
tive, Sheikh Mul.mmmad al-Mubarak Al Khallfah, insisted that Bahrain wanted 
to see the establishment of a council in which the people of the federation were 
totally represented on the basis of the size of the population in each emirate. At 
this stage Sheikh Khallfah bin J:Iamad of Qatar, reminded Bahrain that:33 
As far as the representation in the Federal Council was concerned, Bahrain has 
agreed on a solution that was accepted by all emirates. Also, Bahrain agreed in the 
last meeting of the Deputy rulers, not to re-discuss any items that had been agreed 
upon previously. The subject of representation in the National Consultative Council, 
which was renamed the Federal Council, was among those items. 
Because an agreement had not been signed incorporating the resolutions of 
the Supreme Council of October 1969, Bahrain now argued that it had not agreed 
to accept equal representation in the proposed Representative Council but only 
discussed it. However, Bahrain pointed out that it would accept a temporary 
formula of 6 representatives for Bahrain and likewise for Qatar, Abu Dhabi and 
Dubai; 4 representatives for Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah, and 3 for Ajman, Umm 
al-Qaiwain and Fujairah, (i.e. 41 representatives in all). Her acceptance of this 
temporary formula was on the condition that the Federation would conduct a cen-
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sus four years after its establishment and then proportional representation would 
be introduced. When her demand was not accepted by the other emirates, Bahrain 
kept quiet throughout the meeting and refused to answer questions or vote on any 
item. The meeting ended in a sober mood created by Bahrain's determination 
to bring up again the items that had been agreed upon previously, especially her 
insistence on a proportional representation system in the Federal Council. 
Bahrain's change of heart can be seen from different perspectives. The over-
riding factor influencing Bahrain's attitude toward the proposed federation was the 
settlement of the Iranian claim over its sovereignty through the United Nations (see 
chapter 7). The other factor might have been that Bahrain probably felt that it 
could go back on what it had previously agreed on because it had British support. 
It was known that Sir William Luce, Britain's special adviser on the Gulf, viewed 
the participation of Bahrain as essential to the success of the proposed federation 
because of its size and its educated population and that he supported a strong role 
for Bahrain within the federation (see Luce opinion of Bahrain in 6.2.2).34 In the 
wake of this, Bahrain began to seek a leading role in the federation and when that 
was opposed by other emirates it opted for unilateral independence. 35 
The failure of these discussions encouraged Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to form 
a mission that toured the Gulf in January 1971 and again in April of the same 
year. In its attempt at a reconciliation in which the obstacles that hindered the 
formation of the federation might be removed the joint Saudi-Kuwaiti mission 
proposed the following: 
a. equal representation for all the emirates in the Federal Council for the first 
four years only; 
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b. the formation of the federal army; 
c. a contribution by each emirate of 10% of their income to the federal budget; 
d. Abu Dhabi to be the provisional capital with the permanent capital to be 
decided upon later; and, 
e. the federation should be responsible for customs and ports regulations. 36 
The joint-mission's recommendations were welcomed, but not entirely with-
out reservations. For example, Abu Dhabi insisted on the right of each emirate to 
raise its own army. This was an understandable gesture from Abu Dhabi as it had 
expected trouble from Saudi Arabia over Buraimi. Bahrain made her acceptance 
of the mission's new proposals conditional upon their being accepted by all the 
other emirates: that did not happen. Qatar also expressed some reservations and 
as a condition of her attending further meetings demanded a written statement by 
all the other emirates detailing those matters which they had agreed in previous 
meetings, accompanied by a promise that all parties concerned would abide abso-
lutely by such agreements. As far as Dubai and the other emirates were concerned 
they all agreed on the Saudi/Kuwaiti mission proposals and they were looking 
forward to a nine-emirate federation. 37 
Even though these obstacles played a major role in limiting the federation to 
seven emirates instead of nine, it would probably not have been thus if Britain had 
adopted a different approach. 
6.2.1 Britain and the Federation of the Nine 
In a number of cases Britain pursued a policy of unifying former colonies and 
spheres of influence (Malaysia, West Indies, South Arabian Federation, the Central 
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African Federation) but was not always successful. The reason for her doing this 
in the lower Gulf was her desire to leave a stable system in place which could play 
a role in the security of the area after the withdrawal of British troops at the end 
of 1971. 
J .B. Kelly has criticised the British withdrawal policy from the Gulf and 
argued that the Foreign Office precipitated the whole affair including the federation 
plan. He wrote:38 
Now that the date of departure had been announced, the Foreign Office hastened 
to tie up or cut off the awkward loose end of Britain's remaining involvement with 
the Gulf. The first was the Union of Arab Emirates, the fig-leaf with which the 
British government hoped to conceal its diminished parts from the quizzical gaze of 
the outside world. 
Kelly believed that the Foreign Office never felt comfortable with the Gulf 
because it was a left-over from the Indian raj which had been more imperial than 
diplomatic. Thus when the Conservative Government agreed to adhere to the 
withdrawal timetable of the previous Government, the Foreign Office was prepared 
to accept any form of federation whether it was between nine states, seven or even 
fewer. It is difficult to accept Kelly's point because there is strong evidence that 
both the Labour and the Conservative Governments were keen on establishing the 
federation of the nine. 
Frauke Heard-Bey has argued that the British Government (by which she 
probably meant both Labour and Conservative) had doubts right from the begin-
ning about a federation that included Bahrain and Qatar, and added that when 
the smaller federation was created the Government "could be satisfied that the 
infant was of the very shape and size it had anticipated" .39 However, if Britain re-
ally wanted a federation of seven it is difficult to explain why its officials continued 
for some four years to put pressure on the rulers to agree to a federation of nine 
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states. It was not until June 1971 that the British gave up the idea of federating 
the nine and as the date for the withdrawal approached, accepted a federation of 
the seven. 
There are many indications that Britain played an important role in the ere-
ation of the Federation of the nine and later, the seven. Sir David Roberts, H.M. 
Political Agent in the Trucial States 1966-68, in an interview on 17th January 
1987, pointed out that "the Federation was a British initiative because we could 
not leave Ajman to be an independent state" ,40 implying that Ajman and other 
smaller states did not have the means to stand on their own. Lord Home, Foreign 
Secretary of Edward Heath's Government, wrote in his autobiography in 1976:41 
We put into the mind of the rulers that they should organize a Union of the 
Sheikhdoms, with its own security force, and said that we would be willing to supply 
the personnel and equipment which would ensure that it had a favourable start. 
When the Conservative Government had announced that policy on 1st March 
1971, the Opposition claimed the credit for the federal initiative. Denis Healey, 
Shadow Foreign Secretary, told Sir Alec in the House of Commons on March 1st, 
1971 that:42 
The Opposition share his desire for the establishment and success of a Union of 
Arab Emirates. Indeed, we launched it on its way. 
Another indication that may shed some light on both the Labour and Con-
servative Governments' close involvement in the establishment of the federation, 
comes from the Gulf. According to Mal}.miid ~asan Jum 'ah, Abu Dhabi's Planning 
Director 1968-72,43 
Sheikh Zayed and Sheikh Rashid met in the village of al-Sumayii and solved 
some border dispute between their emirates. At the same time they announced the 
Federation Agreement and called upon other emirates to join. Sheikh Zayed's desire 
for federation was unquestionable but he needed some encouragement. However, since 
there were not enough learned people in Abu Dhabi capable of such a task, then the 
British Political Agency in Abu Dhabi wa.'! in a good position to perform such a role. 
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Furthermore, Jum 'ah also pointed out that the British Political Agents in 
the area encouraged the rulers to opt for the Federation of the Nine. For exam-
ple, before negotiations for the federation began in February 1968 Mr. Jum 'ah 
explained;44 
We [the Arab advisers] convinced Sheikh Zayed that the Federation of the Nine 
would not work because Bahrain and Qatar are bigger than us and we cannot compete 
with them. He seemed to accept our argument, but Balfour-Paul came and told us 
to work for the Federation of the Nine. 
Early in the federation discussion Balfour-Paul, Deputy Political Resident, 
talked to Sheikh Zayed about the federation and stressed that the rulers should 
enter into discussion about federating the nine emirates. Balfour-Paul also asked 
Sheikh Zayed to see Sheikh 'lsa, ruler of Bahrain, as a gesture of his interest in the 
federation of the nine. Although there is some evidence that Sheikh Zayed was not 
happy about the idea, he did visit Sheikh 'lsa Al Khalifah which demonstrated his 
support for the federation of the Nine.45 
However, there were others who emphasized that the federation proposal was 
an Arab not a British initiative. Certain Arabs and British officials stated that the 
idea was originally by Sheikh Zayed and Sheikh Rashid and that the British role 
was only to encourage it. For example, Balfour-Paul in an interview stated, on 
4th February, 1987 that "Britain was in no sense responsible and at no stage was 
British officialdom involved" .46 Mahdi al-Tajir, oil adviser to the Dubai Govern-
ment, in an interview on 2nd December 1988 stated that "Britain had no role in 
the establishment of the Federation, rather it was certainly an Arab initiative." 47 
But one would dispute Balfour-Paul's and Mahdl al-Tajir's views on the 
British role in the federal initiative. Firstly, the idea of federating the Gulf emi-
rates fitted exactly into the British vision of a Gulf security system. Secondly, 
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from the outset most of the rulers and most of their Arab advisers did not want 
a bigger federation. As one adviser put it when interviewed on 5th July 1989, 
"We did not like the federation of the Nine and we wanted it to fail. .. We knew it 
would not succeed". 48 Probably the Arab advisers dislike of the federation of nine 
was motivated by their personal interests as they feared that their influence might 
be reduced in a federation that contained for example Bahrain. Nevertheless, the 
advisers and the rulers continued to take part in discussions about the federation 
of the nine for a period of four years due to pressure from British officials and 
from the wider Arab World. Thirdly, Mahdi al-Tajir's view of the federation as 
an Arab initiative probably represented his personal involvement in the federation 
discussions which convinced him that the idea was of Arab origins. But what really 
happened was that Mahdi al-Tajir and other advisers had started discussing the 
federation only after it had been proposed by British officials. 
It could be argued that while Britain insisted on determining the political 
future of the Gulf after withdrawal, it also wanted to avoid criticism particularly 
from the Arab World ~hich might damage the credibility of the proposed federa-
tion. Therefore, even though in private British officials were pressuring the rulers 
to work for a federation of the nine, in public they stressed that the federation was 
an Arab initiative. Indeed British officials visited the Gulf on several occasions to 
ensure that the process toward federation continued. For instance in May 1970 the 
Labour Minister of State, Evan Luard, toured the Gulf area, and his mission (Lu-
ard Mission) was carried out in October by officials from the Foreign Office (Acland 
and Egerton of the Arabian Department). Throughout 1970-71 Sir William Luce 
headed a team of experts which included his constitutional assistant, Mr. Holmes, 
and his political assistant Duncan Slater. After these visits, the parties to the dis-
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cussion with regard to the federation (i.e. the rulers and their advisers) intensify 
their discussions. Although their meetings did not necessarly reach any agreement, 
it clearly indicated the influence of Britain and the role played by its officials. 
In spite of the fact that Britain declared it had no role in the federation, this 
initiative was heavily criticised by nationalist groups in the area and their sup-
porters. The Dhofar Front voiced opposition to the projected federation believing 
Britain had designed it in order to:49 
[S]trengthen imperialism's hold and to perpetuate the fragmentation of our 
territory in the interests of the oil companies. At the same time they will protect the 
position of the feudal, tribal, ruling families. 
Damascus Radio on 18th March 1968 condemned the federation agreement as 
"A false federation which serves neo-imperialist plans". 50 The Soviet Union accused 
Britain of manipulating the federation in order to preserve its own interests in the 
Gulf. Tass on 3rd March, 1968 stated that: "the Federation was formed under the 
aegis of Britain and the U.S." 51 
In contrast to this opposition by some Arab countries, several Arab countries 
such as Kuwait and Egypt welcomed the federation plan. The Egyptian Govern-
ment spokesman, l:lasan al-Zayyat said: "If this unity is what they want, we have 
to respect it". 52 Egypt though, which was humiliated in the 1967 war, could not 
help the federation with respect to the Iranian claim over the Gulf Islands. 53 Be-
fore his death, the President of Egypt, Jamal 'Abd al-N~ir, was furious about 
the British Conservative Party's proposal to change the withdrawal policy of the 
Labour Government. During his Arab Socialist Union's speech on 24th July 1970 
Nasser said that:54 
We categorically reject all the attempts by the British Conservative Government 
to return to the policy of British presence in the Arabian Gulf under the cover of the 
East of Suez policy. 
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The above examples illustrate Britain's role in the federal initiative; both 
Labour and Conservative Governments made several attempts to make the pro-
posed federation a success. 
Among the first British attempts to reconcile the various differences of opin-
ion among the rulers, was a visit by the Labour Government's Minister of State 
for Foreign Affairs, Evan Luard, who toured the Gulf from 24th April to 8th May, 
1970. He visited Bahrain, Qatar, the Trucial States, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 55 
Mr. Luard suggested that in order to make the Supreme Council of rulers' meet-
ing successful, there should be a preparatory meeting of the Deputy rulers which 
subsequently took place on 13th June 1970.56 Furthermore, as a way of encour-
aging the rulers to concentrate on the Federation and to forget the Conservative 
Party's promises of cancelling the withdrawal decision when they came to power, 
Mr. Luard said at a press conference at the British Embassy in Kuwait that he:57 
did not see any justification for the British remaining in the area after 1971 [be-
cause] Britain supported the federation of Arab Emirates and she would not interfere 
in internal affairs and would not sign any defence pacts with Gulf states, since once 
they were united they would be able to defend themselves. 
At the end of May, Mr. Luard sent a memorandum asking the Deputy rulers 
"to concentrate on the issues that they had already solved and to delay the points 
that needed further discussion to other meetings." 58 
With the Conservative Government in office in June 1970, the efforts to reach 
a federation of the Arab Emirates continued. This was clearly manifested in the 
succession of different British missions and the numerous officials involved in the 
discussions that related to the federation problem. For example, Sir William Luce, 
who was appointed Britain's special negotiator in the Gulf, toured the area from 
August to October 1970, and again in January and May of the following year. 
265 
In October 1970, both the head of the Arabian Department in the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, Sir Antony Acland, and his assistant, Sir Stephen Egerton, 
had visited the Gulf area too. 59 Sir William Luce's assistant, Duncan Slater, also 
had held separate meetings with the governments of various individual Emirates. 60 
At the same time, most of the British Political Residents and Political Agents in 
the Gulf, such as Sir Stewart Crawford, Sir Geoffrey Arthur, James Treadwell, 
E. Henderson, M. Weir, J. Bullard, P. Wright and Julian Walker, had played 
significant roles in the federation process. Sir Geoffrey Arthur, the last British 
Political Resident in the Gulf, told Sir David Roberts, Political Agent in Dubai 
from 1966-68, that "he had great difficulties in trying to make the Sheikhs agree 
[to a federation of the nine and later to the seven]." 61 Furthermore, most of the 
Sheikhs from the Emirates who visited London had held meetings with several 
British officials to discuss the withdrawal policy and, especially, the future of the 
Federation. 
British officials had worked hard to solve the various boundary disputes and 
many had become intimately involved in the establishment of the federation and 
the security of the Gulf region after withdrawal. They sometimes expressed their 
opinions in strong language as in the message of the Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs, Sir Alec Douglas Home, to the rulers on 2nd December 
1970, in which he warned the rulers that "the circumstances are rapidly changing, 
therefore they should not delay taking necessary decisions regarding the establish-
ment of the Federation." 62 The same stand was presented by Sir Geoffrey Arthur, 
Political Resident in the Gulf 1970-1, during a discussion with Mr. J.Iamudi, the 
Government of Abu Dhabi's Adviser on the Federation, at the Foreign Office on 
26th August, 1970. Arthur pointed out to J.Iamudi:63 
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The reason for not taking strong policy on the federation was because of Iran. 
It took us 15 months to convince Iran to accept this policy. But now we will take 
a strong position in encouraging the rulers ..... This actually is one of Sir William 
Luce's jobs during his visit to the area. The problem though is the number of States 
that will enter the federation .... We can't push them too hard, otherwise they will 
withdraw from the federation just after we leave the area. Thus it is better that 
they join the federation willingly .. . these entities will collapse immediately after our 
withdrawal if they do not form a union among themselves. 
6.2.2 Sir William Luce and the Federation 
The most important efforts to establish the Federation of the Arab Emirates 
and solve the various related problems were made by Sir William Luce during his 
visits to the area throughout 1970 and 1971. His main job, as Patrick Bannerman, 
the late Foreign Office official, stated in January 1987, was:64 
a. To assist in setting up the Federation. 
b. The settlement of Bahraini affairs. 
c. Solving the Buraimi dispute. 
d. The affairs of the islands. 
e. Encouraging an understanding between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
Sir William Luce, (formerly a member of the Sudan Civil Service) was, from 
1956-60, Governor-General of Aden and from 1961-66 the Political Resident in 
the Gulf. From 1970-71 he was the Personal Representative for Gulf Affairs of 
the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home.65 Luce's personal opinion, 
with regard to Britain's withdrawal policy from the Gulf, had been expressed in 
two articles in The Round Table in July 1967 and October 1969. Furthermore, he 
delivered two lectures about the subject in November 1968 and in September 1973. 
He also participated in the Georgetown University Conference, The Implication of 
Britain's Withdrawal from the Gulf, in 1969.66 
In his article of July 1967, Sir William Luce expressed his opinion that Britain 
had an important stake in the Gulf oil industry. He realised that the oil companies 
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should be encouraged to rely on their own survival methods, but that the Gulf was 
not stable enough for the oil companies to perform such a task. He wrote that if 
the Gulf was a secure and stable region there would be no problem in disengaging 
from it. But since it was considered unstable the British presence there was vital. 
Nevertheless, Luce agreed that Britain would not stay in the Gulf indefinitely 
but 67 
' 
With the circumstances of the Gulf region as they are today, the dangers to our 
interests and those of our friends in the area of an early British withdrawal are too 
great to make it an acceptable gamble. 
In his view Britain should have worked to create reasonable conditions in the 
Gulf area that would permit the withdrawal of the troops 'honourably'. Amongst 
these pre-conditions were: (a) understanding between Saudi Arabia and Iran; (b) 
the growth of a close relationship between the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia 
whereby the Gulf States would accept the leadership of Saudi Arabia in exter-
nal affairs and defence; and (c) the Gulf States must abandon old feuds that kept 
them divided. 68 
It would appear that Sir William Luce did not see the feasibility of the Gulf 
emirates joining a federation at that stage, but he revived his old idea of 'Peninsula 
Solidarity' by which he sought to encourage the emirates to rely on Saudi Arabia 
for their defence and external affairs. In other words, Saudi Arabia would have the 
same responsibilities that Britain used to have within the Gulf Emirates. However, 
in 1973 Sir William regretted that Saudi Arabia did not utilize this opportunity 
(see Twin Pillars). 
After the withdrawal was announced in January 1968, Luce again expressed 
his opinion in a lecture delivered at the Royal United Service Institution (RUSI) 
on 26th November 1968.69 He did not agree with the withdrawal decision and even 
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called for a reconsideration of Britain's policy of withdrawal from East of Suez. 
In fact, he was not against the withdrawal in principle, but only disagreed with 
the timing and method of the decision since he thought the British presence could 
have continued until the mid-1970s without any serious difficulties. The reason he 
gave was that the Gulf was not yet stable and that the Russians would exploit 
the opportunity to fill the vacuum. Nevertheless, as the decision had been made, 
altering it would have created some political problems, because: "The announce-
ment of our withdrawal from the Gulf last January has changed the situation there 
already. It has set in motion a certain process which cannot be put back." 70 
The programme that Luce outlined to keep post-withdrawal stability in the 
Gulf consisted of four points. Firstly, he believed the withdrawal would revive 
the old territorial disputes, namely between Iran and the Gulf emirates. This 
is why Britain ought to have helped remove these sources of conflict before the 
withdrawal date. Secondly, the best way to solve these conflicts was through an 
understanding between Saudi Arabia and Iran regarding the status quo of the Gulf 
states. Thirdly, the Gulf emirates should be encouraged to join forces by forming 
a federation amongst themselves. 
Even though Sir William expected the federation proposal of February 1968 
to succeed, he was not sure of its cohesiveness. He pointed this out by saying: 71 
I think it has a reasonable hope of growing, if not into what we would regard 
as a particularly efficient organisation, at least into a political entity which would be 
internationally recognised. 
Fourthly, after such a federation was set up, Luce suggested Britain could 
then sign an agreement with it, whereby the British navy would be permitted to 
make occasional visits to the Emirates' ports. 
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Amazingly enough, all four points above, outlined by Sir William Luce in 
November 1968, were accomplished before Britain evacuated the Gulf in 1971. 
This would probably not have happened had Luce not been appointed as the 
British Foreign Secretary's special envoy to the Gulf States in July 1970. 
Further issues that Luce forecasted and which later became reality, were the 
Bahraini conditions for joining the Federation. Luce saw no hope for the Feder-
ation without the inclusion of Bahrain because of her greater and more educated 
population, (more than the combined total of the other emirates) from which the 
proposed federation would be able to draw most of its skilled and educated civil 
servants. For these reasons Luce agreed with Bahrain's demand for a bigger say 
in federation affairs, but when that was rejected by the other emirates he seemed 
willing to accept Bahrain's reasons for unilateral independence. In October 1969, 
before he was appointed special adviser on Gulf affairs, Luce suggested in The 
Round Table article that Bahrain might go its own way if the other states did not 
concede it a leading role in the union. Bahrain claimed that having the largest 
and most advanced population gave it the right to such a role. 72 
In the October 1969 article, Luce also emphasized the problem of post-
withdrawal security in the Gulf and the British role in facing Soviet penetration 
there. He thought Britain should contest Soviet influence in the Gulf by providing 
some balance to their growing influence in the region. Britain could do this simply 
through a naval presence in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf. At the same time, 
naval personnel would be allowed a degree of access to the ports of the Gulf States 
and to bases like Masirah in Oman. This policy would first modernize Britain's 
relation with the Gulf States by virtue of her withdrawal and secondly, Britain 
would still have a presence there in terms of mobile naval forces that would be 
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allowed to use ports in times of emergency, and during occasional visits to the 
area.73 
When the Conservative Government came to power in June 1970, Luce was 
appointed as the Foreign Secretary's special representative to the Gulf States. The 
official reason for his appointment was that he was needed to consult the govern-
ments in the region on the withdrawal decision and to see whether it was possible 
to reverse it, as the Conservatives had promised when they were in Opposition. 
Nevertheless, there were some who argued that Luce's appointment was only a 
face-saving attempt by the Conservative Government, because:74 
by the time the Conservatives got back it was too late to reverse policy and 
anyway, they knew that it was no longer reversible, whatever they said publicly. In 
that sense Sir William Luce 's appointment was a matter of finding a formula not to 
reverse policy, though of course his authority and great experience also offered hope 
of helping to solve the problems that had to be faced before independence. 
However, other researchers and writers (such as Qureshi of Pakistan Horizon) 
saw Luce's appointment as a pretext for Britain to remain in the Gulf, and they 
suggested that Britain would use the rulers' cooperation with Luce as a vital 
means by which she could pursue such a policy. It was suggested that the British 
Government was looking for a reason to remain in the Gulf and that this was 
behind Sir William Luce's mission.75 It will be easier to judge Sir William Luce's 
appointment if his visits are discussed in greater detail and that will be the task 
of the forthcoming pages. 
After his appointment by the Conservative Government in July 1970 Sir 
William embarked on a mission on 19 August 1970 that would last until the 22nd 
of the following month. He visited Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Abu 
Dhabi, Dubai, Qatar, Iraq, Iran, and Egypt.76 His visit was a fact-finding mission 
to assist the British Conservative Government in its policy towards the Gulf and 
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to help it decide whether or not itshould withdraw from the area. The view he 
received from rulers as well as from other leaders was that Britain should adhere 
to the Labour Government's timetable. The rulers were of course not unanimous 
in their views. For example, The Times reported on 14th July 1970, a few weeks 
before Luce's visit, that Sheikh Rashid, ruler of Dubai, had openly supported a 
continued British presence. He said that: 77 
Abu Dhabi and Bahrain, and in fact the whole coast, people and rulers, would 
support the retaining of British forces in the Gulf even though .... they might not give 
a direct answer out of respect for the general Arab view. 
But that was a minority opinion, at least in public, when compared with the 
views of the other rulers, as well as those of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Egypt. 
Sheikh Sa'd AI 'Abdullah, the Kuwait Acting-Premier, declared from the Cairo 
radio station $awt al-'A~ (Voice of the Arabs) on 24th August 1970:78 
The present British government should adhere to the decision of the former 
Labour Government in connection with the withdrawal of British forces from the 
Gulf area. 
Iraq also criticized Luce's visit, accusing the British Government of seeking 
ways to remain in the Gulf. Baghdad Radio on lOth September, 1970 said that: 
"the aim of Luce's tour was to persuade Gulf rulers of the necessity of British 
troops remaining there and to wreck the proposed Gulf Federation." 79 Some similar 
criticism was pointed out by Cairo Radio on 9th September 1970 accusing Luce's 
visit of prolonging the British presence in the Gulf.80 The Shah had long before also 
declared his opposition to any reversal in the withdrawal policy, and he repeated 
this to Luce during his meeting with him on 20th September, 1970. The Shah's 
Foreign Minister, Ardeshir Zahedi, explained the Iranian position to reporters 
the following day by saying: "Iran had emphasized its opposition to any British 
military presence in the Gulf area after 1971." 81 
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Thus the aim of the first round of Luce's Gulf talks was to ascertain the rulers' 
opinion with regard to the withdrawal policy, but it was rather strange of Luce 
to announce on 26th September 1970 at a press conference in Tehran and before 
leaving for Cairo, that Britain was not insisting on the creation of a federation of 
the emirates as a pre-condition of withdrawal but that he was trying very hard 
indeed to accelerate its formation.82 That probably meant that Luce had already 
made up his ¥J.ind about the withdrawal of the troops, or it could have meant 
that he did not want to upset the Shah who was against the formation of the 
federation. Another possible interpretation is that Luce wanted to win over the 
Egyptian Government, which he went to see after the press conference. According 
to The Times of 26th September, Luce was expected to recommend to Sir Alec 
that Britain should withdraw.83 The Times of 14 October 1970 believed that Sir 
William had advised the Conservative Government to carry out the withdrawal 
programme from the Gulf by the end of 1971.84 
In comparison with Luce's first round of Gulf talks (that took him to all the 
countries concerned, spending over one month in the region) the second round was 
very short and involved fewer countries, lasting only from 13th October 1970 to the 
19th of the same month.85 The purpose of his second visit was ostensibly for further 
consultations. He visited Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait, and on the 19th of October 
returned to London.86 This second visit, however, was certainly not for another 
'sounding of opinion' but was instead a serious discussion of federation affairs. 
This was explained by the presence of Luce's constitutional advisor, Mr. Holmes, 
who had a meeting with some of the rulers' advisors during the same period. 
Furthermore, on December 2nd 1970, Sir Alec Douglas-Home sent a message to 
the rulers, the content of which was summarized by l:lamudi, an Abu Dhabi official, 
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as follows:87 
He [Sir Alec] has appointed Sir William Luce as his personal representative, and 
mentioned Luce's efforts to solve the obstacles in the way of federation in between 
August and October. There were two main points that had not been solved yet: 
the site for the capital and the representation quota. The best way to solve these 
obstacles, the Foreign Secretary suggested, was that the rulers should first solve the 
two obstacles and then include them in the provisional constitution. But if they were 
not solved then the constitution should ignore them completely. Furthermore, the 
Foreign Secretary, warned the rulers that time was passing very quickly and circum-
stances were changing, thus, they should not delay taking the necessary decisions to 
establish the Federation. 
The third tour of the Gulf by Sir William Luce was from January 24th to 
February 14th, 1971. This third round looked more comprehensive than the last 
one for this time Luce visited Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, the Trucial 
States and Iran. The Foreign Office spokesman, describing the journey, said it was 
"part of the continuing process of consultation with other Governments concerning 
British policy towards the region." 88 The Daily Telegraph of 29th January, however, 
pointed out that the Conservative Government had already decided to withdraw 
and that "Sir William Luce is on a tour of the nine Gulf Shaikhdoms to tell 
the rulers of this decision. The run-down of forces has begun, and it will be 
accelerated." 89 This speculation was confirmed by Sheikh ~aqr of Ras al-Khaimah 
who, after meeting Luce in February, told the magazine al-Usbii' al-'Arabi, that 
"I told you that Britain will withdraw: Luce has just confirmed that now." 90 Luce 
then went on to meet the Shah of Iran, (on 11th February 1971). He told reporters 
at the airport before departing for England that:91 
The idea of establishing a Federation of At·ab Emirates in the Gulf region has 
not failed: the governments of Britain, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are still doing 
everything in their power to achieve the union, and the differences between the Gulf 
rulers have been narrowed. 
The above statement by Sir William Luce was further proof that he was not 
in the Gulf to consult the rulers on whether to withdraw or not, as the Foreign 
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Office spokesman had stated. The purpose of the visit was rather to notify the 
rulers of the Conservative Government's decision to abide by the former Labour 
Government's dead-line. Furthermore, the statement shed light on the coopera-
tion between Luce and the Saudi/Kuwaiti Mission that toured the Gulf in mid-
January 1971 in an attempt to minimize the differences between the rulers about 
the Federation. 92 
The Conservative Government's withdrawal decision was revealed in a state-
ment delivered by Douglas-Home on 1st March 1971. Besides adhering to the 
former withdrawal time-table, the Foreign Secretary outlined the proposals that 
his Government was prepared to undertake regarding the projected Federation as 
follows: 93 
Firstly, we are prepared to offer a Treaty of Friendship containing an undertak-
ing to consult together in time of need. 
Secondly, Her Majesty's Government is willing to hand over the Trucial Oman 
Scouts, a force whose efficiency and value is well proven and to which I pay tribute 
today for its role in maintaining peace in the Trucial States, to form a nucleus of a 
Union Army. We are prepared to make available British Officers and other personnel 
on loan to the Union's forces and to assist in the supply of equipment. The Union 
itself would naturally assume full financial responsibility for its own forces. 
Thirdly, if the Union wishes, elements of British forces, including training teams 
to assist with the training Union security forces, could be stationed there on a con-
tinuing basis to act in a liaison and training role. 
Fourthly, training exercises involving British Army and Air Force units could 
take place regularly. 
Fifthly, there would be regular visits to the area by ships of the Royal Navy. 
There are differences of opinion among some researchers about exactly when 
Luce submitted his report to the Foreign Secretary. Was it in September 1970, 
as J.B. Kelly suggests, or was it in December of the same year as Balfour-Paul 
believes?94 These writers thus hold the view that Luce submitted his report after 
either his first or his second trip to the Gulf. He found that opinions in the area 
had completely changed since January 1968 when the Labour Minister had come 
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to tell the rulers of the withdrawal decision and they had objected to it. There 
are others, on the other hand, who believe that Luce submitted his report to Sir 
Alec in February 1971 and that the Foreign Secretary made his celebrated March 
statement after receiving the report. Heard-Bey and al-Baharna agree about this 
sequence of events. 95 
Luce's report is important in the sense that it explains to us the nature of 
the Conservative Government's policy towards the region. How relevant was the 
formation of the federation to the new British security arrangements? And why did 
it take the British Foreign Secretary nine months to announce his Government's 
policy in March 1971? 
First of all there might never have been any report by Luce at all, because he 
strongly believed that the Labour Government's announcement in January 1968 
had changed the situation in the Gulf to such an extent that any reconsideration 
of that decision was now impossible. This opinion was declared by Luce even 
before he was appointed as an adviser on Gulf affairs, and the Foreign Secretary 
could hardly have been unaware of it. Secondly, there might have been an earlier 
preliminary report (September or December 1970) advising withdrawal, but the 
Government could not act :upon it because of the failure to form the federation. 
Luce always held that the withdrawal of British troops would create a vacuum 
that might be exploited by the Russians. The best way to fill this vacuum was 
through new arrangements, including a naval presence in the area that would make 
occasional visits to the federation's ports (see Luce's opinion, above). Therefore, 
it was necessary to establish a federation first and to sign an agreement with it 
later. Sir Alec was also a believer in this idea: he told the House of Commons on 
20th July 1970: 96 
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If we are successful in forming the union of Arab Emirates -and I hope we may 
be successful- it is for them to say, in consultation with Britain, what support they 
want. 
Finally, there might have been a final report in February 1971 that recom-
mended withdrawal by the end of the year. This supposition is based on two 
premises. Firstly, even though the federation was not established yet, it is con-
ceivable that Luce had received a certain degree of acceptance for the new British 
security arrangements, including the naval visits. Secondly, taking an earlier de-
cision on withdrawal would itself encourage the rulers to form their federation. 
Therefore, the argument goes, Sir Alec was advised to make his statement on 1st 
March 1971. 
The fourth visit by Sir William Luce to the Gulf region began on 2nd May 
1971 and lasted until the 30th of the same month. He arrived in Tehran on 3rd 
May and on 5th May had what was described as a long and friendly meeting with 
the Shah. No statement on their talks was issued, but it was believed that they 
discussed Iran's claim to the three islands that belonged to Sharjah and Ras al-
Khaimah. Then on 6th May, Luce visited Bahrain, on the 7th he went to Qatar 
and Dubai and on the 9th he returned to Bahrain. After meeting Sheikh 'lsa on 
lOth May he went to Jeddah for talks with Saudi Arabian officials. Later on he 
went to the Trucial States, where he met the Abu Dhabi Crown Prince, Sheikh 
Khallfah bin Zayed AI Nahayan on 16th May.97 
During the May 1971 visit Luce worked on two items. First, he discussed 
the affairs of the islands with the Shah of Iran. This was probably the reason for 
revisiting Tehran on 22nd May, 1971. It is possible that during this visit he gave 
the rulers of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah the British Government's advice that 
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they should negotiate with the Shah. It seems as though Taryam and al-Alkim 
were in error when they quoted 4th June 1971 as the date when Luce warned the 
two rulers that the Shah was contemplating occupation of the islands before the 
end of the year.98 Luce was not in the Gulf on 4th June but in London. 
The second problem that Luce worked on was the Federation issue. Even 
though his first attempt to federate the Arab Emirates in 1970 had failed, Luce 
utilized both the Saudi/Kuwaiti mission of January 1971 and that of April 1971 
to urge the nine emirates to reconsider their individual standpoints. 99 Indeed Sir 
William followed up the recommendations of the Saudi/Kuwaiti mission. He pre-
sented a memorandum to the rulers which contained the mission's proposals cou-
pled with his own recommendations on the disputed points. The mission had sug-
gested seven amendments to the draft constitution of the Emirates, as follows: 100 
a. Representation of the Emirates in the Union Council. 
b. The siting of the temporary and permanent Capitals. 
c. Representation of individual Emirates in international organisations. 
d. Matters on which the Federation has the sole right to legislate. 
e. The right of the Emirates to set up local forces. 
f. Voting in the Supreme Council. 
g. Contribution of the Emirates to the Federal budget. 
Luce's suggestions on the disputed points, (b) (e) (f) and (g) were as follows: 
1- The right of the Emirates to set up local forces: Luce's suggestion 
was to return to the 1970 proposed constitution (see 6.2 above) and in particular 
to article 143 which reads:lOl 
The member states shall have the right to establish local armed forces ready 
and able to form a defensive tool, if need arises, to defend the Union against any 
external aggression. 
2 - Voting in the Supreme Council: all the Emirates, with the excep-
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tion of Bahrain, agreed that the decision of the Supreme Council should be made 
unanimously. Therefore, in the interests of reaching an agreement, Sir William 
suggested the following: 102 
Resolutions of the Supreme Council on matters of substance should be made 
by unanimous vote. Should a unanimous vote on a given subject not be achieved 
then the subject should be reviewed within a month at the most. If the Council on 
this occasion reaches a decision on the subject by a majority of seven out of nine 
votes, then it comes into effect, provided that the majority includes the votes of Abu 
Dhabi, Bahrain, Dubai and Qatar, and the minority is bound by the opinion of the 
majority. Resolutions of the Council on administrative matters should be passed by a 
majority of votes and such matters shall be prescribed in the Council's internal rules 
of procedure. 
3- Contributions of the Emirates to the Federal Budget: Sir William 
suggested that each Emirate should contribute a specified proportion of its annual 
revenue to the union budget. He thought that 10% of their annual income would 
be acceptable to all nine Emirates. 
4- Siting of the permanent capital: Even though the Saudi/Kuwaiti mis-
sion had suggested that the site of the permanent capital should not be specified in 
the temporary constitution, Sir William suggested that the Constitution "should 
reach a final decision on this question." 103 
In the end all efforts to federate the nine Emirates failed. The problem of 
federation went beyond the obstacles that were discussed by the Saudi/Kuwaiti 
mission or by Sir William Luce. According to Mr. IJamudi, Adviser to the Abu 
Dhabi Government on Federation affairs, in a long letter to Mr. Al;tmad Khallfah 
al-Suwaydl, Chairman of the Amiri- Diwiin in Abu Dhabi:104 
The official differences were not the main obstacles for the federation even 
though every emirate tried to prove that they were so. The major obstacle was a 
lack of trust (between the emirates]. It seems also there are other reasons that are 
hindering the establishment of the federation beyond the official reasons and those 
mentioned in the official memorandums. It could be the desire for independence on 
the part of some emirates or the covert threats from the neighbouring countries that 
have some interests in the region. Besides that, some of the emirates paid attention 
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to some of the neighbouring countries' hints and incitements. The above-mentioned 
reasons could be among the causes that are hindering the federation process. 
Even though the period May-September, 1971 was crucial owing to the estab-
lishment of the federation among six of the Trucial States (of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, 
Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, and Fujairah) in July (see 6.2.4) and the inde-
pendence of Bahrain and Qatar in August and September respectively, Sir William 
Luce remained in London. However, that did not mean he was not involved in what 
was going on. On the contrary, he was a full participant. For example, he held 
meetings with the rulers during their visits to London, such as his meeting with 
Qatar's Deputy Ruler, Sheikh Khallfah, on 20th September 1971, after Qatar had 
announced her independence on the 1st of that month.96 Furthermore, the Politi-
cal Agents in the Gulf kept him informed. For instance, J.Walker, Political Agent 
in the Trucial States 1970-71, said on 19th July 1991 about his personal involve-
ment in the federation of the United Arab Emirates that, "I used to send telexes 
to Sir William Luce informing him of what was happening, and asking him for 
confirmation." 105 In fact, his absence from the Gulf during the summer of 1971 
could have been for political reasons. The presence of Luce in the area during 
the period when Bahrain, Qatar and the U AE were about to become independent 
could have exposed the new states to criticism by nationalist forces who argued 
that Britain was behind the establishment of these states. 
From September 4-23 1971, Luce made his fifth tour of the Gulf. He met 
Sheikh Zayed, Ruler of Abu Dhabi, and Sheikh Rashid, Ruler of Dubai, on the 4th 
of that month in Abu Dhabi.106 It seemed the purpose of Luce's fifth visit was to 
discuss the following topics with the newly formed Federation of the Six: 
( 1) Final arrangements for the withdrawal of British forces from the region. 
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( 2) Britain's relations with the Union of the Six after the withdrawal of troops. 
( 3) The relations between the Emirates and the neighbouring countries, espe-
cially Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
( 4) Arrangements for retroceding the British Government's legal responsibility 
towards foreigners. 
( 5) Putting more pressure on Ras al-Khaimah to join the federation. 
On the day Luce returned to London, 23rd September 1971, British officials 
said that quite a lot of progress had been made in the formation of the federation 
and that things were going ahead smoothly and satisfactorily.107 
In October-November Luce made three visits to the Gulf region. For example, 
on 2nd October, he visited Tehran and had talks with the Iranians officials about 
the Iranian claim over Abu Musa and the Tunbs islands. After that, Luce went 
back to London, and on 25th October left for the Emirates. In the Emirates he 
held meetings with several rulers of the Trucial States, but the most important 
were those with Sheikh ~aqr b. Mol_lammad of Ras al-Khaimah and Sheikh Khalid 
b. Mol_lammad of Sharjah. He discussed the Iranian claim over Abu Musa and 
'.funbs with the two rulers (see chapter 7). On 3rd November 1971 Luce returned 
to London, only to start another trip to both Iran and the Trucial States before 
his mission was completed on 20th November 1971.108 
Britain's special envoy to the Gulf region, who had made eight visits to the 
area and had spent one year and five months shuttling between London, Cairo, 
Tehran, Baghdad, Jeddah, Kuwait, Oman, and the nine Gulf Emirates, had suc-
ceeded in solving some problems but had failed with others. For example, he 
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initially began his efforts with the hope of establishing a federation of nine Emi-
rates, but in fact had succeeded in uniting only six. Secondly, he negotiated a 
deal with the Shah over Abii Musa yet was not able to convince Sheikh ~aqr of 
Ras al-Khaimah to negotiate over the 'funbs. Thirdly, he was able to foster un-
derstanding between Saudi Arabia and Iran regarding Gulf security but failed to 
convince Saudi Arabia or Abu Dhabi to reach an agreement over the Buraimi dis-
pute (see chapter 7). Finally, he succeeded in keeping a British naval presence 
especially in Masirah island off Oman and the occasional visits to the Gulf Arab 
states by a British naval force. 
6.2.3 Britain and the failure of the nine 
Britain's role in the failure of the federation of the nine is puzzling. On one 
hand, the British Government's official policy was to encourage the federation of 
the nine but, on the other hand, the federation process was further complicated by 
the changing course of British politics. That is to say after 1968 Britain worked 
to federate the emirates, but there were several factors which might have played a 
significant role in hindering attempts at federation. 
The first factor was that Britain had fossilized the emirates through the 'ex-
clusive treaties' (see chapter.!) and had guarded this semi-independence for many 
years. This meant that each ruler enjoyed almost absolute power over his subjects 
and thus they naturally opposed any attempts to centralize power in a federal 
state. Similarly they were opposed to the promotion of a Gulf national identity. 
The reason for this opposition was due to the fear that such a policy would directly 
threaten the basis of traditional political power which Britain had historically pro-
tected. As the British Desert Intelligence Officer (DIO) Captain Tim Ash, who 
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lived in the Gulf for more than 22 years, explained "If it was not for the British 
protection since the nineteenth century, the Emirates would have been taken over 
by either Saudi Arabia or Oman." 109 
The habit of the British Government of stimulating such division among the 
Gulf emirates was a result of a policy that Britain had pursued in the fifties and 
sixties. This policy had encouraged estrangement between the Trucial States on 
one side and Qatar and Bahrain, as separate identities, on the other side. For 
example, in outlining instructions to Bernard Burrows, on his appointment as 
Political Resident in the Gulf 1953-58, the dispatch from the Foreign Office stated 
that: 110 
1. It is the policy of Her Majesty's Government to maintain the traditional 
position of Great Britain in the Gulf and to continue to fulfil the obligations which 
they have assumed in that area; 
2. The Shaikhdoms of the Gulf have become of first importance to the United King-
dom and to the Sterling Area as a whole. It is essential that Her Majesty's Gov-
ernment should exert sufficient influence in them to ensure that there is no conflict 
between the policies of the rulers and those of Her Majesty's Government. This in-
fluence will in the main flow from a proper appreciation of the value of the British 
protection and advice by the rulers and their peoples. 
3. Where appropriate, Her Majesty's Government will endeavour to advance the 
internal independence of the Shaikhdoms. 
4. Her Majesty's Government will not oppose any political or economic association 
or co-ordination between the Shaikhdoms provided it is consistent with the aims 
under paragraphs 1 and 2 above. Except in the case of the Trucial States, where a 
common administration would appear to be highly desirable, such association and 
co-ordination will be encouraged only so far as it will assist the achievement of the 
said aims. 
However, in a draft minute that was written by A.D.M. Ross, Counsellor, 
F.O., on July 17, 1953, there were further explanations of the above instructions. 
The explanations pointed out that: 111 
(a) Paragraph 1 means that we intend to stay in the Gulf; (b) paragraph 2 is 
a reminder that constant effort is necessary to make our will felt and that we shall 
succeed only through success; (c) paragraph 3 means that we may, where appropriate, 
surrender some of our capitulatory rights. It does not mean that we will encourage 
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novel forms of Government- a point which is deliberately omitted from the despatch; 
(d) paragraph 4 means that we will not encourage fedemtion and that in the unlikely 
event of it being desired we shall oppose it if it seems to conflict with our policies in 
general. 
The explanations of Burrows' instructions had pleased Sir William Strang, 
Permanent Under Secretary, and Lord Reading, Minister of State, F.O. For exam-
ple, Strang commented that "I think that this draft meets the case very well." 112 
Accordingly, Bahrain and Qatar were not incorporated within the Trucial 
States and, consequently, each had separate economic, security and political ar-
rangements. This was probably part of the British Government's old imperial style 
of 'divide and rule' policy. For example, the Trucial States Council had amongst 
its members the Seven Trucial States but not Bahrain and Qatar. This led the 
Sheikhs of the Trucial States to develop some understanding of each other over 
the years but the rulers of Bahrain and Qatar did not have such an opportunity. 
Furthermore, both Bahrain and Qatar were excluded from the Trucial States' De-
velopment Office, the Senior Police Officers' annual meetings of the Trucial States, 
and other discussions that prepared the Trucial States for federation. The outcome 
was that there existed divisions between the nine emirates that in fact Britain her-
self had encouraged over the years. Thus, by persistently neglecting to foster a 
closer relationship between the rulers of the nine Emirates in various fields, Britain 
made it difficult for them to avoid their differences during the federation discussions 
of the 1968-71 period. 
The second factor for which Britain was directly responsible was that the 
nine Emirates were further confused by the course of domestic politics in Britain 
between 1968 and 1971. At the time of the withdrawal announcement in the 
House of Commons on Tuesday, January 16th 1968113 , the Conservative Opposition 
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Leader, Edward Heath, had condemned the decision to withdraw:114 
Do the changes being made in overseas defence expenditure mean that Britain 
will not in fact carry out her commitments and obligations in the Gulf and in the 
Far East? Is not this dishonourable and ought it not to be thoroughly condemned? 
Does not the right hon. gentleman's statement about defence equipment mean that 
in fact any defence policy which the Government may have had in the past is in ruins? 
Finally, is not the whole of the Prime Minister's statement entirely negative? 
Heath, on the third day of the debate on the Prime Minister's announcement 
of the withdrawal, emphasized his party's determination to change that policy: 115 
And so, when the time comes - and on the Prime Minister's time schedule the 
opportunity will be open to us - we shall ignore the time phasing laid down by the 
Prime Minister and his Government for the Far East and the Middle East. We shall 
support our country's friends and allies and we shall restore the good name of Britain. 
Edward Heath's condemnation was echoed by Ian MacLeod, the Shadow 
Chancellor of the Exchequer:116 
I make quite clear that when we become the Government, if in the years to the 
mid-1970s it is practical and helpful for us to maintain a presence in the Far East, 
we shall do so. We will keep the Prime Minister's word for him. 
When he was asked if that was a pledge, MacLeod said "Yes, and one we 
will keep." Maudling, the Deputy Leader of the Conservative Party, and Douglas-
Home, the foreign affairs spokesman were also furious at the Labour Government's 
withdrawal announcement. 
The pledge of the Conservatives, which was repeated again and again, had 
given a false hope to the rulers. As they preferred to remain under British protec-
tion, they began to drag their feet in the negotiations towards federation. They 
were under the impression that if the Conservatives came to power before Decem-
her 1971, it might save them from having to accept the unpalatable necessity of 
federal union. 117 
The same pledge had some influence on the Foreign Office officials too, who 
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were supposed to encourage the rulers to carry on the federation discussion with 
some seriousness. They were appalled by the Conservatives' promise because as 
stated by Donald McCarthy, Head of the Arabian Department 1967-68,118 
We knew that no local government, whatever it really wanted, would dare ask 
the British to stay and that the decision had been made irreversible by the fact of 
its announcement. That was made very clear to Mr. Heath in Iran, Kuwait and 
elsewhere when he toured later, though the Conservatives went on saying that they 
would reverse if the local government wished that. 
However when the Conservatives came to power in June 1970, they sent Sir 
William Luce to the Gulf area to discuss the withdrawal policy with the leaders 
of the Gulf countries. Even though, as we said before, Sir William was used to 
release the Conservatives from their pledge, he reached the same conclusion as that 
of the Labour Government. Therefore, Sir Alec Douglas-Home on March 1st 1971, 
announced that Britain's withdrawal from the Gulf would commence by the end 
of the year (see Sir William L uce and the Federation). 
The effect of Sir Alec's announcement in March was to encourage the emirates 
to conclude their discussion about federation. On the same day in the House of 
Commons, Denis Healey, the Shadow Foreign Affairs Secretary, asked Sir Alec for 
assurance that his Government would not withdraw British troops from the Gulf 
until the union was formed and thus capable of assuring stability in the area. Sir 
Alec's reply showed how determined his government was to withdraw the troops 
even though that would probably mean the creation of a weaker union. Of course 
at this stage he did not specify if he was willing to accept a federation of less than 
nine emirates. His reply was: "The military presence is due to be withdrawn by 
the end of 1971, but we have sufficient time to form the union. If the union is not 
formed I shall return to the House." 119 
As a consequence, the Conservative government was obliged to fulfil the 
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Labour government's plan of withdrawing the troops by the end of 1971. In fact, 
even before the March announcement, the Conservative Government had started 
putting pressure on the rulers to come up with a resolution on the Federation, 
exemplified in Sir Alec's message on 2nd December 1970 in which he urged the 
rulers not to delay the establishment of the Federation (see Sir William Luce and 
the Federation). The Daily Telegraph also reported on 16 December, 1970 that Sir 
Alec had sent a message to the nine rulers in which he said that their "continued 
inability to decide on a federal structure now seriously threatened international 
credibility of its future success." 120 However the pressure on the part of the Con-
servative Government lacked credibility. The Conservatives when out of office, had 
promised to reverse the withdrawal decision but when they were in power they be-
gan pressuring the rulers to federate and, on top of that, to complete the process 
of federation within just a few months! Some of the rulers could have considered 
this as a betrayal by the Conservative government. Other rulers, with their eyes 
on separate independence, realized that Britain had a time-limit in which to carry 
out the withdrawal and saw that if they failed to federate during that time then 
Britain would allow the bigger emirates, i.e. themselves, to go it alone. 
The third factor that caused the shrinkage of the federation of nine emirates 
to seven and prompted Bahrain and Qatar to seek independence outside the fed-
eration, could have been the result of personal advice by certain British Political 
Agents to some of the rulers. This advice was possibly given because the Political 
Agents were instructed to win the confidence of the rulers by telling them the 
truth and being frank with them as much as possible.l21 At the same time the 
Political Agents conveyed Britain's position on certain policies through indirect 
conversations of an informal nature. For example, the political agent would visit 
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the sheikh in the evening at his Am[ri D[wiin and discuss with him, in a friendly 
atmosphere, not only Britain's line of thought on certain issues but, doubtless, 
his own personal viewpoints as well. This method of personal contact, friendly 
conversation and winning the ruler's confidence had strongly influenced events in 
the area. For example, Sir Anthony Parsons, Political Agent in Bahrain 1965-69, 
who was a close friend of Sheikh 'lsa bin Salman Ruler of Bahrain, did not believe 
in the Federation of the nine and so conveyed to Sheikh 'lsa his private opinion 
that Bahrain should go it alone. Sir Anthony wrote in his memoirs in 1986 that 
Bahrain was different from the other Emirates: 122 
Its population was larger, it was geographically distinct from those of the smaller 
Shaikhdoms. Moreover, Bahrain was just large enough to sustain full independence 
on its own. My private feeling was that a union of the Nine would not work and that 
Bahrain would be best advised to go it alone. 
In private he did not hesitate to express this view to Sheikh 'lsa:123 viz., 
"Bahrain should go it alone when the time comes and seek full membership of the 
Arab League and the UN." 124 
As a consequence of conflicting advice from the Political Agents in the area, 
Bahrain and Qatar were influenced dramatically to seek independence alone. Fur-
thermore, W. Ra'fat, the constitution expert of the proposed federation, revealed 
that these contradictions in opinions that were conveyed by some British officials 
had reached the other smaller states too. 125 Since the latter, however, were not big 
enough to stand on their own, they were encouraged to federate among themselves. 
The fourth factor that might have played a role in hindering a federation of the 
nine Emirates was the British position vis-a-vis the territorial disputes between the 
Gulf emirates and their neighbours Saudi Arabia and Iran. It was considered by 
some emirates that Britain was favouring Iran and Saudi Arabia over the question 
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of the Islands and the Buraimi disputes. According to an Abu Dhabian official, 
Britain was putting pressure on the Abu Dhabi Government to give in over Buraimi 
in favour of Saudi Arabia126 (see Buraimi dispute). The same thing was allegedly 
happening in Ras al-Khaimah over the Tunb Islands that were claimed by Iran 
(see Abu Miisa and Tunbs). Sheikh ~aqr, ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, felt outraged 
by Britain taking sides with Iran over the 'funb Islands. A statement issued by the 
people of Ras al-Khaimah after a demonstration on December 1st 1971, condemned 
the Iranian invasion of the Islands:127 
The threads of the conspiracy are now clear. It was known in the last few 
months, when Sir William Luce the British envoy [who] pressured Ras al-Khaimah 
government on one occasion and on the other occasion offered financial temptations, 
that the government of Ras al-Khaimah should cede its sovereignty over the Tunbs. 
Britain's ambivalent position on the territorial disputes had a devastating 
impact on the federation process. 
Firstly, British efforts to reconcile the views of the rulers over the federa-
tion were received with less enthusiasm. The rulers, (who had complete trust in 
Britain's friendship) were annoyed by this new development. It made them doubt 
British advice and led them sometimes openly to reject it. For example, Sheikh 
~aqr, ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, openly criticized Britain's role over the disputed 
islands since he thought Britain had betrayed him. Probably on account of this 
issue he would not allow Sir William Luce and Julian Walker (the last British 
Political Agent in the Trucial States) to persuade him to sign the Seven-Emirates 
Provisional Constitution. 
Secondly, this conception of a British conspiracy with both Iran and Saudi 
Arabia had created a new political climate in the area in which the Emirates now 
had to take seriously what Saudi Arabia and Iran were saying about the Federation. 
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For instance, during the tour of the nine Emirates from 22-23 May 1971, made by 
Al;tmad Khalifah al-Suwaydi (chairman of Abu Dhabi's Amiri Diwan) and Adnan 
Pachachi (political adviser to the Abu Dhabi Government) who were calling for 
a new meeting on the federation, Dubai focussed attention on the Iranian claims 
to certain Gulf Islands. This issue appeared more important to Dubai than the 
federation discussion. The visiting envoys were disappointed by Dubai's stand and 
expressed their predicament by stating that: 128 
Dubai did not pay much attention to what was happening in regard to the 
federation, and even it disregarded Sir William Luce's memorandum. But it gave a 
significance to the Iranian claim over the Islands. In conclusion, Dubai sees no point 
in holding a meeting. As a result, it seems that the federation discussions had reached 
a cul-de-sac 
Finally, the fifth factor that might have made Britain's role in establishing 
the federation of the nine an unconstructive one, was Britain's consideration of its 
future interests in the region. That is to say, with Iran and Saudi Arabia agreeing 
to play the major role in Gulf security, Britain no longer needed to insist on a 
bigger federation (see Twin Pillars). At the same time however, it was in the 
British economic interest to have more than one state in the region with a friendly 
orientation towards Britain so that it would be able to play a major role in the 
economic development of these states, as well as exporting machinery, military 
equipment ... etc. Mr I:Iamudi expressed this by pointing out that: 129 
The British became the intermediary in reconciling the different views that were 
(voiced) by some Emirates. They wanted a federation of the nine, but they did not 
want to be seen as interfering in its formation. Unfortunately, though, when Bahrain 
and Qatar sought independence they did not stop them as this was serving their 
future interests in the region. 
With the failure to achieve a federation of nine emirates and Bahrain and 
Qatar's decision to opt for independence alone, the seven Trucial States decided to 
form a smaller federation among themselves. The British authorities also played 
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an important role in its formation, as we shall see below. 
6.2.4 The U AE federation 
In the light of Britain's failure to create a bigger federation before the with-
drawal, a smaller one that contained only the seven Trucial States was finally 
negotiated. It was hoped by Sir William Luce, in his last attempt at a recon-
ciliation on May 16 1971, that a federation of the nine Emirates could still be 
established. This made him ask the Abu Dhabi Government to call for a further 
meeting of the nine rulers. After visiting all the Emirates, the Abu Dhabi del-
egation, Al).mad al-Suwayd1, 'Adnan Pachachi and N.D. J:Iamudi, communicated 
the failure of their mission to the British authorities. The envoy also reached the 
conclusion that Abu Dhabi should prepare for independence either in cooperation 
with the Trucial States or on its own: 130 
What we saw was that Bahrain has prepared for independence and Qatar will 
follow suit. It remained for the rest of the Emirates, especially Abu Dhabi, to prepare 
for a free modern state. That could be either in cooperation with the rest of the 
emirates or Abu Dhabi going it alone. 
This recommendation in fact represented the delegation's assessment of the 
situation; they saw no hope for the federation of the nine. The British, on their 
side, were limited by the withdrawal timetable which had just commenced, so they 
went along with that recommendation too. 
The process of federation among the seven Trucial States had begun in June 
1971 during a meeting between Sheikh Zayed and British officials in London. 
Al).mad Khallfah al-Suwaydi had already reported to Sheikh Zayed about the fail-
ure of the last attempt to acheive the federation of the nine. Thus after meeting 
Sheikh Zayed in Switzerland on lOth June 1971, they decided to bring up the 
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matter with the British authorities in London.131 Sheikh Zayed, accompanied by 
A}:lmad al-Suwaydi, Mahdi al-Tajir, adviser to Dubai, and other Arab advisers, 
had spent about two weeks in London in mid-June 1971. Therefore, during this 
trip to Europe for a health check Sheikh Zayed discussed the withdrawal pol-
icy with British officials in London 132 . After Sheikh Zayed had returned to Abu 
Dhabi on 19th June 1971, A~mad Khallfah al-Suwaydi, head of Abu Dhabi's Amin 
Diwan and the Ruler's closest counsellor, was confident that the establishment of 
the federation was about to become a reality. He told the people who had come 
to welcome Sheikh Zayed on his return from Europe that, "We hope the coming 
days will fulfil the hopes of the people of the Arab Emirates in their long-awaited 
federation." 133 
What we may conclude from the above is that during Sheikh Zayed's stay in 
London he had received some assurance that the British Government was prepared 
to recognise the independence of a smaller federation. Furthermore, according to 
al-lfawiidith, Britain encouraged the rulers of the smaller emirates to cooperate in 
establishing such a federation.l34 The second important issue that was achieved 
by Sheikh Zayed while he was in London was a preliminary discussion with Mahdl 
al-Tajir of Dubai concerning the new federation of the seven. Tajir recalled that 
Sheikh Zayed had told him that he wanted a federation and Tajir replied that 
Dubai wanted a federation too. 135 Sheikh Zayed nevertheless had pointed out how 
reluctant Sheikh Rashid, ruler of Dubai, was to cooperate with Abu Dhabi. Mahdl 
al-Tajir again reassured Sheikh Zayed, "Do not worry, A}:lmad al-Suwaydi and I 
will do the job." 136 
Therefore, with six months to go before the expiry of the deadline for Britain's 
departure from the Gulf, it was clear that some urgent efforts had to be made. 
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Accordingly, political efforts by the rulers, their advisers and the British officials 
were multiplied. Amongst these efforts were three important initiatives that were 
taken by Sheikh Zayed himself, the first occurring immediately after his return from 
London on 19th June 1971 when he made some diplomatic contact with the rest 
of the Trucial emirates. A}_lmad Khalifah al-Suwaydi and l:lasan 'Abbas, economic 
adviser to the Abu Dhabi government, then proceeded to the northern Emirates137 
in order to discuss the new initiative for the federation of the seven Trucial States. 
Also, the rulers were invited to Abu Dhabi to receive first hand information from 
Sheikh Zayed. So at the end of June 1971, the rulers of Dubai, Sharjah and Ras al-
Khaimah as well as the Crown Princes of Ajman, U mm al-Qaiwain and Fujairah, 
came to Abu Dhabi to attend this primary meeting. Although there was no official 
statement concerning the subjects that had been discussed, it was assumed by all 
that the federation of the Trucial States was the main issue.138 
The second step taken by Sheikh Zayed was to issue a decree forming a cabinet 
for the Abu Dhabi emirate headed by the Crown Prince, Sheikh Khallfah bin 
Zayed, as Prime Minister. The other decree that was issued by Sheikh Zayed was 
to establish a National Consultative Assembly with fifty members from among the 
notables of the Abu Dhabi emirate.139 Both measures were aimed at: (a) putting 
pressure on the rulers of the emirates to accept the federation; and (b) hinting 
that in case the federation was not accomplished by the end of the year, then Abu 
Dhabi would be ready for independence. However, Sheikh Zayed did emphasize 
that a union of the Gulf emirates was his primary objective and that he would 
continue his efforts to achieve it. 140 The link between the formation of both the 
Abu Dhabi cabinet and the National Consultative Assembly and the pressure on 
the rest of the emirates to accept the federation was clear, namely that the emirates 
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realized that Abu Dhabi was serious and that without her they could not support 
the establishment of a state. 
The third step that was taken by Sheikh Zayed was that he made it known 
that Abu Dhabi was willing to form a federation of any number of emirates. This 
was another form of pressure on the other rulers to join the federation or be left 
out. It was reported that Sheikh Zayed had sent al-Suwaydi to Sheikh Rashid, 
ruler of Dubai, with a strong message:141 
Tell Sheikh Rashid that certainly we will establish the Federation, and if he is 
interested then he can join us. Otherwise we shall leave him. 
The determination of Sheikh Zayed to form the federation led him to hold 
several bilateral talks with the other smaller emirates, such as Fujairah for instance. 
The non-oil producing Emirates (by this time they were Sharjah, Ajman, Umm 
al-Qaiwain, Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah) had realized earlier that they could not 
survive alone after the withdrawal of British troops without Abu Dhabi support. 
Furthermore, Sir William Luce had given them a firm warning that Britain was 
not prepared to recognize the independence of any of the Trucial States outside 
the framework of the federation. 142 These factors probably explain why Sheikh 
Kha.lid, ruler of Sharjah, announced in late June 1971 that he was willing to enter 
into a union with Abu Dhabi as the first step towards a larger federation of all the 
Trucial States.143 
Sheikh Mu~ammad bin l:lamad al-Sharqi, ruler of Fujairah, also discussed a 
bilateral union with Abu Dhabi during his visit to Sheikh Zayed at al- 'Ayn on 2nd 
July 1971. He reassured Sheikh Zayed of his sincere intentions in a written letter 
on 9th July in which he stated:144 
It stemmed from our deep belief in the unity of our land, religion, language, 
history, destiny and hope. I refer to our verbal agreement that took place on Friday 
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2.7.1971 in al- 'Ayn city in the presence of my crown prince, the Head of the D{wiin, 
concerning the unity between our two Emirates. I am writing this letter hoping it will 
meet your kind ratification. It will surely go into history that we have worked for the 
benefit of our people by establishing a federation between the Emirates of Fujairah 
and Abu Dhabi. 
This letter of Sheikh M u},lammad al-Sharqi illustrates the manner in which 
the smaller emirates had quickly responded to the federation call of Sheikh Zayed. 
Thus these efforts, coupled with the efforts of British officials like Sir William Luce, 
Julian Walker, Political Agent in the Trucial States, Jim Treadwell, Political Agent 
in Abu Dhabi, and Sir Geoffrey Arthur, Political Resident in Bahrain, resulted in 
a historic meeting in Dubai between the rulers of the Trucial States from lOth 
July 1971 to the 18th of the same month. It ended with a remarkable declaration 
in which six Emirates agreed to form a political union called 'the United Arab 
Emirates' .145 
The announcement was made after almost a month of discussions between 
various officials. In fact, between Sheikh Zayed's return from London on 19th 
June 1971 and the announcement of 18th July continuous discussions were held 
at different levels. Amongst these discussions were the meetings between the rep-
resentatives of the oil-rich Emirates of Dubai and Abu Dhabi headed by A},lmad 
Khalifah al-Suwaydi and Mahdl al-Tajir. The representatives were in almost daily 
contact during which they revised both the constitution of the nine Emirates as 
well as the Basic Law of the Trucial States Council (see below) to fit the federation 
of the seven Emirates. For example, some of the modifications they made to the 
old constitution gave Dubai and Abu Dhabi the power of veto in the Supreme 
Council; in the National Council Dubai and Abu Dhabi were each given eight 
representatives; and in the Ministerial Council the two Emirates were allocated 
the most important ministries i.e. the Defence Ministry and the Interior Ministry 
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which were given to Dubai and Abu Dhabi respectively. 146 
Thus rivalry between the Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai in the federation 
discussions was stifled. Sheikh Zayed alluded to the heated rivalry of Sheikh Rashid 
of Dubai during a press conference in Abu Dhabi on 5 December 1989, "Rashid was 
hesitant in the beginning because he wanted some assurances." 147 Mahdl al-Tajir 
emphasized however, that "there was no greater enthusiasm for the federation than 
Sheikh Rashid who saw in the Federation a bigger market for Dubai commerce." 148 
However Jum 'ah, Advisor to Sheikh Zayed, explained this struggle between the 
two rulers as a struggle over the leadership of the proposed federation. 149 In the 
end it seemed that A~mad al-Suwaydl, Mahdl al-Tajir, and J. Walker, the main 
negotiators, had found a formula that was acceptable to the two rival emirates. A 
kind of 'gentleman's agreement' gave Abu Dhabi the presidency of the federation 
while Dubai held the vice-presidency as well as the premiership and the defence 
and finance portfolios. These arrangements were met with some resistance by the 
less wealthy and smaller emirates of Sharjah, Ajman, U mm al-Qaiwain, Ras al-
Khaimah and Fujairah. They recognized however that the size of their respective 
emirates, together with their dependence on Abu Dhabi finance and the small 
size of their populations, gave them no alternative but to cooperate. The only 
exception was Ras al-Khaimah. 
What actually emerged on the 18th July 1971 was a loose grouping of the 
six emirates in a federation based on the idea of the Trucial States Council (TSC) 
that was established by Britain in 1952. Indeed, the TSC had drawn up a draft of 
a provisional Basic Law for the Emirates of the Oman Coast in 1968.150 After the 
Dubai agreement, the legal adviser of the TSC produced this precautionary draft 
constitution, but since it contained articles in conflict with the federation of the 
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nine it was shelved, and only reactivated when the federation of the nine failed. 
Because the basic law was drawn up under British supervision, we intend to study 
it and compare it with the provisional constitution of the Emirates in order to 
determine the extent to which this basic law influenced the form of the federation 
of the seven. 
The Basic Law of the Emirates contained 26 articles distributed over 7 chap-
ters. Article 2 stated that the Emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, 
Umm al-Qaiwain, Ras al-Khaimah, and Fujairah were to be called the Emirates of 
Oman Coast. Article 6 stated that the authority of the Emirates of Oman Coast 
would be the following: 151 
a. Foreign Affairs; 
b. Defence; 
c. Health and Education; 
d. Immigration and nationality; 
e. Development of the inter-states projects as well as those projects in the needy 
emirates but with the approval of their rulers; 
f. Information; 
g. strengthen relations and cooperation among the Emirates in the fields of internal 
security and other fields; 
h. Any other affairs which are approved by the rulers' Council. 
Furthermore, the Basic Law indicated in Article 7 that the main organs of 
the central government were as follows: 
1- The rulers' Council; 
2- The Ministers; 
3- The Consultative Council; 
4- The Central Court. 
The differences between the Basic Law and the Provisional Constitution of 
the U AE (that became operative on the date of proclamation of the U AE on 2nd 
297 
December 1971) were marginal. For example, in Article 25 the Basic Law es-
tablished a committee that would supervise the development programmes in the 
Emirates, thus retaining the Trucial States Development Office of 1965. However 
the federation transferred the duties of the Development Office to the new Federal 
Ministries. The other difference was over the location of the capital of the Emi-
rates. The UAE Constitution in Article 9 made Abu Dhabi the provisional Capital 
of the federation until a capital could be built on a defined land area lying on the 
border between the Emirates of Dubai and Abu Dhabi. The Basic law did not 
mention the site of the capital, which made some officials in Abu Dhabi point out 
Britain's interest in making Dubai the centre of power.152 The interesting point 
found in both constitutions was the power of veto allocated to Dubai and Abu 
Dhabi in the Supreme Council of the rulers. As to the number of representatives 
allocated to each emirate, the Basic Law agreed with the Provisional Constitu-
tion's total number of 40 members, but it stipulated that the allocation to each 
emirate would be in accordance with its population and financial participation in 
the federal budget. The Provisional Constitution distributed the 40 seats of the 
Federal National Council by allocating 8 seats to each of Dubai and Abu Dhabi; 
6 members to each of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah, and 4 members to each of 
Ajman, U mm al-Qaiwain and Fujairah. 
Therefore the indirect influence of Britain on the U AE constitution was an 
important element. As Patrick Bannerman, the late FCO Research Department's 
official pointed out:153 
The Provisional Constitution of UAE was essentially a British draft. But the 
looseness of the Federation which people consider a weakness is actually one of its 
strong features. Otherwise you would have no UAE. 
This observation can be understood in the light of the Trucial States Council's 
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Basic Law as well as in the efforts of Sir William Luce and other British figures 
who participated in building up the federation. For example Julian Walker, the 
British Political Agent in Du bai 1970-71, explained the problems that were facing 
the area after the failure of the nine Emirates federation. He stated that "Dubai 
and Abu Dhabi were about to be alone, but the others were too small and if they 
became independent alone they will not stay long." He further explained that: 154 
Fujairah might go to Oman, Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah would follow Saudi 
Arabia and Dubai is friendly with Iran, that might have created problems. The 
British role was to get the Council of the Rulers to be strong enough to provide an 
umbrella for them. 
Walker pointed out that with some help from other junior Sheikhs, he had 
played a role in mediating between the smaller emirates and the larger ones. He 
concluded that, "We were able to assure four of the five to agree on the union and 
by July, the Six Emirates signed the Provisional Constitution of the Union" .155 
As a consequence of the efforts made by the rulers, their advisers and the 
British officials, the federation of the UAE was proclaimed on 18th July 1971. The 
joint Communique read by Al;tmad Khalifah al-Suwaydi was as follows: 156 
In response to the desire of our Arab people, we, the rulers of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, 
Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain and Fujairah, have decided to establish a federal 
state under the name of the United Arab Emirates. On this blessed day the provisional 
Constitution of the United Arab Emirates was signed. While conveying this happy 
news to the great Arab people, we pray the Almighty that this Federation will form 
the nucleus of a complete federation which will include the remaining members of the 
brotherly family of emirates who, due to their current circumstances, were not able 
to sign the constitution. 
Immediately after the announcement of the six emirates federation three ac-
tions were taken to strengthen it. (a) Delegations were sent to various Arab coun-
tries to explain the purpose of the federation and seek recognition from other Arab 
States. 157 (b) At the same time committees were established to prepare the proce-
dures required to enable the Emirates to be ready for withdrawal day .158 (c) Some 
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efforts were made to persuade Ras al-Khaimah to join the Federation. However 
Sheikh $aqr, ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, ignored all the pressure put upon him and 
he issued his own statement explaining his position. He did not accept three of the 
amendments that were made to the Provisional Constitution and which differed 
from the old nine Emirates Constitution. The first was the veto power that the 
Provisional Constitution, in Article 49, had given to Dubai and Abu Dhabi. Sheikh 
$aqr insisted on their being equality between all the rulers in the Supreme Council. 
He therefore proposed that decisions in procedural matters should be made by an 
affirmative vote by the majority of its members. 159 
The second point that Ras al-Khaimah rejected was Article 68 of the Provi-
sional Constitution of the U AE. This Article as stated in the nine Emirates Con-
stitution was that "the Federal National Council is composed of 36 members, and 
its seats are distributed equally among the Emirates." 160 The amendment, how-
ever, put the number at 40 members which were not distributed equally among 
the Emirates.161 Instead, Sheikh $aqr proposed that "the Federal Council should 
be composed of 42 members that should be distributed equally among the member 
emirates." 162 This suggestion Sheikh $aqr claimed, was backed by the other four 
smaller Emirates. 
The third point that Sheikh $aqr wanted to change was the financial partici-
pation of each Emirate in the Federation fund. He suggested that: 163 
A Development Office should be established by the Federation and that its job is 
to develop the Five Emirates only. For fulfilling this aim, the oil-producing Emirates 
should allocate 5% of their annual income to it. 
This meant that Abu Dhabi and Dubai should allocate 5% of their annual 
income specifically in order to develop the five less wealthy smaller Emirates. In 
addition to that, each emirate should pay 10% of their annual income to the fed-
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eral government as suggested by Sir William Luce. 164 Sheikh ~aqr had demanded 
that his proposals be considered by the other rulers but the final edition of the 
provisional constitution on 18th July 1971 did not take his proposals into account. 
Therefore Sheikh ~aqr withdrew from the federation discussion and refused to sign 
the provisional constitution. 
The refusal of Sheikh ~aqr, ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, to sign the Provi-
sional Constitution was motivated by pride according to Ma};lmiid I;Iasan Jum 'ah: 
"Sheikh ~aqr considered himself as the descendent of the al-Qawasim tribe that 
once ruled over the Gulf ... but due to his misfortune he had no oi1." 165 The British 
Political Agent in the Trucial States at the time, Julian Walker, believed that to 
be true: 166 
Sheikh $aqr had, a.s he said, reservations about the power of veto, and about 
l'epresentation in the National Council of the federation, given that he regarded him-
self a.s the representative of the Qawasim, one of the most senior families, if not the 
most seniol', of the area. 
However, even though the demands of Sheikh ~aqr and the other smaller 
Emirates were logical, the oil-producing states of Dubai and Abu Dhabi were not 
keen on accomodating them. The main reason probably lay in the fact that the 
British never got along with Sheikh ~aqr, who had cooperated with Saudi Arabia 
in the past, and in 1970-71 had sought cooperation and help from Iraq in response 
to the Iranian claim to Tunbs. He also refused to cooperate with Sir William Luce 
over the Tunb Islands that were claimed by Iran. The Mahdi-Suwaydi-team saw 
Sheikh ~aqr as a partner who manipulated the Dubai-Abu Dhabi rivalry for his 
own benefit, yet once Dubai was persuaded to accept the federation, Sheikh ~aqr 
was left alone. Subsequently Ras al-Khaimah reluctantly joined the Federation 
and accepted its constitution on lOth February 1972. 
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From July to December 1971, the British officials and Arab advisers and offi-
cials from the Emirates were busily involved in transferring the responsibilities that 
were once held by the British Government. Also, future relations between Britain 
and the Emirates were discussed by Mahdi al-Tajir and A)fmad al-Suwaydi during 
their visit to Britain at the end of July 1971.167 Furthermore, a treaty of friendship 
along the lines of Douglas-Home's offer of March 1971 was accepted. The signing 
of the friendship treaty was left to Sir Geoffrey Arthur, H.M. Political Resident in 
the Gulf, who toured the Emirates to terminate the old treaties168 between Britain 
and each of the Emirates, and then sign a new treaty with the President of the 
UAE, Sheikh Zayed.169 In this treaty both parties agreed to "consult together on 
matters of mutual concern in time of need." 170 The treaty was, however, more of 
a symbol than a guarantee of stability in the region. The British Government's 
behaviour, though, can be explained if we look more closely into the Gulf security 
system that prevailed in the post-withdrawal period: 'the Twin Pillars Theory'. 
6.3 Twin Pillars Theory 
In Western terms, Gulf security means the continuation of the oil supply to the 
Western World and Japan without interruption and at the lowest possible price. 
This role was strongly upheld by the British presence in the area until 1971. The 
Gulf security system had developed over the years, sometimes in direct response to 
regional events. For example, during the Iranian oil dispute of Mo!jladeq in 1951, 
the oil companies expanded their exploration activities in other parts of the Gulf, 
such as the Trucial States and Oman. The drilling teams needed some protection 
in order to perform their task, therefore small local forces officered by the British 
were raised, for example the Trucial Oman Scouts. As a result, with the major 
British bases located in Aden, Kenya, the Suez Canal and Iraq, Gulf security was 
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maintained for almost ten years with only a few RAF planes needed to assist the 
local forces in keeping the Gulf region stable. However, after the Suez crisis in 1956 
and the Iraqi revolution of 1958, Gulf security needed further reassessment. But 
no positive reassessment took place until 1961 when General Qasim threatened the 
independence of Kuwait. This led to an expansion and development of the British 
bases in Bahrain, Sharjah and Masirah. Even when Britain gave up her base in 
Aden in 1967, British forces in the area were capable of keeping the Gulf secure 
until their withdrawal in December 1971. 
The withdrawal announcement of January 1968 provoked considerable crit-
icism (mainly from the Conservative Party) but the most alarming thought for 
the whole Western World was that Britain would leave a vacuum in the Gulf that 
might be filled by anti-Western elements like the Soviet Union or one of its allies. 
The argument was that once an anti-Western power had got control over Gulf oil 
then oil supplies to the West could be disrupted.l71 This possible threat to Western 
oil interests brought Britain and the United States together in urgent consultation 
as to what sort of initiatives should be taken in order to keep the Gulf as stable 
as before. Indeed, George Brown, the British Foreign Secretary, in his meeting 
with the American Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, on 11th January 1968 was sub-
jected to considerable American pressure and persuasion to postpone the date of 
withdrawal. The American argument was that U.S. involvement in Vietnam had 
prevented her from taking over Britain's military role in the Gulf. At the same 
time it was recognized that Britain had a wide knowledge of the Gulf that the U.S. 
could not do without. Any tension in the Anglo-American 'special relationship' 
was apparently smoothed over during personal talks between the British Prime 
Minister, Wilson, and the American President, Johnson, during their meeting in 
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Washington in early February, 1968.172 
Ruling out direct US military involvement in the Gulf, American officials 
proposed two alternative policies to fill the vacuum there. Firstly, on January 29, 
1968, Under-Secretary of State, Eugene Rostow, made a statement on the Voice 
of America in which he said:173 
As to the Persian Gulf area, some strong and quite active and stable states are 
interested in assuming responsibility for regional security ... Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait would certainly be a nucleus around which security ar-
rangements could hopefully be built, and we hope that in the long run the policy of 
Iraq will orientate itself in a cooperative direction so that it could join in such efforts. 
This picture of Gulf security after the British withdrawal, was strongly at-
tacked by Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad, who accused the U.S. of sponsoring a 
new Baghdad pact in the area. The idea was thus left to die slowly. 
Secondly, in summer 1969 US President Richard Nixon proposed his view of 
what America's world role should be in what became known as the Nixon Doctrine. 
He stated that: 174 
It is not my belief that the way to peace is by giving up our friends or letting 
down our allies. On the contrary, our aim is to place America's international commit-
ments on a sustainable, long-term basis, to encourage local and regional initiatives, 
to foster national independence and self-sufficiency, and by so doing to strengthen the 
total fabric of peace. 
Since the 'Nixon Doctrine' meant making a major contribution to the security 
of the Gulf without the Americans getting directly involved, the U.S. had to rely 
on strong regional allies, namely Iran and Saudi Arabia, to take responsibility for 
Gulf security. The American Assistant Secretary of State, Sisco, in testimony to 
U.S. Congress in 1973 pointed to that arrangement:175 
We anticipated the British exodus and we asked ourselves: What is it that 
the United States can do, consistent with the Nixon Doctrine, to make a major 
contribution towards stability in the area without ourselves getting directly involved, 
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because this is an area, obviously, in which we have very, very significant political-
economical interests? What we decided was that we would try to stimulate and be 
helpful to the two key countries in this area ... namely Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
It is outside the scope of this thesis to discuss American policy towards the 
Gulf after the British withdrawal176 , but what concerns us is Britain's role in 
building up the 'Twin Pillar' security system. The 'Twin Pillars' (Saudi Arabia 
and Iran) were expected in the light of the 'Nixon Doctrine', to form the nucleus 
of stability in the Gulf region. Supplied with up-to-date military equipment by 
Britain and the US, Saudi Arabia and Iran were supposed to keep the region secure 
and check any radical infiltration. However these 'Two pillars' had not only long 
mistrusted one another, but each of them also had certain territorial claims over its 
smaller neighbours. For example Iran claimed Bahrain and the small islands close 
to the Straits of Hormuz, and Saudi Arabia claimed Buraimi (see J.j). The ill-
feeling, suspicion and even enmity which existed among the Gulf States (Iran, Saudi 
Arabia and the Gulf Sheikhdoms) was therefore in itself a source of instability and 
friction in the region. Britain thus worked especially hard to harmonize relations 
between the Gulf States in the period leading up to withdrawal. 
6.3.1 Britain and the Twin Pillars 
Britain played a crucial role in the late sixties and early seventies in forming 
the Gulf security system or the 'Twin Pillars System'. She was anxious to leave 
behind stable, friendly states that would not disturb the oil supply. The Fabian 
group had published an article in April 1967 on Arabia in which they envisaged 
Gulf security after Britain's withdrawal from the region: 177 
The most that could be done in this respect would be to attempt to ensure 
that friendly governments were in power in these countries and that no 'unfriendly' 
government obtained excessive influence over the policies of the Arab States. 
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To some Foreign Office officials 'Friendly governments' meant the regimes 
existing in Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. Sir Stephen Egerton, Deputy Director of 
the Arabia Department 1970-72, wrote in March 1991 concerning the issue of Gulf 
stability at that period, 178 
British observers believed at the time that the security of the Gulf after Britain's 
military withdrawal would depend on a self-equalising triangle of forces: Iraq, Iran 
and Saudi Arabia, with the possibility of some foreign assistance not far 'over the 
horizon', either in the Indian Ocean or the Russian land mass. 
Since Iraq, however, had an anti-Western stance it was left out of the 'triangle'. 
This meant that Britain was left with two states, Saudi Arabia and Iran, which 
were the most important western allies in the area. Cooperation between them 
would enable them to fill the vacuum caused by the British withdrawal. This was 
seen by Sir William Luce as an important pre withdrawal condition. In the Round 
Table article of October 1969 he stressed the point:179 
Perhaps the two most important pre-conditions for peace in the Gulf after our 
withdrawal are some form of co-ordination between the small states at present under 
our protection, and an understanding between Iran and the Arabs, particularly Saudi 
Arabia about the future of the Gulf. If feuds and divisions among the small states 
persist and Arab-Iranian rivalry threatens to erupt into confrontation, then the future 
after our withdrawal would be bleak indeed. 
Thus the other course of action pursued by Britain in order to stabilize the 
Gulf was to encourage some understanding between Saudi Arabia and Iran; this 
approach paralleled that adopted by the American Government. According to 
The Times this intention was conveyed to the Shah during the visit of Goronwy 
Roberts, Minister of State, to the Gulf in January 1968.180 Furthermore it has 
been suggested by Balfour-Paul that the British Government's was strongly influ-
enced by Sir William Luce recommendations concerning Saudi Arabia and Iran role 
and eventually adopted that as official policy towards the Gulf. 181 The problem, 
though, was how to bring together King Fay~al and the Shah of Iran who were not 
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on particularly friendly terms. 
M u~ammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, welcomed the British withdrawal 
from the Gulf, believing that Iran would take the opportunity to play a more active 
regional role since it had both the means and the will to do so. Iran was the most 
powerful state in the Gulf region with a population of 28 million in 1968, and 
with a more diversified economy although oil remained the dominant sector.182 
At the same time the Shah was more secular and openly pro-Western than the 
conservative Saudis. Furthermore, he was a CENTO member and was on good 
terms with Israel, which made him more acceptable in the U.S. and Europe. And 
finally, Iran had emerged as the predominant military power within the Gulf region. 
This had been made possible by the backing that it received from Britain and the 
U.S., who sold it huge supplies of sophisticated weapons. For example, Britain 
had sold 800 Chieftan battle tanks to Iran in the 1970s, a substantial number of 
hover-crafts, 4 Vosper MK-5 destroyers including Seacat missiles, 400 Tiger Cat 
missiles and Rapier anti-aircraft missiles. The main arms sales to Iran though 
came from the United States.183 Sir William Luce expressed his admiration of Iran 
and its future role in the Gulf to an American audience in 1973 as follows: 184 
Iran, one of the key countries, has emerged as the predominant military power 
within the Gulf region; and this was to be expected in view of the comparative size 
of her population, her natural resources and, above all, the dynamic leadership of the 
Shah, with his determination to take over the previous British role of maintaining the 
security of the Gulf waters. 
However, the Shah was not without his shortcomings; his desire to acquire 
supremacy in the Gulf was disturbing to the Arabs. Firstly, he had claimed Bahrain 
and when that dispute was settled, he turned his attentions to the islands of Abu 
Miisa and the Tunbs. Baghdad radio commented on the Iranian arms purchase 
from Britain in its lOth of January 1971 broadcast as follows: 1B6 
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Britain had recently provided the Shah's Government with arms to be used not 
only against the Iranian people but also against the Arabism of the Gulf. 
Secondly, he was considered as an enemy by Arab nationalists because of his 
close ties with Israel. 
Therefore, even though Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf States actually 
wanted to cooperate with the Shah in regional matters (as was seen from their 
various visits to Iran at that period) they realized that meant inviting criticism 
from Baghdad, Damascus and other radical Arab states. In this context we can 
understand the meaning of the changes in the Shah's policy towards the Arab 
countries; for instance the re-establishment of relations with Egypt in 1970; taking 
a critical stance on Israeli's policy towards the occupied territories; relinquishing 
his claim to Bahrain; and visiting Saudi Arabia in November 1968.186 
In contrast to Iran, Saudi Arabia had a much smaller population, was weaker 
militarily and economically, and was much less willing to take a leading role in 
the Gulf.187 It was reported by Mu\lammad H. Heikal, former editor of al-Ahriim, 
that King Fay~al in June 1967 urged Britain not to withdraw from the Gulf as it 
had done from Aden. 188 Probably the King was under the impression that once 
Britain left the Gulf the Communists would take over as had happened in Aden. 
Yet Saudi Arabia, in the view of the British Conservative Party's research centre, 
held the key for security in the area: 189 
Saudi Arabia should be encouraged to assume some of the responsibilities in 
the Gulf which have fallen to Britain during the last century. Our aim should be a 
system of 'Pan-Arabian Solidarity' under which the rulers of the various states would 
keep their autonomy, but rely on Saudi Arabia for protection, and perhaps advice in 
their external relations. 
The above idea also was backed by Sir William Luce who saw the 'Peninsula 
Solidarity' in the Gulf as the best way of survival for the smaller Gulf Emirates. 
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As his biographer, Balfour-Paul, wrote in 1991 :190 
Luce pleaded with London, and continued to plead throughout his six years as 
Political Resident, that the pursuit of 'Peninsula Solidarity', as he called it, would 
offer the best prospect of preserving stability when the time came for Britain to 
terminate her treaties. 
It seemed that Britain wanted Saudi Arabia to be, in effect, some sort of 
'big brother' to the smaller Sheikhdoms, while at the same time cooperating with 
Iran in the sphere of Gulf security. Again in contrast to Iran, Saudi Arabia did 
not take the opportunity to play that role. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia made 
considerable efforts to bring the nine Emirates into federation and stood by Sultan 
Qabus against the Dhofari revolutionaries. This was considered not enough by Sir 
William Luce, who in 1973 pointed out in dismay: 191 
As regards the other key country of the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, I have to record 
some mild personal disappointment. I have for many years believed that Saudi Arabia 
is the keystone of solidarity and stability in the Arabian Peninsula. Everything is in 
her favour... geographical size, custody of the Holy Places of Islam, ever-growing 
wealth and, above all, the prestige of the Saudi monarchy created by Ibn Saud and 
strengthened in the first years of King Fay!jal's reign. The other Arab countries of the 
Gulf, leaving aside Iraq of course, regard King Fay!jal with the respect and affection 
of younger brothers, and they look to him for leadership and guidance in many ways. 
In spite of these great assets, it seems to me that during the last few formative years 
Saudi Arabia has not exercised that degree of influence or given the positive leadership 
which could have been helpful to her smaller neighbours. 
The Saudi policy of virtual non-interference in the affairs of smaller Gulf 
emirates which so dismayed Luce can be put down to various reasons. Firstly , 
Saudi Arabia's territorial claims over, for instance, parts of Abu Dhabi and the 
Sultanate of Oman perhaps made her unacceptable in the eyes of some of the 
rulers to play the leadership role that Luce expected of her. Secondly, Saudi 
Arabia perhaps needed more time to assume this new role which Britain had 
prevented her from playing for the previous half-century. Thirdly, it is possible 
that Saudi interference would be considered by Arab nationalists as 'hegemony' 
on the part of the Saudi monarchy, which was not popular, certainly with the 
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younger generation. Finally, it was perhaps her military weakness that prevented 
the Saudis from taking the lead in the Gulf. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia had 
set aside a considerable amount of money for defence purposes as a result of the 
British withdrawal from the Gulf. For instance, in 1967-68 the Saudi military 
budget amounted to $396 million but in 1975 it was $6.9 billion.192 
Despite the coolness of Saudi-Iranian relations in the early 1960s, Saudi Ara-
bia strove to improve her relations with Iran later in the decade in order to safe-
guard the security of the Gulf after the British withdrawal. 'U mar al-Saqqaf, the 
Saudi Deputy-Foreign Minister, was reported as saying after his visit to Iran on 
14th April 1970 that "Iran and Saudi Arabia will cooperate in the defence of the 
Gulf and that there is no need for a separate alliance in this respect." 193 Iranian-
Saudi cooperation became stronger after Fay!?al's visit to Tehran on 16th May 1971 
when he discussed the affairs of the Gulf with the Shah.194 
The Saudi-Iranian 'understanding' over the security of the Gulf that was urged 
by Britain and the United States did not meet the expectations of the Shah. The 
latter wanted some kind of pact, but the Saudis on the other hand, saw no need 
for such an alliance and they preferred to play a low-profile role. Any alliance 
with the Shah would be an embarrassment to them since the Shah was quarrelling 
with a sister Arab state, Iraq. Even low-key cooperation with the Shah was not 
exempt from criticism by the 'radicals'. For example Damascus radio described the 
new Saudi policy as a betrayal of Arabism.195 Syria perhaps had not forgotten the 
passive attitude of the Saudi Government during the seizure by Iran of the Tunbs 
and Abu Musa Islands. Taryam reported that when King Fay~?al was asked by 
Sheikh Kha.lid of Sharjah for support with regard to Abu Musa, the King advised 
him to negotiate with Iran, writing that "the door of dialogue between you and 
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the Iranian Government should be left open." l96 
Britain's efforts to reconcile Saudi Arabia and Iran so that they could work 
together for Gulf security did in fact materialize. However, it was not without 
its price. Britain's former position with regard to the territorial disputes had 
been somewhat compromised. It might have seemed that Britain's new policy 
of bringing Saudi Arabia and Iran together had put Britain in an embarrassing 
situation. Given this new situation, it was more difficult for Britain to maintain 
its traditional position of upholding the claim of the Gulf Sheikhdoms to the Islands 
and Buriami. Such support from Britain could have provoked the Shah of Iran and 
King Fay~al and consequently have disturbed the process of mutual understanding 
the very policy Britain worked so hard to acheive. This change in Britain's attitude 
was naturally seen by the smaller emirates as a betrayal after the long friendship 
which had existed between Britain and the Sheikhdoms. For the British policy 
makers the protection of British interests was more important than honour and 
friendship. Britain now viewed territorial settlements through the wider spectrum 
of Gulf security which they were convinced necessitated the cooperation of the 
'Twin Pillars' of Saudi Arabia and Iran. As an ex-British diplomat put it: 197 
We were clear that whatever happened it was important that Iran and Saudi 
Arabia did not quarrel and rather, if possible, cooperated. We thought that since 
then the Americans may have called it 'Twin Pillars', as they like giving titles to 
things. 
In short, each of the countries involved in the Twin Pillars security arrange-
ment had its own particular aim. The Shah for example, saw it as an opportunity 
to fulfil his ambition of making Iran into a regional superpower and controlling the 
Gulf region. On the other hand, King Fayf?al needed the Shah's cooperation as a 
check against marxist Aden, the Dhofar revolutionaries and Ba 'thist Iraq. The aim 
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of the United Kingdom was the protection of her oil and commercial interests and 
the protection of the status quo, For the U.S. the Gulf had become a place of such 
strategic importance that the Soviet Union should be kept away198 from it at any 
cost. Thus the Gulf security system in the seventies was worked out by each one 
of the participants according to their own interests and ambitions. This suggested 
that some form of re-arrangement of Gulf Security would be unavoidable within a 
few years, due either to the fulfilment of some or all of those aims, or the removal 
from the scene of one or other of the participants. For the time being, however, the 
Twin Pillars arrangement served different purposes for different parties and was 
accepted as an essential arrangement before the actual withdrawal of the British 
troops in December 1971. 
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Chapter VII 
Territorial Settlements 
7.1 Introduction 
The territorial settlements were part of Britain's aim to leave a stable Gulf 
after its withdrawal. However, that aim was a challenging one to attain since 
the means of stabilizing the Gulf were in the hands of the regional powers, Iran 
and Saudi Arabia, which were themselves involved in territorial disputes with 
the smaller Emirates. Iran for example, claimed Bahrain, A bii M usa and the 
Tunbs Islands and Saudi Arabia claimed the Buraimi oases. We therefore intend 
to examine Britain's role in solving these complicated territorial disputes and how 
it might be related to the overall policy of withdrawal. 
7.2 Bahrain 
The process of settling the Shah's claim over Bahrain is rather unclear and 
complex. The Shah at first pressed his claim over Bahrain so vigorously that 
he was even prepared to leave the United Nations if Bahrain became one of its 
members. He declared his determination by saying that, "If Bahrain becomes an 
independent State, we shall not recognize it, and if it is admitted to the United 
Nations we shall leave. The UN could chose whether to have us or Bahrain." 1 
Furthermore, on April 1st 1968, the Shah warned the proposed federation, that 
included Bahrain, that Iran would reserve all its rights in the Persian Gulf and 
would in no way tolerate the 'historical inequity and injustice'. 2 However, the 
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Iranian claim over Bahrain was softened at the end of 1968. For instance, the 
Shah during a press conference in New Delhi on January 4th 1969, declared that 
"anything that will be the expression of the will of the people in Bahrain, that 
we, you, the world will recognize as the will of the people of this island would 
constitute an acceptable solution." 3 He added that Iran would abjure force on the 
Bahrain issue. 
The question to be raised here is why the Shah changed his mind over the 
Bahrain issue. There are different arguments which each claim to be authoritative 
on the subject. According to 'Abdullah Bisharah, former Kuwaiti Permanent 
Representative at the United Nations, Kuwait played a major role in mediating 
between Bahrain and Iran which resulted in the dispute being solved through the 
United Nations.4 But James Noyes, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence 
for Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs 1970-76, emphasized the Saudi 
role in mediation which took place mainly during the Shah's visit to Saudi Arabia 
in November 1968.5 However the leftist al-Talz'ah was of the opinion that the 
solution to the Bahrain issue came about through American pressure on the Shah, 
because the US was considering establishing a naval base on Bahrain for American 
warships.6 An American researcher, Nelson Beck, held the view that the reason 
why the Shah relinquished his claim to Bahrain was that "Iranian claims to Bahrain 
might disrupt stability in the Gulf by arousing the hostility of the Arab World and, 
in turn, endanger oil shipments." 7 In support of the last point an Arab writer, 
Jamal Z. Qasim, argued that the Shah's claim to Bahrain could have encouraged 
leftists to infiltrate the region which the Shah wanted to avoid; by giving up Iran's 
claim to the islands the status quo in the region would be preserved. 8 
It is important to focus on Britain's role which was critical in the settlement 
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of this dispute. Firstly, Britain had arranged for meetings between Bahraini and 
Iranian representatives to find a formula for a settlement of the problem. Mr. Al-
Ba,4arnah, legal adviser to the Government of Bahrain, who participated in these 
secret meetings, later wrote that:9 
Subsequently, Bahraini and Iranian officials met, in secret, in Switzerland, with 
the object of working out a mutually acceptable formula on the basis of which a 
satisfactory solution of the chronic dispute could be achieved. 
It is unlikely that Bahrain could have held such negotiations without Britain's 
permission. 
Secondly, British officials were in direct contact with the Iranian Government. 
It seems, however, that Anglo-Iranian contacts were not meant merely to settle the 
Bahrain dispute but also to form a general policy that would guarantee the security 
of the Gulf after the 1971 withdrawal. Several meetings took place between the two 
governments in the period after the withdrawal announcement. 1° For example, Mr. 
Stewart, the British Foreign Secretary, met the Shah in May 1969 during a Central 
Treaty Organization Conference (CENTO) in Tehran. The Times reported that 
they discussed ways of solving the Bahrain affair, adding that their "talks will be 
useful as a stage towards a stable security system in the Gulf, buttressed by Iran 
and the Arab states after Britain's withdrawal." 11 
What the British were really seeking through these contacts with the Shah 
of Iran was to point out to him that his insistence in claiming Bahrain would 
jeopardize the stability of the Gulf as well as destroy the new attempt at an 
understanding between Saudi Arabia and Iran. That is to say the Shah might 
complicate the withdrawal of the British troops from the Gulf, and hence his 
opportunity of playing a major role in the affairs of the area might be lost. 
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However, since the Shah had sought to obtain popular support in Iran for 
his country's claim to Bahrain and there had been widespread demonstrations in 
favour of the Iranian claim throughout the country, he needed a face-saving solu-
tion. This was finally reached through referring the dispute to the UN Secretary-
General to mediate through his good offices. Consequently, the UN Secretary-
General was approached by Britain and Iran to send a Personal Representative to 
ascertain the wishes of the people of Bahrain.12 
On the 20th March, 1970 the Secretary-General agreed to use his good offices 
to ascertain the wishes of the people of Bahrain. He later designated Vittorio Win-
speare Guicciardi, Under-Secretary-General and Director-General of the United 
Nations office at Geneva, to be his Personal Representative to inquire into the 
wishes of the people of Bahrain as to the future of their country.13 Mr. Guicciardi 
visited Bahrain from March 30 to 18 April1970. He talked to a variety of people, 
institutions and clubs, and also visited villages throughout Bahrain.14 On April 29 
he presented his report to the Secretary-General in which he said that, 15 
His consultation had convinced him that the overwhelming majority of the 
people of Bahrain wished to gain recognition of their identity in a fully independent 
and sovereign State free to decide for itself its relations with other States. 
This report was examined by the Security Council on the 11 May 1970. Res-
olution 278 (1970) which endorsed the report's findings, was adopted unanimously 
on the same day. 16 
Even though the UN resolution 278 (1970) had opened the way for Bahrain 
to become independent, nonetheless it was criticized by the French representative 
at the UN, who argued that it was not a democratic method of assessing pub-
lic opinion. Nevertheless, the French delegate accepted this approach because it 
would bring about a solution to a dispute that otherwise could have resulted in a 
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conflict.l7 Besides that, some Arab commentators, such as al-Luzi of al-lfawiidith 
magazine, argued that Britain and Iran had used the United Nations to legitimize 
an agreement which they had made over the future of the island.18 
In the end the UN initiative was considered a success by British officialdom. 
Sir Anthony Parsons, H.M. Political Agent in Bahrain 1965-69, explained how 
reluctant Sheikh 'lsa was to accept UN mediation. Sir Anthony stated that "I 
advised Sheikh 'lsa to accept the UN when he came to New York in 1969 ... I gave 
him my personal word that it would work." 19 However the solution of the Bahrain-
Iran dispute had devastating consequences on the issue of the other smaller islands 
that belonged to the Trucial States of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah. 
7.3 Abu Musa and the 'funbs 
The Shah accepted the UN verdict on Bahrain and on 23rd May 1970 sent 
an Iranian good will mission headed by M. Zelli, Under-Secretary at the Iranian 
Foreign Ministry, to congratulate Sheikh 'lsa, ruler of Bahrain.20 However, with 
the solution of the dispute over Bahrain, the Shah raised the issue of Abu Musa 
and the Tunbs. 
These islands were located at the mouth of the Gulf in the Straits of Hormuz. 
Abu Musa Island (population 800) belonged to Sharjah and lay 35 miles off the 
Sharjah coast, while the Tunbs, both the Greater, Tunb al Kubra, (population 
200) and the Lesser, 'funb al- $ughra, (uninhabited) belonged to Ras al-Khaimah 
and lay 17 to 22 miles from the Iranian mainland. 21 
In order to explain this dispute we shall examine the Iranian point of view, 
the position taken by Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah and the role of British officials 
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in mediating between them. That is, we intend to answer three main questions. 
Firstly, why were the Islands important to the Shah? Secondly, what was Britain's 
role in the debate? Thirdly, what was the standpoint of the Sheikhs, in particular 
that of Khalid of Sharjah and $aqr of Ras al-Khaimah, regarding the dispute?.22 
The Iranian government's claim to Abu Mfisa and the Tunbs was based on 
various arguments. The first argument that had been offered by the Shah was of a 
historical nature. He claimed that the Islands were Iranian because: (a) they had 
been under Persian sovereignty until the late nineteenth century when the British 
government took them over and considered them as belonging to the Arabs of the 
Trucial States; and (b) they were Iranian because they were shown as belonging 
to Iran on a British map produced in 1888.23 This historical right was declared 
by several Iranian officials. For example, the Iranian Foreign Minister, Ardeshir 
Zahedi, during his official visit to Bahrain on 23rd June 1971, when questioned by 
reporters at the airport about the Iranian policy toward the Islands, said: 24 
The Islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, in the Straits 
of Hormuz at the Mouth of the Gulf, belong to Iran although they had been under 
British occupation for the past 80 years. Now that the British are withdrawing, the 
islands should be handed back to their rightful owner. Nevertheless, Iran has no 
quarrel with its Arab brothers on the issue which should be resolved between the 
British and the Iranian governments. 
The same historical argument was echoed by the Iranian Prime Minister, 
'Abbas Hoveida, who reiterated in a speech at Bandar 'Abbas on the 27th June 
1971, that "When the central government in Tehran was weak, the British took 
control of the Three Islands to fight pirates. But now no such problem exists and 
the Islands must be returned to lran." 25 
The Arabs of the Trucial States rejected the Iranian argument as lacking 
any valid legal grounds. They maintained that the Arabs, and in particularly the 
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Qawasim tribe, were in control of both shores of the Gulf before the arrival of 
the British. This meant that they controlled the Gulf Islands of Lingah, Kisham, 
Khung, $1r1, Luft, Abii Miisa and the 'funbs.26 The Arab Qawasim living on 
both shores of the Gulf used the islands for fishing and grazing and some took 
up residence there. Thus the Qawasim tribe was in control of Abii Miisa and 
the 'funbs and the inhabitants of these islands were always Arabs. The Iranians, 
however, retorted that the Arabs on the Persian shore had become Iranian subjects 
in the early nineteenth century, which meant the islands under their control became 
subject to Iranian sovereignty. However, the rulers of Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah 
provided documents that stated that the Qawasim of Oman, i.e. Trucial States, 
and not the Qawasim of the Persian Coast were the sole owners of the 'funbs and 
Abu Musa. The documents were presented by Sheikh $aqr of Ras al-Khaimah to 
the Arab League on the 6th December 1971. 
The Arabs of the Trucial States rejected the Iranian argument made on the 
basis of the British map of 1888. (a) The 1888 map was issued by the British 
Intelligence Section of the Ministry of Defence, and was supported by the Foreign 
Office in London in order to create a favourable atmosphere in which they could 
play a role in solving the Persian-Afghanistan border dispute. The latter was 
considered by the Foreign Office to be more important, due to security reasons 
relating to India, than disputes in the Gulf. This fact was reluctantly accepted 
at that time by the British Government of India which was concerned about, and 
attempted to solve the islands dispute. 27 {b) In spite of the existence of the 1888 
map the British official position was strongly supportive of Arab rights over the 
Islands . 28 (c) At the beginning of the twentieth century the British Government 
admitted that an error had been made in the preparation of the map and accepted 
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that the islands belonged to the rulers of the Trucial States. 29 It was also pointed 
out that the consent of the rulers of the Trucial States had not been obtained by 
the British when they issued the map. 
For these reasons, the rulers of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah maintained that 
the Shah's historical argument could not be sustained. This made them challenge 
the Shah by demanding a settlement of the dispute through the International 
Court.30 The Shah, however, did not see any point in pursuing a legal course in 
order to return to Iranian sovereignty of the Islands and hence objected to Sharjah's 
and Ras al-Khaimah's request. 
The second argument presented by Iranian officials was that of strategic ne-
cessity. They maintained that the security of the Gulf and the protection of the sea 
routes justified the Iranian government's assertion of sovereignty over the islands. 31 
In his memoirs the Shah explained why he occupied the Islands in November 
1971:32 
Mr. Goronwy Roberts, the Fol"eign Office envoy, assured us that Great Britain 
intended remaining in the Gulf 'for the foreseeable future'. Three months later, the 
English were packing their bags. Such incompetence was tied, I think, to Britain's 
entry to the Common Market. The safety of the Persian Gulf had, however, to be 
guaranteed, and who but Iran could fulfil this function? This is, in the the first 
place, why I reoccupied our two islands, Tumb and Abu Mfisa, on the very eve of the 
departure of the English . 
Therefore, the withdrawal decision of January 1968 had made Gulf security a 
major concern for the Shah. For example, the Iranian Foreign Minister, Ardeshir 
Zahedi, told The Daily Telegraph in March 1971, that the "Islands were essential 
for Iran because they were passed every day by over 15 million barrels of oil - a 
tanker every three minutes." 33 Also an ex-Iranian Naval Officer, who participated 
in the siege of the Islands said, on 18 December, 1990 that "The Islands were 
important not because of territorial ambitions but rather because of the marine 
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traffic zone that passes north and south of the 'funbs Islands.34 
The other strategic reason that convinced the Shah that he had to seize the 
islands was his fear of radicalism that might spread into the region after Britain's 
withdrawal. The danger of threats against the monarchy represented by Nasser and 
the Soviet Union both in Yemen and Dhofar, had increased the Shah's suspicions 
that they might carry out subversive activity in the Gulf.35 For example, the Shah 
once explained, "If a nihilist power takes over these Islands it will be a source of 
danger to the rest of us. These Islands must be in safe hands." 36 This fear was 
deepened by the attack on an oil tanker carrying crude oil to Israel from Iran on 
the 13th June 1971. The attack was carried out by the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine off Perim Island close to Bah el-Man dab in the Red Sea. 37 
The Shah clearly feared there could be similar attacks in Gulf waters. 
The security argument, however, was considered by many as an invalid one for 
several reasons. (a) As The Times explained "military observers maintain that they 
[i.e. the Islands] will give Iran no advantage which cannot be obtained from the air 
base and port at Bander Abbas." 38 (b) The Tudeh party, although it acknowledged 
Iranian rights over the Islands, 39 questioned the Shah's strategic motives, speaking 
of "the Shah's plans to seize two islands near the Straits of Hormuz in order 
to intervene in the Gulf affairs after British withdrawal and act as an agent of 
colonialism." 40 (c) The Gulf Emirates were, like Iran, heavily dependent on their 
oil revenues and thus it was in the strategic interests of all parties to safeguard the 
flow of oil through the Gulf. 
The third argument that may have motivated the Shah to occupy the Islands 
was an internal political one. According to one British Official:41 
'Advisors to the Iranian Government told us that the Shah did not want the 
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Islands for military or strategic rea.'lons, despite his statements and much official 
propaganda to that effect. Rather he needed to take them in order to enhance his 
image as a forceful and decisive monarch. At the time of the Bahrayn settlement, we 
failed to grasp the extent to which the Shah's prestige had fallen in the eyes of the 
Iranian people due to his having 'given in' on that question. He had to do something 
forceful to regain it, and in occupying the Islands he did. 
This idea of saving face was considered an important element in causing the 
Shah of Iran to occupy the Islands. Frauke Heard-Bey, of the Abu Dhabi Docu-
mentation Centre, argues that while the Shah's claim over Bahrain was sacrificed 
for the sake of Gulf Security, " it would have been very difficult for Iran to renounce 
its claim over the Islands of Abu Musa and the two 'funbs." 42 
Having set out the various factors that might have motivated the Shah to 
occupy the Islands, one would nevertheless question his ability to achieve that 
goal without the acquiescence of the British Government. 
7.3.1 The British role in the Islands 
The British Government's policy with regard to the Islands may be divided 
into two phases. The first phase was the old official line of complete support for the 
Sheikhs of Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah as the sole owners of the lslands.43 The 
British Government's official position on the Islands was explained by Sir David 
Roberts, H.M. Political Agent in Dubai 1966-68, who pointed out, that in 1968:44 
Before I left the Emirates there was a great scare that Iran was going to occupy 
the 'funbs. We had to do a great operation. We said the 'funbs belonged to Ras al-
Khaimah. Some Iranian ships came close to the 'funbs so I decided to go with Sheikh 
Khalid, Crown Prince of Ras al-Khaimah, in a helicopter to the Greater Island. I 
took some TOS Officers with me to show the flag. 
However, this position gradually changed and Britain's support for the Sheikhs 
of Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah with regard to their sovereignty over the Islands 
began to weaken. This second phase of the British Government's policy over the 
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Islands came when the Conservative party won the June 1970 election. The change 
of policy under the new Conservative Government was reflected by two incidents 
over the Islands in 1970-71. The first was in December 1969 when Sheikh Khalid, 
ruler of Sharjah, granted drilling rights on Abu Musa to Buttes Gas and Oil, an 
American Petroleum corporation, with the approval of the British Government. 
At the same time another American oil company, Occidental, was granted drilling 
rights in the vicinity of Abu Musa by the Sheikh of Umm al-Qaiwain. In May 1970 
however, the British Government stopped the American oil concessionaries from 
searching for oil in the area. Occidental reported that two RAF jets were shadow-
ing the company's rig, while a royal Navy mine sweeper had moved into position 
nearby. An Occidental employee in London, who was puzzled by the behaviour of 
the Foreign Office, explained that the Foreign Office's new order was a "complete 
reversal of the British Government's reply to Sharjah on May 16, when it was 
agreed that Occidental be allowed to continue drilling, pending a solution." 45 The 
Foreign Office's reply was that because Abu Musa was claimed by Iran, to allow the 
oil companies to continue their operations would involve the British government 
in a confrontation with the Iranian government. But they added that they would 
"use their best efforts to try to clear up the present unsatisfactory situation."46 
The second incident over Abu Musa and the 'funbs was in May 1971 when 
Iran's armed forces were ordered to fire upon any British plane violating the Iranian 
air space, including the area around of the disputed Islands. A British Ministry of 
Defence spokesman had denied that the RAF were violating Iranian air space and 
explained that the British aircraft were not equipped for attack anyway.47 
These two incidents showed a shift in British policy over the Islands. Clearly, 
Britain was now unwilling to enter into hostility with the Shah over the Islands' 
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sovereignty. This meant that the former policy of backing the Sheikhs' sovereignty 
of the Islands had in fact been discarded by H.M. Government. Thus it was made 
clear to both rulers that Britain would not defend their rights in the event of an 
Iranian invasion. Sir William Luce, and indeed many British Government officials, 
explained this to the rulers of the Trucial States, in particular to Sheikh Khalid 
bin Mul,lammad ruler of Sharjah and Sheikh $aqr bin Mul,lammad, ruler of Ras 
al-Khaimah. What, however, were the factors that led Britain to forsake its old 
position concerning the Islands, and play a role that was seen by Arabs as being 
more favourable to the Shah. 
In assessing the British Government's role in the affairs of Abii Miisa and 
the 'funbs, six factors may be identified that might have influenced the shift in 
British policy. First, there may have been a link to Iran relinquishing her claim 
to Bahrain. J. Kay, former British Official in the Gulf, pointed out that "It was a 
bargain between the Shah and the British that if he gave up his claim to Bahrain 
he would get the lslands." 48 During another interview1 Mr. Kay explained the 
point further by saying that,49 
The principal British objective as far as Iran was concerned was for her to 
abandon her claim over Bahrain. The best way to do that was to offer Abu Musa 
and the Islands to the Shah, because there was no doubt that Iran would seize these 
Islands. It [the plan] was a great success. 
This way of bartering Bahrain for the Islands was proposed by many British 
officials as well as by some of the British press. For example, The Guardian wrote 
that "The problem on the Arab side is to find something to offer to the Shah 
in return." 50 Another British source stated: "British representatives had told him 
[the Shah] that if he would agree to relinquish his claim to Bahrain, the U.K. would 
view more favourably his claims to other islands i.e. Abii Miisa and the 'funbs." 51 
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Furthermore Sir Richard Beaumont, British Ambassador to Cairo 1969-72, wrote 
on 15 January, 1991 that, "So far as I am aware this deal was arranged by the late 
Sir William Luce at the time when the Emirates were becoming independent." 52 
Subsequently however, British officials denied conveying any such information 
or impression to the Shah. 53 This denial has been recorded by Donald McCarthy, 
former head of Arabian Department, F0:54 
We managed to get the UN ascertainment which got rid of the claim to Bahrain 
We gave our word that we would not reveal how. The Shah tried to pull us into a 
deal between Bahrain and the Islands. We refused throughout on the basis that three 
different rulers were involved and that we could not trade one against another. 
The second factor that influenced Britain's role in negotiating a settlement 
with the Shah over the Islands, was the British Government's efforts to persuade 
the Shah to abandon his opposition to the establishment of a federation of Arab 
emirates. The Iranian Government's insistence on linking its claim to the islands 
with its approval of the federation was a new obstacle that had arisen in the af-
termath of the Bahrain settlement. This was despite the fact that in June 1969 
the Shah had declared that once the question of Bahrain was settled, there would 
be no objection to a federation of the Sheikhdoms. 55 Yet his objection to the Fed-
eration was reported and communicated to Sir William Luce during his first tour 
of the region in September 197056 a few months after the UN resolution regarding 
Bahraini independence. This connection was also demonstrated by the Iranian 
Foreign Minister, Ardeshir Zahedi, in an interview with the Karachi newspaper, 
Dawn, in December 1970, in which he said that:57 
Until the sovereignty oflran over the Abu Mfisa and Tunb Islands is re-established 
and the freedom of navigation is mutually guaranteed, the formation of the Federa-
tion of Sheikhdoms and any other action to safeguard stability and security in the 
Persian Gulf will not be advantageous . 
This Iranian opposition was only removed after Sir William Luce successfully 
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engineered an agreement between the ruler of Sharjah, Sheikh Khalid, and the 
Government of Iran in November 1971. After six days of negotiations with Iranian 
officials, Sir William Luce announced on the 17 November 1971 that the Iranian 
objection to the formation of the Federation had been removed and that Iran and 
Britain have sorted out their differences over the Gulf Islands. He added that 
the Sheikhdoms could now form their federation. 58 The other Emirate, Ras al-
Khaimah, refused to negotiate over the sovereignty of 'funb Islands and had not 
joined the Federation when its islands were occupied on 30th of November 1971. 
Both Britain and the Gulf Emirates considered that winning Iranian support 
for the federation was important. This can be seen in a discussion that was carried 
out on 26th August 1970 in the Foreign Office between Sir Geoffrey Arthur, Politi-
cal Resident in the Gulf, and N.D.I:Iamudi, advisor to the Abu Dhabi Government. 
After emphasizing the Iranian role in the Gulf Sir Geoffrey told Mr. l:lamudi:59 
It is essential to win Iranian support for the federation because it is the biggest 
and strongest country in the region. At the same time it has many citizens as well 
as agents in the Emirates who can cause a lot of problems if they want to. They will 
never drop their claim to Abu Musa and the 'funbs, especially to the island that is 
located closest to their coast. However, the problem with the Arabs is that they want 
their full rights, as in the case of Palestine where they failed. Iran is determined to 
occupy the Islands and it will do so a.'l as soon as we withdraw. Therefore if the ruler 
of Ras al-Khaimah is wise he will sell them and take the payment, otherwise he will 
loose them without any payment. 
Furthermore, Iran had strong bilateral relations with some of the Arab Gulf 
Emirates particularly Dubai which had put her in a position to influence the fed-
eration discussions. This was mentioned by Sir William Luce during his meeting 
with Sheikh Khalid, ruler of Sharjah, on 30th of October 1971. According to the 
head of the Abu Dhabi Government Office in Sharjah, Mul,lammad Khallfah al-
Suwaydi, who attended the meeting, Sir William warned that if the federation were 
established without solving the Abu Musa issue then Iran would disrupt it from 
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within.60 
Therefore, British officials may have suggested that in order to remove Iranian 
objections to the Federation, the Emirates should negotiate with Iran over Abu 
Musa and the 'funbs. This probably made the federation of the six postpone 
a rapid move to independence until an agreement was reached over Abu Musa. 
Agreement over Abu Musa was reached at the end of November 1971. The 'funbs 
were occupied on 30 November, 1971. Iran recognized the U.A.E. on 4 December 
1971, two days after the Federation had been officially declared. 
The third factor might have been that Britain and the United States had cal-
culated that Iran was the only Gulf country with sufficient military and economic 
strength to give a lead in filling the vacuum that would exist in the area after the 
British withdrawal. In particular Britain wanted to secure stability for the flow of 
Gulf oil after 1971. Thus Iran, and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia, were encour-
aged to undertake responsibility in what became known as the Twin Pillars theory 
(see chapter 6). The Shah of Iran however, insisted on occupying the small islands 
in the Gulf for the reasons we have mentioned above. This produced a significant 
debate among the people of the Gulf as well as among British officials. Donald 
McCarthy, head of the Arabian Department in the Foreign Office, has stated that 
Sir Denis Wright, British Ambassador to Iran 1963-71, and Sir Stewart Crawford, 
British Political Resident in the Gulf 1968-70, "had engaged in an intensive debate 
over the islands issue, whereby each supported the point of view of the country 
he works in."61 Furthermore, Mr. J. Kay, former British Residency Official in the 
Gulf, summed up the British position thus: "They thought of the Shah as a stable 
regime with ability to guarantee the peace in the Gulf. They were afraid of dis-
turbances in the area" .62 This was echoed by Balfour-Paul, H.M. Ambassador in 
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Iraq in 1971, who said that "As a realpolitik the 'funbs were much better in the 
hands of the Shah for the safety of the oil supply towards the West." 63 Therefore 
the realisation that Gulf security could be ensured only with Iranian cooperation, 
convinced the Conservative Government to go along with the Shah's claim over 
the islands. 
The fourth factor could have been that the islands did not possess any eco-
nomic interests for Britain. Furthermore, the owners of the islands, Ras al-
Khaimah and Sharjah, were not oil producing Emirates like Abu Dhabi or Dubai. 
Thus offending Sheikh ~aqr, ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, or Sheikh Khalid, ruler 
of Sharjah, was not of great consequence. Supporting the rights of the Sheikhs, 
therefore, did not always serve British interests as for example, the l:lawar island 
dispute had done. I:Iawar island was recognised by the British Indian Government 
as belonging to Bahrain, but the Foreign Office did not agree and recognised the 
island as part of Qatar. The reason for the Foreign Office's position was because 
the oil concession in Qatar was in British hands while in Bahrain it was held by 
an American company.64 
Accordingly, the relative economic importance of the Gulf islands as well as 
the Emirates that owned them were important elements that influenced Britain's 
attitude. This point was expressed as early as 1935 by the head of the Eastern 
Department at the Foreign Office, G. Rendel, who stated:65 
My feeling therefore is that if 'funb is worth anything we should do much better 
to take it and that if it is worth nothing it is foolish to let it affect our policy on major 
issues. 
Thus it was not surprising that Britain let Abii Miisa and the 'funbs go to 
Iran because it was in her ultimate interest to do so. 
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The fifth factor that might have influenced Britain's position concerning the 
islands could have been the influence of American support for the Shah who they 
regarded as the natural successor to Britain in guarding Gulf security. 66 Two sub-
stantial pieces of evidence are available from 1971 which may demonstrate the 
U.S. position on the islands and the Americans' perception of Gulf security. The 
first significant contact between Arab officials from the Emirates and the U.S. in 
discussion of the islands was in January 1971, when an American mission headed 
by Frank Shakespeare, Director of the U.S. Information Agency, toured the Gulf 
area. In Abu Dhabi, the American mission expressed its concern over Gulf stability 
in the aftermath of the British withdrawal at the end of 1971. The mission was 
particularly worried about Iranian-Arab relations and the possibilities of improv-
ing them; however, it was concerned about the Iranian claim to the Islands which 
might adversely affect their relations. In the meantime the American mission ap-
peared to be trying to convince Abu Dhabi officials that Iranian-Arab cooperation, 
given the potential threat from Iraq, was more important than the dispute over the 
islands. However, the American mission found Abu Dhabi more concerned about 
the Buraimi issue than about the Islands question. 67 
The second contact with the Americans related to the Islands affair took place 
in November 1971. This came about during a secret visit by Ras al-Khaimah's 
Crown Prince, Sheikh Kha.lid bin $aqr, to the United States, when he asked the 
U.S. State Department for diplomatic recognition of Ras al-Khaimah in return 
for the use of military bases there. However the State Department rejected the 
Sheikh's proposal and explained that the U.S. did not intend to take over Britain's 
role in the area. Furthermore, American officials urged Ras al-Khaimah to join 
the Federation of Arab Emirates.68 [For Anglo-American cooperation in the Gulf 
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see 'Twin Pillars']. 
From the above we may conclude that the United States Government was 
clearly aware of the Shah's determination to occupy the Islands. Therefore, the 
Americans tried to persuade Sheikh Khalid bin $aqr as well as the other Gulf 
officials that it was in their interests to cooperate with Iran over Gulf security in 
the post-withdrawal period. 
The sixth factor that may have influenced Britain's position vis-~-vis the Is-
lands was the success of her economic links with Iran. According to a recommenda-
tion published by the Conservative Political Centre in 1967, "Britain has a comity 
of interest with Iran. It should be our policy to stand close to her as a military and 
political partner, as well as a trading associate." 69 The importance of Iran as a 
trading partner was significant since Iran was Britain's biggest market in the Gulf. 
This was particulary true of Iranian imports from Britain which had increased from 
£38.3m in 1965 to £494.6m. in 1975, (see table 7:1). Furthermore, Iran was the 
biggest purchaser of British arms during the withdrawal period. For example, Iran 
had placed large orders with British companies for missiles, 800 Chieftan tanks, 
several warships and other military equipment which were considered necessary by 
the Shah in order to fulfil his new role of policing the Gulf. 70 
7.3.2 The Emirates' position: 
The above-mentioned factors put Britain into a very difficult situation over 
the islands: if Britain opposed the Shah then it might sacrifice its interests in Iran; 
but if it supported Iran, then it would alieniate the Emirates and indeed would 
face criticism from the Arab World as a whole. In the end Britain involved herself 
in intensive negotiations in order to find a compromise formula acceptable to both 
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sides. Indeed Sir William Luce engaged in 'shuttle diplomacy' between Iran and 
the Emirates for over a year. In May 1971, Sir William explained to the rulers 
of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah that "H.M. Government wished to advise the two 
emirates that they should negotiate with Iran over the Islands." 71 He also made 
it clear to them that the Shah was going to occupy the islands once Britain had 
left. 72 The rulers first tried to mobilize the Arab governments to come to their 
assistance. For example, Sheikh Khalid, ruler of Sharjah, sent messages on 24th 
August to different Arab States, but few were prepared to risk a conflict with Iran 
when the major threat came from Israel. This probably encouraged Sheikh Khalid 
to enter into negotiations with Iran over Abu Musa through Sir William Luce. 
In his October 1971 tour of the Gulf, Sir William Luce communicated to 
Sheikh Khalid Iran's conditions for a settlement over Abu Musa as follows: 73 
1. Abu Musa should be divided between Sharjah and Iran, with Iran taking 
the larger share. 
2. Income from oil would be divided equally between Sharjah and Iran. 
3. Iran would give Sharjah £1.5 million annually for nine years. 
Sheikh Khalid publicly denounced the proposal and stated that "our reply to 
Luce was that we would never give up our sovereignty and rights to the Island"; 74 
in secret, however, he did negotiate. For instance, on 2nd November 1971 he wrote 
to Sir William Luce confirming these negotiations with Iran: 75 
We have carefully considered the Settlement Memorandum relative to Abu Musa 
which you gave us on October 27th, stating terms to which the Shah has expressed a 
willingness to agree, together with the sketch map of Abu Musa on which has been 
drawn a boundary line for the area to be occupied by Iranian forces, as proposed by 
Iran. We also acknowledge receipt of the draft of a financial assistance agreement 
with Sharjah which we understand Iran is prepared to execute, and letters of imple-
mentation of these arrangements. We have discussed all of these with you. This letter 
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Table 7.1: Britain's Trade with the Gulf states: 1965-75, (£m.) 
Country 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Bahrain 
Export to 9.0 8.1 8.6 10.9 12.8 24.3 25.2 19.6 24.3 33.7 60.9 
Import from 4.8 5.6 2.9 1.9 2.1 1.6 4.0 8.6 15.8 20.3 17.8 
Iran 
Export to 38.3 39.6 43.3 61.0 71.6 66.3 78.6 117.0 169.4 278.6 494.6 
Import from 41.0 38.2 136.7 90.7 73.8 76.1 109.5 123.8 237.4 513.3 700.9 
Kuwait 
Export to 18.9 25.8 25.1 28.7 40.9 36.2 35.3 31.3 36.1 59.8 99.2 
Import from 90.2 92.9 73.6 151.4 172.0 165.4 198.8 176.5 235.3 569.5 418.2 
Oman 
Export to 2.2 3.1 2.3 2.8 5.3 7.8 13.1 17.2 22.2 42.9 97.0 
Import from - - 1.1 11.1 10.4 7.8 4.0 2.9 15.9 32.8 114.2 
Qatar 
Export to 2.2 3.1 2.3 2.8 5.3 7.8 13.1 17.2 22.2 42.9 97.0 
Import from 4.4 16.8 4.3 24.3 24.7 30.6 41.3 39.3 47.3 166.0 159.3 
Saudi Arabia 
Export to 12.8 20.9 16.2 47.0 57.0 35.2 38.9 45.2 58.5 119.7 199.8 
Import from 26.1 39.7 62.5 68.7 86.8 104.2 172.8 183.7 322.2 1178.1 856.6 
UAE 
Export to 4.2 6.2 12.0 18.5 28.5 24.5 26.3 31.1 49.4 96.9 198.8 
Import from 22.2 14.3 12.6 51.2 30.3 32.1 47.1 53.8 69.2 205.9 158.9 
Source: U.K. Government, Department of Trade and Industry, Overseas 
Trade Statistics of the United Kingdom, (London: H.M.S.O, 1965-1975). 
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is to confirm these discussions. 
Furthermore Sheikh Khalid offered counter proposals that he asked Sir William 
to forward to the Shah. He declared that Sharjah did not accept the Iranian 
boundary proposals because "Iran's proposed line would give to Iran the well on 
which the village is dependent, as well as the ancestral home, date gardens and 
burial ground of the Qasimi family [the ancestors of the ruler of Sharjah]." 76 As 
to petroleum operations, Sharjah hoped that the agreement with Buttes Gas and 
Oil Co., dated December 1969, would be recognized by Iran.77 Eventually, a final 
agreement between Sharjah and Iran was announced by Sheikh Khalid on 29th 
November 1971 as a Memorandum of Understanding which was as follows: 78 
Neither Iran nor Sharjah will give up its claim to Abu Musa nor recognize the 
other's claim. Against this background the following arrangements will be made: 
1. Iranian troops will arrive in Abu Musa. They will occupy areas the extent of 
which has been agreed on the map attached to this memorandum. 
2. Within the agreed areas occupied by Iranian troops, Iran will have full jurisdic-
tion and the Iranian flag will fly. 
2. Sharjah will retain full jurisdiction over the remainder of the island. The Sharjah 
flag will continue to fly over the Sharjah police post on the same basis as the 
Iranian flag will fly over the Iranian military quarters. 
3. Iran and Sharjah recognize the breadth of the island's territorial sea as twelve 
nautical miles. 
4. Exploitation of the petroleum resources of Abu Musa and of the sea bed and oil 
beneath its territorial seas will be conducted by Buttes Gas and Oil Company 
under the existing agreement which must be acceptable to Iran. Half of the 
governmental oil revenues hereafter attributable to the said exploitation shall 
be paid directly by the Company to Iran and half to Sharjah. 
5. The nationals of Iran and Sharjah shall have equal rights to fish in the territorial 
sea of Abu Musa. 
6. A financial assistance agreement will be signed between Iran and Sharjah. 
While Sir William Luce was able to reach a settlement between Iran and 
Sharjah with regards to Abu Miisa, he failed, however, to conclude a similar agree-
ment with Ras al-Khaimah over the 'funbs. The Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, Sheikh 
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$aqr al-Qasimi, refused to enter into any kind of negotiations over the Lesser and 
Greater 'funbs. Baghdad Radio reported that Sheikh $aqr had revealed that, "The 
British envoy, William Luce, had offered Ras al-Khaimah £18 million, payable in 
instalments over nine years, as assistance to the Emirate" as a compensation for 
the islands. Iran was prepared to pay but the Sheikh rejected the deal. 79 This of-
fer was confirmed by the ex-British diplomat, Frank Brenchley who says that the 
Shah "was persuaded to offer the Sheikh of Ras al-Khaimah a measure of finan-
cial compensation, which the Sheikh refused." 80 The failure of Sir William Luce's 
discussions over the 'funbs was raised in question time in the House of Commons 
on 6 December 1971 after the occupation of the 'funbs by Iran. Sir Alec Douglas-
Home, the British Foreign Secretary, was asked "Why if he could buy off Sharjah 
with £8m. and an agreement on an oil field, could Sir William Luce not have had 
something similar to settle the claims of Sheikh Zagur {sic} over Abu Musa ." In 
replying to the question the Foreign Secretary said:81 
I understand that the landing on the 'funbs was unopposed and peaceful, but 
there was an incident later, and that in that a policeman and three Iranians were 
!!hot. Sir William Luce tried very hard to get a successful arrangement with Ras 
al-Khaimah as he got from Sharjah but the Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah felt he could 
not make an agreement. I wish it had been possible, we did all we could. 
On 29th November 1971 the Iranian troops had occupied the 'funbs and 
three or four of the Ras al-Khaimah police were killed trying to resist the Iranian 
landing. 82 An Iranian Marine Officer and three soldiers were also killed. Subse-
quently, the inhabitants of the Greater 'funb were transfered to Ras al-Khaimah. 83 
The failure of Sir William Luce to convince Sheikh $aqr to negotiate with 
Iran was rather ambiguous because one is led to believe that Britain may have 
intended the negotiations to fail. First of all the British diplomats did not offer 
any face-saving device to Sheikh $aqr except financial compensation. That was 
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certain to fail since it did not give Sheikh $aqr (who considered himself as the 
descendant of the famous Qawasim tribe) any room to manoeuvre. Not only this, 
but Sheikh Kha.lid, who agreed to negotiate with the Iranians over Abu Musa, was 
considered a traitor by Arab radicals in the Arab World and Sheikh $aqr did not 
want the same thing to happen to him. Indeed, as al-Khalij reported, Sheikh $aqr 
stated that Sir William Luce had suggested to him that he should cede sovereignty 
over the Tunbs in return for annual payments of £1.6m by Iran. Sheikh $aqr's 
reply was that "We rejected this offer and told Luce we would never give up our 
land, nor were we ready to enter into deals to sell our islands." 84 
The second reason, according to Mahdi al-Tajir, was that "the Iranian oc-
cupation of the Tunb Islands was rather suggested by an upper Gulf state," i.e. 
Saudi Arabia. The reason was that Sheikh $aqr had been in close contact with 
the Iraqi Government.85 For example, during his 4-day visit to Iraq from 26-30 
June 1970, Sheikh $aqr had expressed gratitude to the Iraqi revolutionary govern-
ment for its continuous support of the Gulf States. Addressing a press conference, 
Sheikh $aqr said: "During our visit to Iraq we discussed co-operation in all fields 
of trade, the economy and education ... the Arabism of the Arabian Gulf can not 
be disputed and its people are capable of repulsing any agression in cooperation 
with their brothers."86 This kind of relationship between Sheikh $aqr and the Iraqi 
Government had created some concern among the conservative Arab Gulf States, 
like Saudi Arabia, who knew that Iraq was supporting revolutionary elements in 
the Gulf for example the Dhofar revolution. According to John Armitage, a British 
diplomat in Saudi Arabia 1968-1974, this link between Iraq and Ras al-Khaimah 
"probably made Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the lower Gulf States keep quiet about 
it" i.e. the Iranian occupation of the Tunbs.87 
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The third reason might have been that the other rulers of the Trucial States 
did not give enough support to Sheikh ~aqr due to their total involvement with 
the establishment of the Federation. In addition to that, the rulers could not raise 
the Islands issue in their meetings about the proposed federation because it would 
probably have embarrassed those Emirates with a close relationship with Iran: 
this fact was perceived during the Trucial States Council meeting that was held in 
Dubai on lOth July 1971. According to the agenda, the Islands issue was numbered 
as item 14, but the Secretariat had crossed that out because of the sensitive nature 
of the subject.88 
The other point of interest was Sheikh ~aqr's demand for amendments to the 
proposed constitution in which he demanded more power, but when his amend-
ments were rejected he refused to sign it. (see 6.2. ). But after he was humiliated 
over the 'funbs Sheikh ~aqr agreed to federate on condition that the Federation 
would boycott Iran, liquidate its interests and deport those Iranian citizens who 
entered the Emirates illegally. 89 However the other members of the Federation did 
not consider Sheikh ~aqr's demands to be fair and had thus paid no heed to them. 
The fourth reason that might have led to the failure of Sir William Luce's 
efforts to reach an acceptable settlement over the 1\mbs was Iran's tenacity in her 
claim to them. Iran maintained that the islands were too close to her and that 
they had relatively few inhabitants in comparison with Abu Musa. This sort of 
thinking was clearly understood by British diplomats and hence they applied less 
pressure on Sheikh ~aqr. The last British Political Agent in the Trucial States, 
Julian Walker, has stated that no pressure was put on Sheikh ~aqr by the British 
authorities:90 
no one threatened Sheikh $aqr of Ras al-Khaimah to try to persuade him to 
make a deal with the Shah over the 'funbs, but the British made it perfectly clear 
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to him that they believed that the Shah would try to seize the islands from Ras al-
Khaimah once British protection was withdrawn if there was no agreement. Sheikh 
~aqr preferred not to try to make any agreement of the sort made by Sheikh Khalid 
of Sharjah, and in any case there was some doubt about whether the Shah would be 
prepared to negotiate a similar agreement with Ras al-Khaimah over the 'funbs. 
The final reason could have been that the British looked upon the 'funb 
Islands as too close to the Straits of Hormuz and thus for security reasons they 
would be better in the hands of the Shah. This fear had increased due to the 
activities of a nationalist group which had established a base in Ras Musandam. 
(see chapter 2). Furthermore, the landing of the Iranian troops on the Islands 
on the final day of Britain's treaty of protection with the Emirates could not 
have happened without the previous knowledge of the British Government. The 
Financial Times suggested that Iran had occupied the Tunbs on the last day of the 
British presence in the Gulf because, once Ras al-Khaimah was independent then, 
"the act would be more offensive in the international context than if the States 
foreign policy and defence were still technically in Britain's hands." 91 Another 
reason was put by the British diplomat, J. Kay, "The plan was to invade the 
Islands before so as to save the Sheikhs' face and to show that the Sheikhs were 
not weak and not to be blamed." 92 
Ras al-Khaimah, in accordance with its protection treaty, asked the British 
Government to help her in resisting the Iranian occupation. The British reply, 
however, was that "the British Government could hardly be expected to exercise 
their treaty responsibilities on their final day" 93 and that the British troops had 
already been withdrawn from the area so Britain could no longer defend the Islands. 
Yet, according to J.B. Kelly, there was sufficient British presence in the Gulf 
area to defend the islands. The aircraft carrier H.M.S. Eagle with Royal Marine 
Commandos on board and the cruiser H.M.S. Albion were in the Gulf of Oman,94 
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and there were RAF Hunters in Sharjah as well as a strong British military presence 
in Oman, especially in Mas1rah.95 However, as Edward Henderson, the Political 
Agent in Qatar in 1971, put it, "It was considered a joke that we fought on the 
side of the Iranians in Dhofar but at the same time we were not on good terms 
with them over the Islands." 96 
The repercussions over the Iranian occupation of Abu Musa and the 'funbs 
were felt throughout the Arab World. Demonstrations swept the newly established 
United Arab Emirates, where Iranian banks, hospitals and shops were attacked. In 
Sharjah, Sheikh $aqr, the Deputy ruler had four shots fired at him by an unidenti-
fied gunman. The assassination attempt is believed to have been in response to the 
Iranian occupation and to the role that the Sheikh played in receiving the Iranian 
forces on the island. 97 In Baghdad thousands of people took to the streets and the 
British Ambassador, Balfour-Paul, was summoned to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry to 
be informed that Iraq was severing diplomatic relations with Britain. While Libya 
nationalized British Petroleum (BP) and asked the other Arab countries to take 
stronger measures against Iran and Britain, Egypt and most other Arab countries 
limited themselves to verbal condemnation.98 Saudi Arabia surprised many by its 
low-profile stand over the issue: probably its role in the Buraimi dispute provides 
some explanation for this. 
7.4 Buraimi dispute 
The Buraimi oasis, 24° 14 North 53° 46 East, takes its name from the village 
of Buraimi which lies in the Omani part of the Oasis. Today the Oasis contains 
nine towns and villages of which three are located in Oman: l:lamasa, $a 'ara, and 
Buraimi town; and the other six located in Abu Dhabi: Hlll, al-J1m1, al-Qattarah, 
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al- 'Ayn, al-Jahli and al-Mu 'tariq.99 However in the past the name Buraimi was 
given to an area extending well beyond the immediate oasis and which was disputed 
between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi and Oman. 
In comparison with the Islands dispute with Iran, the Buraimi problem was 
more important due to: (a) Its complicated history that had started in 1795 and 
which was not solved until1974. (b) The discovery of oil in the disputed area and 
thus the involvement of a group of American oil companies in a conflict with British 
led oil companies. (c) The wide stretches of land that were involved, covering most 
of Abu Dhabi and a part of Oman, and also the involvement of many countries 
in the dispute including Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Britain and, to 
a lesser extent, the United States. Of particular concern to us here are Britain's 
negotiations with Saudi Arabia to solve the dispute during the withdrawal period 
between 1968-71. However we will begin with a brief account of how the issue had 
developed. 
The Wahhabi reform movement that was founded by MuQammad b. 'Abd 
al-Wahhab (d. 1792) had spread throughout the Arabian Peninsula. As a result in 
1795 Ibrahim b. •u fay~an, became the first amir of the Saudi state to rule over Bu-
raimi. During their presence in Buraimi the Saudi officials collected Islamic taxes, 
{zakat), preserved public security through Islamic laws, {shariat), and established 
tribal allegiances with the Saudi state.100 
After the demise of the first Saudi state in 1850, the Saudi garrison was ejected 
from Buraimi by alliances between local tribes and tribes which owed allegiance 
to the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi. Control over Buraimi passed to its original ruler, the 
Sultan of Muscat and Oman and later, due to shifting tribal allegiances, the ruler 
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of Abu Dhabi took control of parts of the oasis. 
In the twentieth century, however, the Buraimi dispute was influenced by oil 
concessions that were awarded in 1933 by Ibn Sa 'ud to Standard Oil of California 
(SOCAL) to exploit oil on his eastern frontiers. At around the same time, Abu 
Dhabi also granted an oil concession to Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) an 
affiliate of IPC, to look for oil throughout the Emirate's territory. The boundary 
issue between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi thus appeared. 
In 1934 the American Government, on behalf of SOCAL, approached the 
Foreign Office about Saudi Arabia's eastern frontier. The Foreign Office reply was 
that the eastern frontier was that laid down in a convention concluded in July 
1913 between the British Government and the Ottoman Empire. The conven-
tion defined the eastern Saudi frontier, then the emirate of N ajid, as being from 
the west of Qatar running straight south through the Rub' al-Khall, the empty 
quarter (see map 7.1). But Ibn Saud had refused to accept the 1913 convention 
because by that time his authority reached well beyond the boundaries established 
by the convention. Moreover, because of the outbreak of World War One, the 
1913 convention had never been ratified. Consequently, it was necessary for Saudi 
Arabia and Britain (on behalf of Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Oman and the Eastern Aden 
Protectorate) to enter into discussions, which began in summer 1934.101 
Following these discussions, Saudi Arabia put forward a claim to a corridor 
of land to the sea coast in the vicinity of Khaur al- 'Udaid, which would have 
separated Abu Dhabi from Qatar. This proposal, known as the Fuad line, was 
put forward in April 1935. In return, Saudi Arabia was willing to give up its 
claim to the Buraimi oasis (see map 7.1). Britain rejected the Saudi proposal and 
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presented a counter proposal in November 1935, known as the Riyad line (see map 
7.1). This gave Saudi Arabia the bulk of the Rub' al-Khall desert but rejected the 
Saudi proposal set out in Fuad line, for a corridor to the Gulf coast at Khaur al-
'Udaid.102 The Saudi, refused to accept the British proposal and in 1949 the Saudi 
government presented a new frontier, but incorporated four-fifths of the emirate of 
Abu Dhabi, including the Buraimi oases in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (see map 
7.1). This was rejected by Britain which threatened to return to the Anglo-Turkish 
convention of 1913.103 
In 1952 the situation deteriorated further. First, the Dhammam Conference, 
28 January to 14 February 1952, held by Britain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Abu 
Dhabi to discuss the dispute, had collapsed; second Saudi Arabia had despatched 
Thrki ibn 'Utayshan to the Buraimi oasis to act as governor. Britain on her side 
reacted by blockading the Saudi garrison with the Trucial Oman Levies (TOL 
later renamed TOS) and low level sorties by the RAF over Buraimi villages. A 
few weeks later however, the American ambassador in Jeddah, Raymond Hare, 
used his good offices to bring about a reconciliation between the two parties. This 
resulted in: (a) the standstill agreement of October 1952; and (b) an arbitration 
agreement in July 1954 in which the two parties agreed to present their cases in 
front of an international tribunal. The Tribunal of Arbitration that had begun 
in September 1955 came to an end in the same month due to the resignation of 
the British representative, Sir Reader Bullard. On 26 October 1955, the British 
government decided to put aside all further argument, especially with the Amer-
icans, and occupy Buraimi. They expelled the small Saudi garrison and installed 
TOS on behalf of Abu Dhabi and Oman. Britain's action naturally caused some 
embarrassment for the Americans. On one hand they feared that Saudi Arabia 
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might seek allies elsewhere if they did not support the Saudi claim, and that indeed 
Saudi Arabia might retaliate against Aramco and the US air base at Dhahran. On 
the other hand support for Saudi Arabia on this issue could sour relations with 
their ally Britain 104 
In fact Britain had her own reasons for carrying out the Buraimi operation 
in October 1955 to remove the Saudi garrison.l05 The first reason could have been 
a political one. That is, matters were seen in quite a different light in Whitehall 
owing to wider Middle Eastern and other preoccupations. For example, the Iranian 
oil dispute of 1951 and Britain's failure to keep the Suez Canal as a military base 
(see chapter 1) were seen in the Gulf as signs that British power was declining. 106 
In order to assess Britain's position in the Gulf, Sir Roger Makins, Deputy 
Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, was sent to the area in 1952. One of 
his recommendations was that Britain ought not to contemplate any voluntary 
withdrawal. 107 On the contrary, Britain must demonstrate her intention of re-
maining in the area. In 1953 Sir Rupert Hay, British Political Resident in the 
Gulf, saw the opportunity of demonstrating British power by standing firm on the 
Buraimi issue. He wrote to his superiors in the Foreign Office: 108 
I do not propose to deal with his [Ibn Saud] latest aggressions in detail here but 
will content myself with pointing out that our whole position in the Gulf depends on 
the belief of the rulers and their people in our ability to protect them against external 
aggression and that when they lose their confidence in us they will turn elsewhere. 
Accordingly, a tough stance towards the Saudis was meant to retain the rulers' 
confidence in Britain's ability to defend them, a confidence which had been dam-
aged slightly by her weak response over the Iranian oil dispute. According to 
Evelyn Shuckburgh, Principal Private Secretary to Eden, he had suggested to the 
Acting Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, that "we should at once occupy Buraimi 
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to show that we can be tough as well." 109 This was also the Foreign Secretary, Sir 
Anthony Eden's position in 1953, as reported by his private secretary: "Anthony 
Eden seemed to want violent action soon and complained that we had not got 
Turki [b. 'Utayshan] out during his absence. We persuaded him against doing this 
while we needed so much US help on Egypt and Persia." 110 
The second reason was that the Buraimi dispute demonstrated how deter-
mined Britain was to protect the interests of the London based Petroleum Develop-
ment(Trucial Coast) in the face of Aramco111 , even though that would antagonize 
her traditional allies, the US and Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, this determination 
was expressed by the British Prime Minister, Churchill, in a letter to Ibn Saud: 
"what would the friendship of Great Britain be worth if she abandoned the weaker 
of her friends for the sake of the stronger. We would stand up for what we felt to 
be right, and Ibn Saud would, no doubt, do the same." 112 
As to the sourness in Anglo-American relations created by the Buraimi dis-
pute, Britain reminded the US that she fully accepted the Americans' encourage-
ment to enter into discussions with Saudi Arabia over Buraimi. However British 
officials expressed their displeasure at the American position: 113 
They encouraged us to conclude the Buraimi standstill agreement in 1952 which 
Turki never made the slightest attempt to observe, and they also urged us to conclude 
the Arbitration Agreement which the Saudis also never observed. Was it not the duty 
of the Americans first to put pressure on the Saudis to keep these agreements rather 
than put pressure on us to make new ones after the Saudis had rendered the other 
ones useless? One of our main difficulties in dealing with the Saudis is that American 
pressure to retreat is always on us and never, so far as we know, on them. 
Furthermore, Britain reminded the Americans that the British position in the 
Gulf was an asset to the West as a whole including the United States. 114 Thus the 
US was warned that: 115 
The Americans are gaining all the advantages from the British special position 
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in the Gulf and refusing to say a word in support of it. They must realise that if they 
connive at the undermining of one corner of the edifice of British influence, the whole 
will be in danger of collapsing. 
The third reason was that the British officials were concerned lest arbitration 
might end in an advantage for the Saudis. The Foreign Office had issued a state-
ment on 4 October 1955 explaining the reason for Sir Reader Bullard's resignation 
from the Tribunal, accusing the Saudis of tampering with the impartiality of the 
Tribunal behind the President's back.116 Such an accusation of improper conduct 
was an over-simplification of a complicated issue and J. B. Kelly's standard work 
on the affair, which attempted to connect the failure of the arbitration with the 
misconduct of the Saudis, is too biased:117 
The tribunal also heard evidence of the Saudi bribery and gun-running, of the 
plot to overthrow the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, of the circumstances surrounding the fire 
of Hamasa, of the abuse of the Saudi supply aircraft, and of other violations of the 
conditions of arbitration. 
However in recent publications we discover that Britain was concerned with 
the Saudi's success in winning over some of the main tribal leaders of Buraimi 
like Rashid b. ~amad Sheikh of ~amasa, $aqr b. Sultan al-~amudah paramount 
sheikh of Nu 'aym tribe, 'Obaid bin Jum 'ah chief of Bani Ka 'b tribe, together 
with a number of other influential figures who persuaded their tribes to support 
the Saudis. After the escalation of the dispute in 1955 the tribal leaders with a 
number of their followers left for Saudi Arabia as refugees. The British concern 
was reported by Sir Bernard Burrows, the British Political Resident in the Gulf 
1953-1958:118 
After the Arbitration had been running for some time it became apparent to 
us that the Saudis were using all kinds of methods, such as the supply of arms and 
money, to extend their influence and to win the allegiance of tribal leaders over a 
much wider area; these tactics might if they continued succeed in influencing the 
result of the arbitration, insofar as this was likely to depend in part on some form 
of ascertainment of the will of the inhabitants. It was therefore agreed after much 
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heart-searching in Whitehall, to bring the arbitration to an end and to reoccupy the 
oasis of Buraimi and turn out the Saudi detachment. 
The final reason could have been that Britain used military might to solve 
the Buraimi dispute as a sort of punishment of King Sa' iid b. 'Abd al- 'Aziz 
because Eden, the British Prime Minister, came to believe that Saudi Arabia was 
undermining the British position in the Middle East. He wrote in his memoirs that 
"the situation in the Middle East was being rapidly undermined and corrupted by 
Saudi money." 119 Heikal, the Egyptian writer, has suggested that Britain sought to 
punish Saudi Arabia over Buraimi because Saudi Arabian money was being used 
in cooperation with the new revolutionary government in Egypt against Western 
interests in Iraq, Jordan, Syria and the Gulf, therefore a swift punishment was 
justified. 120 
The relations between Saudi Arabia and Britain were further undermined by 
the Suez crisis when Saudi Arabia broke off diplomatic relations with Britain in 
November 1956. Thus the Buraimi dispute was allowed to lie dormant until 1963 
when the two countries re-established their diplomatic relations due to the Yemen 
civil war (see chapter 2). 
On August 14 1964 the Foreign Office submitted a new proposal for solving 
the Buraimi dispute to the Saudi Arabia Government. It proposed a new frontier 
between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia very similar to that of 25 November 1935 
(see Map 7.2). However, the new point in the proposal was the suggestion that 
joint oil exploration between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia be carried out in the 
disputed areas. The British Foreign Secretary, R. A. Butler, wrote to Crown Prince 
Fay~al as follows: 121 
I propose that the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and Your Royal Highness should establish 
a joint oil exploration and production area, which I believe would be designated 
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on either side of the agreed frontier, without prejudice to the existing concessions 
awarded to the Arabian American Oil Company by Saudi Arabia and to the Abu 
Dhabi Petroleum Company by Abu Dhabi. The operational arrangements would 
be made by the two companies, each of which would pay royalties and tax to the 
government from which it obtained its concession. The two governments would then 
share the total receipts from the joint area equally between them. 
The same letter also addressed the Saudi demand for access to the Gulf 
coast:122 
The Ruler of Abu Dhabi would announce his willingness to give favourable 
considerations to applications from any Saudi concessionary for way-leaves to the 
Abu Dhabi coast for pipelines and servicing roads and for terminal installations for 
the export of oil. 
However, as Saudi Arabia was preoccupied with Nasser's involvement in the 
Yemen civil war, the Buraimi issue was once again shelved (except for a minor 
contact between Sheikh Zayed and King Fay~al in 1967) until 1970.123 
7.4.1 Buraimi dispute and the British withdrawal 
The decision to withdraw from the Gulf at the end of 1971 brought the frontier 
question into sharper focus. In May 1970 Sheikh Zayed paid a visit to King Fay~al 
in Riyadh. The King immediately brought up the subject since he wanted the 
dispute settled before the British withdrawal. He produced a new proposal that, 
in comparison with 1949 was a retreat, but still did not abandon the Saudi claim 
to Buraimi oasis, Khaur al-'Udaid and the oil-rich structure of Zararah (see map 
7.1).124 Also King Fayl?al insisted that ADPC stop operating in the disputed areas. 
Sheikh Zayed, on the advice of the British Government125 , agreed to stop oil drilling 
but refused to agree to the territorial claim, especially the claim to the Buraimi 
oasis. 
The Foreign Office reacted strongly to Sheikh Zayed's visit to Riyadh because 
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it had been made without prior consultation with British officials. Sir Geoffrey 
Arthur expressed this feeling to N.D.J:Iamiidl during a meeting in the Foreign 
Office on 26 August 1970. He told him that "Sheikh Zayed's initiative to visit 
Saudi Arabia was without our consultation. I discovered that and informed the 
Foreign Office." 126 This over-sensitive reaction of the British Government was no 
doubt influenced by the withdrawal time-table, since any mistake by Zayed could 
provoke trouble that might disturb the withdrawal schedule.127 Furthermore the 
British Government had her own plans to solve the Buraimi dispute through the 
mediation of Sir William Luce. 
Throughout his Gulf tours, in 1970-71, Sir William Luce visited Riyadh reg-
ularly. His primary concern was to seek Riyadh's help in establishing a Federation 
of the Emirates, to enrol Saudi Arabia in Gulf security and to solve the Buraimi 
dispute. During his first meeting with King Fay~al in August 1970 Luce was sur-
prised by Fay~al's determination. Sir Geoffrey Arthur in conversation with N. D. 
J:lamudi, the Abu Dhabi Government official stated:130 
Sir William Luce's talks with King Fayfi!al were not encouraging. The King is 
hard and immovable. It looks as if there will be no solution unless Abu Dhabi makes 
some concessions by relinquishing Buraimi or Khaur al- 'Udaid, because Saudi Arabia 
refused to make any settlement without some concessions, especially in the western 
part of the disputed area. It is not an easy job because the King cannot come out of 
it empty-handed. 
It looks as if the British officials were sympathizing with King Fay!?al by 
pressing Abu Dhabi to relinquish part of her territory as a face-saving formula 
for the King. Sir William and other British officials tried to find a diplomatic 
solution to the long-standing dispute by shuttling between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh. 
In October 1970, Sir Antony Acland and Sir Stephen Egerton from the Arabian 
Department in the Foreign Office also visited both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi as part of 
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the Luard Mission. (Evan Luard was the Labour Minister of State who had visited 
the Gulf in May 1970). During their discussions with Abu Dhabi Government 
officials they warned them that they should "Tell Sheikh Zayed that time is not on 
his side because after withdrawal Saudi Arabia can occupy it [Buraimi] by force." 129 
At the same time they explained the situation in Saudi Arabia and indicated that 
King Fayf?al might possibly return to the 1949 proposal which claimed most of Abu 
Dhabi territory. They urged Abu Dhabi to seize the opportunity now:130 
The King is strong, but there is some opposition to his proposal from the 
younger princes. If Abu Dhabi neglects him, he might believe the princes and with-
draw his proposal. There is a genuine opposition to the King, no doubt of that. 
This caused considerable concern to the Abu Dhabi Government and so, with 
the approval of the British, they sent an envoy that met Prince Nawwaf bin 'Abd 
al-'Aziz AI Sa'fid, King Fayf?al's brother and personal advisor, and his advisor 
Nuri Ibrahim on October 10-12, 1970. The purpose of the meeting between Prince 
Nawwaf and Abu Dhabi officials was to find common ground for serious negotia-
tions over the dispute. Nuri Ibrahim explained the King's position with regard to 
the dispute to N.D. l:lamudP31 
The King wanted a settlement but he does not want to be seen by the younger 
princes and the Saudi military officers as giving up in the face of a small emirate. Some 
of those young princes wanted to retain their right by force, but the King is stopping 
them. He always says to them that he does not believe in military force against 
Arab brothers. He seriously wanted a solution to the problem as soon as possible. 
The King, because of old age and many responsibilities, is now also becoming more 
impatient. 
This description of King Fayf?al by Nuri Ibrahim was meant as a hint to the 
Abu Dhabi officials that the King might let the younger princes invade Abu Dhabi. 
However during the meeting with Prince Nawwaf, the Prince blamed the British 
for all the complications of the Buraimi dispute. He explained that by saying:132 
The British have complicated the issue because every now and then they express 
contradictory opinions. They extended the problem, that was limited to the Buraimi 
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oasis, to include al- 'Udaid. What they were looking for was oil but in the end they 
did not find any. 
Then Prince Nawwaf explained why Saudi Arabia insisted on negotiating with 
Abu Dhabi over Buraimi, and why the King could not easily give it up :133 
As a matter offact, my brother, praise to Allah that we do not need oil because 
we have the biggest reserve in the World and we do not want to oppress anyone. 
Besides, we in the Gulf should not follow our emotions; that is how we lost Palestine. 
On the contrary, we should cooperate. The dispute with Abu Dhabi is an obstacle to 
our cooperation. In the proposal that we offered to Sheikh Zayed there were specific 
points that we demanded and in return we gave up most of our previous demands. 
The King was not unopposed when he made these concessions. Clearly, after the 
dispute in 1952 that was known to everybody, it is difficult for the King to be seen by 
his brothers and public opinion as giving up Saudi rights. As a result, the King must 
get something in return. He gave you all the disputed areas, including the oil-rich 
area, and what we want is just a corridor to the sea for our oil pipelines and for other 
purposes. 
J.B. Kelly has stated that Sheikh Zayed agreed to provide transit rights 
through Abu Dhabi territory for Saudi pipelines but that the Saudis rejected this 
offer. 134 As a matter of fact the Saudis wanted Khaur al- 'U daid not so much for 
oil terminals but more for internal security reasons. It is not correct, however, 
as Alkim suggested that Saudi Arabia wanted Khaur al- 'Udaid because of the 
Saudis' aspiration to be the predominant power in the region135 , for it seems clear 
that Saudi Arabia wanted it for internal security reasons rather than economic or 
strategic ones. This last point was clarified by Nuri Ibrahim to Mr. l:lamudi in a 
separate meeting in October 1970:136 
Nun said that Prince Nawwaf has stated that there is opposition to the King 
because as he [Nuri] knows, there is strong opposition to the points that he agreed 
to in the Saudi proposal. Genuine opposition had come from junior members of the 
royal family as well as from junior military officers. What they complain about is 
why the Saudi government should give so much account to a little emirate. It is 
understandable that we could seize it by force if we wait until the British withdrawal 
and after that we could divide the whole area between us and Iran. However the King 
personally accepted the responsibility to solve the dispute. As a result he must gain 
something out of it which he can show to the people, as Prince Nawwa.f has said. He 
is not after oil, but he really wanted a corridor to the sea for an oil pipeline and for 
other reasons. Given such a corridor we should have an alternative route by which 
troops could intervene, in the event of a crisis in Dhammam. 
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Here again, Saudi officials were reiterating the same argument that had been 
used before in negotiations with Abu Dhabi officials. It is doubtful whether there 
was in fact any serious opposition to King Fayf?al with regard to Buraimi and, as 
Mr. ~amiidi stated to the present writer, "the truth is that the King was more 
difficult than anyone" in regard to Buraimi. For example, during an official visit to 
Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi's envoy heard some sharp words from the King. Al,lmad 
bin ~amed and N.D. ~amiidi seeking King Fayf?al's blessing for the federation 
were told in strong language: "I have been always a supporter of the federation 
and I always will be, so what more do you want me to do? Do you want me to 
start beating the drums? Why are you raising a strong army and frightening your 
neighbours with it ?." 137 
A corridor to the sea, west of Sabkhat Mati, (see Map 7.1) would have enabled 
Saudi Arabia to seek outside help (from the Americans for instance) ifthe northern 
parts of the upper Gulf happened to fall into enemy hands through, say, a Shi 'at 
uprising in the Eastern Province. 
Furthermore, Saudi Government insistence on Khaur al- 'Udaid could be be-
cause of their principles. The humiliation inflicted upon the Saudis in 1955 by the 
British RAF and the TOS were not forgotten by King Fay~al and the presence of 
refugees from Buraimi in his country were always a reminder to him. The Buraimi 
issue was thus an issue of pride and principles. Saleem al-Luzi quoted a Saudi 
official who told him that "The problem between us and Abu Dhabi is not a ter-
ritorial question we have a huge country, nor is it an oil problem because we have 
plenty, but a problem of honour." 138 
Sir William Luce came to Riyadh in January 1971 and, as Frank Brenchley 
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an ex-Foreign Office diplomat pointed out, he presented a compromise solution 
to King Fay~al139 , although neither Brenchley nor Balfour-Paul have given any 
details of the proposal.140 Burrell has suggested that "In January 1971, the British 
Government is reported to have suggested the creation of a neutral zone, similar 
to those previously in existence between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, in the crucial 
area and for the equal sharing of profits from the exploitation of any oil found" 141 , 
in which case the British Government had repeated the 1964 proposal with minor 
amendments. Sheikh Zayed was again pressed to make concessions but it seems 
that they were not enough to win Fay~al's approval. The question to be raised 
here is why did the British Government go back on its policy towards Buraimi 
stablished in the 1950s. 
The change in Britain's position over Buraimi from that of strong support 
for the Ruler of Abu Dhabi in the fifties, to one which urged him to make some 
concessions to Saudi Arabia, apparently stemmed from several factors. The first 
factor was Britain's intention to withdraw from the Gulf by the end of 1971 and 
thus any strong support for Sheikh Zayed over Buraimi would probably disturb 
the withdrawal schedule. 
The second factor may have been Britain's concern over her economic interests 
in Saudi Arabia. The 1950s dispute had manifestly affected Britain's commercial 
relations with Saudi Arabia: for instance, at the time of the restoration of diplo-
matic relations in 1963 there were only six British businessmen resident in Jeddah 
and none elsewhere in the whole Kingdom. 142 Thus Britain, which was leaving the 
Gulf anyhow, did not want to lose the Saudi market which was huge in comparison 
with Abu Dhabi. The last British Political Agent in the Trucial States, Julian 
Walker, put it this way: 143 
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Britain certainly regarded Saudi Arabia as a profitable market but, at least 
until 1971, she retained very strong political and commercial links with Abu Dhabi. 
After British withdrawal from the Gulf there was a tendency for the British to neglect 
the nurturing of her relationships with the Gulf states and to look on the area of the 
Arabian Peninsula from a commercial basis only. 
Accordingly, there was a shift of emphasis in British foreign policy towards 
the Gulf from a close connection with the Gulf emirates to a policy that was built 
on commercial relations with the whole region. Mr. l:lamudi, Adviser to the Abu 
Dhabi Government, explained the impact of that on Abu Dhabi as follows: 144 
During the period before federation, Sheikh Zayed had to face, for the first 
time on his own, many problems of an international character. Furthermore, most 
of his neighbours were causing problems: Iran had seized the Islands, Iraq refused 
to recognize the federation and Saudi Arabia revived the Buraimi dispute. Britain, 
which had defended Abu Dhabi for so many years, took a pro-Saudi stand on Buraimi 
after it had decided to depart from the area. British officials also extended pressure 
on Abu Dhabi to concede to the Saudi demands. 
Britain's role of intermediary between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia was in fact 
more one of putting pressure on Abii Dhabi. For example, during Sheikh Zayed's trip 
to Tehran, the British Political Agent had followed him there and had said to him 
"We heard that you are not going to accept the points of King Fay~al's proposal. I 
am afraid that if he received such news he might go back to his original claim, which 
was for two thirds of Abu Dhabi. 
The reason for Britain's change pf attitude towards Abu Dhabi was that British 
interests in Saudi Arabia had begun to grow, because it is a huge country with 
numerous contracts and business opportunities. What the British were saying was 
that they wanted Sheikh Zayed to concentrate on his internal affairs. 
The third factor was the reassessment of security in the Gulf after the with-
drawal (see Twin Pillars). Britain did not want to provoke King Fay!jal since he 
along with the Shah, was crucial in filling the vacuum that the withdrawal of 
British troops would inevitably create. Evan Luard, the Labour Foreign Minis-
ter, expressed this feeling after a visit to the Gulf in April 1970. He told a press 
conference in Kuwait: 145 
What I have seen and heard everywhere in the Gulf area is the complete trust 
in, and reliance on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to create peace and hope for the 
region. It is a fact that I cannot deny. 
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However one cannot be sure whether or not Saudi Arabia had linked her 
willingness to cooperate in the Gulf security system with the actual Buraimi issue. 
Al-lfawiidith reported that during the visit of the Saudi Minister of the Interior, 
Prince Fahad, to London in December 1970, the Prince threatened British officials: 
"you took Buraimi from us in the fifties and we expect you to return it before your 
withdrawal unless you do not wish to keep good relations with us." 146 
The fourth factor could have been that Britain needed King Fay~?al's help in 
persuading the Emirates to form the federation. The King, unlike the Shah of 
Iran, did not express publicly any linkage between Buraimi and the establishment 
of the federation. On the contrary, he had despatched his brother Prince N awwaf 
with Sheikh $aha~)., the Foreign Minister of Kuwait, to encourage the rulers of the 
Emirates to form a union among themselves (for the Saudi-Kuwaiti mission see 6.2). 
The King was not threatening to use force to take over Buraimi as the Shah was 
doing over the Islands. Presumably this was because the King was not prepared 
to risk military confrontation with another monarchical regime because it would 
be seen first as an example of bullying and secondly might disturb the stability of 
the area. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia did not recognize the UAE federation until 
the Buraimi issue was solved in 1974. 
The fifth factor might have been due to the American role in the Buraimi 
dispute. US officials were mostly concerned about the stability of the region in the 
face of any radical revolutionary movements like that of Dhofar. This concern was 
expressed by the American mission that toured the Gulf in January 1971. During 
a meeting in Abu Dhabi with two American officials, Frank Shakespere and David 
Nalle, the Abu Dhabi officials had sought the help of the U.S. with regard to 
Buraimi by putting pressure on Saudi Arabia. The American official, David Nalle, 
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inquired whether Sheikh Zayed's concession over Buraimi was going to create any 
internal problems for him or not. 147 This demonstrates that US concern was for 
the stability of the region. Since the Saudis had already explained to them how 
dangerous it would be for Fayf?al to give in, the American officials hinted that it 
would be much easier for Sheikh Zayed to make concessions over Buraimi. In other 
words, the Saudi King could not withdraw his claim over Buraimi because he would 
then face some opposition, whereas Sheikh Zayed had full control of the situation 
and was unlikely to be criticized for any action he took. Thus, any compromise on 
the part of Sheikh Zayed would not create political problems for him as it would 
do for the King. 148 In addition to direct contact between US officials and officials 
from Abu Dhabi, it may well be that the US also sought to influence Britain to 
persuade Sheikh Zayed to cooperate on the Buraimi issue. 
In conclusion, the Buraimi dispute was a thorn in Saudi-Emirates relations 
until it was eventually solved in August 1974 (see map 7.3). However, throughout 
the negotiations Abu Dhabi officials blamed the British authorities for attempting 
to put pressure on them to give in to the Saudis. That was seen as a betrayal of the 
long period of friendship and protection that had existed between Britain and Abu 
Dhabi, and consequently the commercial relationship between them was impaired 
for a short time. However, the efforts of British officials over Buraimi were not in 
vain because the 197 4 agreement was in fact based on suggestions similar to those 
put forward by Sir William Luce in 1971.149 
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CONCLUSION 
In January 1968 the British Labour Government announced its decision to 
withdraw from the Gulf by the end of 1971. The withdrawal decision thus ter-
minated Britain's special position in the Gulf that dated back to 1820, when the 
rulers of the area entered into an agreement with Britain that secured her routes 
to India. In 1892 the rulers signed other agreements allowing Britain to look after 
their defence and foreign policy. Thus British supremacy in the Gulf was closely 
bound up with British rule in India. However, even though India became indepen-
dent in 1947 the British special position in the Gulf survived for more than another 
twenty years. The reasons for remaining in the Gulf after 1947 were economic. For 
the first time in its modern history the Gulf had become of prime importance not 
because of its geographical position but for what it contained: oil. 
Therefore the security of the oil supply to Britain and indeed to western Eu-
rope, and the investment of the oil companies in the Gulf were of prime importance 
for the British Government. That probably motivated Britain to create some insti-
tutions such as the Trucial Oman Scouts (TOS) in 1951, the Trucial States Council 
in 1952, and the Trucial States Development Office (TSDO) in 1965. Furthermore, 
the oil concessions prompted the British authorities to define precisly the bound-
aries of the Sheikhdoms and to appoint British Political Agents instead of the Arab 
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agents. In addition after the 1961 Kuwait operation, Britain expanded its military 
bases in Bahrain, Sharjah and on Masirah island off Oman. 
But with the civil war in Yemen, rebellion in Aden, the Imamate war in 
Oman and the Dhofar revolution Britain could hardly keep the Gulf as isolated 
as before and nationalism was finding its way into the area. For example, in 1964 
Sheikh $aqr, ruler of Sharjah, welcomed an Arab League delegation and accepted 
their offer of an economic development programme for his emirate and the other 
non-oil producing emirates of the Trucial States. The British officials interpreted 
the Arab League involvement in the Emirates as a direct threat to their position 
and believed that this new development ought to be stopped. Accordingly, the 
second delegation in 1965 was not permitted to land in Sharjah and Sheikh $aqr 
was deposed as a consequence. 
Whereas Taryam and al-Mutawa have concentrated on the strength of the 
role of nationalism in influencing the British withdrawal, this thesis has revealed 
few manifestations of Arab nationalism in the Trucial States. However, the British 
officials who were influenced by their experience in the South Arabia Federation 
(Aden and the Protectorates) may have concluded that prolonging the British 
presence in the Gulf might lead to the same situation as had occurred in Aden. It 
could be argued that after its experience in the South Arabian Federation Britain 
sought to develop the Emirates in order to prepare for the eventual withdrawal of 
British troops. While unable to withdraw the British troops at that time Britain 
sought to create and introduce an invironment that would make such a policy 
possible in the future. 
The most important preparation was the economic development of the Trucial 
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States. In 1965 the Trucial States Development Office was established with the 
purpose of developing the non-oil producing northern emirates of Sharjah, Ajman, 
Umm al-Qaiwain, Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah. The other two emirates of Dubai 
and Abu Dhabi were rich so they did not need financial help but they did need 
encouragement and guidance. In contrast to the ruler of Dubai, the ruler of Abu 
Dhabi, Sheikh Shakhbiit, rejected British advice and refused to cooperate with the 
Political Agent in developing his emirate and to share his oil wealth with other 
poorer emirates. The reason for his stance was probably influenced by the earlier 
British role over l:laliil island that was a subject of dispute with Qatar and not, 
as many writers have argued, Shakhbiifs eccentricity. In 1966 Sheikh Sha\<,hbiit 
was deposed by Britain and his brother Sheikh Zayed replaced him. During the 
latter era Abu Dhabi and indeed the rest of the Trucial States witnessed a massive 
economic transformation. 
Besides the economic development of the Trucial States, the British officials 
sought to prepare the area in various other fields for eventual independence; open-
ing up the emirates to international contacts especially with the Arab world; en-
couraging the rulers to establish their own police and military forces; and retro-
ceeding some legal responsibilities to the rulers' courts. However, there were some 
problems associated with such policies, in particular illegal immigration and the 
creation of various defence forces which threatned internal stability, and these were 
not solved by Britain. They remained problems for the new federation. 
Before the withdrawal Britain also encouraged the oil companies and other 
British firms working in the Emirates to rely on their own methods of survival 
instead of the British Government's influence and protection. The oil companies 
and the long established British firms in the Emirates welcomed this policy be-
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cause they realized that they could build on the advantages that they had acquired 
over the years, for example their personal connection with the various ruling fam-
ilies. Furthermore, British companies such as the British Bank of the Middle East 
had realized that the withdrawal policy would encourage the rulers to allocate a 
considerable amount of funds in order to establish the new state and that these 
companies were in a good position to gain lucrative contracts. 
Finally before the withdrawal Britain introduced certain important political 
arrangements and territorial settlements. The federation of the nine Arab emi-
rates of the Gulf that included the seven Trucial States, together with Bahrain 
and Qatar was Britain's first priority, but when that aim became impossible in 
June 1971, the seven Trucial States were encouraged to form their smaller federa-
tion. Heard-Bey and other writers allege that Britain expected from the beginning 
that the federation of the nine would fail, but if that was the case then it is difficult 
to understand the continued efforts of the British officials to achieve a federation 
of the nine. Nevertheless it must be emphasized that certain British policies to-
wards the region before the withdrawal period made it more difficult for Britain 
to introduce a new political structure to prepare for eventual independence. For 
example when it created a quasi-federal institution, the Trucial States Council in 
1952, Bahrain and Qatar were not included. Indeed rivalry between Qatar and 
Bahrain continued throughout the federation discussions. In addition, for many 
years it was the British Government's policy to encourage only limited cooperation 
and links between the emirates, even when the rulers requested certain forms of 
federation. Therefore when the decision was made to withdraw, previous policies 
carried out by the British seriously undermined the British attempt to introduce 
a new stronger federal structure. 
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The British role in the establishment of the smaller federation of the seven 
was completely ignored by Taryam who emphasized its Arab roots. However, by 
comparing the Basic Law (which was drawn up by the Trucial States Council's le-
gal adviser and thus was under British supervision) with the Emirates' provisional 
constitution one can appreciate a considerable British influence. Furthermore, af-
ter Bahrain and Qatar were allowed to seek unilateral independence Sir William 
Luce, the British adviser on the Gulf, warned the seven Trucial States that Britain 
was not prepared to recognize any emirate outside the federation. The only way for 
the small non-oil producing emirates to survive was through cooperation with the 
oil rich emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Sheikh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah did not 
accept the dominance of Dubai and Abu Dhabi and therefore refused to sign the 
provisional constitution on 18th July 1971 (Ras al-Khaimah did not join the Fed-
eration until February 1972). In December 1971 the formation of the United Arab 
Emirates was announced with a federal structure which left substantial powers in 
the hands of the individual emirates. 
The territorial settlements of Bahrain, 'funbs, Abu Musa and Buraimi were 
part of Britain's aim to leave a stable Gulf after its withdrawal. Although the Shah 
of Iran's long-standing claim to Bahrain was eventually solved through the United 
Nations in May 1970, he then claimed the islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs 
in the Gulf. This thesis argues that British officials played an important role in 
negotiations with the Shah over both of these issues. In these negotiations the 
Shah was permitted to take over the small islands in return for giving up Bahrain. 
After all, the British saw no vital economic interests in the small islands and Ras 
al-Khaimah and Sharjah, the owners of the Tunbs and Abu Musa respectively, 
were poor emirates. They offered no significant opportunities for British firms so 
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provoking them was not a great loss. Furthermore, it seems that Britain was con-
vinced by the Shah's argument that leaving these strategically important islands 
in the hands of weak emirates was dangerous for the security of oil shipments. He 
argued that the Gulf would be more secure if these islands were under Iranian 
control. 
The Buraimi dispute was another territorial settlement that witnessed a com-
plete change of policy by the British Government. In 1955 Britain carried out a 
military operation against the Saudi garrison in Buraimi to express her strong sup-
port for the ruler of Abu Dhabi in the dispute, but in 1970-71 Britain was pressing 
Abu Dhabi to compromise with Saudi Arabia. The reasons for Britain's change 
of heart were that Saudi Arabia was a much bigger country than Abu Dhabi and 
thus had more opportunites for British businessmen. At the same time Britain was 
seeking King Fay!?al's cooperation with Iran over Gulf security, so Britain did not 
want to provoke the King over the Buraimi issue. But since Sheikh Zayed refused 
to give in the Buraimi dispute was not solved until 1974. 
The key finding that this research stresses is that the British withdrawal from 
the Gulf in 1971 was a policy that was carried out because Britain sought to 
establish a different basis of stability in the area. Through economic development 
of the emirates; transfer of legal and internal security to the Sheikhdoms; the ability 
of the oil companies and other British firms to establish their relations with the 
host emirates on a new basis; establishment of the Federation; settlements of most 
of the territorial disputes; and encouragement of Iranian and Saudi cooperation 
through the twin pillars system, Britain endeavoured to build a new era of stability 
in the Gulf which did not require the presence of the British troops. 
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Suggestions for future research 
This study has attempted to study the British withdrawal from the Gulf in 
1971. But throughout the research we found that there are interesting subjects 
which need more concentrated work. In addition to general research on the British 
policy toward the area post withdrawal, we suggest the following topics for further 
study. 
1. The Oil Companies in the Emirates: 
The history and role of the oil companies working in the Emirates such as 
ADMA, ADPC and Dubai Petroleum Company offers a number of interesting 
aspects. For example in the other oil-producing countries the oil companies had 
to fight to save their concessions, but in Abu Dhabi the oil companies willingly 
gave up part of their concessions and invited Sheikh Sha~hbut to accept the 50-50 
profit sharing arrangements. This probably shows that the relations between the 
oil companies and the Emirates were significantly different from those in other 
Middle Eastern countries. 
2. The British Companies in the Emirates 
In the specific case of the British companies working in the Emirates apart 
from the oil companies, more research is required into the effect of the withdrawal 
on these companies. Also desirable is a study of the British companies that were 
established in the Emirates before 1971 such as Costain and the British Bank of 
the Middle East, and their position after the withdrawal. This study covered a 
relatively short period of time and future research is needed to see how the with-
drawal affected these companies in the long term and whether they were capable 
of continuing to dominate the market. 
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3. The Political Agents' role 
The British Political Agents, Political Residents, military advisers and other 
British personalities were closely involved in the affairs of the Emirates. Their role 
was an importance and a study is urgently needed based on interviews with all the 
available former British officials before they pass away or their memories grow dim. 
Indeed recording their wide experience could provide much valuable knowledge for 
future historians of the area. 
4. The Trucial States Development Office 
This subject is unavoidable for anyone making a study of the economic devel-
opment of the Emirates. But so far there is no study that adequately addresses this 
issue. A synthesis of the documents that are becoming available through the Pub-
lic Records Office in London and through the Cultural Foundation in Abu Dhabi, 
together with interviews with the handful of former Arab and British employees 
could form the basis for useful research. 
5. T.O.S. 
We should point out that the Trucial Oman Scouts (TOS) was the first or-
ganised institution that covered the whole Emirates, although as far as one can 
tell there is no study of this distinguished military establishment. A study that 
covers its role since it was established in 1951 until it became part of the Emirates 
defence force in 1971 would have a wider readership, well beyond academic circles. 
However, the location of the TOS documents is uncertain with the exception of 
those in the Public Records Office. Nevertheless, an important source of informa-
tion for such a study could be interviews with the former British and Arab officers 
who served in the TOS. 
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6. The role of the Arab advisers 
In the 1960s a substantial number of Arab advisers were employed by various 
rulers. The Arab advisers played an important role in shaping the Emirates' 
policies and in establishing various institutions. Thus to study their role, who 
appointed them and how far they influenced the Emirates would be an interesting 
and important subject. Documentary sources are limited but it was found that 
some of them accumulated private files of letters and documents which remain in 
their possession. Identifying these documents and interviewing those Arab advisers 
who are still alive could enrich our knowledge and expand our understanding of 
important aspects of the political life of the Emirates. 
396 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Official Documents: 
- Abu Dhabi Government, Abu Dhabi Office in London. "Notes on Abu Dhabi 
1970." 5th ed. London, June 1970. 
- Abu Dhabi Government, Director of Planning and Co-ordination. Five-Year 
Development Plan 1968-1972. 
- Abu Dhabi Government, Ministry of Education, Statistical Abstracts 1971-
1972. 
- Abu Dhabi Government, Department of Information and Tourism. "Federa-
tion of Arab Emirates: A Report." Abu Dhabi, 24.10.1970. 
- Abu Dhabi Government, Department of Information and Tourism, "Abu 
Dhabi: Development and Progress." Abu Dhabi, May 1969. 
- Abu Dhabi Government, Documentation and Research Centre. "Abu Dhabi: 
On the fifth anniversary of His Highness the ruler of the Emirate." Abu Dhabi, 
1971. 
- Abu Dhabi Government, Information Department. "Press Release." No. 2. 
Abu Dhabi, 20.10.1969. 
397 
- Abu Dhabi Government, Petroleum Department. Petroleum and Industry in 
Abu Dhabi. Book Two, 1971. 
- "Abu Dhabi Island: Survey Development Plan and Report." Prepared by Sir 
William Halcrow and Partners, Scott and Wilson, Kirkpatrick and Partners. 
London, May 1962. 
- Abu Dhabi T.V., "press conference of Sheikh Zayed." Abu Dhabi, 5th Dec., 
1989. 
- ADCO, Oil: A dream comes true. Abu Dhabi, 1989. 
- Air 20/9886, "Possible Implications of Operation Musketeer in the Middle 
East". Report by the Joint Planning Staff, 21.8.1956. 
- Air 20/9886, Telegram no. 171, "Reinforcement of Persian Gulf', 30.8.1856. 
- Al-Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah li TaJ,uir al-Khalij al-'Arab I al-Mu~tal, "'fa~awur 
al-l:larakah al- Wa~aniyyah wa-1 'U.mmaliyyah fi-1 Khalij al- 'Arabi al-Mu~tal." 
(the development of the National and Labours movement in the occupied 
Arabian Gulf). Aden: Ma~ba't al-l:la~, n.d. 
- BDU 2/30, Letter from H.M. Political Resident in Bahrain, Mr. G. H. Mid-
dleton to Sheikh Shakhbut, ruler of Abu Dhabi. Bahrain, 21.12.1960. 
- BDU 2/31, Letter from Mr. C. G. Mann, Acting Political Resident, Bahrain 
to Sheikh Shakhbut bin Sultan, ruler of Abu Dhabi. Bahrain, 16.5.1961. 
- BDU 2/31, Letter from Sir William Luce, H.M. Political Resident, Bahrain 
to Sheikh Shakhbut, ruler of Abu Dhabi. Bahrain, 27.5.1961. 
- BDU 2/31, Letter from Sheikh Shakhbut to Sir William Luce. Abu Dhabi, 
398 
5.6.1961. 
- BDU 2/32, Letter from W. H. Luce, H.M. Political Resident, Bahrain, to 
Sheikh Shakhbiit, ruler of Abu Dhabi. Bahrain, 26.2.1962. 
- BDU 2/32, Letter from Sheikh Shakhbiit bin Sultan to Sir William Luce. Abu 
Dhabi, 6.3.1962. 
- BDU 2/33, Letter from R.A. Butler, H.M. Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs to Prince Fay~al bin Abdul 'Aziz Al Saud, Viceroy of Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. London, 14.8.1964, (confidential). 
- BDU 2/43, Banking Agreement between the ruler of Abu Dhabi and the 
British Bank of the Middle East. Abu Dhabi, 7.3.1958. 
- BDU 2/46, AD1, Letter from Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd. 
to Sheikh Shakhbiit bin Sultan bin Zaid, ruler of Abu Dhabi, signed by R. E. 
Bird. Abu Dhabi, 28.10.1960. 
- BDU 2/46, AD2, Letter from Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd. 
to Sheikh Shakhbiit bin Sultan bin Zaid, ruler of Abu Dhabi, signed by R. E. 
Bird. Abu Dhabi, 28.10.1960. 
- BDU 14/75, Letter from M.C.G. Man, Acting Political Resident, Bahrain to 
Sheikh Rashid bin Humaid al-Nu 'ymi, ruler of Ajman. Bahrain, 13.8.1959. 
- BDU 14/119, letter from Sir William Luce, H.M. Political Resident Bahrain 
to Sheikh Rashid bin Sa'td ruler of Dubai. Bahrain, 27.5.1961. 
- BDU 14/119, Letter from Sheikh Rashid bin Sa'Id, ruler of Dubai to Mr. J. 
Craig, H.M. Political Agent in the Trucial States. Dubai, 10.5.1962. 
399 
- BDU 14/119, Letter from H.M. Political Agent, Mr. J. Craig to Sheikh 
Rashid, ruler of Dubai. Dubai, 3.2.1963. 
- BDU 15/117, Letter from J.P. Tripp, H.M. Political Agent Trucial States to 
Sheikh Sa 'td Bin Maktum ruler of Dubai and Sheikh Rashid bin Sa 'td Regent 
of Dubai. Dubai, 2.4.1956. 
- BDU 15/117, Letter from Sheikh Sa'Id bin Maktum All:lasher to C.M. Pire-
Gordon, Political Agent, Trucial States. Dubai, 18.3.1955. 
- BDU 15/117, Letter from Sa•Id bin Maktum to Mr. Peter Tripp. Dubai 
5.6.1956. 
- BDU 15/126, Banking Agreement between the Sheikh of Dubai and the Im-
perial Bank of Iran. Dubai, 5.1.1946. 
• BDU 15/127, supplement to the Banking Agreement. Dubai, 5.6.1946. 
- British Embassy, Commercial Department, "British Firms List: Abu Dhabi." 
Abu Dhabi, November 1985. 
- British Ministry of Overseas Development, Middle East Development Divi-
sion, British Embassy, "an Economic Survey of the Northern Trucial States," 
vols. 1 and 2. Beirut, July 1969. 
- British Government, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Department of 
Trade and Industry. "British Private Investment in Developing Countries." 
London: H.M.S.O, April, 1971. Cmnd. 4656. 
• CAB 28/30, CM24(56), " Middle East". 
- COMET, "Report of the British Trade Mission to Aden." December, 1963. 
400 
- COMET, "Report of the British Trade Mission to Kuwait, the Gulf States, 
Muscat and Oman." London, November 1964. 
- COMET, "Britain and the Middle East." London, 1984. 
- F 9/1, Defence Committee: Report ofthe Advisory Mission on Defence to the 
Union of Arab Emirates, By Major-General Sir John Willoughby. 20.4.1969. 
(Secret). 
- F 9/1, The Joint-Communique of the Militery Committee for the Represen-
tation of the Union of the Emirates. Bahrain, 15-16. 6.1969. 
- F 9/1, Letter to Robert McNamara, President and Chairman of the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Washington, D.C., U.S.A., 
signed by Sheikh Khalifah bin I,Iamad Al Thani, President of the Provisional 
Federation Council. Doha, 11.12.1968. 
- F 11/16, Memorandum containing Bahrain's reply in regarding the establish-
ment of the Federation Council in accordance with each Emirate's percentage 
of population. Written by I,Iasan Kamil adviser to the Government of Qatar. 
- F 11/17, A statement issued by the Government of Ras al-Khaimah. Ras 
al-Khaimah, 20. 7.1971. 
- F 11/19, Memorandum Containing Sir William Luce's suggestions regard-
ing the proposals on the Constitution of the Union of Arab Emirates by 
Saudi/Kuwaiti Mission, May 1971. 
- F 11/24, Memorandum containing Dubai's remarks on the constitution draft, 
signed by Maktfim b. Rashid, the Crown Prince of Dubai. Dubai, 28.6.1970. 
401 
- F 14/7, Letter from Mo}:lammad bin l:lamed Al-Sharqi, ruler of Fujairah to 
Sheikh Zayed, ruler of Abu Dhabi. Fujairah, 9.7.1971. 
- FO 370/120567, EA 1052.11, Draft by D.M. Riches, 10.11.1956. 
- FO 370/120567, EA 1052.2, Bahrain reaction to British Policy, from Sir. B. 
Burrows, 31.10.1956. 
- FO 371/120567,EA 1052.4, Telegram no. 965 from Sir. B. Burrows, 2.11.1956. 
- FO 371/120525, American views on Buraimi and Oman, draft paper written 
by D.R., n.d. (secret). 
- FO 371/91260, Letter from the Political Agent in Kuwait to the Political 
Residency in Bahrain, 6.10.1951. 
- FO 371/120561, EA 1031613 Letter to Sir Bernard Burrows from H. Julian, 
Foreign Office, 19.1.1956. (Confidential). 
- FO 371/120561, Letter from Sir Bernard Burrows to Selwyn Lloyd, Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs, (Confidential). Bahrain, 24.12.1955. 
- FO 371/12056, Egyptian influence in the Persian Gulf, by D.M.H. Riches, the 
Eastern Department, 24.4.1956. 
- FO 371/91348/119502, Middle East Report, 29.10.1951. 
- FO 371/91341/119420, Persia and Middle Eastern Oil, by P. Ramsbotham, 
11.10.1951. 
- FO 371/121370, EA 1053.8, Minute by A.D.M. Ross, "Persian Gulf: Instruc-
tion to Mr. Burrows on his appointment as Political Resident." 17.7.1953. 
402 
- FO 371/121234, Out ward Telegram From Commonwealth Relations Office, 
23.1.1956. (secret). 
- FO 371/121370 Sir Roger Makins' Report on the Persian Gulf. D.A. Greenhill, 
20.3.1953. 
- FO 371/121370 Letter from Sir Rupert Hay, British Residency Bahrain, to 
Sir Winston Churchill. Bahrain, 5.6.1953. 
- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, "The Economic De-
velopment of the Arab Gulf Emirates." Europe, Middle East and North Africa 
Department, March 1970. (Confidential) 
- Khalid, W. and Abish, Y. "King Saud Oath of Obedience to King Fay~?al." 
Arab Political Documents. Beirut American University of Beirut, 1965, p. 1. 
- London Chamber of Commerce, "Report of the Trade Mission to Abu Dhabi." 
London, April 1967. 
- "Memorial of the Government of Saudi Arabia: Arbitration for the Settlement 
of the Territorial Dispute between Muscat and Abu Dhabi on one side and 
Saudi Arabia on the other." Vol. 1 (Text) 31 July 1955. 
- MFA 1/3/3, Report on the UAE/UK relations. Abu Dhabi, 23.1.1988. 
- MFA File no. 12 Letter from Khalid bin Mo\lammad Al Qasmi, ruler of 
Sharjah and Dependancies to Sir William Luce, cfo H.M. Political Agent 
Dubai, Trucial States. Sharjah, 2.11.1971. 
- MFA 1/1/3, Government of Abu Dhabi, Ministry of Defence, Letter from the 
Ministry of Defence, to British Embassy in Abu Dhabi, Signed by Major Zaki 
403 
Shuwyhat, 7.6.1972. 
- MFA 1/1/3, letter from Major Buckingham, UAE Ministry of Defence to the 
Consul-General, British Embassy. Dubai, 21.6.1972. 
- MFA 1/1/3, letter from MAT, Sharjah to Ministry of Public Works, Dubai, 
written by Major R. B. Downs, 1.8.1972. 
- MFA 1/1/3, Letter from E.J. Treadwell, British Ambassador at in the UAE 
to the President of the UAE Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahayan. Abu 
Dhabi, March 1972, and its reply in MFA 1/1/3. Letter from Sheikh Zayed 
bin Sultan Al Nahayan, President of the UAE, to Mr. E.J. Treadwell, H.M. 
Ambassador to the UAE. Abu Dhabi, 15.3.1972. 
- MFA 1/1/3, Letter from the British Embassy in Abu Dhabi to the UAE 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Abu Dhabi, 27.5.1972. 
- MFA 1/1/3, Letter from UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs to UAE Ministry 
of Defence. Abu Dhabi, 3.5.1972. 
- MFA 1/1/3, Letter from the British Embassy in Abu Dhabi to UAE Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. Abu Dhabi, 10.6.1972. 
- MFA 1/1/3, Letter from the British Embassy in the UAE, to the UAE Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs. Abu Dhabi, 24.6.1972. 
- MFA 1/1/3, Letter from the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the British 
Embassy in the UAE. Abu Dhabi, 26.6.1972. 
- MFA 1/3/3, Letter from Mr. C.J. Treadwell, British Ambassador, Muscat, 
to Mr Qais al-Zawawi, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. Muscat, 1979. 
404 
- MFA 1/3/3, Letter from UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the British 
Embassy in the UAE. Abu Dhabi, 5.2.1972 . 
- MFA 1/3/3, Letter from the Economic Affairs Department to the Minister of 
State for Foreign Affairs. Abu Dhabi, 3.1.1989. 
- MFA 1/3/3, Commercial & Petroleum relations between the UAE and the UK 
in the Seventies of this century. Report prepared by Ali I:Iusain al-Abbii.di. 
Abu dhabi, January 1980. 
- MFA 1/6/2, UAE/Saudi Arabia boundaries agreement. 21.8.1974. 
- MFA, File no. 18, Statement of the People of Ras al-Khai. Ras al-Khaimah, 
2.12.71. 
- MFA, File no. 11, letter from Mol,J.ammad K. al-Sudwaydi, Abu Dhabi Gov-
ernment's Office, Sharjah to Al,J.amed K. al-Suwaydi, Minister for the Presi-
dential Affair, Abu Dhabi. Sharjah, 31.10.1971. 
- MFA, The Affairs of the Arab Islands on the Arabian Gulf. Abu Dhabi, 
28.5.1981. 
- Persian Gulf Gazettee (supplement) years 1959-1969. London: H.M.S.O. and 
H.M. Political Resident in the Gulf. 
- T 236/462, Letter from Sir D. Rickett to Mr. Petch, 29.8.1956. 
- T 236/4625, Paper on Canal Dues. 24.8.1956. 
- The Gulf Committee, "Documents of the National Struggle in Oman and the 
Arabian Gulf." 9th June Studies. London, 1974. 
405 
- The Gulf Committee, The Gulf Bulletin. No. 1. London, 1971. 
- The British and Foreign State Papers, 1967-68 vol. 169, "Nasser Address," 
Cairo 9th June 1967." London: H.M.S.O. 1969. 
- The National Bank of Dubai Limited, "Annual Account and Reports of the 
Directors." Dubai, 30.11.1967. 
- The Provisional Constitution of the UAE. Middle East Journal. vol. 26, no. 
3, 1972, pp. 307-325. 
- The UN Treaty Series, vol. 443, 1962, no. 6363. "Agreement concerning the 
creation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)." 
Baghdad, 14.9.1960. 
- Trucial States Council Report, 1969. Dubai, 1969. 
- Trucial Oman Scouts "Hand Book." 24.6.1969. 
- TSDO, Report on the Trucial states Development Fund for the First Financial 
Year, April 1965-March 1966. 
- TSDO, Round-up of News, March 1970. 
- TSDO, Newsletter of the Trucial States Council, issued by the Development 
Office, November and December 1970. 
- TSDO, Letter to Salih Farah, Government of Abu Dhabi, from Mr. C. B. 
Kendall, Director of the TSDO. Dubai, 4.6.1968. 
- TSDO, Letter from Salih Farah, Legal Adviser to the Abu Dhabi Government, 
to Mr. C. B. Kendall, Acting Director of the Development Office. Abu Dhabi, 
406 
12.6.1968. 
- TSDO, Letter from Mr. C. B. Kendall Acting Director of the TSDO, to Mr. 
Salih Farah, Legal Adviser to the Abu Dhabi Government. Dubai, 15.7.1968. 
- TSDO 23/1, Draft of the Provisional Basic Law of the Oman Coast. 
- TSDO 23/1, Notes regarding Immigration Law, 1971. 
- TSDO 23/5, Minutes of the Trucial States' Police Commissioners Meeting. 
Dubai, 25.3;1971. 
- TSDO 23/5, An Ordinance to make provision for the establishment of Public 
Security Council. Dubai, July 1971. 
- TSDO 23/5, Letter from N .D.I:Iamudi to the Minister of State, Abu Dhabi 
Government. Abu Dhabi, July 1971. 
- TSDO 23/5/1, Minutes of the First Session of the Trucial States' Police Com-
missioners. Dubai, 17.7.1967. 
- TSDO 23/6, Special Women's Ward al-Maktiim Hospital, 27 August 1968. 
• TSDO 23/6/1, Round up of New, for the Fortnight Ending 18th Oct. 1968. 
• TSDO 23/6/1, Commmunique signed by Sheikh Rashid, Sheikh Zayed and 
Sheikh Al~med bin Ali ruler of Qatar. Dubai, 18.2.1969. 
• TSDO 23/6/1, Record of Retrocession Meeting held on Tuesday. Dubai, 
20.7.1971. 
- TSDO 23/6/1, Communique issued by the TSC, Appendix C: Report of the 
Agricultural Adviser 1969, TSC'. Dubai, 3.3.1970. 
407 
- TSDO 23/6/1, The Economic Survey, Appendix B of the communique issued 
by the Trucial States Council at the 31st Ordinary Meeting. Dubai, 28.2.1970. 
- TSDO 23/6/2, Communique issued by the Secretariat of the Trucial States 
Council. Dubai, 13-14.3.1971. 
- TSDO 23/6/2, Report of the TSC's Secretariat, 10.7.1971. 
- TSDO 23/6/2, Report of the Chairmanship of the TSC, on the 33rd Session. 
Dubai, 10.7.1971. 
- TSDO 23/6/2, Report of the Presidential Council, Session 33. Dubai, 10.7.1971. 
- TSDO 23/6/2, Letter from Mr N ~amudi to the Minister of State regarding 
the 33 session of the TSC. Abu Dhabi, July 1971. (Top secret). 
- TSDO 23/6/2, Trucial States Council, Session 33rd. Dubai, 10.07.1971. 
- TSDO 23/6/2, Report issued by the Secretariat of the TSC. Dubai, 14.3.1971. 
- TSDO 23/6/3, Memorandum prepared by H.M. Political Agent, regarding 
the boundaries among the Trucial States. Dubai, 1968. 
- TSDO 23/6/3, Memorandum of jurisdiction Retrocession to Abu Dhabi. Abu 
Dhabi, 7.4.1971. 
- TSDO 23/7, Immigration Draft, no. (1). Dubai, 1971. (Secret). 
- TSDO 23/8, Minutes of the 29th Session of the TSC. Dubai, 2.9.1967. 
- TSDO 23/8, Report of the President of the TSC, Sheikh $aqr bin Mo}:lammad 
al-Qasimi to the Council. Dubai, 29.7.1967,. 
408 
- TSDO 23/8, Minutes of the lOth Session of the Deliberative Committee. 
Dubai, 31.1.1966. 
- TSDO 23/8, Minutes of the 20th Session of the Deliberative Committee. 
Dubai, 19.8.1967. 
- TSDO 23/8, Minutes of the 21st Session of the Deliberative Committee. 
Dubai, 7.2.1968. 
- TSDO 23/8, Minutes of the 28th Session of the TSC. Dubai, 6.4.1967. 
- TSDO 23/8, Minutes of the 19th Session of the Deliberative Committee. 
Dubai, 2.5.1967. 
- TSDO 23/8, Minutes of the 20th Session of the Deliberative Committee. 
Dubai, 19.8.1967. 
- TSDO 23/8, Minutes of the 21st Session of the Deliberative Committee. 
Dubai, 7.2.1968. 
- TSDO 23/8, Minutes of the 28th Session of the TSC. Dubai, 6.4. 1967. 
- TSDO 23/8, Minutes of the 29th Session of the TSC. Dubai, 29.8.1967. 
- TSDO 23/8/1, Minutes of the 27th Session of the TSC. Dubai, 16.11.1966. 
- TSDO 23/8/1, Minutes of the 24th Session of the TSC. Dubai, 23.11.1965. 
- TSDO 23/8/1, Minutes of the 25th Session of the TSC. Dubai, 2.3.1966. 
- TSDO 23/8/1, Distribution of Responsibility. Dubai, 1966. 
- TSDO 23/8/1, Munites of the 26th Session of the TSC. Dubai, 8.6. 1966. 
409 
- TSDO 23/8/2, Abu Dhabi Government , Amiri- Diwiin, the most important 
points in the first session of the immigration Abu Dhabi, 1.4.1971. (secret). 
- TSDO 23/8/2, Minutes of Immigration and Retrocession process. Abu Dhabi, 
1.4.1971. (Secret). 
- TSDO 23/8/4, Minutes of the Emergency Session of the TSC. Dubai, 6.6.1967. 
- TSDO 23/9, Letter from Sheikh Shakhbut bin Sultan AI Nahayan, ruler of 
Abu Dhabi to the General Secretary of the Trucial States Council, signed by 
William Clark, his private secretary. Abu Dhabi, 27.11.1966. 
- TSDO 23/9/4, Letter from J.F. Walker, H.M. Political Agent, Trucial States 
to Sheikh $aqr bin Mo~ammad al-Qasimi, ruler of Ras al-Khaimah. Dubai, 
11.11.1971. 
- TSDO, Official Bulletin, December 1971. 
- UK Government, Treaty Series, no. 34 (1971). Dubai, 1.12.1971. Cmnd. 
4941. 
- UK Government, Colonial Office, Accession of Aden to the Federation of 
South Arabia. London: H.M.S.O, 1962. 
- UK Government, Defence Estimate, 1968-69. London: H.M.S.O, 1968. 
- UK Government, Defence Estimate, 1967-68. London: H.M.S.O, 1967. 
- UK Government, Statment on the Defence Estimates, 1970. Cmnd, 4290. 
- UK Government, Treaty Series, no. 35 (1972). Dubai, 2.12.1971. Cmnd. 
4937. 
410 
- UK Government, 1936 Treaty, London: H.M.S.O. 1937. Cmnd. 5360, 
- UK Government, Statement on Defence Estimate. London: H.M.S.O. 1977. 
Cmnd. 6735. 
- UK Government, "Agreement regarding the Suez Canal Base signed in Cairo 
October 19 1954." London: H.M.S.O., 1955. Cmnd. 9298. 
- UK Government, "Agreement between the Government of the UK and North-
ern Ireland and the Egyptian Government regarding the Suez Canal base." 
London: H.M.S.O. 1955. Cmnd. 9586. 
- UK Government, House of Commons, various vols. 
- UN Year Book, 1965-1972. 
- U.S. Government, Public Papers of the Presidents of the U.S.: Richard Nixon, 
containing the public messages, speeches, and statements of the President 
1970. Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972. 
- Watt, D.C. and Mayall, J. ed. Current British Foreign Policy: Documents, 
Statements, Speeches. London: Temple Smith , 1973. 
- Zinner, Paul, ed. Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1958. New 
York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relation, Harper and Brothers, 
1959. 
Periodicals: 
- Al-Fil M.R. "Mushkilat al-ij:udud bayna Imarat al-Khalij." (The Boundaies 
disbutes amond the Emirates of the Gulf). Journal of the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula Studies, vol. 2, no.8, October 1976. pp. 25-64. 
411 
- Al-Najjar, M.A. "The East India Company: Features and Influences in the 
Arabian Gulf." Journal of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies, vol. iv, 
no. 15, July 1978, pp. 101-111. 
- Al-Thawadi, M. "Alwaqi' al-Ijtima 'l wa Nidal- Assyasi." (The Social Reality 
and the Political Struggle). Al- Talia, vol. 8, no. 3, March 1972, pp. 44-48. 
- Allen, R., "Arabs cannot drink their oil." Twentieth Century, 179 (1048) 1972, 
pp. 12-15. 
- Anthony, J.D. "The Union of Arab Amirates." The Middle East Journal, vol. 
26, no. 3, Summer 1972, pp. 271-287. 
- Balfour-Paul, G. "Recent Development in the Persian Gulf." Royal Central 
Asian Journal, vol. vi, Feb. 1969, pp. 12-19. 
- Barman, T. "Britain- The Middle East scape goat?" The World Today, vol. 
23, Jan-Dec. 1967, pp. 275-278. 
- Beasley, R. "The vacuum that must be filled - the Gulf and Iran's military 
potential assessed." New Middle East, no. 32, May 1971, pp. 38-40. 
- Beck, Nelson. "Britain's withdrawal from the Persian Gulf and the formation 
of the United Arab Emirates, 1968-1971." Towson State Journal of Interna-
tional Affairs, vol. xii, no. 2, spring 1978, pp. 78-98. 
- Beglov, Spartak, "What is behind the 'special relationship' ." International 
Affairs, (Moscow) March 1968, pp. 34-39. 
- Bisharah, A. "Dawr al-Umam al-Muta~idah ti Istiqlal al-Bahrain." (The UN 
role in the independence of Bahrain). Journal of the Gulf and Arabian Penin-
412 
sula Studies, vol. 2, no. 7, July 1976, pp. 235-241. 
- Bowyer, B. "South Arabia: Violence and Revolt." Conflict Studies, November 
1973, pp. 6-17. 
- Brewer, W. "Yesterday and Tomorrow in the Persian Gulf." Middle East 
Journal, vol., x.xiii, Spring 1969, pp. 149-158. 
- Brown, W. "The Yemen Dillemma." The Middle East Journal, vol. 17, no. 
4, Autumn 1963, pp. 349-367. 
- Buchan, A. "Britain East of Suez: Part one, The Problem of Power." RUSIJ, 
no. 647, August, 1967, pp. 209-215. 
- Burgess, G.T. "Dubai-accent on Liberal Trade." Trade f3 Industry, vol. 6, no. 
3, 20.1.1972. 
- Burrell, R.M. "Politics and Participation where Britannia once rulled." New 
Middle East, Dec., 1972, pp. 32-36. 
- Burrell, R.M. "Problems and prospects in the Gulf: An uncertain future." 
The Round Table, no. 246, April 1972, pp.209-219. 
- Burton, G. S." Abu Dhabi - A Growing Market." Board of Trade Journal, 10 
November 1967, pp. 1151-1154. 
- Candole, De. "Development in Kuwait." Journal of the Royal Central Asian 
Society, vol. xlvi, 1959, pp. 27-38. 
- Clark, William, "Britain East of Suez: Part II, The Problem of influence." 
RUSIJ, no. 647, August, 1967, pp. 216-220. 
413 
- Cottrell, A. "British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf." Military Review, vol. 
50, no. 6, 1970, pp. 14-21. 
- Dow, Peter. "Abu Dhabi: Large and Growing Oil Income." Export Service 
Bulletin Weekly Supplement Trade and Industry, 20 January 1972, pp. 89-91. 
- "Dubai: the Hong Kong of the Middle East." Arabian Gulf Trade, vol. 1, no. 
1, March 1967, pp. 88-90. 
- El Mallakh, Ragaei, "The Challenge of Affluence: Abu Dhabi." The Middle 
East Journal, vol. 24, no. 2, Spring 1970, pp. 135-146. 
- El-Rayyes, R. "Arab Nationalism and the Gulf." Journal of Arab Affairs, vol. 
6, no. 2, Fall 1987, pp. 109-145. 
- Europa publications, The Middle East and North Africa, 1965-1992. 
- Fankel, J. "East of Suez: The Aftermath." Year Book of World Affairs, 1969, 
pp. 20-37. 
- Field, M. "The Gulf." World Survey, no. 37, Jan. 1972, pp. 1-20. 
- Field, M. "Struggle for stability." Middle East International, september 1971, 
pp. 42-43. 
- Freedman, L. "British Foreign Policy to 1985: Britain and Arms Trade." 
International Affairs, vol. 54, no. 1, (July 1978) pp. 377-392. 
- Gause, G. "British and American policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968- 1973." 
Review of International Studies, (1985) pp. 247-273. 
- Good-Adams, R. "Giving up East of Suez." National Provincial Bank Review, 
414 
Feb. 1968, pp. 1-6. 
- Gordon, R.D. "Abu Dhabi holds good opportunities for British exporters." 
Board of Trade Journal, 28 Dec. 1962, p. 4. 
- Halliday, Fred, "The Americanization of the Persian Gulf." Ramparts Maga-
zine, vol. 11, October 19772, pp. 18-20. 
- Hanzal, F. "Historical Survey of European interests and control in the Arab 
Gulf region." Journal of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies, no. 25. 
January 1981, pp. 85-100. 
- Hay, R. "Great Britains' Relations with Yemen and Oman." Middle Eastern 
Affairs, vol. xi, no. 5, May 1960, pp. 142-149. 
Healey, Denis, "British Defence Policy." RUSIJ, vol. XIV, no. 656, December 
1969, pp. 15-21. 
- Heard-Bey, Franke, "Social Changes in the Gulf States and Oman." Asian 
Affairs, vol. 59, (3) October 1972, pp. 309-316. 
- Holden, D. "The Persian Gulf after the British Raj." Foreign Affairs, vol. 49 
no. 4, 1971, pp. 721-735. 
- Hollingworth, C. "The Ba'thist' Revolution in Iraq." The World Today, vol. 
19, no. 5, May 1963, pp. 225-230. 
- Hoskins, H.L. "Background of the British Position in Arabia." Middle East 
Journal, vol. 1, no. 2, April 1947, pp. 137-147. 
- Howard, Michael, "Britain's Strategic Problem: East of Suez." International 
Affairs, vol. 42, no. 2, April 1966, pp. 179-183. 
415 
- Hurd, Douglas. "Would the Tories withdraw? Determined to keep the options 
open." The Round Table, no. 232, October 1968, pp. 369-377. 
- Hurewitz, J.C. "The Persian Gulf: British withdrawal and Western security." 
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, no. 401 
(May 1972) pp. 106-115. 
- Ismael, J. "British Gulf Policy and Kuwait in the 19th Century." Journal of 
the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies, vol. iv, no. 10, Oct. 1978, pp. 11-32. 
- Kassis, Vadim, "The Waiting Game." Middle East International, september 
1971, p. 41. 
- Kedurie, E. "From Amurath to Amurath: A Survey of the Middle East Scene." 
The World Today, vol. 19, no. 7, July 1963, pp. 285-294. 
- Kelidar, A. "The Struggle for Arab Unity." The World Today, vol. 23, Jan-
Dec 1967, pp. 292-350. 
- Kelly, J.B. "British position in the Persian Gulf." World Today, vol. 20, 1964, 
pp. 238-248. 
- Kelly, J.B. "Hadramut, Oman, Dhofar: the experience of Revolution." Middle 
Eastern Studies, vol. 12, no. 2, May 1976, pp. 213-230. 
- Kelly, J.B. "Great Game or Grand Illusion?." Survey, vol. 25, no. 2(111) 
Spring 1980, pp. 109-127. 
- Kerr, M. "Coming to terms with Nasser: Attempts and Failure." International 
Affairs, vol. 43, no. 1, January 1967, pp. 65-84. 
- Luce, W. "Britain in the Persian Gulf: Mistaken timing over Aden." The 
416 
Round Table, no. 227, (July 1967) pp. 277-283. 
- Luce, W. "A Naval for the Gulf: Balancing Inevitable Russian Penetration." 
The Round Table, no. 236, Oct. 1969, pp. 347-356. 
- Luce, W. "Britain's withdrawal from the Middle East and Persian Gulf." 
RUSIJ, vol. cxiv, no. 653, March 1969, pp. 4-10. 
- Manhal, A.A. "l:larakt al-Ta}.u1r al-Wa~ani fi '1 Bahrain," "The National Lib-
eration Movement in Bahrain," Al-Khalij Al-Arabi Journal, Basrah: The Cen-
tre for Arab Gulf Studies, University of Basrah, 1975) pp. 71-86. 
- McCarthy, D. "United Arab Emirates: A special relationship." Trade and 
Industry, special report, 1975, pp. 58-60. 
- MEMO, "The Arms Sales Utopia." 10 May 1975, pp. 9-11. 
- Middle Eastern Affairs, vol. xiv, no. 1, Jan 1963, pp. 62-64. 
- Middle Eastern Affairs, vol. xiv, no. 4, April 1963, p. 126. 
Middle Eastern Affairs, vol. XIV, no. 2, February 1963, "Documents: Ex-
change of Letters between President J .F. Kennedy and Amir Fay~al Premier 
and Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia." pp. 47-48. 
- Monroe, E. "British bases in the Middle East: Assets and Liabilities." Inter-
national Affairs, vol. 42, 1966, pp. 24-34. 
- Monroe, E. "Kuwayt and Aden a contrast in British policies." Middle East 
Journal, Winter 1964, pp. 63-74. 
- Muttam, J. "U.S. Attempts to Resurrect the Surrogate Model in the Persian 
417 
Gulf." Asian Profile, vol. 10, no. 1, Feb. 1982, pp. 1-13. 
- Nouri, Moufid. "The Growth of the revolutionary movements in the Arab 
Gulf: Oman." Al-Khalij al-Arabi, vol. ii, 1975, pp. 385-418. 
- Palmer, R.E. "Commercial Prospects in Dubai and the Northern Trucial 
States." Board of Trade Journal, December 1967, pp. 1367-1373. 
- Parry-Davies, Malcom. "British Defense Policies." Military Review, Novem-
ber 1971, pp. 10-16. 
- Penzin, H. "Oil and Independence." International Affairs, (Moscow) October 
1972, pp. 34-40. 
Peterson, J .E. "The Revival of the lbadi Imamate in Oman and the Threat 
to Muscat, 1913-20." Arabian Studies, III, (1976) pp. 179-183. 
- Peterson, J.E. "Britain and 'the Oman War': An Arabian Entanglement." 
Asian Affair J. of the Royal Society for Asian Affairs, vol. 63, part 3, October 
1976, pp. 289-293. 
- Price, D.L. "Oman: Insurgency and Development." Conflict Studies, no. 53, 
(London: ISC, 1975) pp. 3-19. 
- Remba, 0. "The Middle East in 1962 - An Economic Survey II." Middle 
Eastern Affairs, vol. xiv, no. 5, May 1963, pp. 130-148. 
- Roucek, Joseph. "The changing geopolitical pattern along the Gulf." Politico, 
vol. 29, no. 2, 1964, pp. 440-456. 
- Seale, P. "The United Arab Republic and the Iraqi Challenge." The World 
Today, vol. 16, no. 7, July 1968, pp. 296-305. 
418 
- Serjeant, R.B. "The Two Yemens: Historical Perspectives and Present Atti-
tudes." Asian Affairs J, vol. 60, October 1973, pp. 3-17. 
- "Sheikh Zaid White Revolution, the Five-year Development Plan for Abu 
Dhabi." Arabian Gulf Trade, vol. 1, no. 2, September 1968, pp. 111-113. 
- Sirriyeh, H. "Conflict over the Gulf Islands of Abu Musa and the Tumbs, 
1968-71." Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, vol. vm, no. 
2, winter 1984, pp. 73-86. 
- Standish, J.F. "British maritime policy in the Persian Gulf." Middle Eastern 
Studies, vol. 3, no. 4, July 1967, pp. 324-354. 
- Stern, F. M. "Militians East of Suez: Filling the power vacuum." Orbis, vol. 
12, no. 3, Fall1968, pp. 887-902. 
- The Economic Intelligence Unit, "the Arabian Peninsula and Jordan." Quar-
terly Economic Reviews, 1 Nov. 1968. 
- Thomson, George, "The official opposition view of British defence policy." 
RUSIJ, vol. cxvi, no. 662, June 1971, pp. 16-21. 
- Toynbee, A. "Britain and the Arabs: The need for a new start." International 
Affairs, vol. 40 ( 4) Oct. 1964, pp. 638-646. 
- Tremayne, p. "End of a Ten Years War." Royal United Services Institive 
Journal for Defence Studies, vol. cxxii, March 1977, pp. 44-48. 
- Unwin Tim, "Agriculture and Water Resources in the UAE." Arab Gulf Jour-
nal, vol. 3, no. 1, April 1983, pp. 75-85. 
- Vernier, A. "British Military Policy in Arabia: Some Lessons for the Future." 
419 
RUSIJ, vol cxii, no. 648, November 1867, pp. 351. 
- Vital, David, "The Making of British Foreign Policy." Political Quarterly, vol. 
39, no. 3, 1968, pp. 255-268. 
- Watt, D.C. "The Arab Summit Conference and after." World Today, vol. 23, 
Jan-Dec, 1967, pp. 443-45. 
- Watt, D.C. "Britain and the Future of the Persian Gulf." The World Today, 
Nov. 1964, pp. 488-496 
- Watt, D.C. "Can the Union of Arab Emirates survive?." The World Today, 
vol. 27, no. 4, April 1971, pp. 144-147. 
- Willoughby, John. "Problems of counter-insurgency in the Middle East." 
RUSI, no. 650, May 1968, pp. 104-112. 
- Wilson, K. "Should Britain remain in the Gulf." Petroleum Times, 9 May 
1969, p. 636. 
- Wright, D. "The Changed Balance of Power in the Persian Gulf." Asian Af-
fairs: Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, vol. 60, 1973, pp. 255-262. 
- Younger, K. "Reflections on the Defence Review." Political Quarterly, vol. 
37, no. 3, July-September 1966, pp. 256-263. 
Journals: 
- Ak}J,er Sa'ah, Arabic weekly, Cairo. 
- Al-Ahram, Arabic daily, Cairo. 
- Al-Akbar, Arabic daily, Cairo. 
420 
- Al-Anwar, Arabic daily, Beirut. 
- Al-Bayan , Arabic daily, Dubai. 
- Al-lfawadith, Arabic weekly, Beirut. 
- Al-lfayat, Arabic daily, Beirut. 
- Al-Ittil),ad, Arabic daily, Abu Dhabi. 
- Al-Jumhuriyyah, Arabic daily, Cairo. 
- Al-Liwa, Arabic daily, Beirut. 
- Al-Ra'y al-<Am, Arabic daily, Kuwait. 
- Al-Rasid., Arabic weekly, Beirut. 
- At-Shams, Arabic weekly, Beirut. 
- Al-Usbu< Al-Arabi, Arabic weekly, Beirut. 
- Arab Report and Record (ARR) fortnightly, London. 
- Economist, Weekly, London. 
- Keesing's Contemporary Archives, weekly, London. 
- Middle East Economic Digest (MEED) weekly, London. 
- Middle East Economic Survey (MEES) weekly, Beirut, Cyprus. 
- The Daily Telegraph, daily, London. 
- The Financial Times, daily, London. 
421 
- The Guardian, daily, London. 
- The Sunday Times, weekly, London. 
- The Times, daily, London. 
Books: 
- Abadi, Jacob. Britain's withdrawal from the Middle East, 1947-1971: The 
economic and strategic imperatives. New Jersey: the Kingston Press Inc., 
1982. 
- Abd El-Nasser, J. The Philosophy of Revolution. Cairo: Dar Al-Ma'arif, 
1966. 
- Abdullah, M.M. Dawlat al-lmiiriit al-'Arabiyyah al-Mutaf},idah wa-J[riinuha. 
(United Arab Emirates and its neighbours). Kuwait: Dar al-Qalam, 1981. 
- Abdullah, M.M. United Arab Emirates: A Modem History. London: Croom 
Helm, 1978. 
- Admiralty of Great Britain, Naval Intelligence Division. Western Arabia and 
the Red Sea: Geographical Handbook Series. Oxford: University Pres, 1946. 
- Agwani, M.S. Politics in the Gulf. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Ltd, 
1978. 
Aitchison, C. U. A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads. vol. XL 
Oxford: Archive Editions, 1987. 
- Al-'Abid, S. Dawr al-Qawiisimfi 'l Khalij al-Arabi. (The Qawasim role in the 
Arabin Gulf). Baghdad: Al-ani Press, 1976. 
422 
- Al-'Aqad, S. Ma'alim al-takhyir jt duwal al-Khalij al-'Arabi. (Factors of 
change in the Gulf States). Cairo: Institute of Arab Research and Studies, 
Arab League, 1972. 
- Al-Alkim, H. The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates, London: Saqi 
Books, 1989. 
- Al-'Aydarus, M. al-Tatawurat al-Siyiisiyah Ji Dawlat al-Imariit al-'Arabiyyah 
al-Muta}J,idah. (Political Developments in the United Arab Emirates). Kuwait: 
Dar That al-Salasil, 1983. 
- Al-Baharna, H. The Arabian Gulf States: Their Legal and Political States and 
this International Problems. Second Revised Edition 1975. Beirut: Librairie 
Du Liban, 1978. 
- Al-Daud, M.A. The Arab Gulf and Joint Arab Action. Basrah: Centre for 
Arab Gulf Studies Publications, Basrah University, 1980. 
- Al-Luzi, S. Ri~a§atiin fi-l Kalij. Beirut: al-l;lawadeth publications, 1971. 
- Al-Otaiba, M.S. Petroleum and the Economy of the United Arab Emirates. 
London: Croom Helm, 1977. 
- Al-Otaiba, M.S. The Petroleum Concession Agreements of the United Arab 
Emirates, vol. I: 1939-1971. London: Croom Helm, 1982. 
- Al-Rumahi, M. al-Bahrain: M eshkiliit al- Takyeer al-Siyiisi wa-l Ijtima' [. (Bahrain: 
problems of social and political changes). Beirut: Dar Ibn Khaldun, 1976. 
- Al-Tajir, M. Bahrain 1920-45: Britain the Sheikh and the Administration. 
London: Croom Helm, 1987. 
423 
D Alexander, Y. and Nanes, A. ed. The United States and Iran; A Documen-
tary History. Maryland: Aletheia Books, University Publications of America, 
1980. 
- Anderson, J.R.L. East of Suez: A Study of Britain's greatest trading enter-
prise. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1969. 
- Anthony, J.D. Arab States of the Lower Gulf: People, Politics, Petroleum. 
Washington D.C., The Middle East Institute, 1975. 
- ARIP. Petroleum Industry in the United Arab Emirates. 1983 Year Book. 
Abu Dhabi: Arab Information and Public Relations Establishment. 
- Balfour-Paul, Glen. The end of empire in the Middle East: Britain's relin-
quishment of power in her last three Arab dependencies. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1991. 
- Barttell, C. J. The Long Retreat: A Short History of British Defence Policy, 
1945-70. London: Macmillan, 1972. 
- Baylis, John, ed. British Defence Policy in a Changing World. London: 
Croom Helm, 1977. 
- Behbehani, H. China Foreign Policy in the Arab World 1955-1915: Three 
Case Studies. London: Kegan Paul, 1981. 
- Belgrave, C. The Pirate Coast. Beirut: Librairie Du Liban, 1972. 
- Boustead, H. The Wind of Morning. London: Chatto and Winds, 1971. 
- Brenchley, F. Britain and the Middle East: An Economic History 1945-87. 
London: Lester Crook Academic publishing, 1989. 
424 
- Bullard, R. Britain and the Middle East: From the Earliest Times to 1950. 
London: Hutchinson House, 1951. 
- Bullard, R. ed. The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey. London: 
Oxford U ., Press, 1958. 
~ Burrell, R.M. "Britain, Iran and the Persian Gulf: Some Aspects of the situa-
tion in the 1920s and 1930s," in Hopwood, Derek, ed. The Arabian Peninsula: 
Society and Politics. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1972. 
- Burrows, Bernard. Footnotes in the Sand: The Gulf in Transition, 1953-1958. 
Salisbury: Michael Russell, 1990. 
- Butler, J. Uncivil Servant in India, Pakistan, Kenya and Abu Dhabi. Edin-
burgh: The Pentland Press Ltd., 1989. 
- Campbell, J .C. Defence of the Middle East, problems of American Policy. 
New York: Harper and Brown, 1958. 
- Chisholm, A.H.T. The Firt Kuwait Oil Concession Agreement: A Record of 
the Negotiations, 1011-1934. London: Frank Cass, 1975. 
- Chubin, S. and Zabih, S. The Foreign Relations of Iran: A Developing State 
in a Zone of Great-Power Conflict. Berkeley, University of California Press, 
1974. 
- Clayton, G.D. Britain and the Eastern Question : Missolonghi to Gallipoli. 
London: Lion Library, 1971. 
Crossman, R. The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister. vol. n. London: Hamish 
Hamilton & Jonathan Coyle, 1976. 
425 
- Cordesman, A. The Gulf and the Strategic Stability: Saudi Arabia, the Mil-
itary Balance in the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military Balance. 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1984. 
- Cottrell, A.J. ed. The Persian Gulf States: A General Survey. Baltimore and 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980. 
- Daniels, J. Abu Dhabi: A Portrait. London: Longman, 1974. 
- Darby, P. British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947-168. London: Oxford 
University Press, 1973. 
- Dickson, H.R.P. Kuwait and her Neighbours. London: George Allen and 
Unwin Ltd, 1956. 
- El Mallakh, R. The Economic Development of the United Arab Emirates. 
London: Croom Helm, 1981. 
- El-Hakim, A. The Middle Eastern States and the Law of the Sea. New York: 
Syracuse University Press, 1979. 
- El-Ijamad, A. and El-Mahgari, M. The Arab Petroleum Directory, 1974-75. 
Beirut; Petroleum Directory Assoc., 1974. 
- El-Rayyes, R. Arabian Gulf Documents {1968-1971): Attempts of Federation 
and Independence. London: Riad El-Rayyes Book Ltd., 1987. 
- El-'fabtaba.I, A. al-Nizam al-Itil],ady fi-l-Imiiriit al- 'Arabiyyah: Dirasah Muqari-
nah. (The Federal System in the Emirates: A Comparative Study). Cairo: 
Matba 't al-Qahrah, 1978. 
- Fenelon, K.G. The United Arab Emirates: An Economic and Social Survey. 
426 
2nd edition. London: Longman, 1976. 
- Fitzsimons, M.A. Empire by Treaty: Britain and the Middle East in the Twen-
tieth Century. London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1965. 
- Gavin, R.J. Aden Under British Rule, 1839-1961. London: C. Hurst and 
Company, 1975. 
- Graves, P. The Life of Sir Percy Cox. London: Hutchinson and Co., 1941. 
- Hafiz, H. and al-Sharqawi, M. Qadiyyat -, Uman. (The Case of Oman). Cairo: 
al-Dar al-Qawmiyah, n.d. 
- Halliday, F. Arabia Without Sultan. England: Penguin, 1974. 
- Halliday, F. Revolution and Foreign Policy: The Case of South Yemen, 1961-
81. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
- Hanzal, F. al-Mufssal j[ Tarik al-lmiiriit al-'Arabiyyah al-Muta};,idah. Abu 
Dhabi: Dar al-Fikr, 1983. 
- Harper, S. Last Sunset: What Happened in Aden. London: Collins, 1978. 
- Hawley, D. The Trucial States. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1970. 
- Heard-Bey, F. From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates: A Society in 
Transition. London: Longman, 1982. 
- Heath, E. Edward Heath Travels: People and Places in my Life. London: 
Sidgewick and Jackson, 1977. 
- Holden, D. Farewell to Arabia. London: Faber and Faber, 1966. 
427 
- Home, Lord. The Way the Wind Blows: An Autobiography. London: Collins, 
1976. 
- Hopwood, D. The Arabian Peninsula: Society and Politics. London: George 
Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1972. 
- Hourani, A. Great Britain and the Arab World. London: John Murray, 1945. 
- Hurewitz, J.C. Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary 
Record, 1555-1914. London: D.Van Nostrand Co., Inc, 1956. 
- Ismael, T. and others. The Middle East in World Politics: A Study in Con-
temporary International Relations. New York: Syracuse University Press, 
1974. 
- Issawi, C. and Yeganeh, M. The Economics of Middle Eastern Oil. London: 
Faner and Faber, 1962. 
Jackson, William. Withdrawal from Empire: A military vzew. London: 
William Kimber, 1980. 
- Jeapes, T. SAS: Operation Oman. London: William Kimber, 1980. 
- John, D. Kuwait Journey. Great Britain: White Crescent Press Ltd, 1971. 
- Jones, G. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. London: 
Macmillans, 1981. 
- Jones, G. Banking and Oil: The History of the British Bank of the Middle 
East. vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 
- Khalifa, A.M. The United Arab Emirates: Unity in Fragmentation. London: 
428 
Croom Helm, 1979. 
- Kazziha W. Revolutionary Transformation in the Arab World, Habash and 
his comrades from Nationalism to Marxism. London: Charles Knight and 
Co. Ltd, 1975. 
- Kedourie, E. England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman 
Empire, 1914-1921. Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1978. 
- Kelly, J.B. Britain and the Persian Gulf 1795-1880. Oxford: The Clarndon 
Press, 1968. 
- Kelly, J.B. Arabia, the Gulf, and the West. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1980. 
- Kelly, J.P. Eastern Arabia Frontiers. London: Faber and Faber, 1964. 
- Kent, M. Oil and Empire: British Policy and Mesopotamian Oil, 1900-20. 
London: Macmillan, 1976. 
- Kerr, M. The Arab Cold War 1958-1964. London: 1965. 
- King, J. Imperial Out-Post, Aden: Its Place in British Strategic Policy. Lon-
don: Oxford press, 1964. 
- Klieman, A. Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World: The Cairo 
Conference of 1921. London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. 
- Kostiner, J. The Struggle for the South Yemen. London: Croom Helm, 1984. 
- Lapping, B. End of Empire. London: Granada, 1985. 
- Law, J.D. Arab Investors: Who they are, what they buy, and where'? New 
429 
York: Chase World Information Corporation, 1980. 
- Leatherdale, C. Britain and Saudi Arabia, 1925-1939: The Imperial Oasis. 
London: Frank Cass, 1983. 
- Ledger, D. Shifting Sands: The British in South Arabia. London: Peninsular 
publishing, 1983. 
- Lenczowski, G. Oil and State in the Middle East. New York: Cornell Univer-
sity Press 1960. 
- Lewis, B. and others. Encyclopaedia of Islam. New Edition, vol. 3. London: 
Luzaca Co., 1968. 
- Lloyds, S. Suez 1956, a personal account. London: Book Club Association, 
1978. 
- Longrigg, S.H. Oil in the Middle East: Its Discovery and Development . 3rd 
ed. London: Oxford University Press, 1968. 
- Lorimer, J. Gazetter of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia. vol. 1, 
Pt.1A. Shannon: Irish University Press, 1970. 
- Louis, R. The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab National-
ism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1984. 
- Louis,R., and Bull, H. The 'Special Relationship' Anglo-American Relation 
Since 1945. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. 
- Luce, M. From Aden to the Gulf: Personal Diaries 1956-66. Salisbury: 
Michael Russell, 1987. 
430 
- Maclean, Donald. British Foreign Policy since Suez, 1956-1968. London: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1970. 
- Macmillan, H. Pointing the Way, 1959-61. London, Macmillan, 1972. 
- Magdoff, H. Imperialism: From the Colonial Age to the Present. New York 
and London: Monthly Review Press, 1978. 
- Mann, C. Abu Dhabi: Birth of an Oil Sheikhdom. Beirut: Khayats, 1964. 
- Mayhew, C. Britain's Role Tomorrow. London: Hutchinson, 1967. 
- Mejcher, H. Imperial Quest for oil Iraq 1910-1928. London: Ithaca Press, 
1976. 
- Monroe, E. Philby of Arabia. London: Faber and Faber, 1973. 
- Monroe, E. Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914-1971. London: Chatto 
and Winas, 1981. 
- Morris, J. The Hashemite Kings. London: Faber and Faber, 1959. 
- Morris, C. The Desert Falcon. London: The Outline Series of Books, 1976. 
- Neil, M.N. Minister of Oman: A personal narrative. Cambridge, The Olean-
der Press, 1987. 
- N etten, R. ed. Arabia and the Gulf: From Traditional Society to Modern 
States. London: Croom Helen, 1986. 
- Niblock, T. ed. Social and Economic Development in the Arab Gulf London: 
Croom Helm, 1980. 
431 
- Noyes, J. The Clouded Lens: Persian Gulf Security and U.S. Policy. 2nd edit. 
Stanford, C.A : Hoover Institution Press, 1982. 
- Nyrop, R. ed. Persian Gulf States: Country Studies. Washington D.C: US 
Govt printing Office, 1984. 
- Odell, P. Oil and World Power: Background to the Oil Crisis. England: 
Penguin Books, 1975. 
- Pahlavi, M.R. The Shah's Story. London: Michael Joseph, 1980. 
- Parsons, A. They Say the Lion, Britain's Legacy to the Arabs: A Personal 
Memoir. London: Jonathon Cape, 1986. 
- Peterson, J .E. Oman in the Twentieth Century: Political Foundations of an 
Emerging State. London: Groom Helm, 1978. 
- Peterson, J.E. Defending Arabia. London: Croom Helm, 1986. 
- Pivkar, O.V. Armies of the Middle East. London: book Club Association, 
1979. 
- Pocock, T. East and West of Suez: The Retreat from Empire. London: The 
Bodley Head, 1986. 
- Porter, B. The Lion's Share: A History of British Imperialism. London: 
Longman, 1975. 
- Ramazani, R. The Persian Gulf: Iran's Role. Charlottesville, Va., University 
of Virginia, 1972. 
- Rich, Paul. The Invasion of the Gulf: Radicalism, Ritualism and the Shaikhs. 
432 
Cambridge: Allborough Press, 1991. 
- RIIA. British Interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East. London: Ox-
ford University Press, 1958. 
- Road, S. and Harrison, A. "Gulf Investment in the West: Its Scope and 
Implications." in B.R. Pridham, The Arab Gulf and the West. London: Croom 
Helm and Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, University of Exeter, 1985. 
- Sampson, A. The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World 
They Made. New York: The Viking Press, 1975. 
- Seton-Williams, M.V. Britain and the Arab States: A Survey of Anglo-Arab 
Relations, 1920-1948. London: Luzac and Co., Ltd, 1948. 
- Sharif, I. Al-Sharq al-Awsat. {The Middle East). Baghdad: Dar al-Jamhiiriyyah, 
1965. 
- Sherabi, H. Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World. Princeton: D 
Van Nostrand Co., INL, 1966. 
- Shibaikah, M. Al-Arab wa-l-Siyiisah al-Baritiiniyah fi-llfarb al-'Alamiyah al-
iila. {The Arab and the British Policy in the First Wold War). Cairo: Dar 
Nafi', 1974. 
- Shwadran, B. The Middle East Oil and the Great Powers. New York: Jon 
Wiley and Sons, 1973. 
- Sirriyeh, H. U.S. policy in the Gulf 1968-1977: Aftermath of British with-
drawal. London: Ithaca press, 1984. 
- Skeat, I. Muscat and Oman: the end of an era. London: Faber and Faber, 
433 
1974. 
- Stocking, G. Middle East Oil: A Study in Political and Economic Controversy. 
London: Allen Lane the Penguin Press, 1970. 
- Strang, L.W. Home and Abroad. London: Andre Dartch, 1956. 
- Suchar, H. Europe leaves the Middle East 1956-54. London. Allen Cane, 
1972. 
- Shuckburgh, E. Descent to Suez, Diaries 1951-56. London: Weidenfield and 
Nicolson, 1986. 
- Sultan N. al-Tarikh al-'Askari- fi-l Yaman,1839-1967. (Military History of 
Yemen, 1839-1967). Kuwait: Kha~imah press, 1976. 
- Taryam, Omran. A. The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, 1950-85. 
London: Croom Helm, 1987. 
- Taufic, F. ed. Pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalism the Continuing Debate. 
Boulder and London: Westview, 1987. 
- Taya, Z. India. London: Thames and Hudson, 1965. 
- Townsend, J. Oman: The Making of a Modern State. London: Croom Helm, 
1977. 
- Trevaskis, K. Shades of Amber: A South Arabian Episode. London: Hutchi-
son, 1968. 
- Trevelyan, H. The Middle East in Revolution. London: Macmillan, 1970. 
- Tugendhaf, C. Oil the biggest business. London: Eye and Spottiswoode, 
434 
1968. 
- Verrier, A. Through the Looking Glass: British Foreign policy in an age of 
illusions. London: Jonathan Cape, 1983. 
- Who was Who. vol. vii, 1971-80. London: Adma and Charles Black, 1981. 
- Wilfred, T. Arabian Sands. London: Longman, 1959. 
- Wilkinson, J. The Imamate tradition of Oman. Cambridge: Cambridge U. 
Press, 1987. 
- Williams, A. Britain and France in the Middle East and North Africa, 1914-
1967. London: Macmillan, 1968. 
- Wilson, H. The Labour Government, 1964-1970: A Personal Record. London: 
Weidenfeld, Nicolson and M. Joseph, 1971. 
- Wilson, R. The Persian Gulf: An Historical sketch from the Earlies Times 
to the Beginning of the Twentieth Century. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 
1978. 
- Yorke, V. and Turner, L. European Interests and Gulf Oil. London: Gower, 
1986. 
- Zahlan, R.S. The Creation of Qatar. London: Croom Helm, 1979. 
- Zahlan, R.S. The Origins of the United Arab Emirates: A Political and Social 
History of the Trucial States. London: Macmillan, 1978. 
Interviews: 
- Al-Suwaydi, A},lmad Khallfah, former UAE Foreign Minister. Abu Dhabi, 
435 
15.7.1989. 
- AI-Tajir, Mol_lammad Mahdi, former advif;>er to Sheikh Rashid b. Sa 'ld, ruler 
of Dubai. London, 2.12.1988. 
'Ali, 'Ali, M., UAE Foreign Ministry, European Affairs Department. Abu 
Dhabi, 6.9.1988. 
- Armitage, St. John, CBE, ex-British Army officer with 20 years service in 
Arabian Peninsula. London, 20.2.1987. 
- Aryan, Hossen, Iranian Naval Officer. Durham, 18.12.1990. 
- Ash, Captain Tim, Ex-TOS Officer, (DIO). Dorset, 5.2.1987. 
Balfour-Paul, G., Political Agent m Dubai, Deputy Political Resident m 
Bahrain 1964-68. Exeter, 4.2.1987 
- Bannerman, P., the late Director of African and Middle East Region Research 
Department FCO. London, 21.1.1987. 
- Briggs, Major Jack, former Commander of Dubai Police Force. Dubai, 15.9.1986. 
- Buckmaster, Lord, former Political Officer in Abu Dhabi. London, 21.1.1987. 
- Butts, De. Brigadier, Commander of TOS 1964-1967 and Cheif of Staff of the 
UAE Defence Force 1971-1973. London, 19.2.1987. 
- Carden, the British Council-General in Oman 1965-1969. London, 23.6.1987. 
- Craig, Sir James, Political Agent in the Trucial States 1961-64. London, 
21.1.1987. 
436 
- Ferrier, R.W., BP employee concerned with the history of oil. London, 
26.6.1987. 
- Gibbs, Field Marshal Sir Ronald, The last C-N-C of the British Forces in the 
Gulf. London, 26.6.1987. 
- Heard, David, ADPC Representative. Abu Dhabi, 23.7.1989. 
- Heard-Bey, Frauke, Senior researcher at Abu Dhabi Documentation and Re-
search Centre. Abu Dhabi, 15.7.1989. 
- Henderson, Edward, former Political Agent and Oil Companies' representative 
in the Gulf. Ipswich, 18.2.1987. 
- Jum 'ah, Mal_lmood l:lassan, former Director of the Board of Planing of Abu 
Dhabi. Abu Dhabi, 5.7.1989. 
- Kay, Shirley and Jolyan, British Council-General in Dubai. Dubai, September 
1988. 
- McCarthy, Donald, former British Ambassador to UAE. Orford, 18.2.1987. 
I:Iamudi, N.D., former Advisor of the Federation Affairs in Abu Dhubi's 
Diwiin. Abu Dhabi, 16.5.1989. 
- Parsons, Sir Anthony, Political Agent in Bahrain, 1965-1969. Exeter, 4.2.1987. 
- Pridham, B., ex-Foreign Office official who served in Oman and the Gulf in 
1960s. Exeter, 21.2.1987. 
- Roberts, Sir David, Political Agent in the Trucial States, 1966-68. Hereford, 
17.1.1987. 
437 
• Stockdale, Major Jim, former TOS Officer. Dorset, 5.2.1987. 
• Tait, Michael, H.M. Ambassador to the UAE 1986 and former Deputy Political 
Agent in the Trucial States. Abu Dhabi, 6.9.1986. 
• Walker, J., former Political Agent in the Trucial States. Durham, 19.7.1991. 
• Wilson, Colonel Tug, Commander of Abu Dhabi Defence Force, 1964-69. Abu 
Dhabi, 2.7.1989. 
- Zahlan, Rosemrie Said , Historian and writer on the Gulf affairs. London, 
22.1.1987. 
Correspondents: 
- Acland, Sir Antony, British Ambassador at Washington. Washington D.C., 
16.4.1991. 
- Anson, Sir Peter, the last British Navey Commander in the Gulf. Surrey, 
30.7.1991. 
• Arnold, Harry, Sir William Halcrow & Partners Ltd. Kent, 4.1.1989. 
- Ash, Cap.Tim, former TOS officer. Dorset, 12.12.1990. 
• Barron, Major L.N., former TOS officer. Wiltshire, 15.4.1991. 
• Beaumont, Sir Richard, Chairman of the Arab- British Chamber of Com-
merce, and former British Ambassador in the Middle East. London, 3.10.1989. 
• Brenchley, Frank, former member ofH.M. Diplomatic service. London, 13.2.1991. 
• Bullard, Sir Julian, former Political Agent in Dubai, 1968-1970. Oxford, 
438 
2.10.1991. 
- Coles, Sir John, member ofH.M. Diplomatic Service, FCO. London. 25.6.1991. 
- Crawford, SirS., former Political Resident in the Gulf 1966-1970. Henley-on-
Thames, 14.3.1989. 
- Egerton, Sir Stephen, H.M. Ambassador, Rome, and former Deputy Head of 
Arabian Department at the FCO in 1970-72. Rome, 19.3.1991. 
- Gibbs, Field Marshal Sir Ronald, Last British Commander of the British 
Forces in the Gulf. Chirton, 18.2.1988. 
- Horan A., former ADMA representative in Abu Dhabi. London, 16.2.1987. 
• Kendall, Brian, Acting Director of the TSDO 1965-1971. Oxford, 25.6.1991. 
- Langford, J. E., Costain Group Plc. London, 2.7.1990. 
- Legg, Lt., Colonel, M. Elliot, former Commander of Abu Dhabi Air Force 
Transport Wing 1967-1978. Norfolk, 7.2.1991. 
- Liddiard, R.P., BP Chief Representative in Abu Dhabi. Abu Dhabi, 8.5.1987. 
- Luce, Sir Richard, MP, son of the late Sir William Lucw. London, 12.2.1991. 
- McCarthy, Donald, former British Ambassador to the U AE. Holf, 18.2.1987 
- Paterson, D.W., former director of BBME. West Sussex, 5.6.1990. 
- Paxton, J.F.E., Shell employee and expert on oil development in the Gulf. 
London, 26.6.1990. 
- Rundle, C. J. S., FCO, Research and Analysis Department. London, 3.7.1991. 
439 
- Thomas, Neville, Head of Middle East and Africa Department, CBI. London, 
29.6.1990. 
- Treadwell, Jim, the last British Political Agent in Abu Dhabi, 1968-71. Sus-
sex, 24.12.1989. 
- Walker, J., former Political Agent in the Trucial States. Middlesx, 24.11.1990. 
- Wilson, Tug, former Commander of Abu Dhabi Defence Force (ADDF) 1964-
1969. Abu Dhabi, 25.12.1990. 
Private Papers: 
A. MalJ.mood I;Iasan Jum'ah 
- File no. 2, Letter from Mal,lmood I:Iasan Jum 'ah, the Director of Planning 
and Co-ordination, Government of Abu Dhabi to Gibrael Butrus, the Holy 
Family School, Fallujah, Cairo, 31 May 1973. 
- File no. 2, Letter from Mr. S. J. Nuttall, Political Agency, Abu Dhabi, to 
Mal,lmood I:Iasan Jum 'ah, 16 October 1967. 
- File no 10, Minutes of Meeting between Sheikh Zayed and Mr. E. Heath, 
al- 'Ayn 1969. 
B. Najim D. I;Iamiidl 
- Discussion with Sir G. Arthur in the F.C.O. London, 26.8.1970. 
- Discussion between Mr. I:Iamudl and Mr. Acland and Egerton. Abu Dhabi, 
9.10.1970. 
- Letter to the Chairman of the Amir{ Diwan, Display of the efforts to solve 
440 
problems on the Establishment of the Federation. (Top-secret) 25.5.1971. 
Minutes of Meeting between King Faysal and Abu Dhabi's Government's 
officials. Riyadh, 1970. 
- Meeting with US Government officials. Abu Dhabi, 14.1.1971. 
Reports; 
- Al-Ha.ssan, Y. "Arab-Iranian Dispute on the three Gulf Islands." Unpublished 
Report. 1980. 
- Al-Ittihiid. "Special supplements on the 25th anniversary of the first oil ship-
ment from the Inshore oil fields in Abu Dhabi." Dec. 1988. 
- Al-Qasimi, F.S. "The Iranian Occupation ofthe 'funbs and Abu Musa Islands: 
A threat to the International Order." Unpublished Report, n.d. 
- Arab Report €3 Record. "Abu Dhabi 1969." Special Issue, July 1969. 
- Centre for Strategic and International Studies. " The Gulf: Implication of 
British Withdrawal." Special report series no. 8. Washington, Georgetown 
University, 1969. 
- Cottrell, A.J. "Iran: Diplomacy in Regional and Global context." Washington 
D.C., May 1975. 
- Dodds-Parker, D. and others. "A Presence East of Suez." London: Conser-
vative Political Centre, no. 443, Nov, 1969. 
- Fabian group, "Arabia: When Britain Goes." London: Fabian research series 
259, April 1967. 
441 
- Griffiths, E. and others, "The Middle East and Britain." London: CPC, 
September 1967. 
- Healey, Denis, "A Labour Britain and the World." London: Fabian Society, 
January 1964. 
- Hudson, M. "East of Suez." Old Queen Street Paper, Conservative Research 
Department. London: 27 April, 1969. 
- Hurewitz, J.C. "The Persian Gulf; prospects for Stability." Headline Services, 
published by Foreign Policy Association, no. 220. Washington, DC. April 
1974. 
- Kohler, W. "German Approaches to the Arabian Gulf- Aprovional Survey." 
Proceeding of the Fourth Seminar of the Centres and Institutions concerned 
with Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies. Abu Dhabi: Centre for Documinta-
tion and Research, Nov., 1979. 
- Lawless, R. ed. "The Gulf in the Early Twentieth Century: Foreign Institu-
tions and Local Responses." Durham: Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic 
Studies, 1986. 
- MEED, "UK & the Gulf." Special Report, Dec. 1981. 
- Seccombe, I.J. and Lawless, R.I. "Duty Shaikhs, Subcontractors and recruit-
ing agents: The Impact of the International Oil Industry on Recruitment 
and Employment in the Persian/ Arabian Gulf, 1900-1950." Centre for Mid-
dle Eastern and Islamic Studies, University of Durham, England. 
- Sidney, B. "ruler of Abu Dhabi visits Britain." June 1969. 
442 
- The Centre for Strategic & International Studies. "The Gulf: Implications of 
British withdrawal." Washington DC. Georgetown U., Special Report; no. 8 
Feb. 1968. 
Theses: 
- Al-Hedaithy, M. "Modernization and Islam in Saudi Arabia: A Sociological 
Study of Public Morality Committees." (Durham University, Ph.D. thesis, 
1989). 
- Al-Jazairi, M.Z. "Saudi Arabia; A Diplomatic History 1924- 1964." (Univer-
sity of Utah, Ph.D. thesis, 1970). 
- Al-Musfir, M.S. "The United Arab Emirates: An Assessment of Federation 
in a developing polity." (State University of New York, Ph.D. thesis, 1984). 
- Al-Mutawa, M, "Social change and political Development in the Omani Coast, 
1934-1970". (Reding Univ. Ph.D. thesis, 1983). 
- Al-Sayyar, A "Al-'U~ul al-Tarikiyyah wa-'fatawiirat al-Mu 'asirah li-1-Wal,ldah 
bain Imarat al-Sal,lel al-Omani." (The Historical and Contemporary Factors 
of Unity among the Emirates of the Omani Coast). (University of Ain Shams. 
Ph.D. thesis, n.d.). 
- Awwad, T. "Al-I:Iudwud al-Dawliyah li-1 Manatiq al-Bal,lriyyah al-Magmurah: 
Dirasah 'fa~biqiyah fi-1 Khalij al Arabi." (The International Boundaries of 
the continental shelf: A Case Study of the Arabin Gulf). (University of 
Alexandirya, Ph.D. thesis, 1974). 
- Bazzaz, H. "The Arab Gulf in the 1970s: Stability or Turmoil." (Claremont: 
443 
Claremont Graduate School, Ph.D. thesis, 1980). 
- Carr, D. "U.S. Arms Tranfer to Iran, 1948-72, and the Politics of Reverse 
Influence." (The London School for Economics and Political Science, Ph.D. 
thesis, 1980). 
- Hawkins, T.J.D. "The Labour Party and the Decision to withdraw from east 
of Suez, 1951-68." (Southampton University, M.Phil. 1972). 
444 
